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THE STORY OF A CAVALRY REGIMENT

THE CAREER OF THE FOURTH IOWA
VETERAN VOLUNTEERS

FROM KANSAS TO GEORGIA
1861-1865

BY

WM. FORSE SCOTT
LATE ADJUTANT

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK
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G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

TO THE MEMORY OF

MY MOTHER

**WHO THOUGH BORN AND BRED
IN THE SOUTH IN A SLAVEHOLDING FAMILY
SUPPORTED THE UNION CAUSE
WITH LOYAL ZEAL AND TIRELESS LABORS
AND SENT THREE SONS INTO THE FIELD
IN ITS DEFENSE**

ERRATA.

Page xviii, line 32, for foot-soldiers read foot-soldier.

" xix, " 6, " foemen's *read* foeman's.

" 186, " 8, " Sheridan *read* Sherman.

" 321, " 29, " those *read* these.

" 410, *in the note, after* March *read* 1865.

" 459, *line 16, for and read* or.

" 509, " 6, " is *read* are.

On the Route Map, opposite page 548, the flags at Gettysburg, Chattanooga, Chickamauga, Franklin, Nashville, Shiloh, Pea Ridge, Cross Hollows, and Prairie Grove should be excepted from the statement made in the explanatory note respecting flags without date. They were left in the drawing by inadvertence.

MONROE, AND JOHNSTON
TION OF PROPERTY—JOHNSTON AND PEMBERTON SEPARATED
—BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL AND DEFEAT OF PEMBERTON
—BATTLE OF THE BIG BLACK—CROSSING THE BIG BLACK
—THE REGIMENT MOVES ON HAINES' BLUFF AND OCCUPIES
THE FORTRESS—PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VICKSBURG—
COMMUNICATION WITH THE GUNBOATS AND COMPLETION OF
INVESTMENT—TWO GRAND ASSAULTS UPON THE FORTIFICA-
TIONS UNSUCCESSFUL—THE REGIMENT SCOUTING AND

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE	xi
INTRODUCTION	xv
I.—AUGUST, 1861, TO FEBRUARY, 1862: ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT—IN RENDEZVOUS AT CAMP HARLAN	i
II.—MARCH TO JULY, 1862: IN THE FIELD—MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS—FROM IOWA TO ST. LOUIS, SPRINGFIELD, PEA RIDGE, AND BATESVILLE, WITH ADVANCE UPON LITTLE ROCK AND RETREAT TO THE MISSISSIPPI—THE FIRST FIGHTING OF THE REGIMENT—ACTIONS AT NITRE CAVE AND TALBOT'S FERRY—DEATH OF HEACOCK—ACTIONS AT LITTLE RED RIVER, MT. OLIVE, WHITE RIVER, AND GIST'S PLANTATION—BATTLE OF THE RIVER CACHE—ARRIVAL AT HELENA	30
III.—JULY, 1862, TO APRIL, 1863: SERVICE AT HELENA—SCOUTING AND FORAGING—MANY SKIRMISHES—IMPROVEMENT IN ARMS—WOODRUFF GUNS—ACTIONS AT JONES' LANE, MARIANNA, LAGRANGE, BIG CREEK, AND WITTSBURG—EXPEDITION AGAINST THE POST OF ARKANSAS—DEMONSTRATION UPON GRENADA, MISS., IN AID OF GRANT—ASSIGNED TO THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS—ORDERED TO JOIN GRANT FOR THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG	47
IV.—MAY TO JULY 1863: VICKSBURG—FORMER CAMPAIGNS—OPERATIONS BY CANALS—RUNNING THE BATTERIES—MARCHING THROUGH LOUISIANA—CROSSING THE MISSISSIPPI—THE REGIMENT ASSIGNED TO SHERMAN'S FIFTEENTH CORPS—BATTLES AT PORT GIBSON, FOURTEEN-MILE CREEK, RAYMOND, AND JACKSON—CAPTURE OF JACKSON AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY—JOHNSTON AND PEMBERTON SEPARATED—BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL AND DEFEAT OF PEMBERTON—BATTLE OF THE BIG BLACK—CROSSING THE BIG BLACK—THE REGIMENT MOVES ON HAINES' BLUFF AND OCCUPIES THE FORTRESS—PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VICKSBURG—COMMUNICATION WITH THE GUNBOATS AND COMPLETION OF INVESTMENT—TWO GRAND ASSAULTS UPON THE FORTIFICATIONS UNSUCCESSFUL—THE REGIMENT SCOUTING AND	

CHAPTER

PAGE

IV.—MAY TO JULY, 1863 :—*continued*

RECONNOITRING AGAINST THE ADVANCE OF JOHNSTON—
GREAT HARDSHIPS OF THE SERVICE—ENGAGEMENTS AT
MECHANICSBURG—REMARKABLE BATTLE AT BEAR CREEK
AND HEAVY LOSS OF THE REGIMENT—EXTENDED OPERA-
TIONS IN DEFENSE AGAINST JOHNSTON—SURRENDER OF
VICKSBURG 65

V.—JULY, 1863, TO JANUARY, 1864 : THE BEGINNING OF THE END
OF THE WAR—VICKSBURG AND GETTYSBURG—CHANGE IN
THE COMMAND OF THE REGIMENT—SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN
AGAINST JOHNSTON—SECOND CAPTURE OF JACKSON—TWO
CAVALRY MOVEMENTS UPON CANTON—TWO ENGAGEMENTS
NEAR CANTON—THE TOWN EVACUATED BY THE ENEMY—
THE REGIMENT DESTROYS BRIDGES ON THE PEARL AND BIG
BLACK—RETURN TO VICKSBURG AND CAMP ON FLOWERS'
PLANTATION—GREAT RAID FROM VICKSBURG TO MEMPHIS
—OCCUPATION OF GRENADA—MUCH FIGHTING FOR THE
ROAD—LARGE CAPTURES AND DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAY
PROPERTY—SUCCESSFUL END OF THE CAMPAIGN AND COM-
MENDATION OF GRANT—THE HANGING OF JOHN BUCK—
DEMONSTRATION UPON CANTON BY THE CAVALRY IN AID OF
SHERMAN—DARING MARCH THROUGH THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY
—A CHALLENGE TO COMBAT—ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION
UPON CANTON BY MCPHERSON—ENGAGEMENTS OF THE
CAVALRY AT BROWNSVILLE, BOGUE CHITO, AND LIVINGSTON
—HARD FIGHTING OF THE REAR-GUARD—RETURN TO VICKS-
BURG—FORAGING AND RECRUITING—EXPEDITION AGAINST
WIRT ADAMS AT NATCHEZ—VEXATIOUS FAILURE OF THE
EXPEDITION—VETERAN RE-ENLISTING III

VI.—FEBRUARY, 1864 : SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN OF MERIDIAN—
BRILLIANT OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY—THIRD CAPTURE
OF JACKSON—ENGAGEMENTS AT BIG BLACK BRIDGE, BAKER'S
CREEK, RAYMOND ROAD, CLINTON, JACKSON, MORTON, TUN-
NEL HILL, DECATUR, TALLAHATTA, AND MERIDIAN—CAPTURE
OF MERIDIAN—GREAT DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY—EFFORTS
TO COMMUNICATE WITH GEN. SOOY SMITH—HIS DEFEAT
BY FORREST—SHERMAN'S RETURN TO VICKSBURG—SHERMAN
FURLONGHS THE VETERANS—THE REGIMENT GIVEN A RECEP-
TION AT ST. LOUIS 184

VII.—MAY TO DECEMBER, 1864 : MEMPHIS—VETERANS RETURN
FROM FURLOUGH REMOUNTED—CAMPS MOVED FROM VICKS-
BURG TO MEMPHIS—RECRUITS FILL THE REGIMENT—FOR-
REST'S FORT PILLOW CAMPAIGN—SHERMAN'S EFFORTS TO
DESTROY FORREST—STURGIS' TWO CAMPAIGNS AGAINST
FORREST—DISASTROUS BATTLE OF BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS—
GREAT SERVICE OF THE IOWA CAVALRY AS REAR-GUARD—

CHAPTER	PAGE
VII.—MAY TO DECEMBER, 1864 :— <i>continued</i>	
STURGIS' DEFENSE—SMITH'S TWO CAMPAIGNS AGAINST FORREST—BATTLES ABOUT PONTOTOC AND TUPELO—LEE AND FORREST DEFEATED WITH GREAT LOSS—FORREST'S CAVALRY DEFEATED AT THE TALLAHATCHIE AND HURRICANE CREEK—FORREST TAKES MEMPHIS !—CO. C, FOURTH IOWA, IN ACTION AT MEMPHIS	223
VIII.—SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1864 : CAMPAIGN AGAINST STERLING PRICE—CONDITION OF MISSOURI AND PLANS OF THE ENEMY—THE CAVALRY MARCH THROUGH ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI IN PURSUIT—PRICE OVERTAKEN NEAR KANSAS CITY—SPLENDID BATTLES OF CAVALRY IN THE PRAIRIE—BIG BLUE RIVER, BIG BLUE PRAIRIE, TRADING-POST, MARAIS DES CYGNES, MARMITON, AND NEWTONIA—PRICE ROUTED AND DRIVEN THROUGH INDIAN TERRITORY—VOTING FOR "LINCOLN AND THE VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF THE WAR"—RETURN MARCH TO ST. LOUIS	302
IX.—DECEMBER, 1864, TO JANUARY, 1865 : BETWEEN CAMPAIGNS—THE "BREAD RIOT"—EXPIRATION OF ORIGINAL TERM OF ENLISTMENT AND DISCHARGE OF NON-VETERANS—HUFF'S DISASTER AT WHITE'S STATION—GRIERSON'S RAID FROM MEMPHIS TO VICKSBURG—THE REGIMENT ASSIGNED TO WILSON'S CAVALRY CORPS AND SENT TO LOUISVILLE—SEVERE WINTER IN CAMP—PREPARING FOR THE LAST CAMPAIGN—SOLDIER LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT	353
X.—FEBRUARY TO MAY, 1865 : THE LAST CAMPAIGN—CONDITION OF THE CONFEDERACY AND ITS ARMIES—ITS LAST LINE—WILSON'S CAVALRY CORPS, ITS ORGANIZATION AND OFFICERS—FORCES OF THE ENEMY AND THEIR DISPOSAL TO MEET THE CAMPAIGN—GRANT'S AND THOMAS' ORDERS FOR THE CAMPAIGN—THREE DIVISIONS OF THE CORPS ASSIGNED TO THE CAMPAIGN AND CANTONED AT EASTPORT, MISS.—TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE IN THE CORPS—MARCH UPON SELMA—CROSSING SWOLLEN RIVERS—FIGHTING AT MONTEVALLO AND SIX-MILE CREEK—BATTLE OF EBENEZER CHURCH—FORREST DEFEATED AND WOUNDED—SELMA, ITS IMPORTANCE AND ITS FORTIFICATIONS—THE CAVALRY DISMOUNT AND CARRY THE WORKS BY STORM—MOUNTED CHARGE UPON FORREST'S BROKEN LINES—DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY AT SELMA	410
XI.—APRIL, 1865 : WHERE NEXT ?—"ON TO RICHMOND !"—CROSSING THE ALABAMA—FALL OF MONTGOMERY—LA GRANGE'S FIGHTING WITH BUFORD AND CLANTON—MARCH UPON COLUMBUS—LA GRANGE'S BRILLIANT ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF FORT TYLER—UPTON'S DIVISION BEFORE THE WORKS AT COLUMBUS—ALEXANDER'S CHARGE—NIGHT ASSAULT BY	

CHAPTER	PAGE
XI.—APRIL, 1865 :— <i>continued</i>	
WINSLOW'S BRIGADE A SPLENDID SUCCESS—THE LAST BATTLE OF THE WAR—IRREPARABLE LOSSES OF THE ENEMY,	464
XII.—APRIL, 1865 : THE COLUMN MOVES ON AGAINST MACON AND AUGUSTA—FIGHTING FOR THE ROAD TO MACON—NEWS OF FALL OF RICHMOND AND SURRENDER OF LEE AND JOHN- STON—MACON TAKEN, WITH HOWELL COBB—ORDERED TO CEASE HOSTILITIES	504
XIII.—APRIL TO AUGUST, 1865 : CAMP AT MACON—DEATH OF LIN- COLN—CAPTURE OF DAVIS AND REAGAN—ARREST OF STEPHENS, TOOMBS, MALLORY, HILL, AND JOHNSON—PAROL- ING THE REBEL SOLDIERS—OCCUPATION OF THE COUNTRY —THE REGIMENT SENT TO ATLANTA—ANXIOUS TO BE DIS- CHARGED—REBUILDING THE RAILROADS—CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE—CARE OF THEM BY THE ARMY—MUSTER-OUT!— HOME!	521
APPENDIX: ENGAGEMENTS AND CASUALTIES	549
GENERAL STATISTICS	576
INDEX	577

MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.

VICKSBURG, HELENA, AND MEMPHIS: FIELD MAP OF OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH IOWA CAVALRY IN THAT REGION DURING THE CIVIL WAR	<i>facing page</i> 64
BATTLE OF BEAR CREEK, OR JONES' PLANTATION, JUNE 22, 1863 <i>facing page</i>	102
DEMONSTRATION IN FAVOR OF SHERMAN, SEPT. 29 AND 30, 1863 <i>facing page</i>	160
BATTLE OF BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS, OR GUNTOWN (CALLED BY THE CON- FEDERATES "TISHOMINGO CREEK"), JUNE 10, 1864, <i>facing page</i>	236
BATTLE OF THE BIG BLUE, OCT. 23, 1864 <i>facing page</i>	322
BATTLE OF THE MARAIS DES CYGNES (OR "OSAGE," OR "MINE CREEK"), OCT. 25, 1864 <i>facing page</i>	332
CAPTURE OF SELMA, APRIL 2, 1865 <i>facing page</i>	446
CAPTURE OF COLUMBUS, NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1865 . <i>facing page</i>	484
ROUTE MAP OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE FOURTH IOWA CAVALRY IN THE CIVIL WAR. 1861-1865 <i>facing page</i>	548

PREFACE.

SOME years ago, at the request of the survivors of my regiment, I undertook to prepare a sketch of its operations, to be read at a reunion. The character of the post I had held and my possession of a quantity of contemporaneous papers naturally suggested to them that I should do it. The result was a sketch which I thought too long for the purpose intended and too short to be of permanent value. So, finding my comrades much interested in the work, I set about extending it into a fuller account, still, however, with only slight mention of campaigns or co-operating commands (the usual plan of the regimental histories I have seen), intending to make a book for the gratification of the veterans alone.

But this plan proved unsatisfactory to me, because it could not present an adequate idea of the value of the work of the corps nor suggest an intelligent conception of the purposes of that work. Though survivors of the war may be able to fill out a narrow history from memory, or may imagine they can, their children and friends, who now make a greater number of the readers of such books, lack both of the old soldier's advantages of knowledge and imagination. These considerations, together with the hope, to which I confess, that the

book might be of some value as a contribution to the history of the war, led me to adopt the plan upon which finally I worked.

I have intended to give, with the operations of the regiment itself, a general and brief account of each campaign and action in which it was engaged and of the movements of the associated corps, such as would enable the reader to see, not merely what the regiment did, but how and why it was done. Though the result may be a history more or less broken, so far as the regiment alone is concerned, and at the same time only a meagre account of the campaigns as campaigns, yet I must take the risk of these objections. I think, upon the whole, that the plan I have chosen is better than any other. And I may add, lest it should seem presumptuous, my undertaking to write history, that very largely the book is really a record of what I saw and knew, since I was in the regiment from the first enlistments to the last muster-out, and was a part of nearly all its service.

It will not surprise me if my readers find minor errors. The work has all been done under serious difficulties as to time. Such irregular and uncertain hours as could be taken of evenings and holidays, in the midst of the engagements of an active professional life, are nearly all it has received. Though this does not excuse faults, I hope it may be received as an apology for them.

Yet I have tried carefully to confirm or correct every material statement by contemporaneous papers, official and private, by the printed official reports and other books, and by a large correspondence with the surviving actors. Officers and soldiers of all ranks, not only

of my own command, but of many others, have aided me gladly and with great industry, so many, indeed, that I could not name them here in acknowledgment without making a list that would seem too long. But I must not omit to mention two gentlemen who, though having no part in any of the events of the book, have given me specially valuable help: Col. Ephraim C. Dawes, of Cincinnati, whose very remarkable library of the war I have freely used, and Major Joseph W. Kirkley, of the War Records Office, whose researches for me have supplied many gaps and settled many questions.

For the maps and battle-plans I am responsible alone, except the very excellent one of Selma, which was originally made by Captain Noyes, now Lieutenant-Colonel in the Fifth United States Cavalry. That one was verified, and those of Bear Creek, Brice's Cross-roads, Big Blue, Marais des Cygnes, and Columbus, were sketched on the ground since the war.

WM. FORSE SCOTT.

NEW YORK, *November, 1892.*

INTRODUCTION.

"THE STORY OF A CAVALRY REGIMENT" is the record of the Fourth Iowa in the war of the Rebellion.

In the beginning of that conflict the commanders of Union armies appeared neither to value nor to understand this arm of the service. From Alexander to Frederick, as all students of history know, the great soldiers won their greatest victories with cavalry. But the increasing range of modern musketry, and later the invention of breech-loading and magazine guns, by making continuous long-range fire possible, destroyed the power of horsemen to break squares and masses of trained infantry. By this change the cavalry service suffered unduly in the estimation of incompetent generals, who, unfortunately, were numerous in the early period of the war.

The people of the North, ignorant of military operations, regarded with superstitious and indiscriminating deference all men of military education or experience; and, accordingly, such men were often overweighted with the responsibilities of high command. There was even a time when honest patriots spoke of the able organizer and popular drill-master of the Army of the Potomac as a probable dictator; and bitter lessons were required to teach the President and the people that

military education cannot make a soldier. Inapt cadets, who remained incapable of command though graduated at West Point, were a hindrance rather than a help, by reason of the undue reliance placed upon their merely technical training; and yet officers of this class were outnumbered by those appointed from the politicians, who, though often uniting natural unfitness to a total lack of military training, were yet rewarded or conciliated with high commissions to command the volunteers.

In neither of these classes were there any but the dimmest ideas of the use of cavalry. They employed it actively, it is true, but destructively and without any effective results, making it very costly to the government and very demoralizing to the men. New regiments, undrilled, undisciplined, and wretchedly armed, were broken up by details for escorts, to gratify the vanity of generals, for picketing permanent posts and infantry camps, and for courier and other services for which there should have been specially enlisted corps. Soldiers who marched on foot carrying their arms and accoutrements, seemed to feel their burdens lightened by gibes at the cavalry, whose horses covered them with dust or splashed them with mud, as they hurried their riders on worse than useless errands past the foot-sore columns.

Engineer officers, who, by reason of their standing at West Point, took high rank in the volunteer army, were predisposed to win victories with intrenching tools; and this, with the hope of a speedy termination of the war, the long time supposed to be required for drilling cavalry, and the lack of competent leaders, kept the cavalry for years, with a few brilliant excep-

tions, in wasteful and degrading service, incessant but inglorious marches and petty conflicts.

A cavalry officer distinguished in the East, said, in 1865: "With eighty thousand cavalry on the rolls in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in that arm as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas, or to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring before our army had started in pursuit. Does any one now assert that those obstacles could not have been overcome by twenty thousand cavalry?" Grant himself, after two years' experience in the field, and when there were a hundred regiments of cavalry west of the Alleghanies, went into the campaign of Vicksburg and half way through the siege with only one regiment (the Fourth Iowa) and a few small detachments, the result being the waste of half the men and most of the horses from mere excess of exertion. Even as late as the beginning of the last campaign of the war, a certain famous old division and corps general quarrelled with Wilson, because that able cavalryman refused to break up one of his brigades to supply the usual escorts to brigadiers and outposts for infantry camps.

The true uses of cavalry were not understood, its capabilities were not seen. It was only after "escorts" and "body-guards" had passed out of view with the "show generals," after length of service had formed in each command a corps of veterans to assimilate recruits, after contact with the enemy had brought out leaders, and after the few real generals had been taught by experience to mass this arm and let it fight, that the

Federal cavalry won its place and made its record. Then it compelled recognition from our best commanders, as the most difficult, the most delicate, the most flexible, the most effective arm of the service. General Sherman well said that it required greater ability to command ten thousand cavalry than fifty thousand infantry.

In the last year of the war, Sheridan in the Valley and Wilson in Tennessee and Alabama showed how simple and easy it is to make of cavalrymen soldiers as effective as any, and far more effective for some purposes than infantry could be. Yet there was no magic in the methods of these brilliant leaders, nothing but the conviction that if you want volunteers to be soldiers you must treat them as soldiers: hold them together, train them, fight them together, and lead them—that is all.

So, with opportunity and proven leaders, the cavalry quickly proved itself. Stretched across the breadth of the continent, its imperfect organizations quickened with new life. Order dwelt in its camps. Confidence marched with its columns. The resistless spirit of Freedom moved with its charging squadrons. It did its part, but it has not yet found its historian. Its deeds have not yet been written. They are not easy to believe. It fought with equals. Confederate soldiers have had no superiors since wars began. Yet the achievements of the Federal cavalry during the last two years of the war surpass the romances of chivalry, and make them read like tales told for the nursery.

The time for jeers had passed, the time for cheers had come. The tired foot-soldiers, "marching towards great events," called out at night, "Here comes the

cavalry!" and slept upon the ground, curtained from danger by its sleepless sentinels. At dawn he heard its advanced guns challenge the enemy to combat. In the stress and strain of battle he saw electric tremors in the opposing ranks, then heard the muffled thunder of the horsemen's charge. He knew the foemen's flank was broken and his front must yield. There were cheers now, and not jeers, for the cavalry.

The story of this regiment, were it not proven, would appear incredible. Much reading of the deeds of the different arms in other wars finds nothing to surpass the endurance in marching, or the dash and courage in fighting, displayed by the Fourth Iowa Cavalry after the beginning of the Vicksburg campaign under Grant. The raid from Vicksburg to Memphis, the magnificent covering of the retreat of Sturgis from Guntown, the bold and marvellously successful initiative taken against odds at the battles of the Big Blue and the Osage, the pursuit of Price, and the storming of Columbus illustrate my meaning.

A hundred men of the Fourth Iowa, poorly armed and caught at a disadvantage when engaged in felling trees,¹ abruptly cut off from any aid and attacked by two regiments, obstinately resisted three charges and held their ground till surrounded, when they fought their way out with a loss of half their number. A thousand men of its brigade led Sherman's twenty thousand infantry and artillery from Vicksburg to Meridian,² fighting for the road every day, often all the day, resisted at different times by five different brigades, but always keeping the road clear, so that the infantry and guns behind them made the whole distance, one hun-

¹ Page 103.

² Pages 188-206.

dred and eighty miles, in twelve days. On the open prairie of the Kansas border,¹ this regiment threw itself against Price's line of many thousands, and by sheer audacity broke it, causing the rout of the two divisions by one brigade. At Columbus on the Chattahoochee,² this regiment, with the Third Iowa, here numbering together hardly seven hundred, dismounted in the night and assaulted strong fortifications, defended by several thousand men with many guns (the plan and extent of the works being unknown even to their generals), and carried them by storm. Surely such men had in them the metal of soldiers.

Standing alone, the record of this regiment determines the superior effectiveness of cavalry over other arms on a wide field of action, where rapidity of movement and audacious energy achieve success. Had every Federal regiment done as much as this one did, the number of prisoners taken in arms would have exceeded the whole white population of the Confederacy, and the property taken and destroyed would have far exceeded in value all the property of every kind within its limits.

The rank and file of the regiment were chosen men. None others were retained. Pioneers and the sons of pioneers rode in its columns. Their strenuous lives on the frontier bred no false qualities of character, left few flaws in manhood. Courage with them was not a merit, but a consequence of character. Unconscious patriotism was a part of their existence. Their women would have scorned one who turned back from battle. They made history as they tilled their fields. They took back to the tasks of peace the silent heroism which had won victories in war.

¹ Page 334.

² Page 493.

At their best they were commanded by a young volunteer who bore a name long honored in New England. Descent from Puritans carried conscience into his work. No detail of service escaped his attention, but his faculties rose with the occasion, and in action no emergency found him unprepared. He took blows stoically, but paid them back with compound interest when his time came to strike. His men got their dues, but they were always for duty.

He was gentle by nature, but filled with the aggressiveness of the cause, and while he earned the love of his subordinates, he compelled the confidence of his superiors. His keen intelligence moulded the purpose of his men; his will inspired them and made them think themselves invincible. Though his military education was gained in the field, and he was "only a volunteer," the qualities and the services of Winslow were such as upon larger fields made Sheridan and Wilson the first cavalry leaders of the Civil War.

His men showed no ambition but to do their duty. The writer of their story has shown no ambition but to tell plainly how they did it. He was himself a part of what he writes about. The experiences of his comrades were common to other regiments, but under his hand their achievements have been taken by the imperishable types and made their own forever. In intervals of time borrowed from clients and taken from needed rest, their "Boy Adjutant" has told us the story of their toils and dangers and sufferings through four years of war.


There should be many readers for this book. It is a picture of the Civil War in miniature. To read it will make "the generation which has grown up since

the war " think better of its fathers. Its praise is moderate and its censure just. A child can understand it, and a wise man will not lay it down unread. It will bring crowding memories and pleasures to all survivors of the volunteers. It will call up for them hunger and thirst, burning heat and biting cold, storm and flood, fevers and aching wounds—remembered, but unfelt,—all in the past ; and in the present, growing joy, ever growing blessings, gained by their sacrifice. They see perpetual union of the States, cemented by the blood of those who fell on either side ; no strife now but the peaceful strife of commerce and the rivalry of civic virtues. They see common efforts, hopes, and ambitions, born of mutual respect learned in the field, building prosperity for all the people.

These are worthy teachings. Historians find the best materials in such books. They are reservoirs of fact kept pure from prejudice. The truth is in them. Like deep springs among the hills, which yield refreshment while they mirror their surroundings, such books show forth the form and spirit of heroic days, and nourish patriotism while they give a soul to history.

O. H. LA GRANGE.

NEW YORK, *7th March*, 1892.



BADGE OF WILSON'S CORPS.

**OFFICIALLY, THE "CAVALRY CORPS OF THE MILITARY DIVISION
OF THE MISSISSIPPI."**

*There 's nothing finer in the world,—
Oh, nothing half so fast,
When we hussars rush down the field
And into the fight at last!
Our carbines crash, the ringing skies
With flashing flames are rosy red,
The wild blood flies in our dancing eyes,—
Oh, then we're roaring glad!*

*And if in death among us fall
Our comrades ready and true,
Of that we've nothing more to say,
But that we're ready too.
Low on the ground the body lies,
The shattered shell to earth is given;
But the free soul flies thro' the ringing skies
Up to the tent of heaven.*

From an old German Hussar Song.



THE STORY OF A CAVALRY REGIMENT

CHAPTER I.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.

WHEN the sound of the guns at Fort Sumter reached Iowa that State was instantly in arms. In one day twenty times as many men as were called from it by President Lincoln's first proclamation offered themselves to Governor Kirkwood. These first volunteers lived mostly in the eastern counties. It was a new State. Over nearly the whole of it travelling was still done by stage-coach. The only railways were the beginnings of three single-track lines, running from Davenport, Burlington, and Keokuk, then operating only sixty or seventy miles each. Telegraph lines were few in number and little more extended than the railways. The western half of the State was but thinly inhabited. Indeed, large quantities of public lands were still awaiting "pre-emption." Many county-seats, which are now thriving towns or cities, then contained hardly more than a court-house and a school-house, planted in the open prairie, the high wild grass waving up to their doors.

Into these newer parts of the State the news of the war came slowly. The offers of companies of volunteers to the Governor were sometimes late in reaching him; and the accepted companies, moving by stages and on horses to the places appointed for rendezvous, sometimes found, on arriving, that the regiments to which they had been assigned were already filled. This was the experience of two companies, one from Fremont County, the southwesternmost county, and one from Delaware County, in the northeastern part of the State. They were raised and offered for the Second Iowa Cavalry, then being organized in Camp McClellan, near Davenport. They were accepted for that regiment and ordered to the camp, but when they reached it, early in September, 1861, the Second Regiment was full and on its way to the field. It is not easy to realize now the fact that one of these companies (the one from Fremont County) spent, necessarily, ten days on its way from home to Davenport, the only means of transportation as far as Marengo (260 miles) being farm wagons and saddle horses. The Third Cavalry was then going into camp at Keokuk, but the full number of companies had already been accepted for it.

The two companies were greatly disappointed, and when it was reported that no more cavalry would be accepted from Iowa, to their disappointment was added discontent.¹ They remained in Camp McClellan day after day, week after week, in suspense, the officers constantly in communication with the Governor and

¹ The War Department was of opinion that three cavalry regiments were more than enough from Iowa, and insisted that any further enlistments should be in the infantry. But the State furnished nine regiments of cavalry as well as some companies in regiments of other States.

the Adjutant-General, hoping that another regiment of cavalry would be ordered into camp, and the men zealously discussing every rumor and suggestion, no matter how slight or absurd, which related to their becoming a part of the army. Several regiments of infantry were then being formed in Camp McClellan, and efforts were made to induce the men of the two companies to join them, but there was no success; they had set out to be cavalrymen. The discontent became so serious at last that Governor Kirkwood visited the camp and made a speech to the men. He promised to find place for them. At the same time James Harlan, then United States Senator from Iowa and afterward Secretary of the Interior in Lincoln's Cabinet, urged the War Department to authorize the raising of another regiment of cavalry in Iowa. Mr. Harlan pressed upon the Secretary of War his opinion that the best cavalry could be made of Western men, who were accustomed to riding and the care of horses. In Iowa at that time, as in other Northern states, the people were begging the government to accept more troops. Special authority was finally given by the War Department, in a letter from Secretary Stanton to Governor Kirkwood, dated October 12, 1861, authorizing the raising of a fourth regiment of cavalry in Iowa, to be rendezvoused at Mount Pleasant. At the personal request of Mr. Harlan there was inserted in this order the unusual provision, that the horses of the regiment should be purchased at the place of rendezvous, under the immediate direction of the colonel. Governor Kirkwood ordered the two companies to proceed to Mount Pleasant and go into camp as the nucleus of the Fourth Cavalry; and, in consideration of their age and persist-

ence, they were to have the honor of being "Company A" and "Company B," and of holding, respectively, the "right" and the "left" of the regimental line. The Fremont County company was "A" and the Delaware County company "B."

They moved at once from Davenport to Burlington, by the steamboat *Kate Cassell*, and thence by rail to Mount Pleasant, where they arrived before day-break October 17, 1861. They went immediately to "Camp Harlan," so named in honor of the senator. The camp was then only an open meadow, lying west of the town, where there were piles of lumber provided for building barracks. The frames for two company buildings were then being raised by carpenters. The weather was fine, the question of getting into the army appeared to be definitely settled, and the men went to work on the barracks with great spirit.

Indeed, there was nothing else for them to do. They had no arms, no equipments, no clothing, except what they had themselves provided, not even a sufficient supply of blankets. But the people of Mount Pleasant were burning with zeal in the cause, and they permitted no one to be uncomfortable. It was exceedingly difficult then, especially in the Western states, to get military equipments, and it was hardly expected that the regiment would be equipped and instructed sufficiently for service in the field before the coming on of cold weather. The nights were already cold. The barracks, therefore, although only close sheds of rough pine boards, were built as snugly as time permitted. Those for the companies were each about eighty feet long and twenty wide, and high enough for three tiers of double berths, or "bunks," between the

floor and the eaves. There was a door in each end, a window in the middle of each side, and a floor of rough boards. A small shed against the rear end was the kitchen. Twelve of these buildings, one for each company, stood side by side, facing south, with intervals of about twenty feet, except that between the sixth and seventh the space was wide enough to admit a building of similar plan, but of smaller size, for the use of the musicians—the “Regimental Band.” In the rear of the barracks were the stables, very long, low sheds, closed on one side, one for each company and one for the field-and-staff.

In front of these barracks, on the other side of a parade ground about fifty yards wide, were smaller barracks of similar construction, the quarters of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the field-and-staff.

Excellent water was supplied from Swan’s Spring, a famous spring near the Swan farm-house, just beyond the northwest corner of the camp-ground. It was carried by the volunteers, in big iron camp-kettles, hooked one at each end of a wooden yoke fitted to the shoulders. In 1890 the site of Camp Harlan is still an open field, and that fine spring still supplies a Swan family living in the same old farm-house.

Other companies closely followed A and B into the camp, each company being immediately employed in building and fitting up its own barracks. As the numbers increased and the barracks approached completion, the camp became a very busy place, and the work of filling and organizing the regiment went on with increasing zeal.

Company A was formed at Sidney, in Fremont

County, late in July, 1861, of men of Fremont, Page, and Mills counties. It was sworn into the State service, under the Governor's acceptance, for the Second Cavalry, August 10th, and went into camp at Sidney, August 26th. The Page County men, enlisted by J. Marshall Rust and Samuel P. Kelly, being unable to attend the meeting at Sidney on the 10th of August, were sworn in at Hawleyville August 9th, so that they could be reported at Sidney as enlisted, thus becoming the first men enlisted of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry. The company moved from the Sidney camp September 5th, under orders to proceed to Camp McClellan, at Davenport. Its further movement to Camp Harlan has already been mentioned. Its first officers were Captain Benjamin Rector, First-Lieutenant John Guylee, Second-Lieutenant J. Marshall Rust.

Company B was formed at Delhi, in Delaware County, the last of August, and arrived at Davenport about the 5th of September. From there it went to Mount Pleasant with Company A, as already told. Its first officers were Captain John H. Peters, First-Lieutenant George B. Parsons, Second-Lieutenant Alonzo Clark.

Company C was raised at Mount Pleasant, and was composed almost entirely of men living in that county—Henry. Its first officers were Captain Orrin Miller, First-Lieutenant Henry E. Winslow, Second-Lieutenant James Patterson. It went into Camp Harlan October 25th.

Company D was also of Henry County. It was organized as a militia company, September 7, 1861. Its first officers in the militia and in the Fourth Cavalry were Captain Cornelius F. Spearman, First-Lieutenant

Erasmus Coiner, Second-Lieutenant John Tucker. It marched into Camp Harlan October 21st.

Company E was formed at Grinnell, in Poweshiek County, though individuals and squads of its men joined from neighboring counties. It grew out of a company which gathered at Grinnell to join a regiment of "Mounted Rifles." There was an effort made to organize such a regiment at Iowa City; but authority from the War Department could not be obtained, and the undertaking failed. The first officers of E were Captain Alonzo B. Parkell, First-Lieutenant Orson N. Perkins, Second-Lieutenant Edward W. Dee. It was quartered in the camp in October.

Company F was begun at Ottumwa, in Wapello County, but many of its men came from Mahaska and Henry counties. It was largely recruited in September, but was not filled till November, at Camp Harlan. Its first officers were Captain Edward F. Winslow, First-Lieutenant Thomas J. Zollars, Second-Lieutenant William A. Heacock.

Company G obtained most of its members from Lee County, but some joined from other counties after the main body reached Camp Harlan, which was in November. The first officers were Captain Thomas C. Tullis, First-Lieutenant James Brown, Second-Lieutenant Simon Hooper.

Company H was mostly from Mitchell and Chickasaw counties, though Floyd, Johnson, Bremer, Howard and Iowa counties were represented in it. The men reached Camp Harlan about the 1st of November, and the company was there organized. Its first officers were Captain Dewitt C. Crawford, First-Lieutenant Samuel S. Troy, Second-Lieutenant Edwin A. Haskell.

Company I was formed at Winterset, in Madison County, its men coming from that county and from Adair and Guthrie. Its first officers were Captain William Pursel, First-Lieutenant Jesse R. Lambert, Second-Lieutenant John Overmyer. The larger part of it was in Camp Harlan early in November.

Company K was another Henry County company. It was in the camp before the end of October, choosing for officers, Captain James T. Drummond, First-Lieutenant Jacob Hart, Second-Lieutenant Joshua Gardner.

Company L had a career before it came to Mount Pleasant. A company of men was collected in Des Moines and other counties, who, in October, went into quarters at Burlington, as "Pleyel's Lancers." This was a proposed regiment of horsemen who were to carry lances instead of sabres. A German officer named Pleyel had undertaken to raise the regiment, but, when several companies were in rendezvous at Burlington, the scheme was abandoned, either because it lacked official sanction or because there were not enough men who wanted to carry lances. The men dispersed, and a number of them, led by William E. Harris, were, at their own request, attached to the Fourth Cavalry. In November they arrived in Camp Harlan, where they were joined by others and formed Company L. The first officers were Captain William E. Harris, First-Lieutenant William H. Sells, Second-Lieutenant William W. Woods.

Company M was organized in Camp Harlan, in November, nearly all of its men coming from Jefferson County. The first officers were Captain Abial R. Pierce, First-Lieutenant Frederick S. Whiting, Second-Lieutenant Aaron J. Newby.

Early in November, Orrin Castle brought about twenty men into Camp Harlan from Iowa and Johnson counties, expecting to organize a company and to become captain; but, not succeeding, he left the camp. His men divided and joined different companies in the camp, the largest squad going into H.

A number of the men in different companies had served in the First Iowa Infantry, through its three months' term. Many others, who lived in the region bordering Missouri, had, in August, marched in independent companies, rudely organized for defense against the threatened forays of Missouri secessionists. Captains Spearman and Pierce had led such companies even into Missouri, and the most of the men who were then with them now followed them into the Fourth Cavalry.

Not only the counties above named, but other counties in the State, and even other States, were represented in the regiment.

In addition to the men who were in these companies, there were twenty-eight enlisted men on the non-commissioned staff (regimental and battalion), and seventeen in the regimental band. They were enlisted as privates in the different companies, some of them for the purpose of being placed on the staff or in the band. The band carried the usual brass instruments, drums, etc., of a military band, and David McCrackin, of Fairfield, was its leader.

In October, 1862, under orders from the War Department, following the Act of Congress of July 17, 1862, the band and the battalion staff organization were discontinued. Some of the men thus released took a discharge from the service, while the others re-

turned to the companies in the regiment in which they had originally enlisted.

The organization of the volunteer cavalry at that time was required to be the same as that of the regulars, which, though under an Act of July 29, 1861, was substantially the same as the organization immediately following the Revolutionary war. Each regiment consisted of three battalions, each battalion of two squadrons, each squadron of two companies, and each company of one captain, one first-lieutenant, one second-lieutenant, one first-sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, two farriers, one saddler, one wagoner, and seventy-two privates. The "musicians" were buglers. For each battalion there was a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster-and-commissary (commissioned), and a sergeant-major, a quartermaster-sergeant, a commissary-sergeant, a hospital-steward, a saddler-sergeant, and a veterinary-sergeant (non-commissioned). To the regiment were allowed a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a regimental adjutant, a regimental quartermaster-and-commissary, and two chief-buglers. Except the battalion quartermasters-and-commissaries, all the staff officers were required to be lieutenants of the line, specially detailed to staff duty. A surgeon, an assistant-surgeon, a chaplain, and a sergeant-major, were added by special enactment. Of course, the purpose of this battalion organization was, that the battalions might operate independently and at different places from each other, as if they were separate regiments, this being almost invariably the practice in the armies of the United States before the Civil war. But, in the progress of the war, as the volunteer armies grew

in size, and the use of cavalry regiments unbroken became desirable, the old organization was found clumsy and unnecessarily burdened with staff-officers. Accordingly, under the Act of July 17, 1862, a reorganization was effected. The battalion staff and non-commissioned staff were dropped, the three majors became regimental officers, but remained nominally in command of the respective battalions, in the order of their seniority, and the adjutant, the quartermaster and the commissary, were to be extra first-lieutenants, specially commissioned to those places; and the regimental non-commissioned staff was reorganized by dropping the two chief-buglers and by the creation of a sergeant-major, two hospital-stewards, a saddler-sergeant, a chief-trumpeter, and a chief-farrier. The "squadron" was discontinued. To each company (or "troop," as now designated by the law) were added a supernumerary second-lieutenant, a commissary-sergeant, a sixth sergeant, two teamsters, and six privates, while the two musicians, or buglers, of the old law were dropped.

By the Act of March 3, 1863, the places of supernumerary second-lieutenant, the two teamsters in each company, and the chief-farrier of the regiment, were abolished, and two trumpeters in each company and a regimental veterinary-surgeon were allowed. The organization as now established remained unchanged to the end of the war. The places of supernumerary second-lieutenants were never filled in the Fourth Iowa, though in the summer of 1862 the men in each company interested themselves in "electing" a comrade to that office.

The legislature of the State of Iowa, with anxious

care for the health of Iowa troops, at its first session after the breaking out of the war, provided by law for the commissioning and paying of an "additional assistant-surgeon" in each Iowa regiment, and the place was filled for a few months in the Fourth Cavalry; but the War Department declined to permit such an officer to serve, and, the additional-assistant of the Fourth Cavalry being commissioned as assistant-surgeon to the regiment, the place was not again filled.

There were a few other positions in the regiment to which titles were attached by custom, but those who held them were enlisted men, usually privates, detailed from the companies, and serving without extra rank or pay. Such were the wagon-master, in charge of all wagons and draught animals and their drivers, the ward-master, in immediate charge of the patients and the nurses in hospital, and the armorer, who repaired arms and advised about them. The work of the wagon-master often required great endurance, as well as ability, especially in the earlier years of the service, when there were thirty or forty of the huge army wagons, with as many drivers and about two hundred mules, in his charge, while the roads were often not only very difficult but dangerous. The first man appointed to this place was Charles Litzenberg, of Company G. He served until 1864, when he re-enlisted, became Wagon-Master of the brigade, and was succeeded in the regiment by Sylvanus R. Meigs, of E, who served to the end of the war. The Ward-Master through almost the whole of the service of the regiment was Thomas Robb, of H, and the Armorer, Ephraim T. Palmer, of E.

About the 20th of November, 1861, the work of

organization being substantially completed, a mustering officer, Captain Alexander Chambers, Sixteenth United States Infantry, appeared in camp, and on Saturday, the 23d, he began to muster the companies into the army of the United States. On that day Companies A, E and F were mustered in; on the 25th Companies B, C, D, I, K and M; on the 27th Company G; on the 24th of December Company L; and on the 1st of January, 1862, Company H.

The Field-and-Staff and Non-commissioned-Staff were mustered in on the 1st of January, 1862, and then stood as follows: Colonel Asbury B. Porter, Majors Simeon D. Swan, Joseph E. Jewett and George A. Stone, Adjutant George W. Waldron, Quartermaster Simon P. Lauffer, Surgeon Andrew W. McClure, Assistant-Surgeon Wellington Bird, Chaplain Andrew J. Kirkpatrick, Sergeant-Major Edward D. Ketcham, Quartermaster-Sergeant Edward W. Raymond, Commissary-Sergeant William T. Allen, and Chief-Buglers Carroll H. Bartruff and George W. Marsh.

The lieutenant-colonelcy was to be given to some officer of the regular army, who should be an instructor in tactics and discipline. The place was filled in January by the appointment of Lieutenant Thomas Drummond of the Fifth United States Cavalry. He became at once a very conspicuous figure in the regiment. He was young and handsome, highly intelligent, with a very distinct personal and military pride, and impetuous to the point of recklessness. He set about disciplining and training the regiment with an imperious energy that startled the men, and gave them for the first time the idea that a soldier is a man who obeys another man's orders. He would hear no excuse

for failure or neglect, he had no patience with dulness or slowness, and his comments upon the shortcomings of an officer were as prompt and distinct, and as forcible and impolite in language, as upon those of a private. Some of the men he punished for offenses which they considered trivial. To them, in their greenness, the taking a bit of rest when on guard, some disorder of dress on parade, leaving a horse once ungroomed, might be contrary to strict army regulations, but were not criminal, and the volunteers were not hireling soldiery, but free and independent American citizens. This spirit, the necessary result of American institutions, was hard to control in the army. Indeed it was never wholly controlled, though it was slowly subordinated to higher considerations, through that good sense which hard experience taught the volunteers. Gradually they learned the value, the necessity, of discipline.

But in these camp trials the men found comfort in knowing that their officers suffered too; for Colonel Drummond kept the officers in a "school," where daily and without mercy he instructed and harassed them, characterizing in no diplomatic phrases any lack of capacity that he found. He became quickly the one powerful man in the camp,—the most hated, feared, and admired.

With such men as composed the average volunteer regiment at the beginning of the war it would be hardly possible for such an officer to succeed. Colonel Drummond tried hard, but he had little support or encouragement from either officers or men, and he met constantly as much difficulty and obstruction as could be put in his way. He went into the field with the

regiment, but in a few months resigned and returned to the Fifth Cavalry, in the East. In the battle of Five Forks, Sheridan's crowning exploit with cavalry, April 1, 1865, he was killed. But it had already come about that he was spoken of in the Fourth Iowa with great respect and admiration, and with sincere interest in his career; for the volunteers had in the meantime learned something of soldiering.

The book of tactics first supplied to the regiment was that by General Scott, adopted by the War Department in 1841; but there was little opportunity for mounted manœuvres or drills while the regiment was at Camp Harlan, and the men acquired small knowledge of the tactics. The officers, however, did not wholly escape. They had to learn at least the theory of field movements. Partly through their own zealous studies and partly by dint of Colonel Drummond's pointed methods of instruction in his "school," they acquired some knowledge of the art of war, and found that there was a great deal more to be learned.

But before the winter was over Scott's tactics were replaced by Cooke's, and the double-rank dragoon formation of the "troop" gave place to the single-rank of the "company," an improvement of the time for light cavalry. It was a great change, but it was popular, because the Cooke methods were more simple and easy, and appeared to be more effective. As the lack of horse equipments prevented, however, any general or regular mounted drill, it cannot be said that anybody became skilful in tactical operations while in Camp Harlan.

The struggles of the officers were of course continually reflected upon the men, and they were drilled

and taught, formed and re-formed, pulled and hauled, put through movements and evolutions more or less correct or incorrect, impossible or astonishing, as must naturally be the case when novices try to acquire among themselves a practical knowledge of military science. The blind led the blind, and often both fell into the ditch, though not always at the same time; and the vexation of an anxious officer was many times only the occasion for unfeeling amusement on the part of his pupils, thrown into confusion by his mistakes. The privates were not yet filled with awe of the men who wore shoulder-straps, who only a few weeks before had been on an equality with themselves, as companions or acquaintances in town or country life. Gradually, however, the soldierly capacity was developed, and, as the study became more and more understood and appreciated, while the daily news of the war made the object of it all seem greater and more difficult, both officers and men became more earnest and interested in their work, and progressed together in increasing harmony.

It was a very cold winter, with many snows. It would have been difficult to keep up field-drill, even if there had been a sufficient equipment; but some instruction could be given in the barracks, and on most days the parade-ground could be used for foot-drill by companies, or for the frequent "inspections," which were usually feared, or the "dress-parades," when the command was shown off to admiring visitors. At any rate, the men were generally of opinion that they had enough to do, and were constantly willing to take such relaxation as could be got upon "a pass to go to town."

The relations between the people of the town and the men in the camp were always very harmonious and agreeable. The town was proud of the regiment, especially because it was the first regiment encamped there, and because many of the officers and men were respected citizens of the place.

If there was any one of the people held by the regiment in higher estimation than others, it was Senator Harlan. He had distinguished and endeared himself to all loyal Iowans by his clear and forcible speeches on the right side of every war question, and by the steady zeal and energy with which he gave himself wholly to the cause. As he had persistently urged the War Department to authorize a fourth regiment of cavalry to be raised in the State, so, when he had succeeded in that, he devoted himself with untiring spirit to its organization, equipment, and personal comfort. He was constantly in communication with the governor of the State and the officials at Washington, in behalf of the regiment, and he visited the camp so often that every soldier came to know him. Many men will remember how these visits added to their comfort, for the kind man always brought a quantity of things in his buggy, for the comfort or convenience of the soldiers, which he carried into the barracks and presented himself.

Nor has his interest in the regiment ever diminished. He visited it in the field during the war, and in all its vicissitudes he was its steady friend; and in later years, at every gathering of the survivors, he is an honored guest. He may well be called the "Father of the Regiment."

But Mount Pleasant was full of patriotic people

who gladly did everything in their power for the cause and for the regiment. Any man of the camp would have been sure, at any time, of a sincere welcome in almost any house or family in the town. "Almost any," it is said, because, although the community was among the most loyal and zealous in the State, there were in it some "Copperheads," or "Secesh," as they were colloquially called, who were shy of the Union volunteers. There were also a few persons known or suspected to be engaged in selling liquor to the volunteers.

The selling of liquor had always been considered by the good people of Mount Pleasant as nothing less than the work of the Devil himself; but now, when they believed it was corrupting the innocent young men who were going out to save the country, their indignation would not be restrained. Not finding any law to suit their view, they constituted themselves the law and the court. Parties composed of citizens and volunteers, whose ambition it was to make others as good as themselves, entered several houses occupied by the children of sin, and spilled their liquors in the street. Truth would compel the writer to admit that he was himself in one of these raids of compulsory temperance, in the interest of the good government of his own company.

But the visits of the soldiers among the patriotic people of the town were no more frequent than the visits of the people at the camp. Indeed, their generous attentions were constant, and very many comforts of the men in camp, in health as well as in sickness, including books, dainties in food, and various devices to relieve the inconvenience or monotony of camp life,

were due to the watchful and untiring care of the men and women of that loyal and beautiful little city.

This good fortune of the new soldiers was of special value as sickness increased among them. The great change in mode of life and the necessary crowding of the men in the barracks in cold weather, when doors and windows must be kept closed, had their natural result in many cases of illness. There was nothing very serious, however, until the measles appeared. This disease increased with great rapidity, until fully one third of the men in camp had taken it. As many as possible were moved to a hospital established by Surgeon McClure in the town, but it was necessary to treat the milder cases in the barracks. All the doctors in the town lent their aid to the two surgeons of the regiment; but the inevitable "catching cold" made it a very severe experience for many of the patients, and in spite of all efforts, some of them died in relapse, or fell into long or permanent disability in the *sequelæ*.

It will be pleasant for the doctors who served so faithfully through that time of trial, to read (if they have not already read it), that a medical author, of the highest repute in his school, has said that "In our Civil War the measles raged with great fierceness in some of the regiments, and, *under allopathic treatment*, destroyed many lives."

The first death in the regiment was that of Benjamin Ullery, a private of Company A, who died November 3, 1861, in the hospital in Mount Pleasant. This death naturally appealed strongly to the imagination of the citizens as well as the volunteers. It attracted great attention, and the funeral was remarkably large and impressive. Other deaths from disease followed,

and when the regiment left Mount Pleasant, in February, 1862, the men had buried there nine of their comrades.

Though left behind in their graves when their comrades went out to seek a more famous death in the field, the nine were not without friends to keep their memory green. One steadfast care-taker was Elizabeth Arrowsmith,—“Lizzie Arrowsmith” she was, as she still is, to all Mount Pleasant. Her interest in the men who lost their lives in the cause began when she was a young girl, in the days of Camp Harlan, and the flame of her zeal has never diminished. Some other friend anticipated her by planting an evergreen for each of her sleeping heroes, but every year saw some evidence of her care for their graves. For many years it was her sorrow that no stones were there to tell the names. The cost of such stones was beyond her own slender purse. But when the government undertook to supply headstones for the soldiers’ graves in the national cemeteries, she saw her opportunity. She applied, and followed up her application, and, by dint of persistence, succeeded. Her nine green mounds were furnished with stones like those in the national cemeteries, and, with deep satisfaction and pride, she saw them at last in place. Yet, not content with that success, she extended her efforts, and now she is widely known and respected in the West for her loving care of the graves of fallen patriots. In that cemetery at Mount Pleasant many more graves than the nine are now the homes of men of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry and of other regiments, and all are watched by that faithful friend. Each year, on Decoration Day, their living comrades march out to strew their graves with flow-

ers, and Lizzie Arrowsmith always has an honored place in the silent procession.

When the companies were mustered in, in November, 1861, their numbers were barely enough to entitle them to the full number of company and field officers; but additional enlistments were made in all companies during the winter, and in February the aggregate of officers and men was 1,086, the highest number on the rolls until the large accession of recruits in the spring of 1864.

The company officers were, at first, all elected by the men, that is, the Governor of the State commissioned to the different positions the men who were reported to him as already chosen by the vote of their comrades; so that all the line officers may be said to have first enlisted as privates. This practice of leaving the choice of company officers to the men continued, in filling vacancies, until the summer of 1863, the Colonel or temporary regimental commander always "recommending" to the Governor, for commissions, the men who had got a majority of votes in their respective companies. The result, as must naturally be expected, was more or less vicious and demoralizing. The practice was a constant temptation to intrigue and treachery in obtaining votes, it caused a fever of ill-feeling or discontent, presented a serious obstacle to the improvement of discipline, prevented the full development of that *esprit de corps* which is of such great value among soldiers, and put upon mere personal popularity that premium which should have been the reward of capacity and courage. When that costly system was changed for the only true system, appointment and promotion for merit alone, the men were very

unwilling to give up what they thought their "right" to elect their officers; but they learned in time that it was not by votes that the best officers were obtained, and before the war was ended it was clear to all that the only lasting popularity of an officer is that earned by a persistent and successful performance of duty in the field.

When the regiment was mustered in, it had a full supply of remarkably good horses. All or nearly all of them were actually examined and chosen by Colonel Porter himself; and he was not only a very good judge of horses, but he took especial pride in mounting the men. He assigned the horses to the several companies in different colors. Many companies, of course, were mounted upon bays. The next highest number were on sorrels, and the next on browns. But Company A had grays, and Company K blacks, which led to their being called, jocularly, the "White-horse Cavalry" and the "Black-horse Cavalry." The Regimental Band, however, attracted more attention at first, in respect to horses, than any company, because they all rode fine large roans. There was a continued effort made during the early part of the service of the regiment to maintain this arrangement of the colors, fresh horses being distributed, as far as possible, in accordance with it; but the difficulty of obtaining horses steadily increased, and the maintenance of the colors became impracticable.

But the horses formed the only part of the equipment that was obtained early. It seemed to the impatient that saddles and arms would never come. Even blankets and clothing were not furnished until the winter was half gone. On very cold days all

guards were taken off, because many of the men had not overcoats or sufficient other clothing. It was late in January when saddles and bridles came. Soon afterward sabres and belts appeared. Then, at last, the regiment began to present a martial appearance.

In the last week of December, 1861, there was much talk of the regiment going to New Albany, in Indiana, where there was then a large camp for cavalry. Indeed, it was ordered there. Special Orders No. 336, Headquarters of the Army, dated December 23, 1861, directed that all regiments of cavalry west of Ohio (except those in Missouri), not already in the field, whether organized or partly organized, be concentrated with the least possible delay on the Ohio River, at or near New Albany. This order was sent to the Governor of Iowa, and was communicated to Colonel Porter, but, for some reason not now known, it was not obeyed by the Fourth Iowa.

On the 4th of January, 1862, the Governor was directed, by telegram and letter from the War Department, to send the regiment immediately to Fort Leavenworth. This order was given to the companies. Intense interest was at once excited, and with much activity preparations were begun.

Northwestern Missouri had been for six months the scene of a feverish, desultory warfare, and in the southwest the two armies which a month later fought the desperate battles at Pea Ridge were in expectation of an early conflict. But Fort Leavenworth was on the frontier, and the prospect of going there was not pleasant to the men of the new regiment. However, the order was not executed. Why it was counter-

manded, or replaced by other orders, is not known to the writer. The incomplete equipment of the regiment would have been a good reason, and probably was the one acted upon.

Then there was a period during which it seemed the regiment was wholly neglected or forgotten by the authorities. No orders were received, no supplies could be obtained, and there appeared to be no place for the regiment in any Western department. Even so late as January 11th, the Colonel reported to the Governor that neither clothing, arms, tents, nor horse equipments, had yet been received. Rumors went about that the regiment would be disbanded, and a feeling of discouragement prevailed throughout the camp. Colonel Porter was so much concerned that he started for Washington, but at Chicago he received encouraging assurances, and returned.

Shortly afterward, about the 20th of February, an order was received from the War Department, requiring the regiment to move to St. Louis, and there complete its equipment, preparatory to joining the "Army of the Southwest," then in southwest Missouri, under General Curtis. The long-looked-for service in the field was about to come. The companies were ready immediately, and were moved as fast as transportation was furnished. The battalions went separately, the First leaving Mount Pleasant on the 26th of February, the Second on the 28th, and the Third on the 3d of March. The convalescents from the hospital and men otherwise detained went a day or two later, in charge of Surgeon McClure. The route was by rail to Burlington, thence across the Mississippi and through Illinois, by way of Galesburg and Alton, to East St.

Louis. Crossing the river there, the battalions marched through St. Louis, and were quartered in Benton Barracks.

Surrounded here by a large number of other troops, some of whom had already been in the field, occupied at once and actively in the many duties of soldiers preparing for active service, and the whole camp a constant and exhilarating military scene, the change in the life of our men was very great; and battles seemed to them very near at hand. The remainder of the clothing, blankets, and horse equipments required were now issued, together with camp equipage, tents, and wagons. And to the heavy dragoon sabres were added firearms. But what arms! About four hundred men were loaded with "Austrian" rifles, a very heavy and clumsy, though rather short, infantry gun, a muzzle-loader, with a ramrod. Half the remainder had "Starr's" revolver, a five-shooter, percussion-cap and paper-cartridge pistol, of a bad pattern and poorly made, while all, or nearly all, received a pair of horse-pistols, to be carried in holsters on the pommel of the saddle, the smooth-bore, single-barrelled, muzzle-loader used in the Mexican war.

These rifles and revolvers never gained favor in the regiment; indeed, it is probable that they did more harm than good, because there was a general want of reliance upon them. The Starr revolver caused more fear in the regiment than it ever did among the enemy. Its shot was very uncertain, its machinery often failed to work, and it had a vicious tendency to go off at a wrong moment. The holster-pistols were better thought of. They were found to be more effective than the revolvers, and far more easily managed

than the rifles. Many of them were retained until the Colt's revolvers came, in 1863.

Fully equipped now for the field, the green cavalryman was a fearful and wonderful object. Mounted upon his charger, in the midst of all the paraphernalia and adornments of war, a moving arsenal and military depot, he must have struck surprise, if not terror, into the minds of his enemies. Strapped and strung over his clothes, he carried a big sabre and metal scabbard four feet long, an Austrian rifle or a heavy revolver, a box of cartridges, a box of percussion caps, a tin canteen for water, a haversack containing rations, a tin coffee-cup, and such other devices and traps as were recommended to his fancy as useful or beautiful. The weight of all this easily reached or exceeded twenty-five pounds. The army clothing was heavy, and, with the overcoat, must have been twenty pounds. So this man, intended especially for light and active service, carried on his body, in the early part of his career, a weight of nearly fifty pounds. When he was on foot he moved with a great clapping and clanking of his arms and accoutrements, and so constrained by the many bands crossing his body that any rapid motion was absurdly impossible. When he was mounted, his surrounding equipments were doubled in number, and his appearance became more ridiculous. His horse carried, fastened to the saddle, a pair of thick leather holsters with pistols, a pair of saddle-bags filled with the rider's extra clothing, toilet articles, and small belongings, a nose-bag, perhaps filled with corn, a heavy leather halter, an iron picket-pin with a long lariat or rope for tethering the horse, usually two horse-shoes with extra nails, a curry-comb and horse-brush, a set of gun-tools

and materials for the care of arms, a rubber blanket or *poncho*, a pair of woollen blankets, a blouse, a cap or hat, and such other utensils and articles of clothing or decoration as the owner was pleased to keep. This mass of furniture, with the saddle, would weigh in most cases seventy pounds. So, in the first marches, the unfortunate horse was compelled to carry a burden ranging from two hundred to two hundred and fifty pounds. When the rider was in the saddle, begirt with all his magazine, it was easy to imagine him protected from any ordinary assault. His properties rose before and behind him like fortifications, and those strung over his shoulders covered well his flanks. To the uninitiated it was a mystery how the rider got into the saddle; how he could rise to a sufficient height and how then descend upon the seat was the problem. The irreverent infantry said that it was done with the aid of a derrick, or by first climbing to the top of a high fence or the fork of a tree.

It was perhaps due to the custom of carrying these complex incumbrances that the story became current among the rebels in the East, in the early part of the war, that the Yankee cavalymen were strapped to their saddles to prevent their running away.

Yet some of the men were not content with the regulation load. They added a set of plate-armor to it. Among the scores of articles for various uses which were peddled in the camps within the first year of the war, was an "armored vest." It was a vest of blue cloth, cut in military style, with two plates of steel, formed to fit the body and fastened between the cloth and the lining, so as to cover the front of the wearer from the neck to the waist. Samples of the plates

were exhibited in the camps, with deep marks upon them where bullets had failed to penetrate, a spectacle which, with the glib tongues of the dealers, induced a few of the officers and men to buy ; and some of the horses, accordingly, had eight or ten pounds more to carry.

Not for long, however, did any of the horses bear these dreadful loads. The evident bad effect upon the horses, the care of so many articles, the fact that some of them were not used often enough to justify the trouble of keeping them, and the invaluable lesson steadily taught by experience, that only a few things are really *needed* by a soldier, presented a succession of reasons for diminishing the inventory. The few "armored vests" disappeared on the first march. The lariat was of little use, it often entangled the feet of horses and burned them, and, with its big picket-pin, it was "lost."¹ The nose-bag was thrown away by many, and carried empty as much as possible by others. The rider's clothing was reduced to the least possible—a mere change of underclothing in addition to the garments worn. The hat was stripped of its trimmings, or disappeared entirely in favor of the cap. The pair of blankets was reduced to a single one. Of the small articles for toilet and other uses, only those absolutely necessary were retained. One horseshoe and four nails only were carried, unless there was an express order to carry more. If a curry-comb or brush

¹ Army officers are required to account strictly for all the equipments entrusted to the men. Those which could not be satisfactorily traced were likely to appear in the column headed "Lost." And so, some of the men, whose moral principles had become disabled or elastic, having decided that certain articles were troublesome or unnecessary, could no longer find them, and on inspection were compelled to report them "lost."

disappeared, no matter,—one man with a comb and another with a brush had enough for two. Even the supply remaining according to this description was further reduced by many of the men. It became a fine art how to lessen the burden of the horse; and the best soldiers were those whose horses were packed so lightly that the carbine was the biggest part of the load. If it was a wonder in the first campaign how a cavalryman could get on to or move his horse when equipped for the field, the wonder afterward came to be, how a man could live with so meagre an equipment. But the trooper of experience knew what he was about, and was well repaid for any personal discomfort in the good condition of his horse and his confident reliance upon him. And if any civilian friend of his, having seen him on the first campaign and again in later years, could have regretted the total disappearance of his outward splendor, his regret would have ceased when he found that the careless dress and bronzed skin covered the hardened muscle and determined spirit of a *soldier*, made effective through real needs, by great marches, habitual privations, and trials by fire.

CHAPTER II.

IN THE FIELD—MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS. A CAMPAIGN WITH THE ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST.

At the very outbreak of the war began the struggle for the possession of Missouri. In all parts of that State the Unionists and Secessionists were about equal in numbers. The State government was at first in the hands of the Secessionists, but by the prompt and vigorous action of United States officers, supported by a few of the most influential political leaders, the Unionists gained the ascendancy. In General Lyon's success at Booneville, in June, 1861, the Secession government was overthrown; and his subsequent victory at Wilson's Creek left to the rebel forces only the southwest corner of the State.

Fremont succeeded the brave Lyon, and Curtis superseded Fremont. The War Department undertook to extend its control to Arkansas. The troops in the field were largely increased, and were organized as the Army of the Southwest. With an immediate base at Springfield, this army was to defeat the combined forces of the rebels under Price, McCulloch, and Van Dorn, beyond that town, and finally to take Little Rock and occupy Arkansas. It was a greater work than was then realized. The vast distances, the rude and difficult roads, the many wide stretches of entirely

wild lands in the two States, making it impossible to rely upon the country for forage, and the heavy sick-lists inevitable in an army of green volunteers, proved to be very serious obstacles.

It was in February, 1862, when Curtis was advancing from Springfield and the enemy was falling back before him, that the Fourth Iowa Cavalry was ordered from its rendezvous to St. Louis, to become a part of his army. So when the regiment went into the field, the men expected to have immediately a share in the grand conflict by which the Union flag was to be established, not only over their neighbor State, but over the greater part of the country on their own side of the Mississippi.

At daybreak on the 10th of March, 1862, the regiment mounted and moved out from Benton Barracks, to join the Army of the Southwest. That army was more than three hundred miles distant, in the extreme northwestern county of Arkansas, and was then believed to be about to fight the decisive battle. But the fact was, that the fierce battles of Cross Hollows and Pea Ridge were already fought (March 7th and 8th), and the news that the Union army had triumphed was on the way to St. Louis.

The first stage of the movement, to Rolla, about one hundred miles southwest of St. Louis, was to be made by rail; but owing to the rains, the bad condition of the road and its rolling stock, and the clumsiness of movement by inexperienced soldiers, there was much delay. Four days were spent in getting the regiment to Rolla. The First Battalion, under Major Swan, arrived in advance. It was just going into camp, on a hill west of Rolla, in the afternoon of the 11th, when

an order was received for forty men, to march as an escort to a party of paymasters going out to Curtis' army.

This detachment was made from Company A, and Lieutenant Guylee was placed in command. It was the first service of any of the regiment in the field. The work required was active, as it was necessary for the paymasters to move rapidly; and, because of the great amount of money carried, a large part of the detachment was on guard all the time. The road was by Waynesville and Lebanon, to Springfield, where the detachment remained some days, while the troops of that post were being paid. Then, a larger force being needed for the more exposed road from Springfield to Pea Ridge, it was attached to Colonel Wright's Battalion of Missouri Cavalry, the whole forming a guard of about three hundred men, commanded by Colonel Wright. The march was continued by the battle-field of Wilson's Creek and Cassville, and ended on the 26th of March at the battle-field of Pea Ridge, where Curtis' victorious troops were lying encamped. Its duty completed, the detachment remained at Pea Ridge several days, awaiting orders, the men meanwhile greatly interested in viewing the field of the recent battles. The extraordinary extent of the field or fields, the endless *débris* of the battles, the thickly scattered shot and shell still on the ground, the shattered buildings and trees, and the numerous new-filled graves, all made a vivid impression upon the minds of these green volunteers, who had come out to shoot and be shot.

A few days later this detachment countermarched to Springfield. The remainder of the regiment had

moved on from Rolla to Springfield, though very slowly, the roads being heavy from rains, and several halts being made while companies were detached and sent out for different purposes to different places off the line of march.

One of these detachments was composed of Companies B and E, commanded by Captain Peters of B. Company E was under its First-Sergeant, Exum Saint. The Captain's orders were to occupy the country and patrol the roads between Rolla and Jefferson City, about fifty miles, to preserve order there, and especially to prevent the passage to the southwest of Secessionists who were believed to be bent upon joining Price. The detachment thus became part of a cordon which was then stretched quite across the State; and it remained in this service two or three weeks, when it was relieved by other cavalry and went on to Springfield. One of its captures made while patrolling was a small party of white men, mounted and in citizens' dress, who had in their possession a negro man in handcuffs, fastened in a crouching posture on a horse. The account given of themselves by the whites was, that they were civil officers from Texas and that the negro was a fugitive from justice. They had no papers to confirm that statement, nor any paper at all but a pass bearing the name of the commandant at Jefferson City. It was not at all probable that, a year after the war was begun, the Governor of Texas would send civil officers to Missouri for a black delinquent. Not only was it a year after the beginning of the war, but five or six battles and many minor engagements had been fought in Missouri, and substantially the whole State was under martial law and controlled by the Union army. By

any reasonable construction of appearances the men were merely slave-hunters and their captive a fugitive slave. The party was reported to Captain Peters, but he felt compelled by the pass to avoid interference. The black captive was carried away in his chains.

Another detachment was composed of Companies F and L, under Captain Winslow. On the day following their arrival in Rolla, these companies were ordered to reinforce a body of cavalry stationed at Salem, about fifty miles southwest. They started at four o'clock in the afternoon and, with great efforts, succeeded in marching about eight miles before ten o'clock that night. They were delayed by the incessant trouble they had in moving their four over-loaded company wagons, each drawn by six mules for the first time harnessed together, over a hilly road. In later years they would have gone with one wagon or none at all, and would not have permitted any serious delay from such a cause. The wagons being lightened during the night, a march of about twenty-five miles was made the next day. In the evening of that day, when the companies were in camp, an officer appeared, sent from Salem, who represented that there was immediate danger of an attack upon the town, and begged that the detachment be hurried through before daylight. Six men were left with the wagons, and the remainder, marching all night as rapidly as the bad roads would permit, arrived at Salem at daybreak; but they found that the fear of an attack had arisen only from the report that a scouting party of rebel cavalry had been seen near the town. The two companies remained several days at Salem, until orders were received to join their regiment at Springfield. On their way, two

other companies of the regiment, D and G, under Captain Spearman, were met and added to the command. These companies had been scouting every day since their arrival at Rolla. They had marched many miles without an opportunity to do anything worth recording.

At Springfield all the companies were encamped together, west of the town, in tents, and remained there about three weeks. The weather was very rainy, and the mud was so deep, in the camp as well as the roads, that any movement was difficult, whether on foot or by horses. But the time was occupied, as far as practicable, in drilling, instruction, and practice in field movement. There were large details for picketing and other guard duty, and for some scouting, but the most important experience was one which showed its importance later, in its effect upon the health of the men. The unavoidable exposure to the wet and cold in that camp, and that imprudence in diet and neglect of precaution which always characterize green soldiers, were no doubt the causes of the general and destructive illness which soon afterward afflicted the regiment.

General Curtis now undertook his campaign against Little Rock, but a direct march was impossible for lack of supplies. About the 10th of April he left Pea Ridge and moved eastward, his immediate objective point being West Plains, a village about sixty miles south of Rolla. To that point supplies were to be forwarded from Rolla, and then Arkansas was to be invaded by way of Batesville.

On the 14th of April, under orders to join the army column, the Fourth Iowa broke camp at Springfield and marched southward, on the Ozark road. The

weather had grown milder. There were still occasional heavy rains, but the sun was shining, the air was balmy, the trees and grass were all in fresh green, the thousands of peach trees, in orchards and thickly scattered along the roads, were in the full wealth of their delicate bloom, and every day the scene was one of charming beauty. On the 16th, General Curtis was met at Forsyth, where he at once ordered a "review" of this new regiment. Along the very muddy road, in a prolonged, pouring rain, the companies were drawn up in parade line; and the general and his large staff went splashing by at a gallop, both reviewers and reviewed being hidden in rubber *ponchos* and hardly able to see each other through the storm. That was the introduction to the army; and the work of the regiment was laid out at once. The same afternoon several detachments were made from it, and sent off in different directions southward, upon different errands. All of the detachments had hard night marches, and all returned to the column next day without reporting any important incident, except one. That was a detachment of about 150 men from Companies E, F, G, and K, commanded by Captain Drummond. It had the fortune to be the first of the regiment to be engaged with the rebels. Captain Drummond's command made part of a force of cavalry under Colonel McCrillis, of the Third Illinois, which was sent east and south toward White River, with orders to destroy the saltpetre works then operated by the rebels at different places along that stream, particularly near Talbot's Ferry. The company detachments were commanded, E by Lieutenant Perkins, F by Lieutenant Heacock, G by Captain Tullis, and K by Lieutenant Hart.

After a march of one day, much of the time in heavy rain, it was learned that work was going on at a nitre cave on the White, near the mouth of Little North Fork, eighteen miles farther south; and Colonel McCrillis sent Captain Drummond, with Companies G and K of the Fourth Iowa, to destroy the property. The march was made in the night, and was delayed by darkness and a succession of thunder-storms, but the end of it was reached soon after daylight, and the cave and works were seen on the face of the hill rising from the south bank of the river. The rebels holding the place showed themselves boldly, and indulged in very saucy remarks and invitations to "come over." There was no ford, the river was high, and they supposed themselves safe. But Drummond's men found rowboats some miles up the river, brought them down, and, under cover of a fire from a part of the command on the bank, they crossed and destroyed the works and all property there, the enemy's guard running away after a slight skirmish. No one was hurt among Drummond's men, and he returned to the main column on the road on the 19th.

The same day Colonel McCrillis sent Lieutenant Heacock, with his own company, in advance of the column, with orders to march rapidly upon Talbot's Ferry, on the White River, and seize the ferry. When he reached the place, Heacock found a company of armed "Butternuts"¹ stationed on the opposite bank, guarding the ferry-boat, which was moored there.

¹ This was a name of good-natured contempt applied by Union soldiers to the countrymen of the Southwest. Almost without exception they wore clothes made of coarse homespun cloth, dyed by the women from the bark of the butternut tree. The color was a dirty yellow or faded brown, often an amusing complement to the sallow complexion and yellowish hair of the wearers.

The "Butternuts" not appearing to be regular soldiers, Heacock held a parley with them, in the hope of getting the boat without a fight. Failing in that, and seeing that they considered themselves on the rebel side in the war, Heacock brought out his men and fired several volleys upon them. The fire was returned, and a ball struck Heacock in the forehead and killed him. Sergeant Chaney succeeded to the command, and retired his men, sending back a report to Colonel McCrillis. The other Fourth Iowa companies were then ordered forward under Captain Drummond, with a howitzer. Night coming on, Drummond went into camp, soon after he arrived at the ferry. The next morning the rebels were still posted on the opposite bank, and fire was opened upon them again, the howitzer being used with the small-arms. They were finally driven off. But now the river was greatly swollen, from the rains, and a crossing was deemed too dangerous, even with the boat. Colonel McCrillis therefore ended the expedition here, and, moving across the country eastward, rejoined the army at Rockbridge.

Lieutenant Heacock's body was carried along to Vera Cruz, where it was buried. His death caused a great deal of feeling in the regiment. He was much admired for his fine, brave spirit, and he was the first man of the regiment killed in battle. His popularity, his courage, the picturesque scene and manner of his fall, and his being the first man killed, all contributed to make his death the most impressive of all that occurred in the regiment during the war.

The army moved slowly eastward, the cavalry constantly active in front and on the flanks, until West Plains was reached. The rainy season was ended and

the sun had become very hot. Many men fell ill. To the dreadful diarrhoea and dysentery, which had already greatly enfeebled the new soldiers, was now added the more dreadful camp-fever. All available buildings at West Plains were turned into hospitals, and hundreds of the sick were left there. As the column moved on through the miasmatic swamps of Arkansas still more fell by the way. They were put into ambulances or empty wagons, or left at houses along the road. The mounted column of the regiment was diminished in number almost as if a plague had struck it. Some of the unfortunates died, and others were afterward discharged, disabled by the diseases contracted at this time.

The regiment marched in the rear of the army to Batesville, by way of Mammoth Spring and Strawberry Plains. At the wonderful Mammoth Spring¹ it encamped one night, and had an exciting experience in its first night alarm. A horse frightened outside the camp had got loose and galloped down the road upon the picket-post. It was very dark, and the green picket naturally, if not properly, fired upon him. The shot was heard in camp, and at once it was imagined that the camp was attacked. The whole regiment was roused, and there was the wildest confusion of orders and movements. Horses were saddled and arms seized in a fever of excitement and with a great deal of noise. Each company commander formed his men on the spot that was nearest, and there were as many lines as companies. The buglers were ringing out half a dozen

¹ A spring or group of springs rising in a round lake about a hundred yards across, very deep, and throwing out a large creek, never varying much in size, the water very pure and cold.

different orders, and a hundred voices were bawling through the woods, "Put out the fires!—Put out the fires!"

But there was no enemy. The companies nearest the picket soon learned what had occurred. After half an hour of bewilderment and uproar, the horses were unsaddled and the men set about recovering their scattered and battered properties.

There is a story that, in the beginning of the alarm, the Colonel, suddenly wakened and excited, called for "Tobe" (Bartruff, the Chief-Bugler). "Tobe" appeared, bugle in hand, and the Colonel cried, "Blow, Tobe, blow!" without saying what order he should blow. "Tobe" stood a moment in embarrassment, and the Colonel shouted again, "Blow! Why don't you blow?" "But *what* shall I blow?" cried the anxious trumpeter. The Colonel gasped for breath in his wrath until he could scream, "*Blow?*—blow your *bugle*, damn you!"

The regiment moved on toward Batesville, and reached that beautiful little town, on the White River, early in May. In the morning of the day it arrived, it was met in the road by a party of about forty men, mostly in "butternut" clothes, carrying the "Stars-and-Stripes." They said they were Union men, that they wanted to aid the Union cause, and that there were many Union men in that region who would never go into the rebel service. Such scenes are said to have been common during the first year of the war; and, in fact, several regiments were enlisted for the Union army in Arkansas as well as in other "seceded" States.

Batesville, like West Plains, became a hospital.

Large numbers of sick and debilitated men were left there, while those still fit for duty moved on to the Little Red River, on the way to Little Rock.

General Curtis, finding the enemy at Searcy, a few miles beyond the Little Red, and believing that they meant to hold that place in force, halted his column. He occupied a line on the Little Red, and some detachments were sent to make a demonstration upon the rebel position. There was a little fighting beyond the river, between infantry, but the Union troops retired to the Little Red line; and the army remained there inactive for several weeks. The Fourth Iowa was on the right flank, near the river, and furnished detachments daily for scouting, reconnoitring, foraging, and guarding foraging trains. The most of these marches were made south of the river, which was crossed by fords, and several were made in force, all the available men of the regiment turning out with the other cavalry of the army. Small numbers of the rebel cavalry were seen at times, and occasionally a few shots were exchanged. On the 3d of June Company C, under Captain Porter, was suddenly attacked by a body of rebel cavalry at a ford on the Little Red where it was posted as guard. The company broke up and dispersed at the first fire. Corporals Butcher and Browning were wounded and, with Private Murdock, captured. They were confined at Little Rock until August, when they were exchanged.

General Curtis had expected to receive reinforcements and supplies from Memphis, by boats up the White River, but none came. Communication with Missouri could be broken any day, rations and forage were rapidly diminishing, and the surrounding country

was already nearly stripped. The long lists of sick and disabled were fast growing longer. The affair of Company C convinced Curtis that the enemy was advancing upon him, and he decided to retire. The same day he began to fall back upon Batesville. The retreat was slow, the Fourth Iowa and the other cavalry being kept daily scouting back, to and across the Little Red, with one march of two days westward into the Salado Mountains; and the army was not all behind the White River, at Batesville, until the 11th. There it remained two weeks, engaged only in scraping together the remnants of food in the country within reach of the cavalry, and in the care of the large numbers of sick. At last, on the 24th of June, no relief appearing, and the condition of the army becoming alarming, the general began a movement down the east side of the White River, with the intention, if aid should not come by boats, to march across the country to the Mississippi.

Meantime Company F of the Fourth Iowa had an independent career. It was detached at Batesville, under Captain Winslow, about the middle of May, and placed in the service of Captain Banning, the Chief Commissary of the army. In this service the company was very actively employed in gathering provisions from the plantations, and in guarding the commissary trains and parties of men grinding at the mills in different places.

Its first capture was a steamboat loaded with sugar and molasses, which was taken without a fight on the White River about twenty miles north of Batesville. Among other places visited was Calico Rock, which the company occupied for a day and a night, during which time it loaded about one hundred wagons with

provisions seized there. On the way back to Batesville with this train, it was several times engaged in desultory firing with parties of rebels across the river.

One day, the 7th of June, it was sent twenty miles up the south bank of the White, to bring away a detachment of infantry who were employed there in harvesting wheat. The undertaking was thought to be very hazardous, as it was reported to General Curtis that a large force of rebel cavalry had appeared between the harvesters and the army. By a very rapid march the company reached the place and brought off the men, but on the way back it had a fight with a party of the enemy, whose numbers could not be ascertained because of the thick forest and underbrush in which they remained. Captain Winslow charged into the wood, however, driving the rebels, and following as far as seemed prudent. In this affair one of the company, Corporal John G. Carson, was mortally wounded, but no one else was struck.

On the 14th of July, twelve men of the company, out on a foraging detail under Sergeant Curtiss, while loading their wagons at Gist's plantation, twenty miles west from Helena, were attacked by a detachment of a hundred mounted rebels under Lieut.-Col. Chappel. Curtiss' men were mounted on mules, and his three wagons were just loaded with meat. He formed in line and received a charge with great pluck, but the mules behaved badly, and the little party was immediately broken up, with one killed, five wounded, and three of the wounded and two others captured.¹ When the news reached Captain Winslow, he took all the remaining mounted men of his company, rode at

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

high speed to the place, overtook and attacked the rebels, and recaptured one of the wounded and all the wagons. The four other prisoners came into camp within a few days, released on parole, one of them, Sibley, very tenderly brought by a citizen in whose house he had been left wounded. It is remarkable that one of the men wounded in this affair (Sadler) was struck by five balls, and another (Sibley) by three. Sadler recovered, and served actively to the end of his term of enlistment, but Sibley was killed in another action before the wounds received in this were wholly healed.

The company was not returned to the regiment when the army reached Helena, but was kept on special service in that town, under the successive commanding generals there, first in the commissary department and afterward upon provost duty, until the regiment was ordered into the Vicksburg campaign, in April, 1863. During this service it was in a camp of its own, just west of Helena, at the foot of the bluffs.

The longest march made by any of the regiment up to this time, apart from the march of the army, was made by Companies A and M under Captain Rector. A very long train of wagons, ambulances, and carriages, filled with the sick and disabled, was sent from Batesville to Salem, Mo., and these companies were sent as a guard. They left Batesville June 11th, and reached Salem, without any incident of note, after four days' steady marching. On the 16th they set out to return, guarding a train carrying supplies, and were again four days on the road.

The movement of the army down the White was very slow, the great heat, the constant search for food

and forage, and the large numbers of sick in wagons and ambulances, making any speed impracticable. The enemy added what obstacles he could in industriously blocking the roads by felling the very heavy timber across them. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry marched in the rear. On the 4th of July there was a halt at Jacksonport. There had been a hope that the relief boats from Memphis would get up as far as that town, but the only boat found there was in the service of the rebels. It was taken and burnt. General Curtis sent a detachment rapidly to Des Arcs, fifty miles farther down the river, upon a last hope of finding boats there. One day too late! Halleck had sent boats and troops to aid Curtis against Little Rock, but, getting no news of him, they had steamed away the day before.

Meantime the main column dragged along near the river until the 7th of July, when a considerable force of the enemy, under General Matlock, attempted to prevent further progress. This was at the River Cache, near a small town called Cottonplant. There was a sharply contested engagement, in which Colonel C. E. Hovey, with part of his brigade of infantry and a battalion of the First Indiana Cavalry, defeated the rebels and drove them to a considerable distance.

General Curtis, much disappointed by his failure to join with the fleet, now prepared for a forced march to the Mississippi, at Helena. The wagons were permitted to haul only commissary supplies, sick men, and ammunition. All other property theretofore carried in the wagons was destroyed, including a large quantity of cavalry saddles and equipments, which had accumulated through the disabling of men and horses.

The troops were forbidden to carry anything not absolutely necessary. The wounded and sick filled all the ambulances, a large part of the wagons, and many carriages taken from the plantations, and constituted much the greater part of the train.

Then, on the 10th of July, moving by way of Clarendon, and there turning eastward, the column marched as fast as possible toward Helena. The intense heat, the enfeebled condition of the men, and the cumbrous train of the disabled, prevented any haste; but a picked body of infantry, sent ahead, found the way clear, and reached Helena, sixty-five miles from Clarendon, on the 12th. The main column did not get in until the 15th. In the afternoon of that day the Fourth Iowa Cavalry was stopped at Witherspoon's plantation, about six miles west of Helena, on the Little Rock road; and there went into camp.

It was the end of the first campaign of the regiment. Four months before it had set out from St. Louis, and during the last three months it had been marching nearly all the time, in excessive rains, in excessive heat, and mostly in very unhealthful regions. It suffered greatly, in the illness of a large number and the enervation in a greater or less degree of all the others, death resulting on the march or later in many cases. The hardships of campaigning appeared to these new soldiers to be very real and very great; and, as they could not see that anything was gained by the campaign, they were not only sick and weary, but discouraged.

CHAPTER III.

HELENA.

Now began a different life and a long period of post service in Arkansas. More than eight months the regiment remained in camp at Helena, kept very busy, but always hoping and looking for the time when it would be assigned some important service in the field, of which the people of the North would hear.

The time spent at Helena, while it was passing, seemed wasted ; but no doubt it was an experience of much value. It was certainly of value to the cause, since Helena, in view of its commanding position, could not be left to the enemy ; and, in the long wait, the men learned at least patience and cheerfulness, and not a little of the art of fighting under command.

The first camp of the regiment at Helena was on a very fine site, a piece of dry and gently rolling upland, covered by an open wood, mostly of splendid spreading beech trees. There could hardly have been found a better place in that region ; and the men liked it so well that they were very reluctant to leave it, as they had to do two or three months later. While at this place, the regiment was attached to the brigade of Colonel William Vandever, who had distinguished himself at Pea Ridge. This brigade comprised Colonel Vandever's own regiment, the Ninth Iowa Infantry,

one or two other regiments of infantry, and one Iowa battery.

The duty done during this period was picketing on the roads west, north, and south ; many scouting expeditions, usually toward Little Rock, sometimes made within one day, sometimes occupying two or more days ; many foraging trips, and many marches in guard of wagon trains hauling corn or cotton from the interior to Helena. Armed rebels were seen on these marches often enough to keep up the animated daily talk about them, and sometimes there was an exchange of shots.

Considerable changes in the organization and membership of the regiment occurred while it was at Helena. Under General Orders No. 126 of the War Department, A. G. O., 1862, issued under the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, all volunteer cavalry regiments were reorganized. In the Fourth Iowa Cavalry the result was the loss of many men and the return of others from official or special positions to the line or the ranks.

The most marked feature of the reorganization was the discontinuance of the battalion staff and non-commissioned staff. The three majors were retained and were still nominally in command of their respective battalions, but they were not actively in command except during campaigns ; but of course they often succeeded to the command of the regiment in the absence of their superior officers. Their adjutants, quartermasters, commissaries, and non-commissioned assistants disappeared, some of them accepting the offered muster-out and others returning to the companies from which they had come. At the same time, however, the regimental staff and non-commissioned

staff were somewhat increased. There were added a Commissary, two Hospital-Stewards, and a Saddler-Sergeant, who were to do the work of the nine corresponding battalion officers. The Regimental Band was mustered out, the purpose being to allow only one band to a division. The leader and some of the bandmen accepted a muster-out, while others returned to the ranks in their several companies.

The beneficial effects of this reorganization were seen and felt at once. The companies were brought into direct relations with the regimental officers, the incessant petty difficulties arising from a division of responsibility were greatly diminished, and the field-and-staff was reduced from its unwieldy size to a force comparatively small and quickly felt.

Nobody was hurt in the regiment while at Helena until the 20th of September, when a picket-post near Polk's plantation on the Little Rock road, held by a detail of eight men from Company D, was attacked. The pickets were, of course, dismounted, their horses being kept in their rear. The rebels were mounted, but they got near the post without being discovered. Then they rode directly upon the pickets, firing as they came, killing one, wounding one, and capturing the wounded man with two others.¹ The remaining four escaped to the camp. A detachment, under Lieutenant Abraham, of D, was at once sent out in pursuit of the rebels, but they were not found.

On the 30th of September a party of rebel cavalry cut off two men of Company M from a picket-post, and captured them. All of these captured pickets were exchanged, and returned to service in November following.

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

About the first of October the force at Helena was much reduced, and Vandever and his infantry were taken away. The camp of the Fourth Iowa was then placed about two miles nearer the town, though still on the Little Rock road. The site of this camp was not so good as that of the last, the ground being steep little hills, thickly wooded; but it was well drained, and the trees were conveniently at hand when the building of winter cabins became necessary.

Two other cavalry regiments, the Fifth Kansas and the Ninth Illinois, were encamped near; but there does not appear to have been a brigade organization, nor any authority standing between the commanding officer of the Fourth Iowa and the general in command at Helena, until early in 1863, when Colonel Powell Clayton, of the Fifth Kansas, was placed in command of all the cavalry.

On the 11th of October a costly lesson in war was learned in the Fourth Iowa. Early that morning Major Rector went out on the Little Rock road with a detachment from companies A, G, and H, numbering about fifty in all, on a scout. The detachment marched fifteen miles or more into the country, without meeting the enemy, and then returned. Late in the afternoon, just after crossing Lick Creek, within three miles of the camp, it was suddenly attacked by a much larger body of rebels, the Twenty-first Texas Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Giddings. Rector's men, having seen no rebels farther out during the day, and being now on familiar ground, approaching the camp, took it for granted that there was no longer any occasion for care. They were in a lane about one fourth of a mile long, with fences on both sides, and were marching

at ease, stretched out and in bad order, careless of danger. From the place the engagement is usually called "Jones' Lane," though it appears in some reports as "Lick Creek." The column had entered the lane from a wood at the western end, and its head had nearly reached the eastern end when the attack was made upon its rear. It was altogether in a position as nearly unfit for fighting in an emergency as could well have been contrived. The attack was a complete surprise, and the men were at once disordered and frightened, but Major Rector was a brave man, and always acted in an earnest spirit. He rode back to the rear, trying to get the men into their places, and ordered the column, left in front, back through the lane, apparently with only a general purpose to move toward the enemy. He could not have known how many there were. Some had rushed down the lane upon his rear, but others, it might be a large number, were still in the woods.

His movement placed him at every disadvantage. He was hemmed in by the fences, his men confused and irresolute, and the enemy of unknown strength and sheltered by the wood. The advanced rebels fell back before him, but his little column had hardly reached the west end of the lane, still in bad order, when it was fiercely charged by at least double its own number, and was quickly broken to pieces and driven from the field. Three men, all in G, were killed, two were wounded, one mortally, and fifteen were captured.¹ Major Rector was captured. Private John W. Allen, of A, was among those taken, but he was afterward killed, barbarously, for refusing to run with his captors; for the rebels were attacked and defeated, almost

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

immediately after their success, by another detachment of the Fourth Iowa.

The noise of Rector's engagement was heard by Lieutenant Parsons of Company B, who had been sent out the same morning with forty men of his company on the Marianna road. He, too, was returning to camp without any incident to report. On hearing the firing, he moved his command at once and in quick time in the direction of the sound, and came upon the scene just after the capture. Indeed, more of Rector's men would have been lost if he had not appeared. He immediately charged upon the rebels, boldly and in good order. Although his force was smaller than Rector's and much smaller than Giddings', the suddenness and assurance of his attack brought the success they so often bring in cavalry fighting. The rebels were broken as easily as they had broken Rector's men. Several of them were killed and wounded, and in a few minutes Giddings and eleven of his men were prisoners in Parsons' hands. The remainder retreated rapidly on the Little Rock road, their prisoners being kept running ahead. Parsons thought it imprudent to follow. His loss was four wounded, including himself, and two captured.¹

When the news reached camp it was dark and pursuit was not practicable. At daybreak, however, a large part of the regiment was on the road, marching very fast toward Little Rock. Late in the afternoon, the enemy not having been overtaken and it being thought dangerous to venture farther with so small a force, the pursuit was given up.

If Rector had been prepared to meet an enemy at any time; if he had been moving in order, with rear-guard

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties. "

well out ; if, when first attacked, he had moved on eastward, through the lane, and posted himself beyond it, and there awaited further attack ; if, even after he decided to return, left in front, he had managed to keep his men in order and had forced them, at all hazards, into or through the rebel line, the result would have been very different. If Rector had lacked courage or mental ability, the disaster might have been charged to his weakness ; but as he possessed both qualities, and evidently tried to do what at the instant seemed to him the right thing, the incident provoked much discussion. The other officers noted its points for future use, and the lesson must have been of much value.

The prompt action and substantial success of Parsons gave him, deservedly, great credit. The captured men were all paroled at Little Rock about ten days after their capture, and then returned to the camp at Helena. They were formally exchanged and restored to service the first of the following December.

John Allen well deserves a word more than the mention of his death. He was a man of rare merits. He was highly distinguished for his courage and zeal as a soldier, his intelligence and ready judgment, the purity of his life, and his transparent frankness and unfailing courtesy. He was very popular, but it was a popularity combined with great respect. He would inevitably have become a power in his company and regiment if he had lived.

Some amusing incidents are told of the rout of Rector's command. Many of the horses were disabled in the first volleys, and no doubt all the captured were taken after they were dismounted. But at least one of the dismounted escaped capture. He was a man of

A, who often furnished fun for his comrades without intending it. His luck in getting into ridiculous positions was extraordinary, and never left him. He did not permit this opportunity to go unimproved. He was a short, stout man, his form presenting several great projections. When he lost his horse he went lumbering down the lane afoot, while the rebels were engaged with the others behind him, till he came to a gutter or culvert across the road. It was covered by a couple of planks, laid the length of the gutter and supported by short cross-pieces under the ends, so that by the weight of horses or wagons they were bent down in the middle. The frightened fugitive no sooner saw the hole under the planks than he thought it a good place for hiding, and crawled in. But the space was shallow for a man of his thickness, and while his front was on the ground his rear was against the planks. Hardly had he got into position when the rebels came galloping down the lane in pursuit. They rode over the little bridge with a clatter that must have seemed to him endless, and every horse struck the planks with a thump upon the protuberant portions of his body. There was no turning around, there was no getting out, unless to be killed or captured. Each thump was worse than the one before, but at last, when he thought he was nearly dead, the riding ceased, and he tried to recover his breath. But then, driven by Parsons' charge, many of the rebels rode back again, and pounded more trouble into the unhappy fellow. His torture seemed endless, but the time did come when the fighting was all over. He heard nothing more, but he was awfully battered, the situation outside was uncertain, and he remained in

his hole. Night came at last, to the relief of his mind, if not of his body, and the jellied trooper crawled out and lay in the weeds, in a field near by, until morning. Tribulation is visited upon the innocent as well as upon the sinful in this weary world, and sometimes it is dreadfully painful and laid on in unreasonable quantity. The sufferer found each inch of his flesh more tender than any other, and when he was discovered and helped to camp, it appeared to his rescuers, as well as to himself, that he had borne the brunt of the battle.

On the 22d of October another bold attack was made by the enemy within a few miles of the cavalry camp. This time it was the Fifth Kansas that suffered, losing a number of men and a large wagon-train filled with forage which they were bringing in. The Fourth Iowa, with the other cavalry regiments, was turned out at once, and marched all that night and the next day in pursuit of the rebels, without overtaking them. Camp was reached again on the 25th, men and horses worn out with the long labor and loss of sleep.

On the 8th of November Captain Peters, of B, with one hundred men of Companies B, D, H, and L, had two sharp encounters with rebel cavalry. This detachment was leading a column of six hundred cavalry, under Captain Marland L. Perkins, of the Ninth Illinois, part of a force with which Colonel William Vandever had been reconnoitring near Clarendon. At Marianna a hundred rebels held the road. Under orders, Peters dashed at them, mounted, and quickly routed them, only losing three wounded. Later, approaching Lagrange, he was suddenly attacked by a larger body. At once the Fourth Iowa charged

again, and routed the rebels, this time losing nineteen wounded.¹ The rebels lost in both fights seven killed (also reported seventeen), fourteen captured, and many wounded. The Fourth Iowa wounded included Captain Peters, Lieutenants Beckwith, Tucker, Fitch, and Groesbeck, and Corporal Charles W. Sisson, the last of whom afterward died of his wound. Peters and his men were highly praised for their spirited action.

Ten days later an expedition in force was begun against Arkansas Post, under General A. P. Hovey, and the troops were taken mostly or wholly from Helena. "The Post of Arkansas," more commonly called Arkansas Post, was an important position on the Arkansas River, about twenty miles from its mouth. It was then being strengthened by the enemy. They had already finished and equipped a heavy fort there, and were extending the works. The value of the position was, not only that it defended Little Rock against any advance up the Arkansas, but that it served as a retreat and rendezvous for the rebel gunboats operating on the Mississippi.

General Hovey was to move his troops on steamboats down the Mississippi and up the White River, and thence, through the Cut-off, into the Arkansas, thus reaching the rear of the enemy's position. The "Cut-off" is a stream or channel which connects the Arkansas and White, some fifteen miles up from the mouth of the White, where the two rivers are about six miles apart. It is navigable for small steamboats at a good stage of water.

There were about two thousand cavalry from Helena, under Colonel Bussey of the Third Iowa. The Fourth

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

Iowa furnished four hundred, under Major Spearman. The troops went from Helena on many boats, November 18th, and on the second morning reached the mouth of the White, but the water on the bar there was found to be too low. The cavalry boats were then sent up the Mississippi twenty miles, to Montgomery's Point on the Arkansas side, with orders to land there and march across the country to the Cut-off, while the infantry was expected, with smaller boats, to work its way over the bar. The same day, accordingly, the cavalry landed at the place designated, and marched through dense forests, on very low ground,¹ directly toward the White River end of the Cut-off. The expectation was that the boats which would bring the infantry up the White would ferry the cavalry over. The bank of the White was reached without incident, after a march of about fifteen miles, but no sign of boats or infantry appeared. A rebel picket-post was observed on the opposite bank, with a rowboat and a flatboat in the water. A shell was thrown over from a small howitzer, and then a soldier paddled across on a log and brought back the rowboat. With this a number of men went over and towed back the flatboat. The command meantime lay near the river waiting, while a small party was sent down the east bank to look for Hovey's steamboats. Night came on, and soon after a heavy rain began to fall. The land upon which the cavalry was bivouacked was a mere basin, that along the bank of the White and toward the Mississippi being higher, and it was the midst of a dense forest extending many miles on all sides. As the rain increased the water rose around the campers, and before daybreak it had spread so far that

¹ The water-stains on the trees in this forest, caused by the overflows of the Mississippi, were seen twenty feet or more above the ground.

there was no place left upon which to lie. The night was intensely dark, and the rain poured steadily. The men were all driven out of their blankets by rising water. Those who could not find a stump or log took to the narrow strip of land immediately by the river. The water covered all the camp-ground. The saddles and equipments were placed on the horses. Of course there was no more sleeping or lying down. It was thought dangerous to try to move the command out of such a place in the thick darkness. The men could only watch the water as it rose, and try to keep out of it. So the last hours of the night passed. When daylight came the rising had ceased, but the whole camp was seen to be a lake, the water in some parts of it several feet deep.

Meantime news had come that the infantry had failed to get into the White River, because of the bar, with an order for the return of the cavalry. The horses were saddled in the water, and had to wade in water and mud some miles, to the higher ground toward Montgomery's Point. Of course under the water the soft alluvial soil was easily penetrated, and the horses often sunk to the girth. The struggle was hard and slow, and it took the whole day to reach Montgomery's Point. The cavalry went on the boats that night, and steamed up the river, reaching Helena and returning to camp on the 25th. The expedition was wholly abandoned, and Arkansas Post remained in the possession of the enemy until it was taken by McClernand and Sherman two months later.

On the 26th of November the available men of the regiment were again ordered out as part of an expeditionary force under General A. P. Hovey, whose

orders from Grant were to move from Helena into the interior of Mississippi, to make a demonstration upon Grenada, and to destroy the railways near there. This was to be in aid of Grant's operations in northern Mississippi, looking toward Vicksburg; and the expedition is described in the chapter on Vicksburg.

Grant and Sherman were now steadily, if slowly, moving toward that great object of the war in the Mississippi valley, the capture of Vicksburg. Indeed, while the cavalry was marching on the expedition last referred to, Sherman's divisions were floating down the great river,—on their way, as it proved, to a bloody failure at Chickasaw Bluffs.

In collecting troops for that movement Sherman took some infantry from Helena. His plan of operation did not require the use of cavalry, and the several regiments of that arm at Helena, including the Fourth Iowa, were left there. But these regiments were not enough to hold the long lines which had been maintained while there was a large force at Helena, and the lines were accordingly much contracted. The cavalry was moved in from the outlying hills, where for some five months it had been pleasantly encamped, and was cantoned near the river. Indeed, the Fourth Iowa lay between the levee and the river. The river was very high and the weather was rainy, so that the place became extremely muddy and uncomfortable. The men were greatly disgusted. If they must stay at Helena—and they were much averse to doing so while the rest of the army was moving against Vicksburg,—they wanted to be on the well-drained hills among the trees. In this low and unsheltered camp on the river bank much severe illness soon appeared. There were several deaths,

among them those of Major Rector and Captain Tullis. The number of the sick and the deaths increased until, at last, after much importunity, about the middle of January, the cavalry was permitted to return to the hills. There was great rejoicing; the men would rather risk their lives with the enemy on the outer lines than with disease in that wretched canton.

The regiment was now (January, 1863), in army organization, a part of the Second Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee. It was in the District of Eastern Arkansas, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss, the cavalry division being immediately under Brig.-Gen. Cadwallader C. Washburn. But, so far as the men could see, the regiment was independent, the corps and division headquarters being at Memphis, and the brigade organization rarely appearing in actual service. It was six months later when they first learned, practically, what it was to be part of an organized body of cavalry.

The regiment was kept at hard work. The force at Helena being small, and the camp at some distance from the town, picket, patrol, escort, and other guard duty, came round frequently. Somehow, too, there was a great deal of "fatigue" duty in the service of the quartermasters and commissaries at Helena; and the cavalrymen were convinced there must be something wrong when the infantrymen quartered in the town were not required to do it all. On the other hand, the average infantryman, who seems himself to be rather fond of bearing burdens, is penetrated with the belief that a cavalryman will not work if any way of escape can be contrived. He is persuaded that the horseman

habitually resorts to untruthful devices in his desire to shirk; and he is given to repeating the time-worn jeer (provided the cavalryman is a-foot and at a safe distance), "Soldier, will you work?—No, I'll sell my shirt first!"

It was at Helena and about this time that the regiment first served directly with the Third Iowa Cavalry, a part of which was then there. From that time until the end of the war, excepting one or two short periods, these two regiments were closely connected. They were almost always in the same brigade and on the same campaigns. The men became attached to each other, and each regiment was proud of the fame of the other. They marched and fought and suffered together, and together they re-enlisted as "Veterans." During the last two years of the war they shared all honors. Sometimes one and sometimes the other was first in battle, as the order of the column might require; but it was never long until both were in the fire together. And together they marched, in battle column, ready for one more charge, on the morning of April 21, 1865, when they were stopped by that cry that thrilled every soul,—"*The war is ended!*" The brave Third Iowa! It scoured the Confederacy from Kansas to the Atlantic, and in every State in its way lie its dead and the dead of its enemies.

On the 20th of February, 1863, a force of four hundred mounted and three hundred dismounted cavalry, two hundred of the mounted being Fourth Iowa men, went out to Smizer's farm, six miles from Helena, under Major Winslow, with one hundred and twenty-five wagons, which were there loaded with corn and brought in.

On the 8th of March, a detachment of two hundred and fifty men of the Fourth Iowa, commanded by Major Spearman, forming part of a column under Major Walker, of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry, on a similar expedition, had a skirmish with the rebels at Big Creek, about ten miles west of Helena. The creek was impassable, and the enemy were on the opposite side. Private Benoni F. Kellogg, of L, a popular soldier was killed, but no one else was struck. Kellogg's comrades, unwilling to leave his body, lashed it to one of the "Woodruff" guns, and so brought it into camp, where they buried it with honors.

The Woodruff guns were three small iron pieces, throwing a two-pound solid shot, which about this time in some way came into the hands of the regiment. They were placed in charge of Private "Cy" Washburn, of B, who had a few men detailed to assist him. They were of no value, and were generally voted a nuisance. They were never known to hit anything, and never served any useful purpose, except in promoting cheerfulness in the regiment. The men were never tired of making jokes and teasing Washburn about them; but he was proud of his artillery, and thirsted for an opportunity to justify its existence. When the regiment left Helena he was not permitted to take it along with him; but he pined for a gun, and in the Vicksburg campaign he was given a small brass piece, captured at Jackson, upon which he organized another "battery" and considered himself handsomely promoted. An opportunity for glory came suddenly one fine day, but before it could be fully achieved the unfeeling rebels carried off Washburn, battery and all.

It was about this time that carbines were first issued to the regiment. Only forty could be obtained, and they were divided among several companies. They were "Hall" carbines, an inferior gun of short range, taking a paper cartridge; but they were breech-loaders, and their coming was a thing of great interest to the men. Those who did not receive them envied those who did. It was soon found, however, to be a distinction not altogether desirable; the carbine men were called to the front whenever there was a fight on hand.

The armament of the regiment in general was still very poor. A few men who had Colt's navy revolvers were the envy of their comrades, who had to put up with weapons in which they had no confidence. The clumsy Austrian (infantry) rifles, issued when the regiment was first equipped, were still in the hands of those men who had not had the hardihood or ingenuity to "lose" them. Some had revolvers of the Starr and other bad kinds, many had the single-barrelled holster-pistols, with ramrods, of the pattern in use in the Mexican war, while all had the awkwardly long and very heavy dragoon sabre, as old as the century. Every man saw and, what was much worse, *felt* the inefficiency of the arms.

Early in April it was reported that a considerable body of rebels was collected at Wittsburg on the St. Francis River, about a hundred miles northwest from Helena, and that they had steamboats there. General Gorman, then commanding at Helena, ordered out a force of about seven hundred men, under Colonel Powell Clayton, of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry, to move upon the rebels and break up their rendezvous. There were four hundred cavalry, immediately commanded

by Major Winslow, detailed from the Third and Fourth Iowa, Fifth Kansas, and Ninth Illinois. With the cavalry were sent two small howitzers. All the troops were embarked on the steamboats *Black Hawk*, *Horizon*, *Frank Steele*, and *Alone*, the night of the 5th of April; and the boats immediately steamed up the St. Francis, to a landing some distance south of Wittsburg. The cavalry was landed there, and marched toward Wittsburg. On the way, after dark, it was attacked by a party of rebels in ambush. They were driven out by a charge, but still fought obstinately for a time. There was no great number, however, and they were defeated by the advanced companies; and the march to Wittsburg was completed. But no other force of the enemy was found there, nor any steamboats. Colonel Clayton ordered a return to Helena, which the cavalry accomplished by land, the infantry remaining on the boats. In this expedition the cavalry marched, in three days, one hundred and thirty miles.

The loss of the Fourth Iowa in this affair was one killed and seven wounded, all from Company L, the "carbinemen" at the front. All the wounded were brought back to Helena. One of them, Private George W. Sheppard, had received four wounds, caused by three different bullets.¹

Thus the winter and part of the spring was employed,—in guarding, fatigue-duty, scouting, reconnoitring, with some fighting. It was very active, but seemed of little use to the cause. The men were all the time gaining experience, however, and always hoping they would yet have a hand in the taking of Vicksburg. And that day came.

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

CHAPTER IV.

VICKSBURG.

IN the spring of 1863 Vicksburg was the most distinct of the objects of attack of the Union armies, and it was one of the most important and difficult. It was of very great value to the Confederacy, both commercially and strategically. It occupied the first high ground on the Mississippi below Memphis, and it was the only place in the South where the river was reached by railways on both sides. It was the chief gateway for supplies for the Confederate armies from their vast and rich "Trans-Mississippi Department." In its fall that department would be lost, and in all the remainder of the Confederacy that loss could not be made good. At the same time its possession was absolutely essential to the cause of the North, because it controlled the natural commercial outlet of all the States between the Rocky Mountains and the Alleghanies.

With infinite labor, and great sacrifice of life and money, the Union armies had tried to reach the position. Several different plans, under different generals, had successively slowly worked their way to failure. Nothing had been gained but experience. It is easy now to see that the place might have been taken, by comparatively small efforts, at any time before the autumn of 1862. The Secessionists had assumed that

a Union army could never get so far south ; and they seem to have had no great apprehension of the success of any movement up the river from New Orleans. So until August, 1862, the defense of Vicksburg had been provided for only by inferior earthworks, with light armament, held by troops never more than a few thousands in number. In May of that year the forces sent against it from New Orleans, under General Williams and Admiral Farragut, might have succeeded. Farragut himself seems to have been of that opinion ; and Sherman thought it would have been easy to make the whole river ours that summer. In June, General Halleck could have taken it, by a campaign on the lines of the Mississippi Central railway and the Yazoo River. Although the defenses were strengthened in July, the addition of ten thousand men to the force with which, in that month, General Williams and Admiral Farragut made their second attempt from the south, would have insured success. In August it was the only position occupied by the rebels on the whole length of the Mississippi. The armies under Halleck and the fleet under Ellet had captured or occupied every post of any strategic importance above, and Butler and Farragut controlled every point below.

But opportunities were lost, and in the fatal delay that followed the rebels not only greatly increased and improved their fortifications and organized an adequate defending force, but they recovered all of the river between Helena and Baton Rouge, erecting and manning earthworks and batteries at all commanding points between those places, as well as the strong fort at Arkansas Post already described.¹

¹ At page 56.

In October, Halleck having been called to Washington to act as General-in-Chief of the armies, Grant was practically in command of the forces holding the great river above Helena ; but he was without instructions for future operations. His orders still came from Halleck, but no movement was ordered or proposed. His army was then in northern Mississippi, near Corinth, inactive. Early in November, apparently upon his own responsibility, he ordered an advance from Grand Junction and Corinth, intending to occupy Holly Springs and Grenada. Although this movement does not appear to have been made as part of a distinct campaign against Vicksburg, it nevertheless was the first step upon the line upon which Grant thought that Vicksburg should be reached. Halleck gave his approval of the movement in a vague way, in meagre despatches ; but stopped it when the advance had reached Holly Springs, by telegraphing that reinforcements to the number of twenty thousand were being forwarded. If these reinforcements had been sent, or if Grant had been permitted to proceed with the force he had, Vicksburg might have been taken six months earlier than it was, and at a cost vastly less than that which was afterward required.

While Grant was waiting for the promised troops, Halleck telegraphed him that Memphis would be made the depot of a joint military and naval expedition against Vicksburg. This was the first intimation to Grant of an entirely new plan. He was much puzzled, but explanation came in succeeding events. That noisy, ambitious, "political" general, McClelland, of Illinois, had left the division he commanded in Grant's army and gone to Washington. He was willing to

place at the disposal of the War Department the whole of his military genius, and would accept a position in which that genius would be unrestricted. He succeeded in inducing Lincoln and Stanton to authorize him to raise new troops in Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana, to be commanded by himself for an *independent* campaign against Vicksburg !¹ He would quickly clear the Mississippi and open the way to New Orleans ! There was nothing small in McClelland's plans. It is most difficult now to realize the fact that the President and the Secretary of War were actually supporting and urging on two independent generals in the field, carrying on independent campaigns at the same time and with the same objective, the one hampered and restricted incessantly by the despatches of the General-in-Chief at Washington, while the other dealt directly with the Secretary of War upon a wholly different plan of operation ! History records some military ideas that have made the judicious grieve, but this amazing piece of management must be unique.

The situation was a very serious one to Grant when he was stopped at Holly Springs. He was not ordered to Memphis ; his army was not taken from him ; nor was the movement he had begun countermanded. He determined to go on. He re-issued his order to Sherman to join him with the two divisions then at Memphis, and directed Curtis, at Helena, to send a force across the country eastward, to threaten Grenada. But Halleck then again interfered, with an order to Sherman directing him to hold at Memphis a considerable part of his troops. There was no order issued to

¹ By an order of the Secretary of War, dated October 21, 1862, approved by the President, McClelland's army was to be called the " Army of the Mississippi," Grant's being the " Army of the Tennessee."

Grant, however, and he pushed on, occupying Holly Springs in force, and marching toward Grenada.

This movement was begun when the troops who had gone on the expedition with General Hovey against Arkansas Post, as already mentioned,¹ were on their way back to Helena. The next morning after they landed at Helena, November 26th, Hovey took them and all the other available troops at that post, infantry and cavalry, and crossed the river for the demonstration upon Grenada. Five or six regiments of cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa, were represented in detachments, numbering in all about two thousand, commanded by General C. C. Washburn. This force landed at Friar's Point, in Mississippi, a few miles below Helena, and marched toward Grenada, the cavalry all well in front, while Grant's column was slowly advancing below Holly Springs. The Helena cavalry had a very hard march through the worst of swamps and across several bayous and rivers; but it reached and destroyed the railroad near Coffeeville and thence moved toward Grenada. It then marched northward, on the Memphis road, to Panola, and destroyed the railroad at that place. It returned by nearly the same route to Helena, exhausted by extraordinary labors and loss of sleep, though it was absent only a week. There was more or less skirmishing nearly every day, in some of which the Fourth Iowa was engaged, though without any loss.

The work of this expedition appeared to the cavalrymen to be not of much value, though many good horses were captured and brought to camp, together with several hundred negro men, nearly all of whom

¹ At page 56.

enlisted. But afterward it was learned that the expedition had caused great loss, sacrifice, and labor on the part of the rebels, General Pemberton having been made so apprehensive by it that he abandoned his whole line on the Tallahatchie, with important forts and works which he had just erected at different points upon that river, and retired to a new line on the Yallobusha.

Grant moved on to Oxford, and learned that the enemy were at Grenada in force. Halleck still gave only a half-hearted support. He seemed to prefer a movement by the Mississippi River. Grant suggested holding his position in the interior and also sending a force down the Mississippi. Then Halleck ordered a part of the troops back from Oxford to Memphis, to be sent down the river. Finally, in December, he gave Grant authority to use his own judgment. This was substantially an authority to take charge of all operations against Vicksburg. Halleck had now at last committed himself; but Grant knew that his preference was for a movement down the river, and as Halleck was his superior officer, he must have been influenced by that knowledge. He immediately consulted Sherman, and they agreed that Sherman should take two divisions back to Memphis, collect all the troops he could there and at Helena, move down the river in steamboats, land at the mouth of the Yazoo, and get into the rear of Vicksburg; while Grant himself was to push along the Mississippi Central railway, and effect a junction with Sherman, if possible, between the Yazoo and Big Black rivers. Admiral Porter, with his gunboats, was to co-operate with Sherman's movement.

Upon reporting to Washington the orders given to execute this plan, Grant received from Halleck a message of approval, but he added, "The President may insist upon designating a separate commander." McClelland was still at the North, absent from his post, working for an independent command. Grant pushed his preparations, however, in his persistent way, and Sherman was getting his army into order at Memphis. Another despatch from Halleck, a week later, stated that the President had ordered that McClelland should command the river movement. Grant sent the message at once to Sherman at Memphis and to McClelland in Illinois. But that day the rebel General Forrest cut the telegraph line, and neither Sherman nor McClelland received the message. A few days later, on the 20th of December, Sherman left Memphis, with three divisions, infantry and artillery, on steamboats, was joined by another division at Helena, and reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 22d.

But while Sherman was moving to the mouth of the Yazoo, the enemy, under Forrest and Van Dorn, were trying to cut off Grant's communication with Memphis. They had complete success, Forrest on the Mobile & Ohio road and Van Dorn on the Mississippi Central; and they destroyed a very large amount of army supplies. The country about Grant was exhausted, the armies of both sides having been drawing upon it for the greater part of a year, and he saw that he must retire. He sent a message to Sherman to that effect, but it was received too late to prevent Sherman's attack. That great fighter landed his army on the south bank of the Yazoo, opposite the Walnut Hills, a

few miles northeast of Vicksburg, made his famous assault upon the Chickasaw Bluffs, and failed.

McClelland, who had not accomplished anything under his authority to raise a separate army in the Western States, now appeared and took command of all the forces about Vicksburg, under the "designation" referred to by Halleck, and in a few days moved up the Arkansas River against Arkansas Post. Sherman was second in command, and Admiral Porter's fleet was in support. The position, strongly fortified, was assaulted and taken. In this battle, Lieutenant S. Kirkwood Clark, Adjutant of the Twenty-fifth Iowa Infantry, a nephew of Governor Kirkwood of Iowa, formerly Second Lieutenant of Company A of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, was severely wounded. He died of the wound after a short time. He was a very handsome and brilliant young officer, and extremely popular in the Fourth Cavalry.

The next step in McClelland's plan of campaign was a movement far up the Arkansas River, intended to be a diversion in favor of the Union army in Missouri. His plan of operation against Vicksburg was very comprehensive. It was as if he were going to take Cairo by marching up the Missouri River. He actually had his troops well on the way, taking so many boats that Grant was seriously crippled by lack of transportation, when Grant objected. Oddly enough, though Grant was carrying on a campaign of immense importance by way of the river, he had no command over troops or territory on the west bank. He now modestly advised the War Department that, whoever the commanding general might be, he ought to have power on both banks of the river. Sound advice that.

Halleck at last telegraphed, extending Grant's command over all troops and territory west of the river, so far as he might find advisable. This was about the middle of January. Grant immediately recalled McClernand and returned him to his proper place, the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. By one of the many conflicting orders of the War Department in those days, McClernand had been assigned to that corps.

The situation of the armies at that time, as well as Halleck's instruction, seemed necessarily to limit the advance upon Vicksburg to the river route. Grant collected all the troops he could in the Mississippi valley, put them into four army corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and assigned to command them, respectively, Major-Generals McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. Hurlbut's corps was left at Memphis. The others were at Miliken's Bend and Young's Point, on the west bank of the Mississippi, about ten and twenty miles above Vicksburg, and Grant was with them. The troops at Helena were ordered into McClernand's corps, and so the Fourth Iowa Cavalry became at last an integral part of the army directly operating against Vicksburg.

At the same time the famous series of canal operations was in progress. Before Grant came down to Vicksburg he had ordered work to be resumed upon the canal across the peninsula in front of Vicksburg, undertaken by General Williams in his last campaign. He still clung to the idea that the best movement against Vicksburg was by land from the Yazoo, turning the enemy's right flank and getting into his rear; but the water covered the lowlands along the Yazoo,

and must be expected to cover them at any time for several months more. By the canal in front of Vicksburg he intended to get his troops below the city, land on the east bank of the river, and reach the enemy's rear by his left flank. Vicksburg is on the southern side and near the eastern end of a long loop or bend of the river, the tongue of land in the loop being about six miles in length and three in width. This canal was cut across the base of the tongue, southeasterly, so that its lower opening was almost directly west of the city. When Grant first came down from Memphis a great deal of work had been done upon this canal, but as soon as he saw it he thought it could not succeed. It had been expected that the river would, when let in, wash out a deep channel. But early in March, when the digging was substantially done, there was a sudden high rise of the river. It overflowed the land, burst the barriers, and filled the canal, but did not wash out a channel. Indeed, it partly filled the ditch with mud. It is remarkable that after the war the river of itself turned its course across this peninsula, washed out its main channel there, near the line of this canal, but not including it; and Vicksburg has been ever since upon a mere bayou, accessible only by small boats at high water.

Having expected failure, however, Grant was already at work upon another plan. Indeed, he was at work upon two other routes at the same time. One of these was a canal by way of Yazoo Pass, a bayou in Mississippi nearly opposite Helena, about ten miles long, which connected the Mississippi, through Moon Lake, with the Coldwater River. The Coldwater is a tributary of the Tallahatchie and the Tallahatchie a tribu-

tary of the Yazoo. The engineers reported that the Pass could be improved without great difficulty, so as to admit boats of light draught. The plan was, to carry the troops on small steamboats through the Pass, thence down the Coldwater into the Tallahatchie, and down the latter into the Yazoo. If an army could be landed on the banks of the Yazoo, anywhere above Haines' Bluff, it could easily reach the enemy's rear, turning his right flank. The rivers named are tortuous, and the distance through them, from Helena to Vicksburg, on the route proposed, was about four hundred miles. After some engineering work, the Pass was found practicable, and in the latter part of February a large force, drawn from Helena and Lake Providence, was sent in under General Quinby, crowded into narrow stern-wheel steamboats. Quinby found the eastern end of the Pass obstructed by felled trees, but with patient toil (the stream being so narrow that every tree felled into it had to be cut into pieces and dragged out) he got into the Coldwater. The same obstruction was steadily presented in that stream and in the Tallahatchie; and it was only after immense labor that a small force, with a few boats, approached the mouth of the Yallobusha. The movement had been necessarily very slow, and the enemy had improved the opportunity by increasing the obstructions. To the difficulties of many felled trees they added a large raft, which blocked the stream, and placed a strong garrison in fortifications at the mouth of the Yallobusha. The surrounding country being swampy, much of it then under water, it was impossible to use any sufficient force against these defenses, and at the end of March the enterprise was abandoned.

The third attempt was made on the Lake Providence canal. Here was a large lake, near the northern line of Louisiana, filled by the overflow of the Mississippi. Its eastern end reached nearly to the river, and the western opened into Bayou Baxter, this bayou into the Bayou Maçon, and the Maçon into the River Tensas. The Tensas flows south, parallel with the Mississippi and about fifty miles west of it, and empties into the Red River, not far from its mouth. This passage would have brought the army into the Mississippi some miles above Port Hudson, whence it would have come up in boats to Grand Gulf, the place at which it finally did begin the flanking campaign against Vicksburg. In this plan the only work was to be upon a few miles of the Bayou Baxter, which required dredging and the removing of stumps under water. This was undertaken, but, for want of solid ground to work upon, progress was very slow; and before the bayou was opened Grant had found it practicable to move by land.

The fourth plan of flanking Vicksburg by water was that of Steele's Bayou. Here again was Grant's favorite idea of flanking the position by its northern side; and at first the route appeared to be more practicable than any of the others. It was to be up the Yazoo River, from its mouth to Steele's Bayou, through that to Big Black Bayou, through that into Deer Creek, up Deer Creek to a bayou called Rolling Fork, through that to the Sunflower River, and down the Sunflower to the Yazoo. This route was over three hundred miles long, though its end was within some sixty miles of its beginning; but in the space between was a reach of the Yazoo absolutely controlled by the enemy's

batteries on the highlands from Walnut Hills to Haines' Bluff. Not much work would be required to clear these streams for the passage of boats under ordinary circumstances, but the heavy timber on their banks provided ready means of obstruction.

About the middle of March a fleet of gunboats was sent in under Admiral Porter, followed by troops on transports under Sherman. But the enemy had learned of the movement, and Porter found the Rolling Fork obstructed and a battery erected at its junction with the Sunflower. The battery opened upon him, as well as numerous sharpshooters, the latter being so effective that Porter's crews could not work his boats. Sherman came up just in time to save the gunboats; and he and Porter decided that the expedition must be abandoned.

Grant then went to examine the position at Haines' Bluff, with the idea that he might try to take it by assault; but he immediately decided that that could not be done, unless with very great sacrifice of life. He now gave up all hope of turning the enemy's right, and set to work to find a way southward through the swamps in Louisiana opposite Vicksburg, by which he could get to the Mississippi below the mouth of the Big Black. That part of Louisiana is very low, traversed in all directions by small bayous which can be passed only on bridges, and often widely overflowed when the river is high. The roads in the summer and fall can be used for ordinary purposes, but the passage of an army with wagon trains and artillery in winter or early spring would be impossible. It was intended to move the artillery and wagons on barges, through a series of the small bayous connected with each other, to New Carthage, a small place on the Louisiana bank

of the Mississippi, about twelve miles above Grand Gulf.

By this time the river was falling and the ground slowly drying. Early in April small bodies of troops had worked their way through the swamps to New Carthage. Others followed, but no large number could move at one time, because the roads were so easily broken up; and it was the end of April before the greater part of the army was in bivouac at New Carthage and below, on the bank of the river.

While this movement was in progress, the gunboats and transports were engaged in the exciting game of running the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries from Young's Point to New Carthage.

None of the deeds of the war appear more daring than these thrilling races. The boats were manned by volunteers, it being thought cruel to order men into a service so fearfully hazardous; but there were volunteers in plenty for every race. The boats were trimmed and prepared with care, platings and bulwarks of different materials were constructed along the port sides, and then, with such cover as the night could give, with fires and lights concealed, and a full head of steam on, hugging the western shore and straining every nerve for speed, creaking and trembling as if in desperation, they rushed across the enemy's front. Every battery was opened upon them with terrific crash. The black sky was lighted by the incessant flashes of the big guns, and huge bonfires, intended to disclose the whole stream, were set ablaze on the bank. But the guns were mostly mounted on high ground, and the flying, darkened boats were poor targets at the best. All the boats were more or less

struck, and serious damage was done upon a few of them, but only two or three were lost out of the many that entered the race, and but very few lives were lost.

It was demonstrated that an army could be supplied below Vicksburg by running boats past the batteries. The great question was solved; and the further campaign against Vicksburg was to be only a matter of time and endurance.

Now came the liberation of the Fourth Iowa from Arkansas. It was near the end of April when General Gorman, at Helena, received orders to send one cavalry regiment to join Grant at New Carthage. Several officers of the Fourth Iowa, and particularly Major Parkell, when in command, had been persistently trying to get it ordered into the Vicksburg campaign; but Major Winslow, having the fortune to be then on duty in Helena immediately under Gorman, induced him to select the Fourth Iowa. With great satisfaction the regiment broke camp and embarked at Helena on the 28th and 29th of April, on the *Platte Valley* and other steamboats, Lieut.-Col. Swan in command. On the 30th, in the evening, it landed at Milliken's Bend, and bivouacked just west of the levee, a little north of the landing.

Early the next morning the whole regiment was ordered out to the Bayou Maçon, on a reconnoissance. This occupied several days, but nothing occurred, and the regiment returned to the river on the 4th. On the 5th its march was begun toward New Carthage. The route was by way of Richmond and Lake St. Joseph, leaving New Carthage on the left, and ending at Hard-Times Landing on the 8th. Transports enough

could not be had that day, but during the night and the next day the regiment, except Co. G, crossed the Mississippi and landed at Grand Gulf. The infantry had crossed some days before, the bloody battle at Port Gibson had been fought, and Grant was marching northward in Mississippi. On Sunday, the 10th, the regiment overtook Grant near Cayuga, and went into camp at Rocky Springs. It was then assigned to Sherman's Fifteenth Corps, and placed in the advance. Co. G was left at Young's Point during May, in courier service.

The men felt, at last, that they were soldiers in an organized and effective army, and they entered upon the campaign with great spirit. They were to have a whole career crowded into the next few months.

The Fourth Iowa was the only regiment of cavalry in Grant's army in the Vicksburg campaign, until about the middle of June¹; and the service required of it was very great. It was literally incessant labor, it was performed in intensely hot weather, much of the time in blinding dust and with unserviceable horses, and in the face of a steady and rapid decrease of numbers by disease.

On the 11th Grant's army was all in hand, prepared for action. The three corps moved steadily northeastward, keeping about parallel with the Big Black River, as if to hold it, but on different roads. McClermand kept to the left, on the road to Edward's Depot, a point on the Vicksburg and Jackson railway not far from the Big Black; Sherman was in the centre, on the Auburn road; and McPherson on the right, marching toward Raymond.

¹ There were some separate companies, acting as escorts to generals, and there was one small Missouri battalion, Wright's, on service similar to that of the Fourth Iowa.

The Fourth Iowa, in front of Sherman, came upon the enemy at Fourteen-mile Creek, near Dillon's plantation, early Tuesday morning, the 12th.

The evening before, upon special instructions from Sherman, the Second Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, under Major Winslow, had been sent forward, had crossed the creek by a bridge and examined the country for some distance beyond, but without learning anything of the enemy. Perhaps the bridge should have been held over-night, but it was not so ordered. The enemy occupied the position during the night, and in the morning burned the bridge. Then, concealing themselves in the dense thickets along the northern bank, they awaited the head of Sherman's column. This was the Fourth Iowa, the Second Battalion being in front. As the advanced company turned a bend of the road and observed the smoking bridge, the enemy opened fire from apparently a long line. The whole battalion was immediately thrown into position in the wood on the left of the road, and returned the fire, though without seeing the enemy. The Third Battalion was formed on the right of the road and the First on the left of the Second; and all joined in the fire, but the rebels held their position. As the creek could not be crossed without a bridge, and the position and force of the enemy could not be discovered because of the thick woods and underbrush which concealed them, Sherman ordered up a battery, with infantry in support, and opened the guns at short range. This soon silenced the rebel fire; and the bank of the creek being gained, the bridge was repaired and the corps crossed before noon. It was afterward learned that the enemy was Wirt Adams'

cavalry, a body of wild riders with whom the Fourth Iowa were to become well acquainted in the field.

The regiment lost one man killed and three wounded, and had four horses killed.¹ In this affair Major Winslow, commanding the Second Battalion of the regiment, had the good fortune to distinguish himself in the estimation of General Sherman, who came up in time to witness the most of it. But he lost his horse by a shot, and nearly lost his life by the horse falling upon him.

While the fighting was going on here the thunder of artillery was heard from the east. It was the battle of Raymond, a severely contested engagement, in which McPherson defeated the rebels, and compelled them to retreat upon Jackson. The two corps bivouacked that night near Fourteen-mile Creek, McPherson holding the right at Raymond and Sherman the centre at Dillon's, while McClernand filled the space between Sherman's left and the Big Black. Pemberton and Johnston were in front, numbering together a considerably larger force; but they were separated in position and divided in counsel. They could easily have joined, but they did not. Grant seized the opportunity. He determined to throw himself between them and attack Johnston first, because his command was the smaller and he held Jackson, an important point in the Confederate strategy. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th, McPherson moved toward Clinton; and Sherman, crossing his track, marched eastward, by way of Mississippi Springs, directly upon Jackson. Grant expected to fight the decisive battle of the campaign near Edwards' Depot, where Pemberton was concentrating.

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties. "

The Fourth Iowa was at the head of Sherman's column, passing through the village of Mississippi Springs, a noted watering-place for Southerners, in a tremendous rain. Rain fell nearly all day, making the roads very bad, and preventing any fighting except on the skirmish lines.

The Second and Third battalions of the regiment were engaged in the skirmishing, but without loss. On the 14th the rain still poured, but Sherman pressed on toward Jackson. McPherson had reached Clinton, and was moving upon Jackson. The Fourth Iowa was placed on Sherman's extreme left, keeping within touch of McPherson's right. The enemy fell back sullenly, sometimes threatening to bring on a battle. About one o'clock a determined stand was made, and artillery opened upon Sherman's front. This was done by the two or three brigades of Gregg's Division which had been defeated by McPherson at Raymond on the 12th. Sherman ordered Lieut.-Col. Swan to move with the Fourth Iowa directly forward, beyond the enemy's right, so as to flank him, while he threw his advanced brigades into line on both sides of the road and pushed steadily on, returning the rebel fire as he moved. The rain fell in torrents, and the regiment had much difficulty in getting through the completely saturated, clayey fields and over the many streams made by the rains; but it reached its place in good time, and advanced under a brisk fire of shell and small-arms. Finding themselves thus flanked, the rebels gave way and precipitately retreated into Jackson, losing 250 prisoners, six guns, and many wagons filled with stores.

Sherman's advance immediately moved into the city,

the rebels flying out to the north, apparently in great confusion. Johnston had ordered the retreat of his whole force to Canton. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon. At the same time McPherson came in, by assault, from the west side of the city.

It was a striking scene. The lines of earthworks and bastions, newly constructed about the city and not yet fully mounted with guns, were big ridges of trampled yellow mud; some of the guns were lying on the ground, ready to be mounted; others which had been mounted on carriages were found abandoned in hasty attempts to get them away. There was still a storm of wind and rain. Fires were burning in different places, set by the enemy to destroy military stores. The citizens were filled with terror, and in the streets, in all positions and conditions, were many wagons, carriages and other vehicles, in which they were trying to take away their families and goods. Soldiers of both the corps, who had come into town in the advance and in broken bodies, as is likely to be the case in taking a city by assault, were running about, yelling and making a great uproar, their heads turned by their success.

The Union losses in the battles of this day (all from Sherman's and McPherson's corps) were 42 killed and 258 wounded and missing; while the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded, and captured, 17 guns, a large number of wagons and animals, and a great quantity of stores.

Immediately the city was occupied the Fourth Iowa was sent across the Pearl (the enemy having failed to destroy the bridge), upon a reconnoissance toward Brandon. It marched a few miles from the river, on the Brandon road, and went into camp. The next

morning it moved on, near to Brandon, and then returned to Jackson, having done nothing, though some rebels were seen at Brandon and though there was at least an opportunity to take a locomotive and train of cars. While the cavalry was on this service, Sherman's infantry was occupied in destroying all supplies and property at Jackson which could be of avail to the enemy.

The next day, the 16th, the work of destruction being done, Sherman's corps was moved rapidly to the west, on the Clinton road. The Fourth Iowa was now placed in the rear, and was the rear-guard of the army, McPherson having marched toward Clinton on the 15th and McClelland having remained between Fourteen-mile Creek and Edwards' Depot. It had to deal with many infantry stragglers on leaving Jackson, and found them troublesome. Its rear companies were not yet beyond the suburbs, when, looking back, they saw the noted "Confederate Hotel" in flames. Much had been said about this house during the occupation, and there was among the soldiers a grudge against the owner. He had changed the name of the house from "United States" to "Confederate," and the old name could still be seen under the new on the sign; and it was reported he had ill-treated Union prisoners taken at Shiloh. He had courage enough to apply to General Sherman for "protection," upon the ground that he was a Union man, but the General found it too hard to believe. His hotel was of wood, and was large and high, so that it made a fine fire.¹

¹ The claims of Unionism were, naturally, very common in the South during the war, and gave officers in the army a great deal of trouble. Of course they were false in many or most cases, the object being to save property or to get personal favors. There was a firm in Jackson at the time of its capture

It was afternoon on the 16th when the Fourth Iowa left Jackson. Before Clinton was reached the booming of distant guns was heard. It was the battle of Champion's Hill. Sherman pushed his column on as fast as possible. The noise of the conflict increased. The distance became shorter and the battle hotter. The hill could be seen at times, with clouds of smoke rising over it, and with glimpses of the movements of troops. Every man felt that he, as well as the whole army, was to be put to the test; for every man in the army understood that a great battle must be fought and perhaps every fighting man engaged before the Big Black could be crossed.

Grant intended to fight Pemberton as soon as possible, fearing that Johnston would, by a circuit westward from his position between Jackson and Canton, bring the two rebel armies together. Indeed, as afterward appeared, Johnston had ordered Pemberton to move to Clinton for that junction. But Pemberton was already marching to the southeast, from the Big Black toward Raymond, with the purpose to attack Grant's communications. A fatal mistake! Grant had no communications. He had made no attempt to maintain a line behind him to the Mississippi. It was the theory of Davis and Pemberton that he could not exist without such a line, and they assumed that he had it. He had a big wagon-train, however, which was then

operating a large cotton factory, making tent-cloth for the rebel army. They, too, wanted "protection." Their factory was still in full operation when Grant visited it, after the capture of the town, and they saw no reason why they should not continue. They said they had some orders from "the government," which really must be filled, and that they gave employment to many poor persons. They were advised to leave the factory for awhile, a hint they understood a little later when it was seen to be ablaze.

near Raymond, and, if Pemberton had followed out his plan, there would have been a battle for it on that day (the 16th) at Fourteen-mile Creek, not far from where the Fourth Iowa had its engagement on the 12th. Indeed, Pemberton's advance was actually skirmishing with the advance of the divisions guarding the train on the morning of the 16th when he received Johnston's order. Upon that order he abandoned his plan of cutting off Grant from the Mississippi, and, in the face of his enemy, countermarched to the north to join Johnston. But it was too late. Three of McClellan's divisions and one of Sherman's (Blair) were now close on his right flank, another of McClellan's (Hovey) was in his front, McPherson with his two divisions was coming up on Hovey's right, and Sherman was moving from Jackson with two divisions more.

The head of Pemberton's column had reached a point just east of Champion's Hill. He faced to the right, Stevenson's division forming his left, Bowen's the centre, and Loring's the right. In that order Stevenson and Bowen took possession of the hill, and Loring held the Raymond-Edwards road in front of the crossing of Baker's Creek, south of the hill. Their aggregate was at least eighteen thousand, that number being admitted in Pemberton's report. McClellan's march had brought his divisions directly in front of these divisions of the enemy, Hovey being on the right, Smith on the left, Osterhaus and Carr in the centre, with Blair (of Sherman's corps) in rear of Smith. McPherson, now arrived from Clinton, was moving into position well to the right of Hovey. There must have been in all these divisions thirty thousand men, but the battle was fought by less than one third of that number.

The battle was opened by Hovey, who ascended the eastern slope of the hill with his division against the divisions of Stevenson and Bowen. In a fierce struggle he took the crest of the hill and eleven of the enemy's guns, but he was not supported as he had expected to be, and the enemy, rallying in force, compelled him to retire. No help was given this intrepid officer by his corps general, but his call upon McPherson for aid was instantly honored. With Crocker's (Quinby's) division, just arrived, Hovey again assaulted, again reached the crest in a storm of fire, and again captured five of the guns. Grant had now appeared, and put McPherson in immediate charge of the battle. He ordered Logan's division up the steep northern side of the hill, to attack Stevenson's left flank. But meantime Loring's three brigades were sent, one after another, to reinforce Bowen and Stevenson. Hovey and Crocker were again forced back, but not far, and, taking advantage of the awkward position into which the rebels had been compelled to place their lines, Hovey concentrated his batteries and opened an enfilading fire. Logan had just doubled up Stevenson's division by his flank attack. The rebels broke at all points and retreated in great confusion, losing 24 guns and 4,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. Besides these losses, Loring with his whole division was cut off by Osterhaus, and retreated to the south without guns or baggage.

The Union loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded, and 187 missing. Hovey's division lost more than one third of its number, bearing again and again, with splendid fortitude, the most destructive of the enemy's fire. The only Union troops actually engaged in the battle were the two brigades of Hovey's division,

three of Crocker's, and three of Logan's, between 9,000 and 10,000 men in all.

Pemberton's army would have been destroyed if McClellan had done his duty. The shameful failure of this "political" general can hardly be spoken of with patience. He was on the right of the rebel position, with as many men (excluding Hovey and including Blair) as Pemberton had. He could easily have thrown his left on Pemberton's flank, who would then have been confronted on three sides, with a difficult stream (Baker's Creek) on the fourth. He had himself sent to Grant in the morning, asking in his noisy way for leave to "bring on a general engagement"; and he got the leave, but he remained quietly in position the rest of the day, comparatively without action, though on the very verge of the battle-field, while the smaller force of McPherson twice advanced alone to the assault upon that bloody hill. Indeed, one of his own divisions (Hovey) temporarily separated from him and operating with McPherson, bore the brunt of the battle, fighting at times against desperate odds, suffering reverse again and again almost under McClellan's eye, but without any help from him. Even when the battle was over and Pemberton was falling back in confusion upon Edwards' Depot, Osterhaus, already close on the right flank of the defeated remnant, could have reached Edwards' Depot in time to complete the ruin already so nearly accomplished, if only McClellan had so ordered.

It was plain then, and it has been confirmed by sound military criticism since, that with active co-operation on McClellan's part Pemberton's whole army would have been destroyed. If any one of his

division commanders, Carr, Osterhaus, Smith, or Hovey, had been in his place, the Thirteenth Corps would not have stood idly by when the fate of Vicksburg was in the balance. For Vicksburg must have fallen in that battle, if McClernand had only done what he easily could have done. It is not an idle speculation, but a proposition capable of demonstration, that if the Thirteenth Corps had been permitted to do what it could have done at Champion's Hill, there would have been no siege of Vicksburg, no siege of Port Hudson, no siege of Jackson, perhaps even no Gettysburg, nor any subsequent invasion of a Northern State. Certainly many thousands of lives and many millions of money were afterward spent in doing work which would not have been required if the work of that day had been made complete. It was one of the several lamentable instances during the war of the dreadful folly of placing a man in high command, not for ability proved by training and experience, but to pay off a political debt or to placate political "influence."

As it was, however, Pemberton's defeat was complete. He had lost half his guns and a very large part of his men. The remainder, broken and demoralized, hurried toward Vicksburg. Indeed, he could not have moved in any other direction. Grant immediately sent McClernand's divisions in pursuit, and ordered the whole army forward to the Big Black. The Fourth Iowa bivouacked that night near Bolton, and in the morning, Sunday, moved on, now on Sherman's right, on a road to Bridgeport, a crossing of the Big Black. But it was soon detached and sent on a rapid march to the north, to learn whether Johnston was moving westward. This march was to Brownsville,

about fifteen miles, and it disclosed that Johnston had not moved west of Canton; but some of his cavalry were at Brownsville, and had a little skirmish firing with the Fourth Iowa before vacating that village. Returning thence to the Big Black, the regiment reached Sherman's rear, near Bridgeport, at night.

Pemberton had made preparations at several places to defend the passage of the Big Black, particularly at the railroad bridge. But there was great confusion in his army, and he was closely pursued. He was only able to get his troops into position at the railroad bridge, where strong field works had been constructed. For the defense of the Bridgeport crossing, a few miles above the bridge, he could do but little.

But the position at the bridge was naturally very well adapted for defense. The river here bends directly to the west, the land within being in horse-shoe form, about one and a half miles long and half as wide. The railroad runs along the middle of this tongue of land, and the bridge is at the western end. On the western bank, on both sides of the bridge, the land is high, rising into hills above the railroad, and easily defended. Here strong earthworks had been erected and guns placed in position. The land opposite, within the horseshoe, was low and flat, but little obstructed by trees, and across the neck, a mile or more in front of the bridge, ran a bayou or series of miry lagoons, filled by the overflow of the river. These lagoons reached nearly all the way from the river above to the river below the bridge, and served rarely well as ditches. Behind them the enemy had constructed lines of entrenchments, with bastions mounting eighteen guns. Three brigades occupied

this line, while the main force was held in reserve in support of the heavier works at the west end of the bridge.

Carr's division of McClelland's corps, in advance in the immediate pursuit of Pemberton, coming up to the front of the outer line early in the forenoon, impetuously assaulted without waiting for the movements of the other divisions. The rebels checked the first assault, but broke on the second and fled from their entrenchments over the bridge, leaving all their guns and nearly 2,000 prisoners in Carr's hands. The Union loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded, and 3 missing. Two Iowa regiments¹ led this splendid attack, suffered the greater part of the loss, and may almost be said to have won the battle of themselves. Two others² at Champion's Hill had yet more distinguished themselves and suffered still greater loss.

It was now easy for Sherman, reaching Bridgeport at noon, to drive off the small body of rebels posted on the west bank. He did so, and immediately set to work to lay his pontoon bridge. This was finished when the Fourth Iowa arrived from its Brownsville reconnoissance, and a large part of the corps moved over during the night.

Early on Monday, the 18th, Sherman marched his column to the northwest, with the purpose of establishing a line from the Big Black to the Yazoo, which would have to be broken in any attempt to join the forces of Pemberton and Johnston west of the Big Black. The Fourth Iowa was on the right, marching toward Haines' Bluff. This formidable position, heavily

¹ The Twenty-fourth and Twenty-eighth Infantry.

² The Twenty-first and Twenty-second Infantry.

fortified, was then held by only two companies of the enemy. It was about fifteen miles north of the railroad along which Pemberton was retreating into Vicksburg, and was open to the rear, so that it became untenable when the Big Black was lost. When Sherman got to the Benton road with his infantry he had practically taken Haines' Bluff, because it was only four miles farther and neither Pemberton nor Johnston could have reached it. He directed Lieutenant-Colonel Swan to move rapidly upon the place with the Fourth Iowa, and take it, unless there should be a serious attempt at defense. Early in the afternoon the head of the regiment approached the works. There was no sign of a purpose to defend. Captain Peters, with Company B, was sent forward for closer observation. He rode into the main fort without a shot, and received its surrender with about twenty of the enemy. The rest had fled to Vicksburg, too much hurried or scared to destroy the property, or even to spike the guns. They had left their tents standing, and had even abandoned their hospital with fifty sick in it. Admiral Porter's fleet being seen down the Yazoo was signalled, when the gunboat *Baron de Kalb* came up, under Lieutenant Walker, to whom Captain Peters turned over the fort and the prisoners. The fortifications at Haines' Bluff¹ were, it is said, the most extensive and elaborate in construction of all then in the Confederacy. It was well that Grant, in April, decided not to try their strength. There were on the works fourteen of the heaviest guns then known and a full equipment of smaller ones, with a large supply of ammunition and

¹ Called "Snyder's Mills" in Pemberton's and other Confederate reports. Snyder's Mill and Snyder's Bluff were near.

material. From the height of this bluff the surrounding country and the Yazoo River could be overlooked for a long distance.

Captain Peters moved on to the fortifications at Snyder's Bluff, a few miles nearer Vicksburg. These he found also abandoned, with nine heavy guns dismounted and a large quantity of fixed ammunition in magazine.

By Admiral Porter's report of May 20, 1863, it would appear that Lieutenant Walker, with the *Baron de Kalb*, had taken Haines' Bluff, a piece of carelessness in statement which Fourth Iowa men regard with resentment. Other writers, probably led by Admiral Porter's statement, have fallen into the same error, but General Sherman gives the credit to the Fourth Iowa, to whom it belongs.¹

In the occupation of Haines' Bluff the campaign against Vicksburg was assured of success. Grant's army, after a complete isolation for ten days, had now a sure base of supplies, and communication was again opened with the north. That formidable range of hills which, five months before, had witnessed Sherman's bloody defeat, which, only one month before, Grant had thought too strong for the whole of his army, now fell into the hands of a company of cavalry. The same day connection was made with the steamboats, and a permanent landing established at Chickasaw, upon the very ground where Sherman's heroic effort was made in December.

Sherman's infantry rapidly closed in, leaving Haines' Bluff to the rear of their right, their lines extending from the Walnut Hills, on the right, to the Graveyard

¹ Sherman's report of May 24, 1863.

road on the left. The other two corps moved up, McPherson stretching from Sherman's left to McClernand's right and McClernand's left moving out toward Warrenton, a place on the river two miles south of the city. That night the Fourth Iowa bivouacked at Clear Creek, on the Jackson road, in rear of McPherson, about ten miles directly east of the city.

The next morning, the 19th, the lines of the three corps were advanced, and, relying upon the demoralization of the enemy under his recent defeats, Grant ordered a general assault upon the works. It was made, and failed, with severe loss. Of course the cavalry did not take part, but it furnished a heavy picket detail for the rear, and a large detachment marched to the Big Black for observation. The remainder of the regiment lay in camp.

Then there were some days of comparative rest for the infantry. Grant was occupied in the disposition of his lines and camps, getting up supplies from the river and considering a more determined attempt to storm the position. The Fourth Iowa remained in the temporary camp it occupied the night of the 18th, maintaining several strong picket-posts toward the Big Black and sending out every day scouting and reconnoitring detachments. Fatigue details were also kept on the road to the Yazoo landing at Chickasaw, bringing rations and forage; and the men not otherwise under orders were busied in the shoeing and care of the animals in camp and other labors.

On the 22d Grant made a careful and persistent attempt to carry the rebel works by storm. The Fourth Iowa remained on duty on the rear line, but some of the officers and men, with leave, went to the

front and saw the terrible struggle as spectators. There could be no more splendid courage in war than was seen that day. At many points along the lines columns of the blue coats moved down into the ravines which separated the opposing armies, in fine order, with gleaming arms, amid the roar of artillery and the crash of the enemy's musketry; then dashed up the opposite steeps, surmounted by the works they were to take, their numbers thinned by the sweeping fire with fearful rapidity, and the survivors at last struggling desperately hand to hand in flame and smoke along the top. It was all of no avail. The men who broke at Champion's Hill and the Big Black fought well behind heavy fortifications.

It was seen that the cost of success by assault would be far too great, and Grant resigned himself to a siege. The operations and incidents of that siege are told in many books, and it is with only one regiment that we are here concerned.

The camp of the regiment was now moved to a better position, a mile or more northward, in the rear of Sherman's left. It was in and near a beautiful grove of magnolias, now in full bloom, on the plantation of Marshall, a rich lawyer of Vicksburg. The mansion supplied some comforts to the hospital department of the regiment; and indeed in other parts of the camp there could be seen certain equipments for ease, such as were not issued by quartermasters nor mentioned in the army regulations.

The effective force of the regiment was kept very closely at work. Co. G now rejoined, from its courier service at Young's Point, to share the ceaseless toil. Grant was getting considerable additions to his troops,

but no cavalry came until a month after the investment, and, as has been said, the Fourth Iowa was meantime the only cavalry regiment in the army. There was a detachment of the Sixth Missouri Cavalry, known as Wright's Battalion, numbering about 150. This detachment and the Fourth Iowa were relied upon to furnish all the cavalry pickets along the lines of the Big Black and all scouting and reconnoitring parties. And even during the last two or three weeks of the siege, when there were several additional regiments of cavalry, there was quite as much to do as ever, because the outer lines were then more extended and there was more apprehension of Johnston's advance. From the 1st of May till the 1st of July scarcely an hour of rest was possible. Fifty-four days within those two months the effective force of the regiment, or a large part of it, was in the saddle; and many of the nights, too, were partly or wholly spent there.

The service was all within the country between the Yazoo and the Big Black, from the Jackson railroad nearly as far north as Yazoo City. The only route practicable to Johnston in advancing to the relief of Vicksburg would be southward between those rivers. He could cross the Big Black above Brownsville without opposition, but below he would have to fight a decisive battle for only the crossing. One might say that every road and lane within that region between the two rivers was known to every man in the Fourth Iowa. Indeed, although the regular camp of the regiment was during all this time at different points a few miles east of Grant's investing lines, the camp was only a place where the baggage and the men and horses not fit for duty were kept, the men on active duty having

no camp but the bivouac they made each night by the roadside on their marches.

As the summer advanced the weather became very hot, water was scarce and bad, and the dust increased in the roads to a serious hardship. Naturally, many men fell ill, and deaths and discharges from disability were frequent. Many even of those on duty were ill in some degree. The heavy work and insufficient food told severely upon the horses too. Many hundreds were broken or worn out by their incessant trials, and, for some reason, none could be got from the quartermaster's department to supply the deficiency. So that there was, from the beginning of the siege, a steady and rapid decline in the effective strength of the regiment, both in men and horses, and when the fall of Vicksburg came, barely three hundred men, out of the eight hundred then on the rolls, could be mounted for duty.

The work of the regiment during this period has not found a place in history. The reports buried in the Adjutant-General's Office show some marches and engagements; but there are, after all, only a few scattered points in the actual life of the soldier which get recorded. The hardest and most destructive part of his service does not reach the page of fame. There are no scenes of thrilling conflict in it, nothing picturesque or glorious, nothing but toilsome marches, sleepless nights, coarse labor, exposure, privation, and disease.

Of course, skirmishes with rebel cavalry often occurred in this service, in which sometimes men were shot or captured; and there were more important engagements. On the 24th of May, near Mechanicsburg, a large detachment of the regiment, under Major Parkell, joined with other smaller detachments of

cavalry, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Swan, met a body of the enemy, and a desultory skirmish followed, lasting several hours. Night coming on, Colonel Swan returned to his camp. In the Fourth Iowa one man was wounded and one horse killed. On the 29th, near the same place, Major Parkell, with all the effective force of the regiment, acting alone, had a more serious engagement, but he succeeded in driving the enemy, with the loss of one officer and six men wounded. Major Winslow, whose battalion was in position in support of the guns, was struck on the leg by a piece of shell, and though he continued on duty, suffered from the wound for many months. On the 4th of June, at Satartia, marching in advance of General Kimball's infantry, on the "Yazoo River Expedition" (a reconnoissance in force, to develop the enemy's strength between the Yazoo and Big Black), the regiment was again engaged with Wirt Adams' cavalry. A larger force being developed by this affair, General Kimball brought a division of infantry into action, and drove the enemy back upon Yazoo City.

On one of these marches, June 6th, one of the hospital-stewards of the regiment, Joel R. Garretson, was captured. He had for some time insisted upon riding a ridiculously small horse, and, falling behind the column that day, he was pursued, and could not ride fast enough to escape. He was exchanged after a time, but did not serve again with the regiment, being detached at St. Louis and placed on duty in one of the hospitals there.

The camp of the regiment was moved several times in June, first from Marshall's plantation to Wixon's plantation, about two miles northeast, then, for a few

days, to Snyder's Bluff, a part of the range of bluffs along the Yazoo, between Haines' Bluff and Chickasaw Bluff; and finally to Bear Creek, farther toward the Big Black and about twenty miles northeast of Vicksburg.

In the latter part of June, Johnston advanced from Jackson toward the Big Black, and his cavalry was reported in considerable bodies on the eastern side, from Brownsville toward Mechanicsburg. Our cavalry watched the crossings with care, and was employed in obstructing the roads on the west side, by which Johnston would have to advance if he should cross. This was done chiefly by felling trees into the roads. The Fourth Iowa had much of the work to do, and made a number of trips toward the Big Black for that purpose, without seeing the enemy.

On the 22d of June, Grant was convinced that Johnston was about to give battle. He sent a message that day to all his corps generals, advising them that Johnston would, within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, cross the Big Black above Bridgeport, and advance by way of Bear Creek; and gave them careful instructions for the disposition of troops to meet the movement in force. On the same day, under orders from General Sherman and before the message was received by him, a detail of the Fourth Iowa was sent out toward the Big Black River, for the blockading work. There were about 120 men, the official detail being 30 each, from Companies A, F, I, and K, and Major Parkell commanded. "Cy" Washburn went along with his "battery,"—the 2-pound brass howitzer which had been captured at Jackson. This was the occasion, already referred to, when Washburn

was lost to sight, though he remained long to memory dear. Major Parkell was ordered to blockade the road at or near Birdsong's Ferry, a crossing of the Big Black, first reconnoitring the region carefully. The detachment accordingly marched out on the Mechanicsburg road, to Hill's plantation, about seven miles northeast from the camp. Here there was a fork, the Mechanicsburg road turning to the north and the Birdsong's Ferry road to the southeast. Toward Mechanicsburg there were open fields on both sides the first half mile, then a long stretch of thick woods and underbrush. The Hill house was on the right or east side of this road, near the fork, and a little north of the house, on the west side of the road, extending away from it at a right angle, was a long row of cabins, the slave quarters. The ferry road ran, in serpentine form, along the crest of a dividing ridge, with fields extending about five hundred yards on its easterly side and about a thousand yards on its westerly side. After passing these fields the road ran through woods about a mile, and then descended the ridge, to the bottom lands of the river. Along this wooded part of the road the ridge was narrow and its sides steep and irregular,—an excellent position for blockading. Nearly parallel with the ferry road and about five hundred yards west of it was Bear Creek, a considerable stream, the west bank of which rose abruptly into hills and bluffs so steep as to be inaccessible except at a very few points.

Major Parkell posted the thirty men of Company I at the border of the woods on the Mechanicsburg road, as a picket, and with the remainder of his little column, rode down the ferry road, to the bottom. That region

he carefully explored, without finding any sign of the enemy or of any movement of theirs, except that one mounted rebel was seen, who fled in haste. But it was found that the river was very low, and that it could be forded at several places not far from the ferry, so that there would be little gained by blockading near the river, unless the work were done on a scale much larger than was contemplated by the orders. At present the narrow ridge appeared to be the best place for the work, because there it could be done more safely, and made more troublesome to the enemy, than at any other point examined. Leaving another picket on the river bottom, the Major therefore returned to the ridge and set to work. A few men held the horses while the others took off their arms and felled the trees across the road and down the slopes of the ridge. The work had been in progress some hours and was nearly done when the attack was made. The most of Parkell's men were armed with breech-loading carbines, the remainder had only revolvers and sabres.

It was not known that there was any body of the enemy west of the Big Black and south of Mechanicsburg. But that morning Lieutenant-Colonel Robert C. Wood, with two regiments of Mississippi cavalry (Wirt Adams' and P. B. Starke's), numbering about one thousand, made a swift march down from Mechanicsburg, hoping to catch some isolated body of his enemies. It was easy for him to learn of the movements of Union troops in a country where every house contained their bitter foes. Indeed, as the blockading of the roads had been going on for some days, it is probable that Colonel Wood knew of it before he left his camp, and that his immediate object was to destroy one of the blockading



**BATTLE OF BEAR CREEK, OR JONES' PLANTATION,
JUNE 22, 1863.**

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| a, a, a. Scene of blockading. | g, h. Second position of Cos. A and K. |
| b. Picket-post of Co. I. | i. Washburn's gun. |
| c. First formation of the enemy. | k, l. Positions of Cos. F and I. |
| d. Second and third formations of the enemy. | m, n, o. Cos. F, I, A, K in last stand. |
| e. First position of Co. A. | p. Enemy's advance on flank. |
| f. " " " K. | r, r, r. Course of flight. |

detachments. He must have had accurate information of the movement and position of the one sent out this day before he attacked. At any rate, his own movement showed that he knew very well how best to proceed.

He moved quietly down the Mechanicsburg road, in column, until he got within a mile of the Hill house. The wood there, already described, served to conceal his men, and enabled them to come very near the picket without being seen. Then he made a dash for the fork of the road at Hill's house. The astonished pickets fired upon him, but of course they were beaten at once. Some were shot or taken, and the others made for their command on the ferry road, firing back as they fled. This firing served to check the rebels a little; but they gained the fork of the road, thus placing themselves between Parkell and his camp. The firing was heard by the choppers, and they sprang at once to their arms. They knew instantly that their picket was attacked, and with energetic speed they seized their arms and ran up the road. Indeed, two of the companies, A and K, were so earnest to reach the scene that they gave but little opportunity to Major Parkell for an orderly formation. Company A, commanded by First-Sergeant Caleb J. Allen, being the first to get into the lane from the woods, immediately moved up to the nearest corner of the fields on the right. Midway they were met by the flying pickets, and at the next curve of the road they received a volley from the enemy, and several of them fell dead. Getting into the field on the right, the remainder, sheltered by the rail fence, returned the fire with brave spirit. The conduct of Sergeant Allen in making this

stand has been greatly praised. Company K, led by Lieutenant Gardner, followed close upon A, and took position on its left; and the two companies, though with severe loss in killed and wounded, fought so effectively that the enemy retired behind the slave quarters. But, re-forming there, and preparing for a more careful and heavier charge, they returned to the battle. Major Parkell planted Washburn's howitzer in the road where it entered the wood, and formed F and the remainder of I, dismounted, on the left of the gun, behind the fence which there skirted the wood, giving good range across the open field. Then he tried to complete this line by ordering A and K into a similar position on the right of the gun; but the rebels had advanced to their second attack, a part of them charging along the road and through the fields on the right, and a part moving off to the left, dismounted, to turn Parkell's right flank. The A and K men held their old position with great courage until the rebels were close upon them in overwhelming numbers, when they fell back, stubbornly firing, through the woods on that side of the road, to a position in front of the right of the gun. In this part of the battle the brave Lieutenant Gardner fell, mortally wounded. This movement permitted the rebels to charge upon the line at the gun, which Washburn was meantime firing up the road as fast as he could. But the charge was met by the fire of all the companies, and the rebels found it so hot that they again retired. Taking advantage of this repulse, Parkell tried to improve the position of his line and of the gun. But his chance was desperate. The road and the ridge were blockaded behind him, the bluffs of Bear Creek made a wall on the

left, the enemy was in front and on the right, ten times his own number, and the nearest troops who could help were seven miles away. Colonel Wood ordered another charge in front, and his flanking detachment was now on Parkell's right. The last charge was made with great boldness and with incessant yelling. The devoted Iowans stood their ground until the enemy was upon them. Washburn had no more shot, many of the men had exhausted their cartridges, and the dismounted flanking detachment now opened fire on their right. The unfortunate men broke, and attempted to escape. A few got through the enemy's lines, but the most ran down the east side of Bear Creek until they could pass the bluffs, when they crossed and made a long circuit westward, reaching their camp in the night. The rebels followed a couple of miles, filling the air with triumphant yelling, and capturing and wounding many. Washburn and his gun were taken. He would not leave it; but two of his gunners, Eli Allen and Henry Black, both of E, took the heavy breech-pin out of the gun (it was a breech-loader) and carried it for some distance as they ran, finally concealing it in the ravine. The pursuit was not long continued, however, Colonel Wood naturally fearing that he would have to meet a reinforcing column if he should long remain in the region. So he soon drew in his men, mounted such of his wounded as could ride, and hurried off on the Mechanicsburg road.

As soon as the news reached the camp of the Fourth Iowa, the remainder of the regiment was mounted, and galloped to the scene in hot haste. Other cavalry was sent to join, and the whole force marched till late in

the night, nearly to Mechanicsburg, but too late to overtake Wood's command.

Only one half of the unfortunate detachment returned to camp. The remainder were killed or captured, some of the captured being wounded. There were 8 killed, 3 mortally wounded, 14 others wounded, and 36 captured.¹ But, except in prisoners, the enemy suffered more severely. As they took away all their wounded who could be moved, their loss cannot be exactly stated; but they left behind 15 killed and 1 mortally wounded, the latter an officer, Major Harris. From the number of their killed and the circumstance that Parkell's men were partly sheltered, firing at short range and much of the time from steady positions, it may justly be estimated that the rebel loss in killed and wounded was nearly or quite double that of the Fourth Iowa. The rebel commander admitted a loss of 5 killed, 16 wounded, 1 missing, and 40 horses; but, as has been said, fifteen of his killed were found on the ground, and he states Parkell's killed and wounded at more than one hundred, so that he seems to be careless about numbers.²

Though it was disaster and defeat for the Fourth Iowa, it was a defeat no Iowan need be ashamed of. Caught unprepared, as they were, through no fault of their own, cut off from any support and without any hope of timely reinforcement, assailed again and again by largely superior numbers, it can hardly be said that any men have, on other occasions, done better than did these in their time of trial. But of course so unfortunate and destructive an affair caused great feeling in the regiment; and it was long the subject of bitter criticism. One thing at least was clear, that if

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

² War Records, Vol. 24, Part 2, page 511.

the cavalry had been employed, as it should have been, in watching the points by which the enemy could approach or in patrolling the roads and river banks, instead of constructing defenses, any blockading party would have been protected. In view of the known position and purpose of Johnston, and of the known rendezvous of a large body of the rebel cavalry near Mechanicsburg, it was inexcusable neglect or folly to send so small a body to do such work without another force, of at least equal numbers, posted for protection and constantly under arms. The situation in that vicinity was well known at army headquarters, as is shown by the fact that already orders had been issued and preparations begun for an extensive strengthening of the lines there. Indeed, on the same day of this little battle, Sherman, under orders given by Grant the day before, was moving a large force from Vicksburg toward the Big Black to meet Johnston's advance.

All of the captured were exchanged and returned to the regiment in October, except Livingston, who was reported to have died of his wounds in the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant Gardner, of K, lived six weeks after the battle, and Sergeant William T. Biggs, of A, six days, each with a ball in the brain.

It is noteworthy that William Hole, of K, was wounded four times in this action; and, as showing that the fighting was hard and close, that the most of the killed were struck in the head. Of the seven dead in A, six had each a bullet in the head only. Johnson, of I, was wounded once in the action, not severely, but was wounded twice more while a prisoner. He was

asked by his captors, some time after the battle, how many men were in Parkell's command, and on his telling the true number he was profanely called a liar and shot with a pistol, an ugly and dangerous wound in the back of the head, and cut a long gash across the face with a sabre. His wounds were grossly neglected while he was a prisoner, so that when he was exchanged his condition was very pitiable and critical ; but under good care he recovered.

There is a remarkable story told of Chappel, of A, one of the men killed in this battle. He was a very good soldier, earnest, faithful, and industrious about his duties. When he was detailed for the blockading party he prepared to go, but said he knew he would be killed. He said he felt sure of it. He packed up his effects, to be sent home, marked the package with the proper address, wrote a farewell letter to his wife, and had all his earthly affairs in order when he mounted his horse. He was one of the first killed.

In the new dispositions of troops made by Sherman and just referred to, he placed several divisions of infantry and artillery near Bear Creek, and had them throw up a chain of earthworks along the westerly side of that stream and thence northwestwardly toward the Yazoo. The cavalry was posted in front, along the stream, the position of the Fourth Iowa being advanced to the point where the Vicksburg and Mechanicsburg road crossed the stream, which was about a mile west of its recent battle-field.

The men were very glad to find themselves directly under Sherman again. They had been very severely tried. The great strain on muscle and nerve of the incessant labor and excitements of the past two months

had reduced the number for duty to a fourth of those on the rolls; and even those marked for duty were now much diminished in physical vigor. They saw their ranks thinned by unimportant fighting and the increasing advances of disease; they were set to do work they were not used to, and which is usually done by other portions of an army; and now in the bloody affair of Bear Creek they believed that their general officers had not taken even ordinary care for their protection. They were not very happy then.

But it was the dark hour preceding the day. Under the immediate rule of Sherman there was a better division of the work among the several regiments of cavalry. The men saw his prompt preparations for the defense of the new line, and saw that they were no longer alone on the outer line; they were put only to proper cavalry work; they were promised more of Sharp's carbines; and there were rumors of important changes among the field officers.

This period was short. About the 1st of July, the mining approaches to the works of Vicksburg being nearly finished, Grant decided upon a final grand assault, to be made on the morning of the 6th, when he was sure he would go in. He ordered Sherman to prepare his command to move upon Johnston immediately upon hearing that Vicksburg was taken. Sherman prepared at once. All the sick and other impediments were moved out of the way, and the able men were equipped, ready to march at any moment.

But Pemberton anticipated Grant's plan by surrendering on the 4th of July. An account of that glorious day in any part of Grant's army would be only one account among a thousand. The campaign

had become a perfect success, crowned by that day of all days, after a long and unbroken experience of toils and dangers, hardships, losses, harassing anxieties, and bloody battles, and at the time when Union men everywhere were in deep discouragement because there was "nothing done" and Lee was invading the North. Let it be enough here to say, that on the morning of that 4th of July every man in Grant's army felt well and strong and happy, no matter what reports the surgeons have made, with their sick-lists and hospitals: we knew nothing of Gettysburg, but VICKSBURG WAS OURS! It was the beginning of the end of the war.

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE WAR—CHANGE IN THE COMMAND OF THE REGIMENT—SECOND CAPTURE OF JACKSON—GREAT RAID FROM VICKSBURG TO MEMPHIS—LESSER MOVEMENTS IN MISSISSIPPI—RE-ENLISTMENT: “VETERAN VOLUNTEERS”—BETTER ARMS.

THE 4th of July, 1863, is the great day of the war. The fall of Vicksburg that day opened the Mississippi and divided the Confederacy, cutting off its principal armies from their largest field of commissary supplies and depriving its forces west of the river of any material value as a factor in the future strategy of the great contest. On that day the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg was made complete, and irretrievable disaster ended the grandest movement of all that were undertaken by the rebels during the war, a movement to which their best men devoted their most zealous energies, in which they concentrated their every available power, and upon which they had built the highest hopes. A great battle in Pennsylvania won by Lee was to divide the North against itself, overthrow the war-party in Congress, and open a way for such terms of peace as the South would be willing to accept. The government at Richmond strained every effort for the success of the great plan. They staked all upon the result, and lost.

The double defeat, on the 4th of July of all days, was too much for the Confederacy to bear. There was no longer any good in the Trans-Mississippi Department: there could never be another great invasion of a Northern State. The Confederacy was now like a man keeping up a fight after losing both arms,—brave and fierce, and still able to use his legs, but sure to be beaten in time. Indeed, to make the simile literal, after the summer of 1863 the legs of the rebels gave a great deal more trouble and occupation than did their arms. That was the experience, at any rate, of the Fourth Iowa and the Western cavalry generally, who, from July of that year, were continually making great marches, trying to reach the enemy, whose legs, as if toughened by much use, made it often a long, hard chase.

But though that 4th of July was to the Union cause a day of great victories, it was that and more to the Fourth Iowa Cavalry. That day marked the complete success of its first great campaign. Its work up to its departure from Helena had been laborious and costly enough, but, comparatively, it had been small and profitless. Now the regiment reached the end of its green period. It may be said that in the Vicksburg campaign it took its degree, and with honors. Indeed, though its service afterward steadily increased in value, that was due rather to added experience than to further instruction. It had learned its lesson.

Yet there was another event of that 4th of July which was more directly important to it than either the success of the campaign or the acquisition of experience. Its control passed from one set of officers

to another, and the change was distinct. The colonel had resigned, and now the lieutenant-colonel, and a little later the adjutant, resigned. They were succeeded by Colonel Edward F. Winslow, promoted from Second Major, a man born for the place; Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Peters, promoted from Captain of B, an officer of very high abilities; and Adjutant Ambrose Hodge, promoted from Second Lieutenant of L, brave and untiring, and of great natural capacity for the adjutancy. On the 4th of July Colonel Winslow was mustered in, and on the 5th he took command of the regiment, relieving Major Parkell.

Immediately there was a change in the life of the regiment. The indulgent methods which had prevailed at once disappeared. When orders were issued, somebody promptly appeared to see that they were executed. Each man found that he was expected to do his whole duty as a soldier, but he saw that every other man was required to do as well; and the natural results soon appeared in the cheerfulness and alacrity with which the work was done. Better discipline was instituted and steadily improved, and the best care of horses and equipments was persistently required. And, what was naturally of great influence in winning approval among the men of the new order of things, they saw that though they were held to a strict performance of duty, they were themselves cared for with zeal and constancy. Their supplies and comforts were attended to with a promptness and carefulness they had not known before; their demand for better arms was at last in the way of being supplied; and the rights and position of the regiment in relation to the rest of the army appeared to be now insisted upon and fairly

defined. Although immediately after the change of command the regiment marched its whole available force upon a campaign in which it was kept very busy, and in which it suffered much from the dreadful heat and dust of central Mississippi in July, yet from the beginning, and day by day from that 4th of July, the advantages of the change in command became more and more apparent. If there was at first any doubt or fear as to the result, it was soon dispelled, and from the fall of Vicksburg till the day the regiment was disbanded a just confidence and pride in the high qualities of Colonel Winslow as a commander were felt by every man in the regiment and were increased by every trial.

It must not be supposed from this that the officers who at that time retired were not men of ability, or that they had not tried to do their duty. They had all proved the contrary in the field and in camp, but both the colonel and lieutenant-colonel had suffered much from ill-health; indeed, their resignations were offered for that reason. Officers necessarily meet peculiar and constant difficulties in the management of soldiers through the first year or two of their service. During that period volunteers will be sick, restless, complaining, and more or less insubordinate and shirking. Until they are seasoned by experience, the life is very irksome to them, and it is only through many troubles and unceasing difficulties that their officers see them become good and effective soldiers. If an officer who goes through this first period continues in command, he may see his men in later service working with zeal, cheerfulness, and increasing efficiency. So, while the new regimental officers are entitled to great praise for

their success, it should be remembered that they themselves had learned much by experience, and that they had much improved materials to work with,—that is, proven soldiers, instead of green volunteers.

Surgeon McClure had already been compelled by failing health to resign and return to the North. He had served the regiment with untiring efforts and devotion from the day of his appointment. Delicate in conscience as well as in constitution, his unceasing anxieties and labors in carrying a thousand men through their first year of service, in the most unhealthy regions of the South, told too severely upon him. He was very successful, not only professionally, but in winning the respect and esteem of all in the regiment. Every man sincerely regretted his leaving the command, and still more regretted the occasion for it.

Assistant-Surgeon Robinson was promoted to Surgeon, and ably filled the place. He served in the field to the end of the war. Stephen Cummings, of Hopkinton, Iowa, was appointed from civil life to be Assistant-Surgeon, *vice* Robinson, promoted, and joined the regiment in June.

It has been said that the Fourth Iowa was the only regiment of cavalry in Grant's army through all the field campaign against Vicksburg and until the siege was half done. About the middle of June several other regiments were brought down the Mississippi, the Second Wisconsin, the Third Iowa (six companies of it, with its colonel), the Fifth Illinois, and a detachment of the Eleventh Illinois. All these and the Fourth Iowa were thrown into a provisional brigade, and placed under the command of Colonel Cyrus

Bussey, of the Third Iowa. For some time, however, the brigade organization was not much felt or seen, at least not by the men and subordinate officers; and the regiments were encamped at some distance from each other. It was in August following, in the great raid of the brigade from Vicksburg to Memphis, that the Fourth Iowa first felt itself to be part of an organized body of cavalry. Then it learned its first lesson in supporting and receiving the support of other cavalry, and first experienced the satisfaction and realized the value of such support.

On the morning of Saturday, the 4th of July, as soon as Grant had received the surrender of Vicksburg, he sent the order to Sherman to march against Johnston; and while Pemberton's men were laying down their arms before Grant, Sherman's were tramping eastward, under a scorching sun, on another campaign. The cavalry was already near the Big Black, but much of the infantry assigned to Sherman was near Vicksburg. Yet, in the evening of that day, Sherman had nearly all his force at the bank of the river, ready to cross.

It was supposed that Johnston would resist the passage of the river. Only a few days before he had moved his army to the Big Black, west of Brownsville, and sent word to Pemberton that he would attack on the 7th. But on the 5th it appeared that he had withdrawn to Brownsville; and Sherman, after some infantry skirmishing, took possession of Messenger's and Birdsong's ferries. At each of these places he laid a pontoon bridge, and on the 6th all of his infantry and artillery were over.

The cavalry consisted of the available men of the

Third and Fourth Iowa, Second Wisconsin, and Fifth Illinois, all under Colonel Bussey. The cavalry in Johnston's command in this campaign was Jackson's division, three thousand, and Wirt Adams' independent brigade, two thousand. The Fourth Iowa had its new colonel at its head. On the 6th the whole brigade marched down the river to Messenger's Ferry, and on the 7th crossed. It was at once placed in the advance of the army and moved out on the Jackson road. It bivouacked that night near Bolton, on Mellon's plantation, not having met the enemy during the day. Johnston was retreating upon Clinton.

In his retreat he, or some one in authority in his army, caused the carcasses of dead animals to be thrown into the wells and ponds. In summer the water supply of that region is meagre and is furnished mostly by wells, cisterns, and small artificial ponds. The water is bad at the best, especially so in the ponds, where it is usually quite yellow with mud made by the cattle and horses coming to drink; but when, in hot weather, carrion is added to it, language fails. But enough of the stuff to quench thirst had to be swallowed somehow. This trial was the harder to bear in the Fourth Iowa, because the physical condition of the men was then very low. The Vicksburg campaign had left not much of health in the command; and the half of those who marched on this campaign could justly have been excused and left in the care of the surgeons.

On the next day, the 8th, Bussey's brigade, the Third Iowa in front, moved steadily, though slowly, forward, on the Clinton road. In the afternoon the enemy was found, and there was some firing between

his rear and the advance of the Third Iowa. It was Jackson's cavalry, covering Johnston's retreat to Jackson. The retreat continued slowly, the cavalry rear occasionally stopping to engage the Third Iowa skirmishers, until within a mile of Clinton. Here it was reported that Whitfield's brigade of Jackson's command was deployed in front, ready for battle. Colonel Bussey threw his whole brigade into position and sent a report of the situation to General Sherman. The enemy's line was not uncovered, however, when darkness came on; and the brigade retired a little, and bivouacked for the night. In the morning Whitfield's men were not found, and the column moved on, through Clinton and toward Jackson. The Fifth Illinois was in front. A few miles east of Clinton, Whitfield's rear was overtaken and at once attacked by the advance. On both sides the brigades were thrown into position and advanced full lines of skirmishers. The rebels skirmished carefully and stubbornly, retiring slowly, until the infantry of Parke's Ninth Corps came up on the left of the cavalry, when the whole of the enemy's force fell back upon Jackson. Sherman immediately advanced the infantry and artillery, and invested the city.

This being done, there was occasion for very active service on the part of the cavalry. Grant had ordered Sherman to destroy the Mississippi Central Railroad north and south, damage the enemy's means of transportation as much as possible, and make a demonstration upon one flank or the other, as if to cross the Pearl River and cut off his communications in the rear. General Ord, with the Thirteenth Corps, accordingly moved toward the river to the south of Jackson, and

General Parke, with the Ninth Corps, to the north. A body of cavalry marched in front of each of these columns, Colonel Bussey's brigade being the one sent to the north.

This movement was begun on the morning of the 10th. The Fourth Iowa took the front of the column, and the whole brigade moved northeastward to the Livingston road, and thence eastward toward the Pearl River. Late in the afternoon the Fourth Iowa was detached and sent on to the Pearl, the other regiments going into camp near the Insane Asylum, a mile or two north of Jackson. The Fourth made a rapid march in the night, crossed the Central Railroad and destroyed the telegraph line there, reached the river and burned the bridge over it, returned to the railroad and tore it up for some distance, and finally joined the brigade in camp before morning.

The next morning, all dispositions having been made, Sherman advanced his lines at all points, and opened all his artillery upon the enemy. On the right, by some misunderstanding, desperate assaults were made by Lawler's brigade of Iowa infantry, with severe loss and no gain. The cavalry was kept standing to horse on the left, in rear of the artillery, until the middle of the afternoon, when Colonel Bussey was ordered to march upon Canton, about twenty-five miles northward. The march was without incident until ten o'clock at night, when the Central Railroad was reached again. This the Third and Fourth Iowa tore up for a distance of half a mile. Then, at two in the morning, about fifteen miles from Jackson, the brigade went into camp. On Sunday, the 12th, the Fourth Iowa marched to Calhoun Station, on the same road, and

destroyed two engines and eighteen cars. It returned to the column after a few hours, and the march upon Canton was resumed. A couple of miles south of Canton, at the crossing of Bear Creek, the enemy was found in position. A skirmish followed, without loss on our side, and Bussey, believing the enemy too strong for him in numbers and position, decided not to go farther. He posted the Fourth Iowa at the creek, with orders to engage the attention of the enemy, and marched with the remainder of the brigade westward.

It being left to Colonel Winslow's discretion how he would engage the attention of the enemy, he did it by moving the Fourth Iowa upon them, crossing the creek for that purpose, and driving them into Canton. He was confident that the regiment could occupy the town, but his order was to follow the brigade after a short time, and he did so. The brigade was overtaken that evening, near Beatty's Ford on the Big Black. After a short rest there, the whole force marched south on the Brownsville road, to Vernon, and there, at ten o'clock, went into bivouac. At half-past three the next morning it set out on its return to the lines of the army near Jackson, and reached its former camp-ground near the Insane Asylum the same day.

On the 14th a body of the enemy's cavalry, moving with great celerity from the vicinity of Canton, made an attempt upon Sherman's communications at Clinton. The infantry at Clinton successfully repelled this attack, and the rebel cavalry retired to Canton. Sherman then ordered Bussey to march again upon Canton; and placed under his command, in addition to his own brigade, Woods' brigade of infantry and Landgraeber's battery of four light field-pieces, about two thousand

men in all. The expressed objects of this march were to destroy factories and *matériel* of the enemy known to be at Canton, and to learn their strength in that region. It had just been reported to Sherman that Jackson, with the main body of Johnston's cavalry, had moved up the east side of the Pearl, with intention to cross at Grant's Mills or Madisonville and make a bold attack upon his left.

The cavalry set out in advance the morning of the 16th. The march was first to Grant's Mills. Nothing was learned of Jackson's movement there; and the Fourth Iowa and Fifth Illinois, with two pieces of artillery, were detached, placed under Colonel Winslow, and sent up the river, to Madisonville. There were two bridges over the Pearl at that place, one a pontoon. The detachment marched at high speed, reached both bridges without being discovered, and destroyed them; and then, turning westward, it joined Colonel Bussey at Calhoun Station that night. While this was going on Johnston was evacuating the city. Early on the 17th Sherman found that his adversary had got his army safely beyond the Pearl. The same morning Bussey moved his column from Calhoun toward Canton. He was not yet informed of the evacuation of Jackson. About nine o'clock, when approaching Bear Creek, two miles from Canton, the enemy appeared and resisted the march. Skirmishing was begun, and continued with more or less activity until the middle of the afternoon, when the enemy retired into Canton. The artillery was brought into action two or three times on both sides. The Fourth Iowa was employed on the left throughout the affair, and, under orders, several times drove back the enemy's

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right. The Union loss was fifteen killed and wounded, none of whom were of the Fourth Iowa. Seventy-two prisoners were taken from the enemy, but their loss in killed and wounded was unknown. The command bivouacked at Briscoe's plantation, near the contested ground. The rebels evacuated Canton that night, and early the next morning, the 18th, Bussey took possession.

The Fourth Iowa was sent at once to the Big Black River, about nine miles westward, and burned the long railroad bridge over that river, together with a mile of trestle work, and all the railroad property at Way's Bluff, after which it returned to Briscoe's, to the camp of the preceding night. Meantime, the other regiments were occupied in the destruction of the many important factories and machine-shops at Canton, which had been employed in the manufacture of materials and equipments for the rebel army. Military property of great value was broken up or burnt, as well as some locomotives and cars.

Sherman crossed the Pearl, with the most of his army, and followed Johnston's retreat about twelve miles, to Brandon, when he decided to return to Vicksburg. So the army moved slowly westward, the intense heat, the clouds of dust, the scantiness of water, making the march a great hardship. The cavalry under Bussey moved across the country from Canton, and, crossing the Big Black by the military bridge at Messenger's Ferry, went into camp a mile west of that point.

The camps of the different regiments were separated, and that of the Fourth Iowa was on the plantation of a Mr. Flowers, where it remained for about three

months. This was a very beautiful place. It was on the western border of the dense forest through which the Big Black slowly winds its way, occupying the first slight rise of the land from the river bottom. In the luxuriant growth of trees, shrubbery, and flowers on the plantation, particularly upon that part near the owner's residence, it was a semi-tropical scene, and all the appointments and adornments of the place gave evidence of the wealth and cultivated taste of the owner. But to the soldiers it was an unwholesome beauty, the air being as rich in miasmatic fevers and ague as was the soil in vegetation. General Sherman established his headquarters about a mile north of the Fourth Iowa camp; and between that time and his leaving the Southwest to engage in his campaign against Atlanta, an acquaintance grew between him and the regiment which was continued to the end of the war. From the day of the affair at Fourteen-mile Creek he had expected something of Winslow and the Fourth Iowa; and now there was an opportunity to give them a better trial than they had yet had. Colonel Bussey was transferred to General Steele's department at Little Rock. The Second Wisconsin was detached, and the remaining regiments of cavalry were organized into an independent brigade, with Colonel Winslow in command.

The Fourth Iowa, having no lieutenant-colonel at this time (Peters not having been mustered in), was commanded by Major Parkell. For a period of three weeks after going into camp at Flowers' the regiment did nothing better than picketing along the Big Black, with some foraging and scouting. It was a well-earned period of rest. But the unhealthfulness of the coun-

try was a very serious drawback. The sick-list was very long, and the cases uncommonly obstinate. But all who were able, officers and men, had plenty to do. Colonel Winslow, with zealous persistence, pursued the course he had laid out for making the most of the regiment; and careful discipline, strict attention to orders, the care of horses and equipments, had now become familiar phrases of very practical import.

The improvement thus gained was soon to be tested. On Sunday, the 9th of August, there was great activity in the camp. All the men of the brigade who had serviceable horses were warned to be ready to march under this order:

HEAD QRS. 15th ARMY CORPS,
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, Aug. 8, 1863.

Colonel E. F. Winslow,
4th Iowa Cavalry.

SIR:

In pursuance of Special Orders No. 156 of the 6th inst., you will take command of the Cavalry Force designated in those orders, and start on the 10th instant for the north. You will strike for the lower Benton Road, and follow it to Mechanicsburg, and thence to Yazoo City. There you will find a gunboat and a supply of provisions, with which you can replenish. After a short rest, keeping well quiet as to your destination, proceed to Lexington and then strike the great Central Railroad, and ascertain, if possible, if the locomotives and cars belonging to the road are still above Grenada. At our last accounts there were between Grenada and Water Valley an immense number of locomotives (70) and near five hundred cars.

If you find any locomotives below Grenada, you will endeavor to have them and all cars sent up to and above Grenada; and you will proceed to that place with your cavalry.

General Grant has ordered a force from Memphis to meet you at or near Grenada. Communicate with him as soon as possible, and with your joint forces use all possible efforts to get these cars and locomotives into Memphis.

I take it for granted that parties are now employed in repairing the track out from Memphis, and that you will find everything done on that end of the road. You know that we have so crippled the road from Canton south, that no railroad stock can be carried off by the enemy, and therefore we have no interest in destroying it; and therefore you will confine your labors and efforts to save it by running it toward and into Memphis. You will find plenty of engineers and conductors whom you can employ, or, if necessary, use force to compel them to work their engines and trains.

I am satisfied all of Jackson's cavalry is at or near Brandon, east of the Pearl. If any detachments have been made they are toward Natchez. The Memphis forces will of course drive out of that neighborhood all of Chalmers' men and other detachments of guerillas, more intent on collecting conscripts than on fighting. No matter what force you meet, attack promptly and resolutely; and so handle your forces that they cannot count your numbers. Do not stay in Grenada, but occupy the bank of the Yallobusha, the other side of Grenada, till you are in communication with the Memphis forces. After which, act according to your judgment.

You carry money with you, and it is now to the interest of our Government that all plundering and pillaging should cease. Impress this on your men from the start, and let your Chief Quartermaster and Commissary provide liberally and fairly for the wants of your command by paying. Union people and the poor farmers, without being too critical as to politics, should be paid for their corn, bacon, beef, and vegetables. But where the larger planters and farmers have an abundance and to spare, you can take of the surplus, giving in all such cases a simple receipt, signed

by your Chief Quartermaster or Commissary. Also, when your horses break down you can take a remount, exchanging the broken-down animal and giving a certificate of the transaction, fixing the cash difference in value. Deal firmly but fairly with the inhabitants. I am satisfied a change of feeling is now going on in this State, and we should encourage it. Much importance is attached to this branch of the subject, and you will see that every officer and man is informed of it. Punish on the spot and with rigor any wanton burning of houses or property without your specific order.

If at Grenada you find the Memphis force fully competent to the task of saving the railroad stock enumerated, you can return via Yazoo City, but if there be any doubt, remain with them and go on into Memphis, and return to my command by the river. On your application, the Quartermaster, Captain Eddy, will furnish boats. Report to me by letter as often as possible, either by the route you go, or around by way of Memphis.

I enclose you the best map we are able to compile. Add to it as you progress; and on your return I shall expect it to be well filled with roads and names of localities not now on it.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General Commanding.

This order is given in full, partly because the raid made under it was very successful, and partly because it refers to the policy which the government attempted to inaugurate in 1863, after the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg—a policy of conciliation toward the people of the South wherever they might come within reach of our armies. For nearly two years the Union armies had, with very limited exceptions, found only enemies along their lines of invasion; but it was be-

lieved now that the great disasters of the year had so disheartened and sobered the Southerners, that a policy of considerateness and respect for property would, at least in the minds of many, turn the scale against the Confederacy. The order was in that respect (as indeed in all respects) faithfully carried out on this raid; but, as the country traversed could not be occupied, not much evidence could be gathered as to its practical effect.

The probability is that the terrorism which was maintained by armed Secessionists in all parts of the South, over all citizens suspected of cherishing any Union sentiment, was quite enough to prevent the average Southerner from saying anything against the Confederacy or in favor of the Union, even though his pocket had just been filled by Union officers with good money for his corn and horses. It is more than probable that in any seceded State, at any time after the fall of Sumter, the expression of Union sentiment was confined strictly to the limited territory that was covered by Union guns.

Early in the morning of the 10th of August, the raiding column moved out on the road to the north. There were about 800 officers and men from the Third and Fourth Iowa and the Fifth Illinois. Major Noble, of the Third Iowa, was the second officer in rank. The Fourth Iowa turned out 375 officers and men under Major Parkell. All was in good order, only the best conditioned men and horses being taken, but the cavalry arms were still inefficient. A part of the men had Sharp's and Union carbines, which were fairly good for that time, but among the others were distributed a variety of cavalry guns, inferior in range and poor in

construction, which one would guess the War Department had never carefully examined or tested. Indeed, up to that time a large part of the Fourth Iowa had received no carbines at all, and carried only pistol and sabre.

Only two days' rations were taken, as it was expected, according to Sherman's order, that there would be received at Yazoo City as much more as it might be found expedient to carry. That would not be much, for it was intended to march in the lightest order possible. The weather was hot, the marches might be unusually long, the dust would be a trial to man and beast, and great activity of movement might at any time be required. There was never a lighter column. There was no train, not a wagon, not even an ambulance or a pack-mule.

The march was by way of the familiar village of Mechanicsburg; and the first day eighteen miles were made by one o'clock, when the command went into camp. The next day it was through Mechanicsburg and on to Roach's plantation, another place familiar to the regiment. Early on the 12th Yazoo City was reached; but no gunboat was there, nor any Federal force. There had been some infantry there, as Sherman had understood, but, for some unexplained reason, it had all gone down the Yazoo on steamers two days before, whether with the idea of returning or of remaining away no one there knew. This unexpected circumstance seemed to present a very serious difficulty. There were no rations for men or animals, the corn in the fields was not yet ripe, and a march to Grenada, perhaps to Memphis, would keep the command many days in a country unknown to all.

Winslow assembled all the commissioned officers of the command, read to them General Sherman's letter of instructions, and requested their advice. The question was whether to go forward or to return if no supplies should arrive. The officer youngest in rank was asked to speak first, and he advised a return. All the others voted the same way. Winslow did not express an opinion. He sent a man down the road along the Yazoo, on a strong mule, with orders to ride hard and as far as he possibly could and return by four o'clock the next morning. This scout went as far as the town of Satartia, about twenty miles down the river, and returned at the hour named. He had seen neither steamboat nor troops, but had learned that they had passed below Satartia, presumably on their return to Vicksburg.

The enemy's headquarters at this time were at Canton, about twenty-five miles east from Yazoo City. It was learned that several cavalry commands were in that vicinity, numbering some thousands in all. Winslow decided to go on, and to make a forced march to the north of Canton, so as to leave all the rebel cavalry well to the rear the first day. Immediately on the return and report of the scout, at daylight on the 13th, the column was put in motion toward Lexington. Marching at the highest speed consistent with proper care, thirty miles were made before night, and the command bivouacked at Harlan's Creek. The next morning at eight it was in Lexington. Leaving the Third Iowa there, under Major Noble, to procure rations, Winslow marched with the other regiments eastward, by Castilian Springs, to the railroad (Mississippi Central), and arrived at Durant Station just in

time to intercept and capture two trains from the north, with a number of prisoners. These trains were to be the first to run to Canton over the new bridge which the rebels had just finished on the Big Black in the place of the one destroyed by the Fourth Iowa on the 18th of July. The telegraph lines were cut, the railroad destroyed, and, Major Noble having come up with the Third Iowa, the march was resumed northward. The bivouac at night was at Jordan's Creek, after thirty-two miles made that day, not to speak of the additional work of destroying property and reconnoitring. The raiders now had control of the railroad, and the march lay along its line.

Captain Peters, of the Fourth Iowa, had been put in charge of train service, with instructions to gather up all the engines and cars on the line and run them north. He first ran an engine south of Durant, five miles, and burnt the bridge on the road at that point. Then he moved north, taking along all engines and cars, and keeping up communication with the marching column. Volunteer engineers, firemen, and trainmen were found in the command, who, with those captured on the line and forced into service, kept up the movement of trains until the command arrived near Grenada. As each station on the railroad was reached, the track or the nearest bridge south of it was destroyed, so that, if it should become necessary to abandon any of the rolling-stock temporarily, it could not be run south by the enemy. Then all the rolling-stock was moved to the next station. But the accumulation soon became very great. For miles the track was occupied by locomotives and cars, and it was a serious reduction of the fighting column to furnish the men required to run the

trains. And of course each man on the cars left a horse in the column to be cared for by another man. It was the intention to march all the night of the 15th, but tremendous and prolonged thunder-storms came on, with floods of water, and after a struggle until midnight in deep darkness and in increasing mud and water, a halt was ordered. To this day the men who were in that storm speak of it as a marvel in nature. The terrific, continuous crashing of thunder, the incessant, fearful flashing of lightning on all sides, the torrents of falling water, and the dense darkness in the intervals of blinding light exceeded anything they have ever known. The halt was near West Station. It was impossible to go farther that night, but the march was resumed early in the morning. More engines and cars were found and run forward. So many were now in hand that the management of them required, in one way or another, the attention of the whole column, and there was no rest for any one.

All through the night of the 16th the march went on, and at daybreak the station at Winona was reached. The rebels then appeared in front. They had destroyed a bridge on the railroad north of Winona, but they were either too weak in numbers, or too timid, to attack. Up to the 16th there had been no fighting, except a little skirmishing. The sudden appearance in the middle of the State of a body of Yankee cavalry must have been surprising to the rebels, and the movement of the column was in the first days so rapid that any information of its position was in a short time contradicted by its appearance elsewhere. When the railroad was cut, however, and the rolling-stock disappeared northward, the design was understood, and

pursuing forces appeared in the rear. But the quality of boldness in the movement was itself worth many men ; and the enemy, at least at first, much exaggerated the number of the raiders. The pursuing column was therefore so large and moved with such caution that it accomplished nothing. As the raiders were hampered and delayed by the train work, and by the condition of their horses, jaded by long marches and suffering from the irregularity and inferior quality of food, a light brigade of the rebels, by forced marching and resolute attack, could have given very serious trouble.

On the 16th and afterward until Grenada was reached, the rear-guard was kept busy watching the pursuing rebels, sometimes turning to fire upon or skirmish with them. They showed themselves only in small bodies, occasionally making a dash upon the rear-guard, apparently operating independently of the larger column following which never came in sight.

The captured rolling-stock could not be run north of Winona without rebuilding the bridge the rebels had destroyed. It was reported that there was a force of the enemy posted at Grenada, still twenty miles distant, and there was no news yet of the co-operating column from Tennessee. It was important that Grenada should be taken at the earliest moment. If it could be held by the enemy, not only would the captured property be lost, but the raiding column would be in great peril. Winslow decided to leave the cars at Winona, as if abandoned, push on and take Grenada, hold that place until the arrival of the Tennessee cavalry, and meantime send a detachment down the railroad to repair the bridge at Winona and

bring up the trains. This movement was immediately undertaken. The column arrived at Duck Hill, about eight miles south of Grenada, by the middle of the afternoon of the 17th. The horses were so much jaded that the march was necessarily slow.

The attacks upon the rear became bolder, and now the enemy appeared also in front. It was better in every way to fight those in front. The column was well closed up, and the head of it pushed on without stopping. The rebels kept up a continuous fire, but, whenever they showed any disposition to stand, they were at once assailed with determined spirit, and driven, with a view to give them no time to reform. As they fell back always on the Grenada road, there was much anxiety as to whether they meant to defend that place and as to whether they had force enough to do it. If they could hold Grenada, they might prevent the junction of the two Union columns. But, within a few miles of the town, at Berry Creek, they fell off to the east and disappeared.

The column thereupon marched directly in, having made thirty-two miles that day, with almost continual skirmishing. On approaching the town in the darkness fires were seen, lighting the skies in different directions. Winslow sent a staff officer with the advance guard, to learn and report the cause; but he was himself soon in the streets, where he met Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, who had arrived a few hours before from Lagrange, Tennessee, with two cavalry brigades. Phillips had found some of Jackson's cavalry at Grenada, and had driven them out, but not until they had burned the two railroad bridges just north of the town, one over the Yallobusha and the

other over a tributary creek. Expecting to be attacked if he should remain there, he was engaged in destroying the cars, engines, and other railroad property, intending to leave for the north as soon as possible, without waiting for the column from Vicksburg. In fact, his men had nearly all recrossed to the north of the Yallobusha, with that purpose, when Winslow's column arrived. The fires had been caused by the carelessness or indifference of Phillips' men, who, in destroying the railroad property, had permitted the fire to spread to private houses.

Winslow assumed command of all the troops. The mayor and citizens being too much frightened and distressed to make any efficient efforts to put out the fires, the soldiers were ordered to direct and help them. Soldiers and citizens were soon working zealously together, and the fires were limited to the buildings which had already caught. Order was restored and the fears of the people dispelled. The captured city had learned its first lesson in war. Grant had again and again, in 1862, planned the capture of the place, and had more than once led or sent a force against it, but without success. In December, 1862, the Fourth Iowa had got very near it, in a demonstration made from Helena, under Hovey and Washburn, but had not seen it.

There were now about three thousand cavalry at Grenada, all without provisions or forage, and all much fatigued. Winslow decided to remain a day or two, to rest and procure supplies. By his direction, the mayor, at midnight, assembled the leading citizens, and each family in the town was ordered to deliver the next day at Brown's Hotel all the bread that

could be made in the meantime. This was done, and a portion of meat was taken wherever it could be spared. All these provisions, as well as those taken before, were paid for under Sherman's order, except such as plainly were or would become the supplies of the enemy.

The Third Iowa was placed in occupation of the town, with its commander, Major Noble, as Provost-Marshal, and all the other troops were encamped north of the Yallobusha. On examination, it was found that a large part of the rolling-stock at Grenada had been so much damaged by Phillips that it could not be used and that the bridges north of the town could not be rebuilt without an expenditure of time and materials impossible under the circumstances. It was certain that Jackson's brigades of the enemy's cavalry were moving in pursuit from the south; and it was reported that there was another body of cavalry near Panola, north of Grenada, under Ruggles, which could intercept the march to Memphis. It seemed quite impracticable to save the rolling-stock taken at Grenada or that left at Winona; and, with much reluctance, it had to be admitted that one of the principal objects of the expedition was defeated. There was no help for it. The work of destruction begun by Phillips was completed. Seventy locomotives, over three hundred cars, and other railway properties in proportion, were broken up and burnt. It was afterward learned that the railway bridges farther north, over the Tallahatchie and Coldwater rivers, had also been destroyed, so that the difficulties in the way of completing the enterprise were even greater than they had appeared to be at Grenada.

On the second morning, Wednesday, the 19th, the railway property having all been destroyed, men and horses having had rest and plenty of food, and some days' provisions having been gathered and distributed to the whole force, the march was resumed to the northward. Movement was, naturally, slower than it had been south of Grenada, but the enemy was not met. The country was desolate. It had been harassed and swept by hostile armies for more than a year. Along the principal roads it was as if one were following the path of a great fire. After two or three days' march, crossing the Tallahatchie at Panola, where it was supposed the enemy would be found, and finding no enemy in force, Winslow parted with Phillips' brigade, which then set out directly toward Lagrange, in Tennessee, returning to its camp, while his own brigade moved northwest, toward Hernando, bound for Memphis. At the Coldwater River, near Hernando, in the afternoon of Friday, the 21st, a body of rebels, on the northern bank, undertook to hold the bridge. The Third Iowa, at the head of the column, was dismounted, placed in the fallen timber along the southern bank, and ordered to fire upon the enemy across the river. This was intended to occupy their attention for a time. Major Farnan, with the Fifth Illinois, was sent down the river, with orders to cross half a mile below, get into their rear, and capture them. The Fourth Iowa, being in the rear of the brigade, was brought up to increase the fire, while a feint was made to cross in the face of the enemy. But the plan was probably suspected. The enemy retired before Major Farnan could reach his position. While this was going on, a party of the rebels busied themselves in an

irregular firing upon the rear, but without any effect except in wounding a few horses.

The brigade immediately crossed the river, and a detachment was sent after the rebels who had held the bank, with the purpose to drive them and to learn whether they were in communication with any stronger force. But they could not be overtaken within several miles, and there being no indication of the presence of any others on that side of the river, the brigade went into bivouac on the high ground near the river. The Third Iowa had four men wounded in the fight across the river, none dangerously, while the other regiments suffered no loss.

There was no further appearance of the enemy, and the next morning the brigade moved leisurely toward Memphis, about twenty-five miles distant. Long halts were made to relieve the weary men and animals, so that Memphis was not reached until the following day, the 23d. There the brigade remained in bivouac until the 29th.

General Grant was at Memphis at that time, and Colonel Winslow reported to him for orders, giving an account of the operations and incidents of the expedition. Grant was much gratified, and directed that the command return to Vicksburg by steamboats, with leave to "take it easy." But as soon as boats could be cleared, the brigade was shipped, and, landing at Vicksburg on the 31st, the men reached their camp at Flowers' plantation the same day. One of the boats, the *Madison*, having several companies of the Fourth Iowa aboard, ran aground, and was delayed so long in getting off that her passengers did not reach the camp till the 1st of September. The Third Iowa detachment

was debarked at Helena, by special leave of General Grant, in order that the two parts of the regiment, which had long been separated, might be reunited. In the spring following, however, at Memphis, the whole of the Third was again brigaded with the Fourth.

This raid, or more properly expedition, deserves to rank as one of the first of the war. The column of only eight hundred men had marched two hundred and sixty-five miles, almost wholly through the enemy's country, had killed and wounded many of the enemy, had captured 55, had brought to Memphis 25 skilled engineers and mechanics, whose services were greatly needed by the enemy, and had destroyed an immense quantity of railroad property, making the Mississippi Central useless to the enemy for a long time. Private property had been respected, the men having committed no excesses, having entered not one house from Vicksburg to Grenada, except on duty; all supplies taken from private persons had been paid for; and the losses had been only 2 killed, 5 wounded, and 6 missing.¹

The two brigades which had come from Tennessee under Phillips, not having instructions similar to those given to Winslow (as Sherman understood they were to have), had pursued the usual course, living on the country as far as possible and taking animals and forage wherever found, without compensation. This conflict of policy between the two columns was unfortunate, and the good effect of the careful conduct of Winslow's command between Vicksburg and Grenada must have been in part counteracted by the hostile treatment of the people north of Grenada by Phillips' command.

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

General Sherman heartily approved of the management of the expedition, and soon afterward appointed Winslow Chief of Cavalry. He expressed his approval then and in a letter he afterward wrote to Winslow.¹

The six missing were from the Fourth Iowa. One of them, Charles H. Smith, of C, escaped from his captors and rejoined at Memphis; two others, Caleb J. Allen, of A, and James M. Carson, of H, died of ill treatment in prison, and three were exchanged and returned to service.

An episode of this Grenada expedition especially interesting to the men of the Fourth Iowa, because the subject of it came to be well known and liked in the regiment, was that of John Buck; and it serves well to illustrate the vindictive cruelty often shown by Southerners of that day. At his plantation, two days out from Vicksburg, Buck was met. He was a good citizen and a man of property. He was said to be a Union man, and probably was one until the fighting began. There was a very large number of Union men in the South up to the fall of Sumter; after that they were compelled by the active rebels to take the Secessionists' side, or hold their peace and dissemble. Buck was intelligent and was well acquainted with the country through which the proposed line of march lay. Winslow asked him to go along, expecting his information and advice to be of value in respect to the roads and the adjacent country. Buck objected strongly, but he was compelled to go. He rode with the column to Memphis, though he rendered no service except in giving information as to the roads to be marched and watched. Indeed, his presence with the column was probably of more value to

¹ See p. 165.

the citizens along the road than to the Union cavalry, in connection with the policy Winslow was trying to apply, of conciliating and protecting the people.

He returned with the regiment to Vicksburg, with the purpose of going thence to his home at Lexington, and early in September he passed the lines for that purpose. He had made many friends in the regiment, and they advised him not to go yet; but his anxiety to see his family controlled him. He had not gone far beyond the Union pickets when he was arrested. He was taken to General Whitfield, who was then at Vernon, in command of a brigade of rebels known as the Texas Cavalry, composed in part of the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Texas regiments. Whitfield immediately ordered him hung to the nearest tree, and it was done. There was not even the form of a trial or examination, nor any time permitted for explanation or defense. It was enough that he was said to be a Union man, and that he had, though under compulsion, acted as guide for Union troops. It was by methods such as this, very commonly practised, that Secessionists had destroyed the influence of Union sentiments in the Southern States and made it practicable for the Confederate government to maintain a military despotism as complete and absolute as any in history.

Another incident of this expedition, though of more interest to the two immediately concerned than to any one else, ought to be recorded. As the troops did not get the rations they were to have from the boats at Yazoo City, they were compelled throughout the march to live upon the country. Flour was found at mills along the way, but many of the companies or messes were without utensils for making bread. The

men got along as best they could, eating green corn from the fields by day, and at night borrowing from each other the few frying-pans and metal utensils that were to be had for making bread. At Grenada, the command remaining in camp one day, a mess of C thought it a good time to find a frying-pan or other vessel for cooking flapjacks. Charles H. Smith (afterward a lieutenant in the company) and James H. Davidson were detailed by their messmates to look for the treasure. Leaving their horses to rest, they mounted mules, rode into Grenada, and went to all the stores and a number of private houses, but without success. Then they rode out of the town eastward, of course supposing themselves still to be within the picket line. They had hardly got beyond the town, with eyes upon a house where they hoped to find the frying-pan, when from the bushes they heard the sharp order "*Halt! Surrender!*" A party of rebels, about twenty, who had been concealed near the road, now stood up and presented shotguns and rifles at short range. On those slow mules and at that distance there was no hope of escape for the Yankees. They surrendered. The rebels immediately mounted and hurried their prisoners away southeastward, taking from them their arms and all equipments. They rode rapidly ten miles without stopping, though they had no other prisoners and no occasion for apprehension. The captain then ordered a halt, and had supper prepared for his men at a farm-house. He made no provision for his prisoners, but the old lady who seemed to be mistress at the house offered them food, notwithstanding she said she knew that they had come south to kill the women and children. The march

was continued that night, with the expectation of joining Chalmers' command, but that was not accomplished until the night following. Meantime Smith and Davidson had been dismounted and were compelled to hurry along afoot. In a conversation with Colonel McCulloch, of Chalmers' division, whom they met, they were much interested to hear that his men had counted Winslow's column on its march to Grenada, and that it numbered eight hundred. The prisoners had said, in reply to McCulloch's inquiry, that there were two thousand, but he insisted that there were only eight hundred. No doubt the column had really been counted at some point near Grenada.

Four other prisoners from other commands were added, and a captain and twenty men were detailed to take the squad of six to West Point, Miss., whence they were to be sent by rail to some prison camp. The captain's name was Hill and he rode a fine horse. His men and the prisoners went afoot. For two days they marched about twenty-five miles a day, and on the evening of August 21st, the fourth day from Grenada, they camped not far from West Point.

Of course our two captives had been all the time studying plans of escape, and, as they heard they were to be put into a railway car the next day, this night seemed to be the last chance. The night before, they had slept in a cabin, upon a floor of heavy, loose planks, a couple of feet above the ground. Smith had raised one of the planks in the night, and had undertaken to slip through, when his movement disturbed the geese and hogs domiciled under the house, and he was afraid to go further. He gave it up, and contrived to replace the plank without exciting suspicion.

This last night they were quartered in a log school-house. The south end was a close wall, with a fire-place and chimney. In the north end was a long, horizontal opening, answering for a window, but without a sash. It was rather low, and just under it was a long desk fastened against the wall. On the east side was a door. The prisoners were directed to lie on the floor near the fire-place. Those of the guard not on immediate duty occupied the remainder of the floor, with two or three lying on the long desk. A sentinel stood in the doorway, gun in hand. The corporal of the guard posted himself at a fire three yards in front of the door, and it was to be presumed that there were other sentinels about the house. The sentinel in the door seemed to be quite able to keep awake.

It was two hundred miles to the Union lines, either at Vicksburg or in Tennessee, and the rebel cavalry was constantly moving through the intervening country. The chance of successful escape seemed very small indeed. Smith tried hard to keep awake, intending to seize even the smallest chance of escape, but, exhausted by fatigue, he fell asleep. Suddenly he awoke, his mind intensely strained by his purpose. The sentinel at the door was awake. At that moment he asked the corporal of the guard what time it was, and the corporal answered two o'clock. The chance was so desperate, at the best, that it seemed to Smith not right to involve another in the attempt, and, as Davidson was asleep, he decided not to awake him. The room was dark, except as lighted dimly and fitfully from the low fire outside. He took his blouse and boots in one hand, stepped with great care over the

bodies of the other prisoners and the rebels on the floor, and reached the desk under the opening or window in the wall, without having made any noise. He could see that the sentinel in the door was facing toward the fire. He had passed within six feet of him. Then he managed to creep over the desk, between the rebels lying on its top, and through the window opening. He dropped to the ground, and saw the captain's fine horse tied near. He found the saddle and bridle, put them on, and led the horse straight away into the woods. It is amazing that he was neither seen nor heard. Within a short distance he stopped, listened, and mounted; but the saddle girth broke, and he had to stop long enough to mend it. What intense excitement and anxiety he must have felt in those lost moments! He mounted again and walked the horse northward until he thought it safe to make the noise of galloping. Then he set out at high speed, following the road by which he had come. He kept on rapidly the rest of the night in the road, but at daybreak took to the woods and worked steadily northward, through forests and swamps. Captain Hill's haversack, found on the saddle, furnished him a little food, but that night hunger compelled him to apply at a house for more. He pretended to be a courier from the Confederate general, Chalmers, and was not suspected. He found he had made thirty-five miles in the right direction. He pushed on through that night, right along the main road, and even called at a house and waked a man, to ask about his route. This man was not easily satisfied, and Smith was alarmed. He hurried away, determined to depend only upon the north star for information after that. So he

kept on, riding by night in the roads as far as it appeared to him safe, and making slow progress through tangled woods and swamps by day. He fed his horse with green corn when he could. Once he ran unexpectedly upon a house, seeing it too late to retire. He made the best of the case by going up and asking for food. He even waited while the mistress made and baked some bread for him. This woman said he was a Yankee, and he found it hard to quiet her suspicion ; but she told him there was a large body of rebels at Pontotoc and another at Redland, towns about eight miles distant on either hand, and that there were two regiments at Randolph, a town about six miles northward. Unwilling to take the time to make the circuit around these bodies of the enemy, he risked going between them. He kept close in the woods, and carefully reconnoitred every road he found he must cross. During the next day he saw, on different roads, several parties of rebel soldiers, but managed to escape observation ; and at night he took the highway again. Fortunately the horse was a good traveller and kept up well. Near morning he lay down to sleep and rest his horse, but at daylight he was startled from sleep by the baying of bloodhounds. He supposed they were after him, and hurried away in a state of mind that may be imagined. Every Union soldier had heard of the terrible uses to which bloodhounds were put by the Southerners. But the fugitive did not hear them again, and it is probable that they were in pursuit of other game. When he reached the Tallahatchie River he could not cross it, the bank being so miry that he could not reach the water with his horse. He went down the river about eight miles before he ventured a

crossing. The horse was nearly lost in the mire at the water's edge, but struggled through and swam across. That night, in going over a ridge, he came suddenly upon the camp-fires of a large rebel force. He heard the noises of the camp, but for some reason the pickets had not heard the tread of his horse. He retired quietly, and undertook to go around the camp, but, becoming entangled in a swamp, he lost his course and came up to the same camp on another side. He was warned by his horse, which stopped suddenly and stood still. Then he saw two rebel videttes in the road, and heard them talking. He backed out, but again lost himself in the swamps; and, worn out by fatigue, he lay down till daylight. Then he carefully reconnoitred, located the camp, and again pushed northward through the woods. About noon he came to a deserted road running the right way for him. He took the risk, and rapidly made ten miles on that road without seeing any one. He now hoped soon to see Union videttes, and his anxiety impelled him to try to learn, by inquiry at a house, the shortest course to the Union lines. He went to a house which happened to be occupied by a preacher and his family. The preacher told him that there were bands of Yankees roaming about the country, and gave him plenty of advice how to avoid them, and, being pleased to have a good listener, he invited him to eat the remains of the family dinner of pork and beans and "corn-dodgers," with "peach-cobbler" for dessert. It was the first full meal he had after his capture. He ate all he could, and, having an eye to the future, watched his chance slyly to slip the remainder of the pork and "dodgers" into his bosom. The man told him it was twenty miles to Holly

Springs, and that he would probably meet a body of heroes on the way; but, as the talk went on, it appeared the heroes were a party of "bushwhackers," whose heroic occupation was the murdering of Union soldiers from ambush. The wretch told with glee some of the exploits of his savage friends in killing Union men and Union soldiers, always by stealth. There were many such devil-like spirits in the South, particularly in Mississippi.

The lost raider now moved toward Holly Springs, in the hope of finding it a Union post; and, his remarkable success up to this time giving him confidence, he took the main road. Several times he met rebels, among them a colonel, but on his salute and some commonplace inquiry, all of them passed him without concern. At dark he crossed the Tippah River. Going up the hill on the northern side, his horse suddenly stood still, as he had done on approaching the rebel camp the night before. Again he heard the voices of men ahead. A silent search disclosed a rebel picket, with camp-fires beyond. A long circuit was made, through woods covering high hills, and the rest of the night was spent partly in the road and partly in the woods, still pressing forward. The fatigue of both man and horse must have been very great. It was the fourth day of the flight, and they had been nearly all the time in motion, only two or three hours a day being spent in sleep. It was now the 25th, and the regiment had been two days at Memphis. That morning the fugitive ran upon a party of five rebel soldiers lounging about a house by the roadside. He talked with them without attracting any special attention, representing himself as one of McCulloch's Second Missouri Cav-

alry, a regiment known to be below, and said he was now on furlough. Then he met a boy in the road, who said that there were no Yankees at Holly Springs, but that some of "our men" were there, and that it was twenty-five miles to the nearest Yankees, at Lagrange, in Tennessee. Then he met two of "Mitchell's Guerillas," a notorious band infesting that region, and found them very inquisitive. Getting away from them, he decided to risk no more encounters in the road, and took to the woods. Passing some miles to the left of Holly Springs, he reached the Lagrange road before dark. This made the end of his perilous journey seem near and increased his energy. Early in the night a small town was reached. He was afraid to go through, and tried a circuit. A long ride around ended at the same town. It was about midnight and all still. He took the risk and rode through, seeing no one. Later he found he could not keep awake on his horse, and, as that added new dangers to his situation, he concealed himself and fell asleep on the ground. That was unfortunate. He slept longer than usual, and awoke late in the morning. Then pushing on, he soon saw a place where there had been a camp only the night before. Examining the ground, he found that the campers were Union soldiers. If he had only kept on a few miles instead of going to sleep!

In much disappointment and anxiety he urged on his weary horse, and soon learned that he was right in his belief that Yankees were near, but he could not fix their position, though he ventured to inquire of several persons he met. He found now that he was on a road to Mount Pleasant, the headquarters of Mitchell's band of savages, and fifteen miles yet from Lagrange.

Avoiding Mount Pleasant and taking the most northerly road, regardless of exposure in his great anxiety, he rode right for Lagrange. When he knew he must be within two or three miles of the Union pickets, he saw four men ahead, mounted. They went to a house near by and dismounted. Smith rode along, trying to look unconcerned. He saw that the men were rebel soldiers or guerrillas, and that they expected him to stop and join them. When he came opposite he saluted and went on. Being so near the Union lines, they must then have suspected him. They shouted "*Halt!*" He quickened his pace. The rebels at once mounted and pursued. He spurred on his faithful horse—a race for the picket-post. He kept ahead, and in a few minutes found himself with the Second Iowa.

It was just sundown, ten days since he was captured. He had been six days and five nights in the incessant labor and dreadful anxieties of his struggle to escape. He had travelled quite two hundred miles, every mile in the enemy's country.

Davidson says that Smith's flight was not discovered till morning, and that then searching parties were sent out and bloodhounds employed. But he had four or five hours the start and was on a good horse.

How widely different and how much harder was poor Davidson's experience! He paid dearly for his hope of a frying-pan. He spent fifteen months in prisons and prison pens, in Mobile, Richmond, Belle Isle, Andersonville, and Millen, half-clad, half-starved, and most of the time without shelter or blanket. If his story is less interesting than Smith's, it is only because, unhappily, in those days his was a very common experience. Stories of the captivity of Union soldiers

and their unsuccessful attempts to escape have often been told. The hardships of prison life in the South were so dreadful that almost every day some of the wretched prisoners risked their lives upon some desperate plan of eluding or breaking their guards. Many other soldiers of the Fourth Iowa suffered in the hands of the rebels much as Davidson did; and his story is told as the type of all.

As soon as a detachment was despatched in pursuit of Smith, the other prisoners were marched on to West Point, and sent thence by rail to Columbus, Miss. After a while they were sent to Mobile and confined in a jail. There it was Davidson's fortune to occupy the same cell and bed with the famous Neal Dow of Maine, then a general in the Union army, who had been captured. Thence he was shipped to Atlanta, where he was confined several weeks, but with comparative comfort and with enough to eat. But that was too good to last, and he was sent, with a large number of prisoners, to Richmond. There he spent some time in the Libby prison, of which his most distinct memory is the incessant fighting of the prisoners against vermin, a hopeless task, because they were allowed no means for cleanliness.

While at Libby he had an adventure which he refers to as "a little circumstance that made the hair rise on my head." One morning in October, just after the roll was called, he and four others were ordered to step two paces to the front. Then "*Right face!—Forward, march!*" and they marched out into the street and through the city, surrounded by a guard with fixed bayonets. They were not told where they were going, but, naturally, they imagined it was to death.

The procession brought up in the notorious Castle Thunder, where the prisoners were separated and placed in solitary confinement, with the information that they were to await and follow the fate of a like number of Confederates who were then held by the Union government and threatened with punishment for some exceptional villainy. They were confined in Castle Thunder a week, and then, without explanation, returned to Libby.

A few days afterward he was sent, with all other enlisted men, from Libby to Belle Isle. After that Libby was occupied only by captive officers, and Belle Isle was crowded with soldiers. It was at the beginning of an extremely severe winter, which witnessed the death or ruin of health of many thousands of the prisoners from cruel exposure and starvation. There was shelter enough for only a part of the wretched men. Indeed, at times the crowd was so great that only a small part could get their heads under a roof. The weather was by turns wet and freezing, with piercing winds. Nobody had enough clothing, many had far too little, and only a few had been so lucky as to have a blanket left to them when plundered of their effects by their captors. Davidson was without shelter, without a blanket, bareheaded, and barefooted. The food was always scanty, poor, and irregularly supplied. The hunger of these patriots, dying by inches, was most pitiful. Yet when two or three prisoners were reported missing one day, the commandant deprived all the others of food, with the threat that they should get no more until they disclosed the method of escape. This atrocious barbarity overreached itself. If any one knew, no one would

tell, and the ration was restored after a day or two without the information.

At times the Sanitary Commission of the North, under leave of the rebel authorities, succeeded in getting shipments of clothing, canned food, fruits, and other comforts, through to Belle Isle for the prisoners. It was all appropriated by their guards, some of whom were base enough to wear the clothing and eat the provisions in the sight of the prisoners, jeering them the while and tossing to them the emptied cans.

No one who has not seen the ghastly objects in the form of men delivered at Annapolis from Belle Isle early in 1864, can imagine the terrible life in that slaughter-island. The dead were buried there thickly, under the eyes, under the feet, of the miserable survivors. But when the ground was frozen, so that it was hard to dig graves, the corpses were thrust into the river through the ice.

At the end of the winter it was decided to remove the survivors to the interior, and many of them were sent to Andersonville. Davidson was in that party. The prisoners had often been told by their guards during the winter that they were about to be exchanged, and their hopes were as often raised, only to be disappointed. Now, when they were again told so, and were at the same time ordered out and removed from the island, it did seem likely to be true. For a brief hour there was the sweetest happiness among the poor fellows. But the rebels had only made a hideous joke: the wretches were to be "exchanged" from the horrors of Belle Isle to the greater horrors of Andersonville.

The fearful sufferings of the captive Union soldiers

at Andersonville have been described many times. It is enough to say here that Davidson saw the heartless deeds done as they have been described. It was in March, 1864, that he arrived there. The prison was only a pen, a high close fence or "stockade," surrounding about thirty acres, one fourth a swamp. In that low, sandy region of southern Georgia the sun is very hot even in the spring, but no shelter was provided. The prison was surrounded by endless stretches of worthless pine woods, and the prisoners would have been very glad to cut the timber to build huts or shelters. They begged for leave to do it, but were not permitted. Some of the men were lucky enough to have, or to beg or buy, pieces of blankets or of old tents, which they stretched on sticks. These served as an awning, but were of little use against rain. The men who did not have them were compelled to take the burning sun and the storms as they came; and very many of them were without hats or shoes. Even the shade of the high fence was denied them by the "dead-line" regulation. The food was so scanty and so bad as to create the belief in the minds of many, that the rebels entertained a deliberate purpose to kill the prisoners by starvation or to destroy their physical vigor. The ration for the day was from half a pound to a pound of meal, made of corn and cobs ground together, two ounces of pork, almost always spoiled and often wholly withheld, and soup made of dried (and often "wormy") peas. Even this ration was sometimes diminished, or wholly cut off when the commandant lost temper over an escape or an attempt to escape. The regular ration of Confederate soldiers weighed about two and a half pounds, that of Union

soldiers about three pounds. At least two pounds of good food a day have been found to be absolutely necessary to maintain the health and strength of a soldier.

Those who escaped from the pen and were caught and returned had to suffer more than the loss of this wretched ration. In some cases they were compelled to drag after them for an indefinite time a heavy cannon-ball, fastened to the ankles by a chain; in others they received a ferocious thrashing on the bare body with a cat-o'-nine-tails, applied until the miserable man sunk to the ground, all strength and heart driven out of him by pain. Sometimes the poor wretch was made a "spread-eagle," a mode of torture exquisite and effective, which cannot be realized upon the mere telling. The victim was placed on his back on open ground, his legs and arms stretched as wide and far as possible and secured by cords to stakes. Occasionally a forked stick was pushed into the ground, a-straddle of his neck, to "make him lay low" as the rebels said. There he lay, the sun or rain beating in his face, without food or drink, for a time to him indefinite and of endless torture.

But it was not intended to speak at length of these barbarities. That the prisoners were compelled to use the fouled water within the pen when there was good water outside easy to reach; that they were exposed to sun and storms when they could have been sheltered easily and without cost; that they were not supplied with any means of cleanliness whatever, nor with any clothing whatever; that they were kept at the point of starvation and were inhumanly neglected in illness; that under such circumstances and in the prolonged heat of the summer in that unhealthy

climate they sickened and died in shocking numbers ; that they were shot on the "dead-line" or "for fun" by the guards ; that many lost their lives in desperate attempts to escape the horrid inhumanity of their fellow-men,—all these things are elsewhere recorded, filling one of the most shameful pages in history.

Davidson, like all the other prisoners, was always planning escape, but he did not make an attempt till the 11th of September, 1864. That night he and about twenty others made a dash upon the guards at the gate. They were fired upon, of course, but in the darkness the most of them got to the woods. They were hunted and pursued for days with bloodhounds, and the greater part were retaken. Davidson was caught after twelve days. He had moved northwestward through woods and swamps, and had reached the Chattahoochee River near Columbus ; but he could not get over the river. At night he ventured into the town and tried to cross by the bridge. He was challenged when partly across, by a sentry at the Alabama end, when he ran back and took to the woods again. This must have been the southernmost bridge, the one which was first assaulted by our cavalry in the attack upon Columbus, April 16, 1865. He wandered the next day in the woods along the river, seeking means of crossing, but about noon the hounds got on his trail. Of course he had not strength enough to run well (having had no food in the twelve days except raw sweet-potatoes and muscadines), and he was soon caught. His entire clothing at this time was a shirt without sleeves and trousers reaching to the knees, the missing parts of these garments having been worn and torn away.

He was taken to Columbus and with a party of his comrades who had been recaptured was sent to Macon and then to Millen. At Millen was another prison, in which he was kept several weeks, somewhat less miserable than at Andersonville. The proposal to enlist in the rebel army often made to Union prisoners, was here repeated to the prisoners, and some of them accepted, with the idea of escaping in that way. These were released, but in a few days reappeared in prison "wearing jewelry,"—the ball and chain. They had tried to escape soon after they were enrolled, and had failed. As they had enlisted, the act was desertion and they were liable to be shot; but it is not known how they were finally punished.

At last, near the end of November, after more than a year of almost continual suffering from exposure, hunger, and illness, emaciated and reduced to extreme feebleness, he was removed to Savannah, and, with some hundreds of others in similar condition, was paroled and sent by water to Annapolis. He was sent thence to Camp Chase, at Columbus, Ohio, a general camp of paroled prisoners, and remained there till the end of the war.

A year later fate brought him revenge. He was called as a witness against Wirz, then on his trial at Washington for the horrid cruelties practised upon the Union prisoners at Andersonville; and Wirz was convicted and hung.

During the three weeks' absence of the men on the raid, those who stayed behind were very quiet. Picketing and other guard duty, with the usual fatigue work, occupied their time; and there was still much illness. The returned raiders, too, now had some rest. Every few days, however, a detachment,

large or small, and sometimes the whole effective force, was ordered out for a scout, a patrol, a reconnoissance, or a foraging trip. One of the foraging parties, sent out September 12th, was the whole brigade of cavalry, with a train of ninety wagons, which were brought back filled with corn and meat,—one of the largest foraging expeditions in the history of the regiment. But the experienced cavalryman thinks it “more fun” to go a-foraging in small parties. A quartermaster between the corn-crib and his horse he considers superfluous; and he never saw a commissary who could distribute hams with better effect than he can himself.

When at Memphis, at the end of the raid just described, Captains Peters and Pierce, with Quartermaster-Sergeant Marsh of the Non-Commissioned Staff, and Sergeant John W. Corbin of B, were detailed to proceed to Iowa on recruiting service for the regiment. They were absent several months, and gained a large number of recruits, who joined in the winter.

But meantime, in October and November, 1863, the effective force of the regiment was very low, the number of men in camp being only about six hundred and fifty, with hardly five hundred fit for duty. Nearly two hundred men had enlisted in the regiment from Iowa since it took the field, but the losses by death, by disability from wounds and disease, and by other casualties, now amounted to about five hundred, while hospital-wards and detached-service at different places from Keokuk to Vicksburg could account for about two hundred more. But this was not the only regiment with such a record. The Iowa troops paid dearly for their fame. Lieutenant Yorke, Mustering-officer of the Fifteenth Corps, in August, 1863, officially informed the Adjutant-General of Iowa, that

the Fourth Cavalry and all other Iowa regiments in the corps had fallen below the minimum in numbers, and that for that reason none of them could muster-in a colonel. But the patriotic zeal of the young State had not flagged, and about this time there was a wholesome change there, from the passion for forming new regiments to the wisdom of recruiting into the old ones, with the result that the Fourth Cavalry was filled to the maximum during the following winter and spring.

When, after the battle of Chickamauga, Grant was sent from Vicksburg to Chattanooga, to command the armies there, he directed Sherman to take all the troops that could be spared from Vicksburg, move them by boat to Memphis, and march thence to Chattanooga. The line of march was to be through the northern borders of Mississippi and Alabama, along the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. That road was now broken at so many places, however, that it was of little use for transportation. The rebels had several divisions in central and northern Mississippi which could easily be thrown in Sherman's way. To divert the attention of these troops, Sherman directed Winslow to make a demonstration to the northeast with all his effective cavalry. At the same time he appointed him Chief of Cavalry of the Fifteenth Army Corps. This was the order :

HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, Sep. 26, 1863.

General Orders {
No. 76. }

1. Colonel Winslow will organize a force of about one thousand men, to move via Brownsville, Vernon, and Benton, and to return by Yazoo and Mechanicsburg, to start

to-morrow evening, special instructions to be given to the Commander, who will report in person to the Commanding General.

2. General Buckland will send two regiments of infantry forward on the Benton road, to await the arrival of the cavalry.

3. General Corse will send a brigade of infantry, with three days' rations, to-morrow to the church on the Jackson road. When the cavalry passes there, they will follow to Brownsville, to remain until time is allowed for the cavalry to reach Vernon, when they will return to camp, and follow the motions of their division.

4. This move is designed to clear our north front before moving up the river, and during the time it occupies camps will be disposed as follows :

General Tuttle's headquarters where these headquarters now are, and the camp of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry near by ; General Buckland's brigade at Oak Ridge ; Colonel Geddes' brigade at or near Tribble's ; General Mower's brigade at the Railroad Bridge ; and all the cavalry except the Fourth Iowa at Messenger's.

5. Colonel Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, is announced as Chief of Cavalry, and his orders will be obeyed by all the cavalry forces now attached to this command.

6. No cavalry will accompany the movement up the river, except the detachment of Thielemann's Cavalry attached to the Second Division.

By order of Maj. Genl. W. T. SHERMAN,

R. M. SAWYER,


Asst. Adjt. Genl.

The day before this order was issued three regiments, or parts of regiments, of cavalry, the Fourth and Eleventh Illinois and the Tenth Missouri, sent from Memphis by the river, arrived at the Big Black, reported to General Sherman, and encamped near the Fourth Iowa.

Sherman had suggested to Winslow a couple of

cavalry raids into the interior of the State, one to the northeast, upon Vernon, and another southward beyond the Big Black and against Port Gibson, these towns being held by the rebels as important posts and places of rendezvous; and preparations for such raids were in progress. But this purpose was abandoned, for a time at least. The cavalry was at its worst then in respect to horses, and only about nine hundred men were found fairly mounted in the whole brigade; but on Sunday, September 27th, a column of that number, drawn from five regiments, the Fourth Iowa, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Illinois, and Tenth Missouri, with two small howitzers, crossed the Big Black at Messenger's Ferry, and marched toward Bolton. There were three hundred men from the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Pursel. On the same day Sherman's infantry, except the regiments mentioned in the above order, marched into Vicksburg, to embark for Memphis.

Ten miles out, at Queen's Hill, the cavalry came up with General Corse's infantry, which had already met a body of the enemy and had created the impression that an important expedition into the interior of the State was in progress. When the cavalry had passed him, Corse countermarched for Vicksburg. The cavalry bivouacked that night at Clark's plantation, a few miles south of Brownsville. At four the next morning it turned out and moved upon that town. A detachment of Whitfield's brigade of cavalry held the place, and offered some resistance. It was immediately attacked and driven out, taking the road northeastward, toward Livingston. Winslow left one regiment and one howitzer at Brownsville, with orders to remain a few hours, watching the eastern roads, and



DEMONSTRATION IN FAVOR OF SHERMAN,
SEPT. 29 AND 30, 1863.

- a. Sherman's Headquarters.
- b. Camps of the Cavalry.
- c. Bivouac first night.
- d. Whitfield's Headquarters and Camps.
- e. Loring's Headquarters and Principal Camps.

- f. Bivouac second night.
- g. Battle offered: Winslow's Brigade.
- h. Whitfield's Brigade.
- < Enemy's cavalry met.

then to follow and overtake the column, while the other regiments were to march north on the Vernon road. It was very sultry, the roads deep in dust and water scarce, and the rebels in front kept the advance continually in a skirmish. Eight of the enemy were captured in action during the day. The camp of Whitfield's brigade was then just south of Vernon, and the purpose was to strike it. There were one or two other brigades of the enemy's cavalry in the region and some brigades of infantry at Canton, the whole commanded by General Loring. The rebel camp near Vernon was reached after a march of sixteen miles, but Whitfield had retired that morning, going toward Livingston, eastward, probably upon the news of the movement of the day before. Vernon was occupied at once, care being first taken to send a regiment on either side of the town, to prevent the escape of any of the enemy who might be there; but none were found. A halt was made, and a detachment sent out on each of the roads leading eastward, for observation and to confuse the rebel commanders, and then the column moved on to the north, Sherman's instructions requiring it to recross the Big Black by the ford at Beatty's Bluff, nine miles from Vernon. A cross-road near this place was reached after sunset. It was about twelve miles east and north to Canton, where Loring and the larger part of his command were, and about nine north to Moore's Ford. A detachment was sent out on each of these roads, while an attempt was made to ford the river. One regiment was also posted in the rear, as the enemy had been following and skirmishing with the rear-guard all the afternoon. Indeed, the rebel cavalry had been found on the right

on every road, at first of Whitfield's and then of Cosby's brigade; but it always retired upon approach, with the object, as was supposed, of leading the Union column far enough to the east to enable a force of the enemy to get between it and the Big Black.

The ford was found to be impracticable from depth of water and mire, and it was necessary to go farther north to cross. The horses were fed in the woods, many fires were lighted, to make it appear to the enemy that a large force was encamped there for the night, and the men made coffee and took supper. Then the detachments were called in and the whole command marched up the river, avoiding the road and moving through woods and fields, and reaching Moore's Ford at ten o'clock. This route took the column within seven miles of Loring's camps at Canton. Forty-two miles had been marched that day. The ford at Moore's was passable, and the command crossed in the night. The Fifth Illinois, with one howitzer, was left at the river, and the other regiments rode westward across the bottom-land about a mile, and went into camp on the high ground. From this position the bottom and the ford could be overlooked, and, as the object of the march was now accomplished and the command was well protected by the river, the men were permitted to rest. More than fifty miles had been marched on the east of the Big Black, the greater part of the time within a few miles of larger forces of the enemy; but the feint with infantry the first day and the appearance of the cavalry on different roads in quick succession misled the enemy as to the size of the force and its purpose. After much countermarching throughout Monday, the rebel cavalry must have hit

upon the real movement during the night. It was afterward learned that one of their cavalry commands marched seventy-five miles that day, under changes of orders, upon different reports of the position and movement of Winslow's column.

Early in the morning the enemy arrived in force on the east bank of the river. The Fifth Illinois had been well concealed among the trees and underbrush at a little distance from the bank. At daybreak the pickets saw the rebels move up to the river bank, plant a battery of four guns, and dismount a part of their force in support. Then the guns opened fire, and the mounted men began to cross. But they could not see any of the Union men, and they hurt none. The rebel guns were immediately followed by the bugles in Winslow's bivouac on the hill, sounding "To horse!" The Fourth Iowa was sent down toward the river, to relieve the Fifth Illinois, and with orders to fall back slowly. The Fifth Illinois was placed at the head of the column, and all moved off westward, on the road to Benton, leaving behind the small howitzer which had been planted at the river and which the enemy's fire had disabled. The enemy followed, but cautiously and keeping well together. Winslow had left a note for Whitfield with a rebel officer, who was captured but was too sick to march, inviting him to fight his command at Benton. In this note Whitfield was reminded of the murder of John Buck, and was warned that he might expect retaliation for that atrocious crime. At Benton, fourteen miles, the command was faced about, thrown into line, ready to receive attack. The enemy appeared and drew into line on lower ground, but took no further step and made no attack.

As Winslow's orders were now fully executed and he did not know how large a force the enemy could bring into action, he determined not to attack, but to return to the camp on the Big Black. The column was accordingly remounted, moved into the road, and marched toward Yazoo City, the rebel cavalry apparently following no farther. The bivouac that night was at Short Creek, three miles from Yazoo City, and twenty-five miles from Moore's Ford. The next day the march was southward, and in the afternoon camp was made at Satartia, twenty-one miles from the halt of the night before. The enemy was not again seen; and the next day, the 1st of October, the camp at Flowers' was reached.

The movement had been entirely successful and the marching orders exactly executed, except the recrossing the river at Beatty's Ford. As this could not be done, a greater risk was run than Sherman anticipated; but no loss was occasioned by the further march into the enemy's country. And the purpose of diverting attention from Sherman's movement across the country was accomplished. His divisions were well on their way from Memphis to Chattanooga before Loring knew they had left Vicksburg.

This expedition was very gratifying to all concerned. The march had to be made with great activity and care, the country east of the river being mostly cultivated and open, traversed by many roads, and the enemy having within easy reach of any point forces much larger than ours. There would have been a dangerous, perhaps fatal, loss of time, if so small a command had attempted to discover the precise positions and numbers of the enemy, and equally dangerous to permit the

enemy to get possession of any road between it and the river. The main column therefore marched steadily in the direction intended, with that boldness which is the first element of cavalry success. There was no rest for any one until after the Big Black was recrossed.

With the exception of the capture of two men (not of the Fourth Iowa) who left the ranks contrary to orders, there was no loss; but the command captured and brought in eight of the enemy, one hundred horses, fifty mules, and one ambulance, and destroyed fifty stand of arms taken in action.

Sherman was gone when the cavalry returned to its camps, and was not again seen by the Fourth Iowa, except during the following February, when he commanded the great expedition from Vicksburg to Meridian. When the official report of this Black River movement was received by him, he returned a letter of commendation, which is here published for the first time. As will be seen, it applies not only to the expedition just described, but to the raid of August from Vicksburg to Memphis.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
IUKA, MISS., Oct. 25, 1863.

Colonel Winslow,

Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Vicksburg.

DEAR SIR:

I have heretofore failed to answer your letter containing your report of the expedition made at the moment of my leaving Black River. I was much interested by the report, which I forwarded at once. It fulfilled all the purposes aimed at, and your conduct of the expedition met and still meets my hearty approval.

In like manner I repeat that in the former trip to Grenada and Memphis you did exactly as you were ordered, and

acted perfectly right. I wish now I had ordered you to destroy all cars instead of attempting to save them, but my instructions were based on General Grant's wishes, as conveyed to me in person. I do not now know why these instructions varied with those which controlled the party which came from La Grange. That was none of my business or yours.

I now assure you of my great respect. I esteem you highly as a most promising cavalry officer, and only ask you, in whatever position you may find yourself, to obey orders; and when left to your discretion, to do just what your judgment suggests. Only remember that boldness and dash are the characteristics of good cavalry. The Southern cavalry are more reckless of horseflesh than ours, but massed ours is the heaviest and best.

I will watch your progress always, and wish you to consider me your friend and to call on me freely when you will. Don't commit the common mistake of supposing yourself slighted because not advanced with lightning rapidity, but feel that it is better for promotion to follow fitness, rather than precede it. Do your duty always manfully, and before you have my years, there is no reason why you should not have my rank and more power.

Your sincere friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

Two weeks later, further movements of troops being made from Memphis to Chattanooga, and the enemy having collected a still larger army near Canton, under Generals Loring and Stephen D. Lee, General McPherson, then in command at Vicksburg, was directed to make a demonstration in force, to prevent, if possible, any movement of troops to the north.

On the 15th of October, McPherson crossed the Big Black, with ten thousand infantry and several batteries, in two divisions, commanded by Logan and

Mower. The Vicksburg cavalry being now under McPherson, he ordered Winslow to take the front with the five regiments of his command. This time it was possible to mount one thousand men, and that number was detailed. And now, for the first time, the cavalry was allowed the dignity of some effective artillery of its own. Two good brass field-pieces, James' rifled 12-pounders, were assigned to the brigade, and placed under Captain Peter Joyce of the Tenth Missouri. It was a good choice. Captain Joyce was very zealous and successful in command of the battery, distinguishing himself with it on more than one occasion. From the Fourth Iowa went about two hundred and seventy-five men, under Major Spearman.

The cavalry crossed the Big Black at Messenger's Ferry on the 15th, and took the upper Clinton road, turning off to the north on the Brownsville road. The Fifth Illinois was in front, and near Brownsville it ran upon the rebel cavalry, attacked and drove it through and beyond the town. The cavalry then bivouacked north of the town, while the infantry lay south of it. The next morning the cavalry was sent on the road to Clinton, where it soon met the rebel cavalry again, under Lee. The advanced regiment attacked, and Lee fell back, but he moved slowly, and presently disclosed a line of infantry and artillery. When the guns were opened upon the cavalry, McPherson sent up the infantry, and ordered Winslow to move around on the enemy's right flank. This was immediately done, and, finding a body of the enemy to resist the movement, the cavalry attacked and drove them to and across the Bogue Chito creek. The whole of the enemy's line then fell back.

The brigade had hardly gained this position, however, when the Fifth Illinois, which occupied the extreme left of its line, in a strip of woods, was sharply charged by a regiment of the enemy's cavalry. This regiment appeared suddenly, and attacked so impetuously that a part of the fighting was hand-to-hand. Winslow at once ordered up the Fourth Iowa and the two guns. As the Fourth came up and opened upon them, the rebels retired, moving across some open fields, their speed hastened by a few shots from the two guns. They left a number of dead and wounded in the woods and the fields, but they inflicted some loss upon the Fifth Illinois. In the Fourth Iowa one man was killed,¹ and several horses were killed or disabled.

The brigade then moved forward on a road to Livingston (a village about ten miles southwest from Canton), the Fourth Illinois in front. The Tenth Missouri was detached and sent with four regiments of infantry upon another road to the east, also leading to Livingston; and that regiment was not again with the brigade until the return to the Vicksburg camp. The other regiments bivouacked that night near the Bogue Chitto, the enemy having retired only five miles during the day; and the next morning, Sunday, the 17th, the column moved slowly forward toward Livingston. The rebels fell back, but not in haste, and it appeared plainly that a large body was within supporting distance. The Fourth Iowa was next the head of the cavalry column, the small detachment of the Eleventh Illinois having the advance. The infantry was kept close up to the rear of the cavalry.

Two or three miles from Livingston, approaching it from our direction, the road struck, at an acute

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

angle, the foot of a wooded ridge, high, but of an easy slope. In front of the ridge is a narrow valley, which was then occupied by open fields extending partly up the slopes on both sides. The road by which our cavalry was moving on the southern side of the valley descended the hill by a gradual course along its face, just outside of the fences of the valley fields, so that all of the wooded ridge spoken of was in view to the left and front. At the bottom of the valley, where the road crossed it, were the many buildings of a large plantation, and a great quantity of corn was stored there. The Eleventh Illinois detachment had reached these buildings and was destroying the corn by fire when it was attacked by heavy volleys from the front. The detachment fell back to the column, bringing its wounded. The Fourth Iowa was at that time descending the slope into the valley, in column of fours, the fence and fields being immediately on its left, and the rising ground of the hill it was descending, covered with woods and in places with thick underbrush, on its right. A battery opened on the column from the front with solid shot, but ranged too high, while from the border of the fields on the northerly side of the little valley came a sustained fire of small-arms. The enemy's main position had been developed. Lee was in command, and apparently willing to give battle. The regiment halted in column, to await orders. It was that hardest of all situations to a soldier, standing under fire waiting for orders. Many of the companies were in plain view of the enemy, with only such shelter as a common rail fence can afford to men on horses. That battery might at any moment improve its range, and the lines on the other

border of the little valley were certainly improving theirs. Their balls were making a lively patter on the rails and the more lively *z-z-zip!* that sets a soldier's nerves on edge. It was far from pleasant, and it seemed as if orders never would come.

This was the occasion upon which Captain Beckwith distinguished himself by inventing on the field a novel and effective order for moving a column quickly off a road. He commanded the Second Battalion, which was at the head of the regiment and more exposed than the others. On his right there was a hollow or depression in the hillside, grown up with underbrush, sufficient to conceal his men. The fire of the enemy increased and struck closer. He would not keep his men there to suffer when they could be sheltered. He could not wait long for orders, he thought it necessary to act at once. He turned to his men and tore out the order—“*Fours right! Into the brush like hell!*” It was obeyed instantly, there was no difficulty in understanding it.

Then at last came an order for the cavalry to fall back. But just before it came the rebels began an advance all along their lines. As our cavalry moved back up the hill they saw the long gray lines emerge from the woods along the opposite ridge and enter the fields. There being not room enough in the narrow road to countermarch, the column was reversed by a right-about-face, so that Beckwith's battalion was still the most exposed, and he had a first-rate opportunity to see the advance of the enemy. But at this moment General McPherson's artillery was opened, to protect the retrograde movement, and the enemy was checked.

McPherson, deeming the object of the expedition now accomplished, began his return to Vicksburg. He drew in the infantry and moved it on the road to Clinton, and directed Winslow to take the rear with his cavalry. While this was being done, he kept a couple of batteries firing on the rebel position and a brass band playing in a conspicuous place, probably with the idea that the enemy would suppose for a time that his withdrawal was only a change of position.

But when Lee learned what McPherson was really doing, he naturally took the movement to be a retreat. His cavalry pressed boldly upon the rear, and the rear-guard, as it could go no faster than the infantry in its front, was kept fighting all the time. The infantry moved with a speed that seemed exceedingly slow, though the work of the cavalry might not have been easier if the infantry had gone faster. McPherson wanted the enemy to understand that he was not running away. At any rate, the Fourth Iowa, holding the extreme rear, found itself in the paradoxical position of moving to the south with the army though facing north in line of battle. The rebel cavalrymen, exultant with a supposed success in driving off the Yankees, were very spirited. A large body followed closely, while a regiment or several companies kept quite upon the heels of the retreating column. As the speed of the retreat was only a slow walk, the nearest pursuers had plenty of opportunity, and all the afternoon, until sunset, their attacks were incessant. Their advanced companies made frequent dashes upon the rear and flanks, and came very near, all the time firing, yelling and cursing, mad with excitement. They appeared to find a sort of delight in thus nagging the rear-guard.

The most venturesome rode up furiously, within short range, taking little care for shelter; some of them expressing their opinions not only with their guns but with their tongues, and their language was often impolite and unrefined. These foolhardy ones sometimes paid dearly for their folly.

Of course, as the army was steadily moving on, the cavalry could not for any length of time maintain the same line against these dashes, and the usual method of maintaining a rear-guard was inadequate. So the companies took rapid turns in forming lines in echelon, to hold back the enemy and repel his attacks. The rear company of the rear battalion was placed in line facing to the rear, in a concealed or protected position if possible, with its flank on or near the road, the other companies moving forward on the road. When the rebels came up, they received a steady fire from this company, and sometimes, if circumstances favored, a charge forcing them back. While this was going on, the next company in order was taking a similar position on the other side of the road, some hundreds of yards farther on, to fight its turn when the company just engaged should pass. When the engaged company knew that the next company was in position, it withdrew its line, took the road in column, and rode by at a trot to rejoin its battalion. So all the companies were, in regular turn, actively engaged. The enemy was so persistent that it was necessary to maintain this method of defense for several hours. But, though it was very exciting and fatiguing, it was a safe and effective method. Indeed, the loss was very remarkably small. Only one man in the regiment was killed and one captured.¹

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

It was Sergeant Caskey, of I, who was killed. He was at the time in command of his company and defending his position with great courage. He had been wounded and captured in the bloody engagement of Bear Creek only four months before. He was a very good soldier.

But the enemy, partly because of this mode of defense and partly because of their own temerity, lost many men. The nervous strain upon the men of the Fourth Iowa on duty that day was as severe as on any day during the war; and the relief was great when, in the evening, the rebels ceased to follow and were no more seen.

McPherson camped that night near Clinton, the cavalry being posted to the north of the town; and the next day all the army marched leisurely toward the Big Black and the camps.

The forces at Vicksburg were now much reduced in numbers, all Western posts being stripped to fill up Grant's army for the contest at Chattanooga. The outer lines were drawn in, and the cavalry camps near the Big Black were abandoned. When the Fourth Iowa returned to Flowers' it found its camp broken up and moving to Clear Creek, six miles nearer Vicksburg. Here, on Hebron's plantation, it settled into a home of four months. It was an uncomfortable place in wet weather, because of the mud, the company lines being in a cotton field, but at other times it was good enough, and there was the great advantage of a stream of good water running through the camp.

Now there was a period of comparative quiet and rest. There was picketing enough, and occasionally a scouting or a reconnoitring party sent to the Big Black;

but the men saw that they were to be in that camp an indefinite time, and they set to work to make it as comfortable as possible. All who were not on regular duty busied themselves in cutting trees, building huts and chimneys, with shelters for their horses, draining and improving the grounds, and in the many devices by which ingenious men make an exposed life endurable. In small numbers each day they were "passed" to Vicksburg, which the most of the men had not yet seen, although they had been for six months so near it. A few furloughs were granted, and some men who had been absent, sick or detached, returned to duty. Peters and Pierce, who had been in Iowa recruiting for the regiment since August, now returned, and were mustered into their new positions as lieutenant-colonel and major. They had done well in the recruiting service, a large number of new men being sent from Iowa a little later to join the regiment.

This well-earned period of rest was not broken by any movement or expedition of moment until early in December. It was then reported that a large force of rebels was concentrating in the country east of Natchez, apparently with the object of taking that place. The troops then at Natchez being thought insufficient, reinforcements were asked from Vicksburg. General McPherson sent some infantry and about four hundred of the cavalry forces at Clear Creek, all under General Walter Q. Gresham. The cavalry detachment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, of the Eleventh Illinois Cavalry. A detail of one hundred was made from the Fourth Iowa, from Companies C, H, I, K, L, and M, and Major Spearman was sent in command. It required nearly all the fit horses to mount this number.

In the afternoon of the 4th of December the cavalry rode into Vicksburg and embarked on two steamboats. It reached Natchez on the 6th, landed, and marched through the town, to the east, where it was joined to the provisional division which General Gresham had just organized. Gresham had now about three thousand infantry, the four hundred cavalry, and a few hundred of those unfortunates called Horse-Marines. It was the first time the Fourth Cavalry had met any of these nondescript warriors; and they looked upon them with curiosity and amusement, pretending to regard them as a new and comical species of man.

The Horse-Marines were organized specially for service on the Mississippi, and were quartered, with their horses, on a fleet of "tin-clad"¹ boats, moving up and down the river as occasion was supposed to demand. They wore a uniform of green and orange, in marked contrast with the distinct blues of the army and navy. It was the hope of their imaginative inventor that some day they would be landed somewhere just in the nick of time to do something dreadful to the enemy. But, if history has not neglected their deeds, they permitted their enemies to live in peace and die from natural causes. The soldiers ridiculed them on the land and the sailors spoke of them disrespectfully on the water. The cavalrymen, now seeing them marching, said it was plain that they could not ride, that they mounted on the "off" side, boosted by the corporals, that they were afraid it was going to rain, and that if by any chance they should fire

¹ This word was invariably used in referring to these boats. They were usually ordinary river steamboats, reconstructed for the purpose, and protected against the fire of small-arms by a sheathing of thin plates or sheets of iron.

their guns, they would have to go back to the boats to have them reloaded by the chaplain.

Gresham camped that night near Washington, a few miles east of Natchez, Colonel Wallace's cavalry forming the eastern outpost; and early the next morning the little army marched southeast, by Palestine, and thence south, with the cavalry in front. The cavalry soon found that they were following their old acquaintance, Wirt Adams, his rear being sometimes near enough to engage in a skirmish with the Fourth Iowa detachment, which held the advance. In the afternoon there was a long halt, for some reason unknown to the cavalry, but later the pursuit was resumed and fast time made. The march now bore to the southwest; and it was said that Adams would be caught in the narrow space between the Homo Chito River and the Mississippi. This put the Fourth Iowa men into high spirits. They wanted revenge upon Adams, and were willing to attack him in almost any place. So when, after marching till late at night, the cavalry was halted and directed to rest, but without fires and without making noise, and the men understood they were near the end of the tongue of land between the two rivers, their belief was that at daybreak they would have an opportunity to punish, perhaps destroy or capture, their troublesome enemy.

At daybreak, accordingly, the command had quietly got ready for action, and was standing to horse, when an order was received from Colonel Farrar, who was in command of all the mounted men on the expedition, to return. Though they did not know the reason for this order, the cavalrymen were much vexed by it;

and more so when they saw, later, that the rebel cavalry really had been in their front. After marching back a mile or two, it was seen that the rebels had returned by the same road ; and they moved off by a road to the east, within easy view of Farrar's halted column, released from their predicament. The Fourth Iowa men were disgusted and angry. Gresham moved slowly back to Natchez, by nearly the same route he had taken on the way out, reaching there on the 9th. The cavalry had a little skirmishing in the rear. So far as the soldiers could see, the expedition had accomplished nothing. If, however, the enemy really had intended an attack upon Natchez, he may have been deterred by this show of force.

The only report of this affair is an unofficial one,¹ but it is very friendly to Farrar, and appears to have been written by some one who was with him on the expedition. By that report, Farrar's reason for refusing to attack was that he feared the infantry would not get up in time to support him. But on the return march the infantry was found, at rest, only a couple of miles from the road by which Adams escaped. It could easily have been brought up within half an hour ; and the cavalry, even if it could not alone have beaten Adams, which is not admitted, could certainly have held him in the *cul-de-sac* where he was until the infantry and guns came up.

The cavalry was halted a few miles out of Natchez, on the Woodville road, and spent some days of luxurious ease on the splendid Nutt and Veasie plantations, varied by visits to the quaint old southern city, very beautiful, as it was then, in the soft December

¹ 8 Moore's Rebellion Record, p. 466.

sunlight. On the 15th it was released from orders at Natchez, and went on the boats, to return to Vicksburg. It arrived there and reached the camp at Clear Creek on the 17th, having neither loss nor gain to report, nor any record except that it had travelled three hundred and eighty miles on the river and sixty in all on the horses.

A few days after the return of the Natchez detachment occurred the only disturbance within the regiment in its history. The bringing of liquor into the camp was, of course, always strictly prohibited; but on Christmas day some of the men were found drunk. They became so boisterous and troublesome that their immediate officers could not control them. Major Spearman, then in command of the regiment, appeared and ordered the rioters to their quarters. One of them, Private John L. White, of L, refused to obey, and, in his drunken rage, threw a brick at the Major, which struck him down. White was at once seized and confined, and was soon afterward court-martialled and sentenced to be shot. General Howard, then in command of the Army of the Tennessee, disapproved the sentence, and ordered the man to be imprisoned at hard labor during the remainder of his term of enlistment, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be dishonorably discharged from the service; and the order was executed.

In November, 1863, the general orders of the War Department respecting the re-enlistment of "veteran volunteers" were published to the regiment.¹ The original order had been issued in June, but it was not made known in the army till some months later, after

¹ General Orders No. 191, June 25, 1863, No. 305, September 11, 1863, No. 324, September 28, 1863, and No. 387, December 1, 1863.

it had been amended ; nor was any official step taken upon it as to the soldiers at Vicksburg till November. Under these orders, volunteers who had enlisted originally for three years (the case of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry), and who had served more than two years, could immediately re-enlist for the further period of "three years, or during the war." The advantages were to be, the honorable distinction of being Veteran Volunteers, a furlough of thirty days, and a bounty of some \$400, to be paid in a number of installments. There was also to be a "service-chevron," to be worn by the "Veteran" on his sleeve, to make him proud in the presence of the humble recruit ; and it was provided that if three fourths of the men eligible in any regiment should re-enlist, they should have the right to maintain their regimental organization and name.

There was of course much talk about it among the old soldiers ; and it is very gratifying to record that the greater part of them at once expressed their desire and intention to re-enlist. Indeed, it had been already, from the time of their original enlistment, the expectation or intention of the most of the men to see the war through to the end.

As the first muster of companies of the regiment into the army of the United States did not occur until November 23, 1861 (although many enlistments had been made months before), there were no men eligible to re-enlist until after November 22, 1863. The re-enlisting was somewhat interfered with by the Natchez expedition, but within a short time the number required to make the Fourth a "veteran" regiment was enrolled. On the 11th, 12th, 14th, 18th, and 19th of December a large number volunteered in the different companies,

and the making up of company rolls was then begun. On the 19th the whole number required was reached, though many additional re-enlistments were made down to the next March. On Christmas day the regiment was mustered in as "Veterans."

Colonel Winslow took a great interest in the Veteran re-enlistment, and his active zeal and his confidence in the success of the war had much influence in the work. On December 21st he wrote to the Adjutant-General of Iowa that four hundred and forty men had re-enlisted, being three fourths of those eligible; that one hundred and twelve men were absent; and that there were about two hundred men ineligible, not having served two years. On January 1st Major Parkell, then in immediate command of the regiment, wrote to the same officer, saying that three fourths of the regiment had re-enlisted as Veterans, and that there were about one hundred men present who had served more than one year and had offered to re-enlist, but that the mustering-officer at Vicksburg had refused to receive them because they had not served two years. It should have been said that the original order of the War Department permitted the re-enlistment of men who had served more than nine months, but that in the Adjutant-General's Office at Washington it was held that that clause did not apply to men in three-years regiments. The men referred to by Major Parkell as refused by the mustering-officer were those who had joined from Iowa in 1862. They had become excellent soldiers, quite as effective as any. Nearly all the companies re-enlisted about forty-five men each, the non-commissioned staff eight, and the aggregate was five hundred and forty-two. Company H had the honor of being the first to

enlist the proportion required. It had fifty men and officers present and eligible for re-enlistment, of whom forty-nine re-enlisted. The one exception had recently married, with a promise to his wife that he would not enlist again. Six eligible men of that company were absent, but two of these were prisoners in the hands of the enemy and three sick in hospital. Company M stood next to H, re-enlisting on the same day a greater number of men, but not so great a proportion of those eligible.

When the Veterans of the regiment celebrated their Christmas by being sworn in for three years more, they learned that theirs was the second regiment to re-enlist among the troops at Vicksburg. But, better than that, as they afterward learned, it was the first veteran regiment from Iowa. They did not then know of the re-enlisting in other Iowa regiments, but it appears by the official reports that, with one exception, there were only a few scattered re-enlistments in other regiments before December. The one exception was in Company B of the Twelfth Infantry. On October 25th that company re-enlisted to the number required to make it a veteran company, but the other companies of the regiment did not re-enlist till December 25th; and of course the regiment was not mustered in as veterans till later. This distinguishing precedence gave the Fourth Cavalry great fame in Iowa. To honor its prompt action, a costly silk flag was presented to it by patriotic citizens, through the Loyal Women's League of Iowa. In view of the meritorious record of Company H in the re-enlistment, this flag was assigned to that company, and in the veteran re-organization of the regiment it was given the post of

honor as Color-Company. Sergeants Henry M. Newhall and James H. Stocks and Corporal Amos O. Rowley were constituted the Color-Guard. The Fourth Iowa was very proud of this Veteran flag, and its beautiful colors shone at the head of the regiment in every battle from the day it was dedicated. It may still be seen, in tatters, in the Adjutant-General's Office at Des Moines.

The next thing was to get the promised furlough. That promise was, indeed, a strong inducement to the re-enlistment. Furloughs had been very rare, much fewer than the men, when they first enlisted, had supposed they would be ; and only a very small number had seen their homes since they left them, more than two years before. And, as they were almost the first regiment of that army to re-enlist, they naturally counted upon being one of the first to be furloughed. But there was to be another trial of their patience and zeal in the cause. The leave to go to Iowa, so anxiously awaited, did not come until the 1st of March. When, in January, it seemed to the men high time for General McPherson to issue the order for their furlough, General Sherman set about preparations for his great Meridian campaign. He was to start from Vicksburg, and he directed McPherson to hold on to all the troops he had there. While the regiment was grumbling, Sherman appeared, and it was intimated that the regiment upon which he particularly relied to make this campaign a success was the Fourth Iowa. Would "the boys" kindly forego their furlough for a little time, and go along with him ? It was hard to give up the furlough, but they did it ; and they have always been glad they did.

The spirit of the regiment was strongly emphasized by the re-enlistment, but hardly more by that than by an improvement in the arms which immediately followed. At last every man had a carbine as good as any then in the army. At Helena, as has been said, for some months forty of the men had "Hall's" carbines. Before leaving Helena a small lot of "Union" carbines was received, and afterward, at Vicksburg, in June, more Union and some "Sharp's" were supplied; but in all there had not been half enough. Now, in January, 1864, came some hundreds of new Sharp's. Several companies were thereupon armed wholly with the Union gun and the others with the Sharp, all other guns being returned to the ordnance officers. The Union and Sharp carbines were of about equal merit, and were, for that day, good cavalry guns. They were breech-loaders, of simple mechanism and easily carried, but they required a paper cartridge and a percussion cap, and had to be recharged for each shot.

It was very gratifying to have, at last, effective arms and enough of them; and in the very next campaign the men gave excellent proof of their capacity as soldiers when well armed. Their new carbines came in good time to make them famous in the Meridian campaign.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF MERIDIAN—THIRD CAPTURE OF JACKSON—VETERANS FURLOUGHED.

IN the winter of 1863-4, after Grant and Sherman had retrieved the disaster of Chickamauga and secured a base for operations upon Atlanta, they set about their preparations for the spring campaigns. The greatest of these was to be the campaign into Georgia. To take Atlanta was to break the Confederacy again into two, as it had been broken at Vicksburg, for Atlanta was the only remaining gateway between the seceded States on the Atlantic and those on the Gulf.

The army for this grand movement was to be made as strong as possible ; but the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, the care of the long lines of transportation and great army trains, and the defense of innumerable posts and towns in the conquered territory, had diminished the troops in the field to such an extent that hardly half of the numbers on the rolls could be placed in line of battle. There were many regiments of experienced soldiers then at Memphis, Vicksburg, and other places along the Mississippi, doing hardly more than garrison duty. Enough for seven or eight divisions were so employed, at least the half of whom could be released for service in the Atlanta campaign if the railways and certain depots of supplies and places

of rendezvous of the enemy in Mississippi could first be destroyed. Meridian was much the most important of these places, as to both railways and depots. It was a small town in Mississippi, near the Alabama line, about one hundred and eighty miles directly east of Vicksburg, and at the crossing of the Vicksburg & Meridian and Mobile & Ohio railways, within easy reach by rail of Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile. It was the centre of a fertile region never yet penetrated by Union troops, which was supplying a large part of the food of the rebel armies. Because of its position, it was the depot of great quantities of military supplies of all kinds and the site of many factories employed in the manufacture of military equipments. Even before the present occasion it had been a favorite idea of both Grant and Sherman to destroy the property there, especially the railways. They had thought, too, of an expedition against the place as auxiliary to a campaign against Mobile from the Gulf; but, after some consideration, Mobile was left out of the plans now laid. The work finally determined upon was only the destruction of the enemy's railways and *matériel* centred at Meridian.

Mississippi was then in Sherman's department, and Grant gave him leave to organize and conduct the expedition upon his own judgment. In January Sherman appeared at Memphis, and began preparations with characteristic vigor. He took two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps from Memphis and points near and below on the river, and sent them on to Vicksburg, under their corps commander, Hurlbut. To these were added two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps collected at Vicksburg, under McPherson. In all he brought

together about twenty thousand infantry, with eight or ten batteries of artillery. He remained a few days at Memphis, to see that place left in proper condition for defense and to arrange for the movement of a large cavalry force, which had been ordered to rendezvous there, under Major-General Wm. Sooy Smith. Smith was to march upon Meridian from the north while Sheridan was marching upon it from Vicksburg.

All the cavalry at Vicksburg at that time numbered about two thousand five hundred men for duty; but, from lack of serviceable horses, hardly more than thirteen hundred could be put into the field. It consisted chiefly of the four regiments already mentioned, the Fourth Iowa, Fifth and Eleventh Illinois, and Tenth Missouri. This small body, in effective numbers hardly more than a full regiment, was all Sherman could have on his march between Vicksburg and Meridian; and of course it was in numbers quite unequal to the cavalry work of the whole campaign as planned. Indeed Sherman had laid out a vast deal of work. He meant to destroy so extensively and completely as to prevent any important operations by the enemy in Mississippi during the remainder of the war. It was not only railways and *matériel* of war that were to be destroyed, but also all means which could in any way be applied to aid the rebel armies, including bridges, factories, stores, warehouses, cotton-gins and presses, as well as all grain, meat, cattle, horses and mules, in excess of what could be carried away by the invaders. And he meant to bring away all the slaves he could reach and all the white men who would come. The end of the war was now only a question of time, and the sooner the Southerners could be made to see that they had insuffi-

cient means the sooner the end would come. At the same time it was more than usually important to have it distinctly realized by the people that this work of destruction was done for purely military purposes, and Sherman issued the most careful and stringent orders to prevent any act of wanton or unauthorized destruction or seizure, forbidding the soldiers, under the severest penalties, even to enter any house except under an express order and for a proper purpose.

To enable him to do the work he thus had in mind and to protect his infantry against the large numbers of experienced rebel cavalry now in Mississippi, Sherman needed on his side a body of cavalry, if not as large as that of the enemy, at any rate of equal experience and better equipped.

The rebels had at that time about twelve thousand infantry at Canton and Jackson, under Loring and French, and some three thousand more between Jackson and Meridian, with six thousand cavalry in the north part of the State under Forrest, and four thousand in front of Jackson and Canton under Stephen D. Lee. The whole was commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, with headquarters at Meridian. Polk was calling for reinforcements, but Davis and Johnston could not agree about sending them ; and when, on the 17th of February, after losing several days in a duel of telegrams with Johnston, Davis peremptorily ordered him to send Hardee from Georgia with three divisions to Polk's assistance, it was too late. Hardee's advance reached Demopolis, sixty miles east of Meridian, a week after Meridian was taken.

From the cavalry then in West Tennessee and a division just sent by Grant from East Tennessee, Sherman

directed General Smith to organize a force of about seven thousand well-mounted men, and to set out on the 1st of February by the general line of the Mobile & Ohio road. This movement would necessarily occupy the attention of Forrest's cavalry north of Meridian, and might also draw off a part of Lee's from the front of Jackson. Smith was expected to meet and defeat Forrest, and was timed to reach Meridian by the 10th; but he failed. One of his brigades, two thousand men, marching under peculiar difficulties from Union City, Tenn., did not reach his rendezvous until the 8th; and he did not move his column toward Meridian until the 11th. Then after he set out he moved so slowly that on the 19th, five days after Meridian was taken, he had got only to West Point, hardly half way to his goal. There, out-manceuvred by Forrest, supposing that Sherman was yet far from Meridian, encumbered by large numbers of confiscated animals and slaves and much plunder, he decided to turn back; and, greatly harassed by Forrest on the way, losing several hundred men and some thousands of horses, he appeared at Memphis about the 25th.

But the failure of Smith was, in some sense, the opportunity of Winslow. His small body of cavalry, being the only mounted men in Sherman's command, had plenty to do, with conspicuous opportunities and the unvarying fortune of brilliant success.

On the 2d of February the regimental details received orders to march early the next morning. The Fourth Iowa turned out nearly four hundred men, under Major Spearman. It would have sent about two hundred more if it had had enough serviceable horses. Each of the three other regiments furnished a detachment

about equal to that of the Fourth Iowa. The two James rifled 12-pounders, which had already done good service with the cavalry, were taken along, and two mountain howitzers were added, the four guns giving valuable weight to the brigade. Colonel Winslow was instructed to operate the force as if it were a third corps of the expeditionary army, reporting direct to General Sherman. But at the moment of marching, three companies of the Fourth Iowa, C, D, and F, were detached for special service. Company F was assigned to duty as part of the guard of the pontoon train. C and D acted as advance-guard to McPherson's corps until Jackson was taken, when they became escorts respectively to Generals A. J. Smith and Veatch, commanding divisions. At the town of Union, however, on the return march from Meridian, C and D rejoined the regiment.

Early on Wednesday, the 3d, the cavalry marched from Clear Creek, in good condition and the men in high spirits. The infantry had already reached the Big Black and were crossing, Hurlbut by pontoon at Messenger's and McPherson on a temporary bridge near the railway bridge. The cavalry followed McPherson, but after crossing passed his column and took the advance. Soon afterward the enemy's cavalry appeared in front, and a skirmish followed. One man of the Fourth Iowa was dangerously wounded. The column steadily pushed on, the Fourth Iowa in advance, and late in the afternoon reached Baker's Creek, near the battle-field of Champion's Hill. There the brigade bivouacked, its outpost well beyond the creek.

The enemy's plan of operations required the employment of the whole of Lee's cavalry, with several

batteries of artillery, assigned to different brigades, to hold the country between Jackson and the Big Black, at least until the infantry could be concentrated for the defense of Jackson or of the crossing of Pearl River. But, as Sherman moved in two columns, Lee had to divide his force, and either Hurlbut or McPherson could easily drive the division in his front. More rapid action than was possible to infantry was wanted, however, and here was the value of the veteran cavalry, which, in its experienced management and prompt attack, made up in large measure for its small numbers.

At half-past six o'clock on the morning of the 4th the command was in the saddle, on McPherson's right, on the Raymond road. It had hardly started when the rebel cavalry appeared in front and opened fire upon the head of the column. The column moved right on, in fours, with a strong head of skirmishers thrown out, and was forcing its way along the main road when a body of rebels appeared on the left flank and made a dashing charge. The companies at that point were at once wheeled into line, facing them, and the rear regiment was ordered to oblique to the left, advance in column, and in turn assail their right flank. In this way the charge was quickly repulsed, and the brigade steadily advanced. Skirmishing continued for hours afterward, until, at Walton's plantation, the enemy was found in line of battle.

His line was formed on the farther side of an opening, among scattered trees, giving a fair opportunity to charge. The Tenth Missouri, in front, was ordered forward, made a charge, and steadily drove the rebels back across Baker's Creek, but not without severe fighting. The Tenth lost fifteen men killed and

wounded. The rebels lost a major and captain killed, a lieutenant wounded, and left a number of men dead on the field. The other regiments of the brigade were drawn up under fire, in support of the Tenth Missouri, but it required no help. The Fourth Iowa had one man captured. Here the brigade encamped for the night, some distance to the right and in advance of the infantry.

On the morning of the 5th the brigade moved at six o'clock, and, turning to the left at Woodman's plantation, arrived at Clinton with the head of the infantry column, and passed to the front through that town. The enemy was now known to be in force, and was found in a strong position on a range of hills about two miles east of Clinton, covering the road to Jackson. He opened and kept up an artillery fire, showing apparently a determination to hold the position.

The eastern verge of the town of Clinton rests upon a ridge, from which the enemy's position could be readily observed. The cavalry brigade was formed in the open valley to the west of this ridge. McPherson directed Winslow to withdraw the cavalry, and Sherman, coming up, ordered him to move through the woods to the south of the town, and, by turning upon some local road leading to the east, get upon the enemy's left or into his rear, near Jackson. The brigade rode rapidly through the woods, parallel with the enemy's line but concealed from view, to and across the main road, then eastward, parallel to the road and a mile to its right, until it came to the residence of Judge Sharkey. This took it past the left flank of Lee's position, and brought it near the outer western fortifications of Jackson. The head of the column then

turned to the left, crossed a small bridge which spanned a running stream, and suddenly emerged from the woods within sight of the outskirts of Jackson and in front of its defenses.

The main column was still concealed by a wood, but had now come near its border. Looking out to the north, there were open fields, rising by a gentle slope to the top of a ridge lying east and west, about a quarter of a mile away. Along the top of this ridge ran the main road from Clinton to Jackson. To the right could be seen, through spaces between the trees, the fortifications. To the left of the fields, half a mile west of the fortifications, were woods extending northward across the road which ran along the top of the ridge. It was just before the setting of the sun, and a flood of soft yellow light lay upon the scene. The Fourth Iowa was in front, and while the men stood awaiting further orders, they were peering intently to the front. The sight before them was one not often within the experience of a soldier. A column of the enemy's cavalry, marching in fours, was passing in full view along the ridge road in front, within rifle shot. They were moving into Jackson, and the head of their column had already passed the line of works, while the rear had not yet got out of the wood which lay west of the fields. They filled all the space within view, and there was no telling their whole number.

It was plain that the enemy meant to defend Jackson only while evacuating, and that evacuation was then going on. Sherman had said to Winslow, at Clinton, that Jackson would not be seriously defended, but that he must have the place that day if possible, that "the possession of it by to-night would be worth

five hundred men to us," and that he would look to him to save the bridge over the Pearl. There was no time to lose, nor to wait for further orders. The rebel cavalry would probably move out to the north of the city, if they could not all get over the bridge in time, and the infantry might be now nearly over. The Fourth Iowa was at once dismounted, with the order, "*Prepare to fight on foot!*" and formed in three lines, column of battalions, on the right of the road by which it had just arrived. The lines were partly covered in front by small trees and bushes, thinly scattered between them and the fortifications and the top of the ridge. The Eleventh Illinois was rushed into line mounted, farther to the left, and the fence was thrown down immediately in its front, ready for a charge. The enemy easily saw these dispositions. Indeed, a group of their officers collected on their flank to observe them, and remained there until they were scattered by the fire. The two James rifles, brought up at a run by Captain Joyce, were hurried across the creek, took position on a low mound at the left of the road, and instantly opened fire across the fields upon the rebel horsemen.

The first of Joyce's shells passed directly through the gray column, killing three men, and the next exploded near it. This threw the rebels into confusion, and their column at that point fell off to the left of the road, into the shelter of the woods. Winslow now ordered Colonel Kerr, with the Eleventh Illinois, to charge where the column was broken, while he (Winslow) went forward with the dismounted Fourth Iowa. Kerr charged at once. The Fourth Iowa, advancing at a run, made directly for the gate through which the

enemy was entering the fortifications. The Tenth Missouri, which had marched in the rear of the Eleventh Illinois, was now crossing the bridge, mounted. It was ordered to move by fours right ahead, to the intersection of that road with the ridge road, and join in the charge. The Fifth Illinois was kept closed up on the rear of the Tenth Missouri, with the two howitzers in its front.

The attack was successful at all points. The rebels yet in the woods west of the position fell back, and must have gone in haste across the country northward. Those in front along the ridge were routed and scattered by the charge of the Eleventh Illinois, reinforced by the Tenth Missouri. The Fourth Iowa was met by an uneven fire from the fortifications, but its lines kept on at a run, changing direction slightly to the right, so as to face that portion of the works. The enemy's fire slackened and ceased. The men jumped into the ditch and clambered up the parapets; and from their top they saw the enemy flying toward the middle of the town. Lieutenant Vanorsdol and his company (K), being on the right of the regiment, are entitled to the credit of being the first to mount the works. Immediately afterward the left reached the road by which the enemy was entering, and cut off its column at that point. Those who had not reached the line of works then ran off into the woods, while those who had passed crowded upon the heels of their leaders in the street inside. In a few minutes the brigade occupied the whole field.

Colonel Kerr's fine charge had gone right through the enemy's column, and when the Tenth Missouri came to his support he put a whole brigade (Starke's)

to flight. He captured one of their new Rodman guns, turned it upon them, and drove them off to the north. But he deemed it imprudent to pursue far, as the numbers and position of the enemy still on the left were unknown.

The street running down the hill into the town was seen to be filled from side to side with rebel cavalry as far as the state-house, where they were turning to the north. Captain Joyce, who had been ordered up with his rifles, now arrived at a gallop, and opened on the retreating column; but he could not depress his guns sufficiently from such a height. The fire only served to scatter the rebels into the cross streets and hasten their flight. One shot happened to strike the state-house, which stood near the middle of the city at the head of the street. With the Tenth Missouri and the two howitzers, leaving the Fourth Iowa and the Fifth Illinois to drive the defeated rebels out of the city, Winslow dashed directly through the city and on to the bank of the river. Every nerve was strained to save the pontoon bridge known to be on the river. Night had now come on, and some time was lost in finding the site; and when it was found it was seen that the end of the bridge attached to the west bank had been cut loose and had swung down the stream. The bridge was lying its length against the opposite bank, and was covered with men who were trying to destroy it with axes. The advanced companies of the Tenth Missouri fired upon these men, and they disappeared in the bushes on the bank. The two howitzers were brought forward and opened across the river. A train of cars dimly seen through the trees thereupon immediately moved out, and the enemy abandoned that

bank of the river. Winslow's cavalry had taken the city and saved the bridge.

The Fourth Iowa and the Fifth Illinois, divided into detachments, were posted in different parts of the city, to guard it and to hold the roads. Captain Joyce with his two guns remained on the hill where the engagement had ended. Meantime Winslow sent an officer to Sherman, at Clinton, to report that the city and the bridge were held by the cavalry. He requested that a brigade of infantry be sent forward to support him. The Iowa Brigade, under General Alexander Chambers, volunteered to come, and arrived about midnight.

Sherman was delighted. It was a brilliant beginning of the campaign: Jackson taken, a good bridge captured, the most of the enemy's cavalry cut off from any immediate service, and all with a loss of less than twenty men. The great object being the capture of the bridge and the control of the Pearl, but little attention was given to lesser affairs; and only about one hundred prisoners were taken. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was not known. Time was not taken to go over the ground, all of the troops being in rapid movement before daybreak, the infantry marching as fast as possible across the river and the cavalry on a reconnoissance toward Canton. But from the character of the attack, the short range, the disorder and massing of the enemy, they must have suffered much.

The bridge across the Pearl River being saved, Sherman sent back to Vicksburg his pontoon train. The guard of the train, consisting of Company F of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, under Lieutenant Woodruff, and

a detachment of infantry, went with it. This guard marched all night without stopping, and delivered the train to General Tuttle, commanding at the railroad bridge on the Big Black, early in the morning. That afternoon, at four, General Tuttle sent Lieutenant Woodruff with his company to carry despatches to General Sherman, who was believed to be then in Jackson. So, from Black River the company counter-marched to Jackson. It arrived there in the night (of the 6th), and had entered the town, supposing as of course that it was still in the possession of Sherman's troops. The advance was challenged in the street by a party of men, who, in the darkness, were supposed to be Union soldiers. Upon the careless answer "Yankees" came a volley of rifles. The last of Sherman's men had been across the Pearl some hours. Woodruff fell back, but soon learned that the place was occupied by Wirt Adams, who had just come in from Brownsville with his cavalry.

It was a serious responsibility for Woodruff. His company, of about thirty men, was alone between the Pearl and the Big Black, thirty-five miles from the nearest accessible Union outpost. He could not remain in that region after daybreak. The only thing to be tried was another countermarch to the Big Black. This was immediately begun, the road lying not many miles off the line of the rebel cavalry from Brownsville to Jackson. The march was continued, with but little halting for rest, until daylight, when the bridge on the Big Black was reached. Thus within sixteen hours these faithful soldiers covered about seventy miles. Woodruff reported his company to General Tuttle, who assigned it to duty with himself at the bridge;

and it remained there until the regiment returned from Meridian. It did some scouting, and several times marched as guard to wagon-trains hauling cotton from the interior, a service which was of some benefit to the United States and of much benefit to certain citizens thereof whose virtue was unequal to the fascination of cotton-stealing.

Another company of the regiment made a separate and creditable record on the day of the capture of Jackson. Company C had been detached the first day of the march and assigned to duty as escort to General A. J. Smith, who commanded a division of infantry. It was commanded by its captain, Warren Beckwith. It continued in that service more than two weeks, rejoining the regiment about the 20th, at Uniontown, on the return march from Meridian. When Smith passed Clinton, on the 5th, he found a body of rebel cavalry in his front who were disposed to hold their ground. Captain Beckwith was kept on the skirmish line until the infantry took the front, when there was some sharp fighting, with losses on both sides. He was then sent to the right, to make a demonstration upon the enemy's left flank. Moving in column on a road he found the line nearer than was expected, and immediately charged upon it. The line fell back, and the Captain, seeing that he might go too far, ordered a rally, but the first platoon, led by Lieutenant Dillon, not hearing the order, rode right ahead at high speed, into and through the rebel line. Quickly realizing what they had done, Dillon turned his men about and rushed them back, the rebels giving way on both sides, but sending after them a shower of bullets. There was no loss in the company. It brought off four

prisoners, but could not tell whether the rebels had suffered from its fire.

The capital of Mississippi had now been taken three times by Union forces; and each time the Fourth Iowa had an important share in the capture. On the first occasion, May 14, 1863, it had led Sherman's advance, and had been among the first to get into the city, upon the heels of the enemy. The second time, July 17, 1863, the city was evacuated after being invested and assaulted; but the Fourth Iowa did important work in assisting to keep off the rebel cavalry on the north. And now, the third time, dismounted, it had led an assault upon the fortifications and upon the mounted enemy, which was made with such spirit and daring that the enemy's plan of defense during evacuation was defeated. As afterward appeared, Polk had been confident of holding the city until his trains and troops, including the cavalry, were all withdrawn across the Pearl. With that purpose his cavalry had been all the afternoon slowly falling back upon the works, covering the movement of the infantry and trains, which were crossing the river by the pontoon, and maintaining a dogged resistance. The rebel generals must have counted upon the advance of Sherman's lines slowly and uniformly. The promptness and drive of the cavalry, miles in advance of the infantry lines, probably disconcerted them and induced the belief that the attack was closely supported by the infantry.

Cut off by this successful assault, a large part of the rebel cavalry moved toward Canton, and either crossed the Pearl in that vicinity, or proceeded directly to the north, to aid Forrest in delaying the march of the Union cavalry under Smith. That portion of the

rebel cavalry which got over the Pearl at Jackson, with perhaps other cavalry already on that side, or which moved over near Canton, covered the retreat of the rebel infantry from Brandon toward Meridian.

Early on the morning of the 6th, the infantry having hauled the end of the pontoon bridge into place and begun crossing, Winslow was sent with the cavalry upon a reconnoissance on the road to Canton. The brigade marched some miles on that road, and, without any incident other than the sight of a few scattered rebel horsemen and many proofs of the haste of the enemy's retreat, in wagons, ambulances, and equipments strewn along the way, returned in the afternoon and bivouacked near the Insane Asylum, north of the city, not far from the camp of the Fourth Iowa in the July preceding.

On the morning of Sunday, the 7th, the cavalry crossed the river by the pontoon bridge, and taking a left-hand road six miles out (thus covering the left flank of the army) overtook and passed the infantry at Brandon about three o'clock in the afternoon. Just before going into camp the advance had a slight skirmish with rebel cavalry.

The next morning the brigade took the front, leading McPherson's divisions, and almost immediately after leaving camp began skirmishing. The enemy fell back steadily and slowly, and kept up the fight nearly all day, all our cavalry regiments being engaged in turn. There was some loss in the brigade, but none in the Fourth Iowa. Seventeen miles were made, and camp ordered two miles east of Lime Creek.

There was a sad incident of the fighting of this day. The rebel cavalry had made its last stand in the after-

noon on the summit of a little hill, where there was a house surrounded by a yard. Some had posted themselves in this yard and about the house, and fired from there, although they must have known that the house was occupied by a poor woman with a large number of children. It was not known to our skirmishers that the family was there, and one of their bullets struck the mother and killed her. When the rebels were driven off and the house was reached, the body of the woman was found lying on the floor, her children weeping around it. A guard was placed there, and directions given that the neighbors be called in to care for the dead and the children. The story was told to Sherman and McPherson in the evening, with the result that a generous fund was made up among the officers about headquarters and in the cavalry; and the children and money were left with a kind-hearted neighbor.

It seemed evident, from the manner in which the enemy's retreat had been conducted this day, that his main force was not far ahead. Accordingly, extra precautions were taken that night. Indeed, the whole army was prepared for a battle that might occur in the morning. The cavalry brigade was to receive further orders during the night.

Shortly after midnight the bands in the rebel army were heard playing. While the music was going on, Winslow received written instructions from McPherson, to form his force at daybreak and ascertain the enemy's position, when the infantry would move forward and attack if necessary. But further reports from the pickets during the night indicated that some movement of the rebels was in progress, which was reported to Sherman. Just before daybreak the brigade turned

out and moved upon the enemy's position, when it was found that he had retired. His rear-guard was overtaken, and with brisk skirmishing driven to and through the town of Morton, about four miles from the place of bivouac. Moving steadily on, the brigade was in a continuous skirmish as far as Shogola Creek, about seven miles beyond Morton. McPherson's infantry followed closely, in support. A number of rebels were captured during the day. The cavalry encamped for the night near the Shogola, on the plantation of a Mr. Coulan. Early on the morning of the 10th it moved forward through Hillsboro and over Ontoxaloo Creek. Skirmishing went on fitfully all day, at times obstinately. Bivouac was ordered just before sundown, only fourteen miles having been made. Some prisoners were captured and the column that followed the skirmishers saw thirteen dead rebels along the road. The most of these were killed in the taking of Tunnel Hill, a strong position which it was expected the enemy would defend with his whole force.

On the morning of the 11th the brigade marched at half-past six, following and attacking the enemy during the day, and building bridges over the Tuscameta, Barber, and Conahatta creeks, branches of the Young Warrior, a tributary of the Pearl; and east of the Conahatta, about six miles west of Decatur, it camped for the night, having made about fifteen miles. On the 12th the march went on, through Decatur and beyond the Chunky Creek, a tributary of the Pascagoula River, a distance of about fifteen miles. All day the rebel cavalry were just ahead, and the crack of shots on the skirmish line was continuous. The march of the 13th was begun later in the morning, but with the same sort

of fighting. The fighting continued steadily, and only thirteen miles were made that day.

The rebels were very active in all this work, and made every effort to impede and harass the march, felling trees in the road, destroying bridges, and firing from all points of vantage. On the Union side there was not only the fighting but a great deal of labor and difficulty in clearing the way, passing around obstructions, and repairing bridges. Otherwise no doubt the enemy would have had to move much faster or accept a decisive engagement. As it was, they lost a good deal, not only in killed and wounded, but in property and arms captured; and every day's work increased their losses and added to the spirit of the Yankees.

In the evening of the 13th, when the fighting was ended for the day, the column was about fourteen miles from Meridian and had just entered a wild tract of country, of rough hills, covered thickly with pine forests and almost uninhabited. The opportunity for obstruction was better than ever, and there was no forage or food in the region. It was therefore important to occupy this tract and pass it as quickly as possible, not to speak of the advantage there would be in diminishing the enemy's time to prepare for the defense of Meridian.

General Sherman directed Colonel Winslow to move on in the night of the 13th, and drive the rebels over these hills. He sent General Hurlbut with his two divisions of infantry to support the movement. When the order was received the brigade had just got into camp. It was mounted at once and pushed forward. Long after dark, at a place called Tallahatta, the enemy was found, engaged in felling the big pine trees across

the road. The advanced regiment was dismounted and began the attack in line, with carbine; the other regiments were held in reserve. The enemy slowly yielded, returning the fire. As fast as the leading regiment became tired or was otherwise detained, the next regiment was put forward in its place. Of course the dismounted men could not maintain a good line. They climbed and passed around or through the felled trees, moving from shelter to shelter, cheering and firing, and always gaining ground, until the enemy at last abandoned the hills. When they reached the low country east of the hills, still in the night, they made a more determined stand. Here they formed two lines, one in the rear of the other, lying across the road, with their right flanks against a piece of woods. Winslow's advanced regiment immediately attacked the front line. At the same time the second line, by some mistake, also fired upon the first line. In the confusion that followed both lines broke up and disappeared. Not long after midnight the brigade halted and bivouacked, its orders fully executed.

The invading army had now come to the last day of its march, and there was but little time left in which the enemy could make his dispositions for the defense of Meridian. But that night, the 13th, General Polk drew into the town all the troops he could muster for the defense, employing only his rear-guards in burning bridges and obstructing roads. So on Sunday morning, the 14th, the cavalry brigade marched quietly along without seeing the enemy. At the Okatibbeha Creek, about two and a half miles west of Meridian, there was a delay caused by the necessity of rebuilding a long bridge which the enemy had burnt there.

The pioneer corps was doing the work, with the help of the infantry. There was a wide marsh on one bank of the stream, and the bridge must cover that as well as the stream. Sherman was promptly on the ground, and in his impetuous, spirited, way urged the men on with the work of rebuilding. But with the best efforts of all employed, it would take many hours. Colonel Winslow wanted to disclose the position in front and to get possession of the hill seen on the east side of the stream, expecting that the enemy would be found not far beyond the creek. Without waiting for the bridge, he dismounted one regiment, the Fourth Iowa, got the men over by various devices, and sent them to occupy the crest of the hill beyond. Then he made a large detail from the other regiments, had the men tear down a cotton-press near by, and, using the long arms of the press and other timbers at hand, constructed on the surface of the water a bridge strong enough to bear the men and horses carefully distributed. Indeed, it succeeded so well that, by some strengthening, it was made to bear the four guns of the brigade, one at a time.

The whole brigade over, it was moved up the hill, on the top of which was found a line of fortifications. No guns were in these works, nor any men, and the column passed inside of them without opposition. But the road now turned southward and entered a wood, where the enemy's cavalry were found. There was a line dismounted in front, supported by mounted troops in the rear.

The Fifth Illinois, and especially its commander, Major Farnan, had been disposed to complain that the other regiments of the brigade had had more than their

share of opportunities on this campaign. That regiment was, therefore, now given a chance to distinguish itself. Major Farnan was ordered to charge, dismounted; and he did it with such promptness and spirit that the dismounted line of the rebels was immediately broken and driven off, losing many prisoners, among them an officer of the staff of General Ferguson, whose brigade then held the rebel front.

To press the advantage Winslow hurried up the three other regiments, and gave Ferguson no time to re-form before he reached Meridian. Indeed, on approaching the town and observing that there was no artillery firing nor any general attempt to defend it, Winslow rode the brigade in at a gallop, seized the railroads, cut off a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry who were trying to reach the Demopolis road, and, leaving one regiment to await the infantry, moved out on the road to the east by which it appeared that the larger body of the enemy's cavalry had gone. General Polk, with his infantry and artillery, had already got away by the railroad to Demopolis. Turning over the town to the infantry, the cavalry bivouacked where it ceased the pursuit, three miles out on the Demopolis road.

The objective point of the campaign was reached, every step had been attended by success, and the little brigade of cavalry had distinguished itself every day.

General Sherman issued a congratulatory order to the troops, "for their most successful accomplishment of one of the great problems of the war." He said that by the capture of "the great railway centre of the southwest" and the destruction of railways and property there, the enemy would be "deprived of the chief source of supplies to his armies." And, in a despatch

to Grant, he said he had "made the most complete destruction of railroads ever beheld—south below Quitman, east to Cuba Station, north to Lauderdale Springs, and west all the way to Jackson," that is, in all about one hundred and forty miles. His order for the work of destruction is here given as an example of that branch of his military operations:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
MERIDIAN, MISS., Feb'y 14th, 1864.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 17. }

1. The destruction of the railroads intersecting at Meridian is of great importance and should be done most effectually. Every tie and rail of iron for many miles in each direction should be absolutely destroyed or injured, and every bridge and culvert should be completely destroyed.

To ensure this end, to Gen. Hurlbut is entrusted the destruction east and north, and to Gen. McPherson the roads west and south. The troops should be impressed with the importance of this work and also that time is material, and therefore it should be begun at once and prosecuted with all the energy possible. Working parties should be composed of about one half the command, and they should move by regiments, provided with their haversacks and arms, ready to repel attacks of cavalry. The other half in reserve will be able to watch the enemy now retreating eastward.

2. Col. Winslow, Commanding Cavalry, will keep his cavalry in advance of the party working eastward and will act as though this army was slowly pursuing the enemy.

3. Special instructions will be given as to the general supply train, and the troops now in Meridian will, by proper brigade parties, collect meal, meat, and supplies. The destruction of buildings must be deferred until the last minute, when a special detail will be made for that purpose.

By order of Maj.-Genl. W. T. SHERMAN,

L. M. DAYTON,

Aide-de-Camp.

The infantry occupied the town, and was immediately employed in destroying public property. Its headquarters remained at Meridian for nearly a week, and heavy details were sent out on the railroads to the east, west, north, and south. Great care and ingenuity were exercised in making the destruction complete and permanent. All locomotives, cars, depots, shops, all factories, arsenals, warehouses, and all supplies of every kind, in short, everything which could in any manner be made to serve as public property or aid in maintaining the rebel army, was burnt or broken beyond repair. All serviceable horses and mules were taken, all cotton-presses and ginning-houses were burnt, not even a wagon or cart was spared that might be used by the enemy.

The cavalry moved slowly eastward, in advance of Hurlbut's infantry, on the Demopolis road, Hurlbut having been charged with the work of destruction in that direction. On the 17th it was ordered to Old Marion, a town a few miles north of Meridian, where it was encamped near A. J. Smith's division.

Up to this time nothing had been heard of General Sooy Smith's cavalry, though it should have been found at or near Meridian four days before. On the 18th Sherman ordered Winslow to move northward, to meet Smith or get news of him, but not to go beyond Lauderdale Springs, twenty miles north of Meridian. He sent along Major Audenreid, of his staff, with orders to Smith to turn over his division to Winslow and report to Sherman personally at Meridian for further orders. Winslow's orders were, to join the two forces, move immediately upon Demopolis, and destroy all property there that could be used in war, including the steamboats in the river and the railroads.

The column was moved with special caution, because, if Smith was near or approaching, Forrest's forces must be near too, as well as a part or all of Lee's, probably all nearer than Smith. The march was begun early in the morning, and Lauderdale was reached about dark. Many inquiries brought no news of Smith, but there was a rumor that he had been defeated by Forrest near Aberdeen, a place on the Mobile & Ohio road a hundred miles farther north. Two days later, on the 21st, Smith and Forrest did fight at West Point, not far from Aberdeen, and Smith was driven back toward Okalona. And at Okalona, on the 22d, there was a more decisive engagement, with heavy losses to Smith, followed by his rapid retreat upon Memphis. Forrest suffered but little, except in the death of his brother, Colonel Forrest, who was killed in the action.

Scouts sent in different directions from Lauderdale Springs reported before morning without news of Smith, but they had learned of three camps of rebel cavalry in the country, apparently a brigade in each. These must have been Ferguson's and a part of Ross' men. Thinking it prudent, Winslow moved the column back about two miles toward Meridian, and placed it in position on the crest of a ridge running at a right angle with the road. This was hardly done when the pickets were attacked, but the attack was not followed up. Winslow sent a captain with his company (Neet, Tenth Missouri) back to the army, to make a report, and ordered him to return before daylight. Meantime the picket posts were strengthened, and the force was held prepared for engagement at a moment's warning.

Neet's company rode with speed, ran upon several rebel scouting parties, and got back to the command by four o'clock in the morning. He brought orders from General A. J. Smith to have the cavalry return at once. The command thereupon marched back over the same road, to its former encampment at Old Marion.

The army remained at Meridian six days, during which time the cavalry brigade was constantly employed in scouting and reconnoitring to the east and north, and in escorting foraging detachments engaged in gathering supplies from the surrounding country. In this service small bodies of rebel cavalry were often seen and occasionally fired upon.

On the 20th, all the purposes of the army at Meridian except those which required the presence of Smith's division of cavalry having been accomplished, the army was ordered to Vicksburg. Partly that it might move on new roads and partly in the hope that Smith might yet appear, Sherman returned by roads to the north of those by which he had moved out.

The cavalry acted as rear guard, marching behind the Sixteenth Corps. Nothing of note occurred during the first two days. Sunday evening, the 21st, the brigade bivouacked a few miles east of Union, about thirty miles from Meridian. The next morning, at Union, Sherman ordered it to march to the north, and make another effort to connect with General Sooy Smith. He directed Winslow, if he could not reach him with the brigade, to communicate with him in some way across the country, with orders to return to Memphis. And Sherman said he would meantime march the infantry on the direct roads to Canton, and would expect the cavalry to report there at about the

time of his arrival. Canton, it will be remembered, is west of the Pearl, about twenty-five miles north of Jackson.

The brigade was at this time entirely without rations, except coffee, but the men were experienced in living on the country. It left Union immediately, and marched directly north. The route was by Philadelphia, a county-seat; and a few miles beyond that town, at the village of Pearlvalley, it crossed the Tallahaga (the upper Pearl), by a long, high bridge. A little further on there was another long bridge, crossing a large creek, a tributary of the Tallahaga. Both bridges were destroyed; and the column arrived after dark at a large plantation, owned by a Judge Atkins, having made twenty-eight miles during the day. No considerable force of the enemy was met, although the advance guard followed constantly small parties of rebel cavalry.

Ample supplies for men and horses were found on Atkins' plantation, belonging to him, as well as storehouses filled with corn and other provisions contributed in that country for the families of soldiers in the Confederate army. The patriotic Atkins begged the Yankees to take the supplies in the storehouses rather than his own; but, naturally, the unmanly petition had exactly the contrary effect. When the brigade marched the next morning, it was evident that men and horses had been fed and supplied for the march with a bounty careless of the judge's selfish prayer. But the punishment did not subdue his greed. When he found the brigade about to leave, he had the assurance to ask for a detail of men to remove some of the corn collected for the soldiers' families to his own cribs, to replace

that which had been so freely used during the night. He would not dare to do it himself afterward, for fear the act would become known to the rebels. It is unnecessary to tell how the request was treated. Leaving the honest gentleman to his unhappiness, the brigade marched northward, on the road to Louisville, another county-seat, about fifty miles from Union. A little before reaching that place, the column moved to the left and occupied the road leading westward from Louisville to Kosciusko, Major Benteen with the Tenth Missouri moving on to Louisville, with orders to retire on the Kosciusko road. This detachment had a slight brush with the enemy's cavalry. A halt was now made to observe any signs of movement on the part of the enemy and to await the reports of the scouts who had been sent out during the day, in different directions, to get news of General Smith. These all came in reporting no news of him, and without having heard even a rumor of his presence anywhere in country. Yet West Point, where three days before he had met Forrest, was hardly fifty miles away. Forrest's headquarters were, however, then at Starksville, which was directly between Louisville and West Point; and the scouts reported a large body of rebel cavalry at that place. A march further north would be at the risk of being cut off from Sherman,—a risk which ought not to be taken without a fair chance of joining General Smith. But up to this time there was no information whatever of Smith; it was not even known that he had moved from Memphis. As no considerable force of the enemy's cavalry had been met since the Union army left Meridian, Lee's brigades must have joined Forrest, or were those the scouts reported

at Starksville. Winslow's orders were only to find Smith if he could safely, or to communicate his orders to him, if possible, and not to permit a general engagement unless compelled. So he decided not to go farther, but to send Smith's orders to him by courier. The fact was, as afterward learned, that both Forrest and Lee were in the country, with six or eight thousand cavalry, elated by a victory just achieved over Smith.

It was a hazardous venture for a courier, and volunteers were called for. Among those who offered, Winslow chose a man named William J. Spicer, a private in Company D of the Tenth Missouri, whose appearance and dialect best answered the purpose and who had a reputation for prudence and courage. He was an Arkansas man, enlisted in that State when his regiment was there, and he had the characteristic appearance, manner, and tone of his country. He was supplied with "butternut" clothes, received careful instructions, and set out to find General Smith and give him his orders. But his career as a courier was very short. He left his comrades the evening of the 23d, riding northward; the next day he was hanged. He fell in with rebel soldiers, one of whom, unfortunately, had been his neighbor in Arkansas. This man denounced him, and the rebels, always impatient of trials, since they delay execution and may possibly prevent it, immediately swung him to a tree.

Giving up the last hope of a junction with Smith, on the 23d the brigade moved to the west, crossed the Yockanockany, the western fork of the Pearl, destroyed behind it the important bridge there, and entered Kosciusko, the county-seat of Attala. There was some irregular skirmishing, apparently with reconnoitring

parties from one or more bodies of the enemy's cavalry. At Kosciusko the column turned south, and on the evening of the next day, the 24th, reached the vicinity of Canton. Captain Fitch, with his company (H) of the Fourth Iowa, was sent east to Pearl River, to meet and report to General Sherman. The next day the brigade occupied Canton and awaited the infantry, which came up in the afternoon.

Sherman's march from Union had been heralded throughout the country, and many persons fled from Canton and its vicinity before his arrival. The natural direction of this flight was toward Kosciusko, and the fugitives on the road were surprised and frightened to find themselves confronted by another Union force. Our cavalry met very many wagons, carriages, and vehicles of all kinds, conveying these trembling people and their property, men unfit for service in the rebel army, women, children, slaves, and a hurried jumble of household gods and goods. There were pitiful scenes in the despair of some and fear of death in others. The circumstances of each case were inquired into, and some of the people were permitted to proceed, while others were required to return to Canton; so that, as the brigade advanced upon that town, it found itself in the novel duty of escorting a procession of citizens, negroes, and vehicles, constantly increasing in size. Thoughtful troopers remembered, however, to exchange for the good horses and mules in the procession, on the fixed principle that no cavalry command can ever have too many of that kind.

But many a "boy" in the Union column, thinking of the "girl" he left behind in Iowa two years before, was much interested in another scene in that day's

captures. Among the prisoners was a young rebel captain, who had come from Lee's army in Virginia on furlough, to be married. He was a handsome, spirited fellow, and excited more sympathy than he knew of among his captors. The beautiful young girl who was with him had become his bride just that morning; and they fancied they were safely escaping from Sherman's front to the delight of a honeymoon. It was hard for any Yankee with a spark of sentiment in his breast to witness the scene,—the handsome captain in his brilliant new uniform, struggling to control the bitter feelings excited by his mishap, and the beautiful bride, yet in her wedding array, distressed by dreadful fears and full of tears and entreaties. Colonel Winslow took the case in hand himself, and, with much politeness and kindness, quieted the lady, and convinced them both that after all the Yankees were not very cruel. He permitted the captain to remain with his bride, at a house by the road, until the last of the brigade had come up, when of course he had to fall in as a prisoner of war.

As the column was marching along from Kosciusko, a man was met who came with a message from his wife's mother, requesting that the commanding officer and his staff take dinner at her house, on the road a few miles ahead. He was a Northerner, who had married in Mississippi before the war, and had remained there. The column was halted at the lady's plantation about noon, the men to feed and care for their horses and take their dinner, while the officers accepted the invitation to dine with the family at the house.

Very unfortunately some evil-disposed soldier or negro in the brigade set fire to the kitchen, which, as

was the custom in the South, was in a building a short distance from the house. The dinner was rudely interrupted and brought to an end, and the guests, with some soldiers called from the camp, aided by members of the family, had to fight the fire. They succeeded in confining it to the outbuilding where it began. Of course this was exceedingly annoying, and it would have gone hard with the incendiary if he had been detected. That night, although the camp was on a plantation, it was placed at some distance from any building except a long row of slave cabins. Early the next morning, as the brigade was moving out, a man was seen setting fire to one of these cabins. He was arrested by Captain Fitch of the Fourth Iowa, and proved to be a lieutenant of the Tenth Missouri. His case was submitted to General Sherman, and he was severely punished.

Many of the officers and men of the Tenth Missouri had been driven from their homes in Missouri by neighbors or other rebels, and had joined the Union army in the hope of revenge. They were much more bitter against the rebels than were those who were fighting upon no personal grounds. There is no doubt that very many, or the most, of the unauthorized acts of destruction committed by men of the Union army in the South were committed by men, who, like these, had suffered in the "border" States.

As soon as Sherman reached Canton, he announced his purpose to proceed rapidly to Vicksburg, leaving the army at Canton. He was impatient to see Banks at New Orleans, who was to have some of the Meridian troops for his projected Red River campaign. He directed Winslow to detail a regiment of cavalry

for his escort. This gave an opportunity to remind him of the "Veteran furlough" matter. Whereupon the General thought that the Fourth Iowa was the very regiment he wanted. Lieutenant-Colonel Kerr, who had rejoined at Canton with his Eleventh Illinois, was placed in command of the remainder of the brigade, and early on the morning of the 27th the Fourth Iowa Veteran Cavalry, with the Colonel in command and General Sherman at the head, set out at a brisk pace for Vicksburg, over sixty miles distant. The infantry divisions were to remain five days at Canton.

The men were told that their work was done and their Veteran furlough waiting at Vicksburg. They were riding now for Iowa—home! The weather was fine and dry, the air exhilarating, the sun shining, there was plenty to eat, the horses were in good condition. The country was clear of the enemy, there was no skirmish line, no beating the woods for hidden gray riflemen. It was a charming holiday, with a more charming long holiday ahead. And to crown all, they had made of the campaign a splendid success, and, for themselves, had added to their reputation.

The Veterans were quite as willing to ride fast as the General, and that night the bivouac was below Brownsville, forty miles from Canton. The stars were still shining the next morning when they were again in the saddle and on the way. Before noon on the 28th, about thirty hours from the time of leaving Canton, the regiment reached its encampment on Clear Creek. Indeed, a few men, especially zealous, got leave to go on the night before, and finished their ride of sixty miles from Canton before daylight and within twenty hours.

The whole loss of the brigade in the twenty-six very active days of this expedition was only twenty-seven killed, wounded, and missing, while it had caused the enemy a loss of many times that number, and had taken or destroyed large quantities of property. Of the men lost the share of the Fourth Iowa was only one wounded and two captured.¹ The Tenth Missouri suffered most in the sharp engagement of the 4th, near Clinton. The losses of the infantry were hardly more than those of the cavalry; it had, comparatively, but little fighting to do. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was not known, though it may safely be estimated at one hundred. About two hundred and fifty captured were brought back to Vicksburg. And in addition to the great destruction accomplished as one of the objects of the expedition, Sherman received and took to Vicksburg, in execution of another purpose, about one thousand white men and eight thousand negroes. In those days to take away a man, either white or black, even though not a soldier, was as effective against the Southern cause as to take a soldier. Indeed, as to the greater part of these negroes, their taking away was still more effective; for they were soon afterward organized into regiments, and armed and put to service as Union soldiers.

This campaign stands high in the memory of the Fourth Iowa. As soldiers it was an almost perfect experience for them. With fine sunshine and dry air the most of the time, the roads were good and exposure to the weather a pleasure rather than a hardship. No wonder the little brigade was glad and proud. Especially the men of the Fourth Iowa, who had post-

¹ See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

poned the pleasures of their furlough only to make them greater than they could have been before. They had marched in twenty-six days over four hundred miles, though attached to an army of infantry, and had taken part in four or five distinct engagements and many skirmishes, always with quick success. They had an agreeable change from the army rations in the food taken from the country; they had confidence in their new arms; they were always prompt and spirited in attack; they moved as if they were sure to go ahead in spite of any obstacles.

Almost without lying down to sleep the Veterans prepared for their journey to Iowa. They could hardly wait until a steamboat was made ready for them at Vicksburg. Contrary to the custom of furloughs, the men were in this case permitted, by a special order from General Sherman, to count their thirty days from Keokuk in Iowa; for which again they cheered "Old Sherman" or "Uncle Billy," as his irreverent but affectionate "boys" called him.

On the 4th of March about five hundred of the Veterans, with Colonel Winslow and most of the other officers of the regiment, as many as could be spared, embarked at Vicksburg, on the steamboat *Constitution*, for Iowa. At St. Louis, on the 11th, the boat was stopped and the citizens surprised the regiment with a public reception, honoring them for their re-enlistment and their late brilliant campaign. On the 13th they landed at Keokuk, and on the 14th each man received his furlough, to date from the 15th, and went his way with joy.

No one without the experience can appreciate the sweet and exhilarating feeling of relief and freedom in

the bosom of the soldier of that war who suddenly found himself his own master amid scenes of peace. To go where he pleased and without orders, to eat his meals with his friends ("like a Christian," in soldier's phrase), to sleep in a bed and without need of a guard, to be rid of the strain upon body and mind of service in the field in the presence of the enemy! It was a bit of heaven in the midst of harassing toil.

But not all of the Veterans could go to Iowa at that time. There were some who, from their positions in the regiment and other circumstances, had to postpone their furloughs for a time. The chief reason for detaining these was in the needs of the recruits, a large number of whom had just been added to the regiment. In February and March over three hundred joined from Iowa, and were distributed among the companies. Only about one hundred of the old soldiers, re-enlisted and not re-enlisted, whose instruction and example was expected to be of value to the newcomers, remained in the camp. It is easy to see that it is much better for a recruit to go into an old regiment than a new one. The old soldier is very clear that this is a sound principle; and he tries to apply it to the education of his new friend in very practical ways, with an eye not only to the future good of the service, but to present "fun." The recruit, smarting from the effects of his efforts to get experience, imagines the alleged kindness of his instructor to be really persecution, and becomes more or less rebellious according to his intelligence and courage. Under such trials as these, and the added ones of the inevitable illnesses of new soldiers, the recruits struggled on toward the necessary toughness. There was nothing for them to do beyond ordinary camp, patrol,

and guard duties, though no doubt that was to them a great deal. Unfortunately the measles got among them, as formerly in the camp at Mt. Pleasant. There were many cases, but not many deaths.

The weather, very disagreeable through March from rains, grew better in April, the sick-list was not so long, the recruits became more contented and cheerful; and when, near the end of the month, marching orders were received, the whole command was in good condition and spirits.

The regiment was commanded during this period, first by Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, and then by Major Spearman, Colonel Peters being advanced to the command of the Cavalry Forces of the Seventeenth Army Corps (all the cavalry then at Vicksburg), a command which he retained till the regiment was ordered to Memphis at the end of April.

When the furlough of the Veterans was expired, they reported to Colonel Winslow at Davenport, as ordered. They were joined there by a considerable number of recruits, and the whole body proceeded by steamboat to St. Louis. They were to stop at St. Louis, to be mounted. It is remarkable that the regiment was still deficient in serviceable horses. For a whole year there had been many men fit for duty, sometimes numbering hundreds, who could not be furnished with horses; and now that the recruits were added, not half the regiment was mounted.

The men were put into Benton Barracks, where the regiment had been in February, 1862, to await their remount. Fortunately they had the zeal and energy of Winslow in their service. There were four or five thousand other dismounted cavalrymen of other regi-

ments in the barracks, also waiting for horses, some having been waiting there a long time; and the quartermasters then had on hand only about eight hundred good horses, which they were trying to distribute in small numbers in such a way as to satisfy the clamoring cavalrymen. Winslow telegraphed directly to General Sherman, then at Nashville, asking an order to take all the horses to mount his Veteran regiment then *en route* for the field; and the order was immediately telegraphed back.

But Sherman also sent an order to Winslow, to move the regiment to Memphis and report to the general in command there. Accordingly the horses were taken, the necessary additional equipments obtained, steamboats prepared for transportation, and, after a stay of but two or three days at St. Louis, the men were on their way down the river. At the same time orders were sent to Colonel Peters, at Vicksburg, to move the Fourth Iowa men from there to Memphis, with all camp equipage.

The Veterans reached Memphis on the 24th of April and the men from Vicksburg on the 29th; and the regiment went into camp, all companies together, on the eastern outskirts of the city, between the Pigeon-roost and Raleigh roads.

CHAPTER VII.

MEMPHIS — FORREST — THE BATTLE OF BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS—SPENCER CARBINES—FORREST DEFEATED AT TUPELO—FORREST TAKES MEMPHIS!—INCESSANT CAMPAIGNING FROM APRIL TO JANUARY.

At Memphis the regiment was immediately assigned to the Second Brigade of the Cavalry Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. General Grierson was in command of the division, and Colonel Winslow was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade. This left Lieutenant-Colonel Peters in charge of the regiment.

The regiment had now about twelve hundred men in camp. Nearly six hundred recruits had joined during the winter and spring. In May its highest mark in numbers was reached. There were one thousand three hundred and fifty-four officers and men on its rolls in that month, though many were on detached service and in hospitals. But the recruits were not all capable of becoming effective soldiers. Indeed, many of them were, physically or mentally, quite unfit for the service. After the second year of the war, under the repeated and heavy demands of the government for more men, and in the feverish excitement constantly maintained in the North in urging enlistments, there was much more concern as to the numbers of the new

volunteers than as to their fitness. Many of the recruits obtained in the third year would not have been permitted to enlist in the first or second. It was even worse than that. The "bounties" offered after the first two years were so much increased as to excite the rapacity of a class of mercenary wretches who engaged in the search for recruits as a business. By various arts and deceits, they succeeded in getting into the camps many who were worse than worthless. Some of those sent to the Fourth Iowa were, at sight, proofs of shameful frauds upon the government.

Surgeon Robinson found a number of these cheats on his sick-list immediately after they were received in camp. As the list increased his indignation was excited; and he examined all the new men, to discover the extent of the fraud. Then the wrath of the honest old doctor was unbounded. He was never seen more aroused or active, nor ever more persistent in performing his duties. The regimental officers, his superior medical officers, the general commanding at Memphis, the authorities in Iowa, all heard from him in unmistakable language. To the Adjutant-General of Iowa he wrote boldly that he intended to "have some of those men discharged," and said "there appears to have been gross ignorance, extreme carelessness, or unmitigated rascality practised in recruiting many of the men sent to this command. Boys under size and age—mere children—no development of the physical system—voices not changed from the feminine notes of boyhood. And others are broken down by premature old age and disease. The officers who recruited and the surgeons who passed such miserable material should be brought to a strict account for their ignor-

ance or perfidy." On hearing from the angry surgeon, General Washburn, then in command at Memphis, wrote to the Adjutant-General too, and quite as much to the point. He enclosed a list of fifty-seven names of recruits recently sent from Iowa to the regiment, with the report of Surgeon Robinson on each; and he wrote—"The surgeons who passed these men and boys ought to be shot."

Of course all such material was weeded out; but the doctors found plenty of employment in the sickness among the other recruits, who were still in their seasoning period. Field service, however, which now began, and continued with never ceasing activity for a year, relieved the doctors from much labor. Active service is much more wholesome than any medicine for a soldier, especially so in an unhealthful climate. Chasing Forrest, even at the risk of bullets, was a better means of health than prescriptions or a hospital. On the very next day after the men from Vicksburg landed at Memphis, the regiment began its share in the long and bloody warfare with that notorious butcher, which made of northern Mississippi and the border of Tennessee an almost unbroken scene of desolation.

It is popularly believed of General Sherman that in his theory of war the first principle and the last is "destruction." If you are in earnest in war, the great thing to do is to destroy the property of the enemy. If you resort to strategy, let it be only to get you near enough to destroy. The more you can destroy the shorter the war will be.

While he was in charge of affairs in the Mississippi valley, there were two objects which kept this passion

always at a zealous heat, and very justly. One was the Mobile & Ohio railway and the other was Forrest. He was always bent upon breaking up that railway. From the Ohio to Meridian there was hardly a mile of it that had not at some time felt the skillful hands of his cheerful twisters. As to Forrest, he was continually trying to find a general with smartness and endurance enough to catch the tireless cutthroat and destroy his forces. Having the railway at their back, as a base and a line of supply, Forrest and Chalmers had no difficulty in maintaining their cavalry in northern Mississippi. With headquarters near Tupelo or Corinth, they made themselves very troublesome in the latter part of 1863 and the most of 1864. They could at any time stop the use of the Memphis and Charleston road, by cutting it near Corinth; and after Sherman went to Georgia in September, 1863, they kept him in constant apprehension of their cutting the line from Nashville to Chattanooga by which his armies were supplied. In March and April, 1864, Forrest produced great excitement and apprehension by marching northward from Corinth nearly to the Ohio, capturing some small posts, threatening Paducah, summoning Columbus to surrender, and making his name forever infamous by the atrocious massacre at Fort Pillow. From that time every Union soldier burned for revenge upon him; and it was the fortune of the Fourth Iowa that, from then till the end of the war, it was almost continuously trying to catch and destroy him. It never succeeded as to him personally, but it had the great satisfaction to take a hand several times in his defeat, and the greater satisfaction of a conspicuous share in the final rout and destruction of his forces.

When Forrest and his men had done their savage murders at Fort Pillow, they marched in haste for their old camps in Mississippi. They could not long have existed north of that State. The bitter hostility already felt toward them was now intensified to exasperation. The available troops at Memphis were hastily thrown together and sent out in the hope of cutting them off. The Fourth Iowa arrived at Memphis just in time to take part in the movement.

On the 30th of April the available force of the two brigades of Grierson's division was mounted and marched out, as part of a provisional army of about twelve thousand commanded by General Sturgis. The division was commanded by Colonel Waring, of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, the First Brigade being under Colonel Kargé, of the Second New Jersey, and the Second under Colonel Winslow. The Second Brigade was composed of the Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri, with the two James rifles, under Captain Joyce, which had been brought from Vicksburg.

The march was directly eastward, by Moscow and Somerville, to Bolivar, which was reached on the 4th of May. The enemy was not seen, and it was found that he had reached the Mississippi line, moving with speed to the south. A pursuit was undertaken, and continued by way of Salem, Miss., until Ripley was reached, about eighty-five miles from Memphis. There it was reported that Forrest was far ahead. The country was stripped of food and forage, and the command was already at some distance from any depot of supplies. General Sturgis determined to abandon the expedition and return to Memphis. This was done by nearly the same route the advance had been made

upon; and Memphis was reached on the 12th. The cavalry had marched about two hundred and fifty miles in the twelve days, much of the distance by night, and there was but little time, day or night, when the men were not in the saddle and upon the strain of attention. The horses suffered severely, having to do their work with very little rest and upon very scanty forage, some days with none. The men had been required by orders to carry one hundred rounds each, about three times the usual supply and an unreasonable addition to the loads of the horses.

The men who had not gone upon the expedition were left in a temporary camp near the western border of Memphis. Under orders they moved the camp farther north, and established it on the Raleigh road,¹ about two miles from "Jackson Square" in Memphis. It was a good ground, well drained, and in a grove of small trees. The men were busily employed in constructing and improving the camp; and the recruits had, if possible, more to do than the veterans. Colonel Winslow was incessantly active and energetic in keeping the men of the brigade up to their best efforts in improving their condition and increasing their efficiency. Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, commanding the regiment, was equally determined that it should keep well ahead of the other regiments of the brigade in cleanliness,

¹ This was the "New" Raleigh road. The camps of the Fourth Iowa were just south of that road, on both sides of Marley Avenue, extending from "Parson" Knott's house on the west to Mosby Avenue on the east. Regimental head-quarters were on the east side of Marley Avenue, the right of the line resting on the avenue, a little north of Mrs. Cavan's house, which was on the west side of the avenue. The pretty house of Mrs. Cavan has been burnt since the war, but Parson Knott's is still standing. This camp was the home of the regiment eight months, though many of the men were but little acquainted with it, being there only in the short intervals between campaigns.

fighting equipment, and the care of the horses, even if at the expense of the other virtues. The lazier men grumbled, and wanted to know whether they were being prepared for heaven, to which the Colonel replied, that they had only to stay in that regiment a little longer to find out. Even the trumpeters were astonished to find themselves compelled to earn their positions by acquiring a reputation for blowing well and in concert, arts which up to this time had been beyond their attainment. They were required to practice together several hours a day, which they did in a wood near the camp, to the great disgust of most of them and the great discomfort of the other soldiers, who were vexed by the discordant din. Between the mutiny of his subordinates, who objected to such drudgery, and the impolite remarks of the other men, who thought they heard enough of the bugles on other occasions, the Chief-Trumpeter found life hardly worth living.

General C. C. Washburn was then in command at Memphis. He was a good officer, zealous, energetic, and very patriotic, but his credulity led him at times into errors which caused the soldiers much fruitless labor. He was constantly excited by the highly-colored tales or inventions of his scouts and spies. One of them, a woman, told him, in the latter part of May, that Chalmers, the rebel general, was about to go to Hernando, in Mississippi, and would visit a relative there on a certain day. This is the James R. Chalmers who has been conspicuous in the peculiar politics of Mississippi since the war. He was Forrest's right hand at that time, and was high game. Washburn was immediately anxious to capture him; and he

ordered Winslow to march to Hernando, with fifteen hundred men, for that purpose. That number was ordered upon the supposition that Chalmers' brigade would always be found with or near him. The Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri furnished the number of men required, in about equal detachments, and Winslow went in command. To lessen the risk of discovery by the enemy, the march was made by night and with the greatest speed possible. The column left Memphis at ten o'clock the night of May 29th, and, moving very rapidly directly toward Hernando, reached there, about twenty-five miles, by daybreak. Strong detachments were thrown out to the right and left, surrounding the town. Closing in then and entering the streets, no rebels were found there, nor could any news be obtained of Chalmers. Officers were sent out, with several companies each, some miles on all the roads, without discovering any rebels; and the only information obtained was to the effect that Chalmers had no relative at Hernando nor any occasion to go there. At noon, the expedition having proved to be useless, the column was countermarched, and returned to Memphis, where it arrived at eight in the evening. About sixty miles had been marched within twenty-two hours, including the eight hours halt at Hernando.

Meantime Sherman had directed Washburn to send General Sturgis, with all available troops at Memphis, upon another expedition against Forrest and the Mobile & Ohio road. It appears that in ordering this campaign Sherman's object was, not only to destroy Forrest, but to keep the rebel cavalry off his communications while he was operating against Atlanta; and he says that this latter object was assisted by

Sturgis' campaign, even though it was in itself so disastrous.¹

General Sturgis was a West Point officer, a major in the Fourth United States Cavalry and a brigadier-general of volunteers. He had done well in command of a division in the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg and at Antietam, but before this summer he had not been assigned to any independent command in field operations. He appears to have been fretful and much given to bothering himself about little things; and he was guilty of that weakness which proved fatal to several West Point officers during the war, the superficial notion that volunteers could not be depended upon to fight. A general who does not believe in his men had better not go out with them. It would be wiser to avoid the command than to risk a defeat which could be explained only by bewailing an imagined difference in fighting qualities between volunteers and regulars. It is true, and quite natural, that volunteers, when they are green, without discipline and without experience, though they sometimes fight desperately, will at other times break or fail to do the work expected of them; but such instances were comparatively rare during the Civil War, and in the summer of 1864 a very large part of the volunteers had been two or three years in the field, and had had quite as much experience as any troops in the regular army. Indeed, the most of the men under Sturgis on this expedition were not only "Veterans," so-named in the organization of the army, but were in fact the veterans of many successful campaigns. They had proved on many fields, in many times of peril and

¹ Sherman's Report of Atlanta Campaigns, dated September 15, 1864.

hardship, that they were good and effective soldiers. If they should fail in one campaign after succeeding in many, the presumption must be that their failure was due to bad management. In the campaign now to be described this presumption became a historical fact. The whole record of the war may safely be challenged for an instance of equal blundering and incapacity on the part of the general commanding.

The army now organized by Sturgis numbered about eight thousand. There was a division of infantry, five thousand men and twelve guns, commanded by Colonel William L. McMillen, of the Ninety-fifth Ohio, divided into three brigades. The smallest brigade, twelve hundred, was composed of Colored troops, under Colonel Bouton. There was a division of three thousand cavalry, commanded by General Grierson, with eight guns (two of them small howitzers), in two brigades of about equal strength. The First Brigade was under Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., who had commanded the division in the first campaign against Forrest, and the Second under Colonel Winslow. The Second Brigade started with only two guns, the 12-pounder James rifles which had been attached to Winslow's command at Vicksburg; but on the march, Captain Lee, of the Seventh Wisconsin Battery, was ordered to report to Winslow with two of his guns. The Third and Fourth Iowa, with one hundred and forty men from the Tenth Missouri and about one hundred temporarily added from the Seventh Illinois, composed the Second Brigade. The Fourth Iowa left camp with seven hundred and six men and officers, commanded by Major Pierce, and the Third with five hundred and thirty-five, commanded by Lieutenant-

Colonel Noble. There was a train of two hundred and fifty six-mule wagons, loaded with rations, forage, and ammunition.

It was left to General Sturgis to choose the route and the methods by which he was to gain the objects of the expedition; and, accordingly, he proposed to move by way of Salem upon Corinth; to take that place, if defended; to proceed thence southward, destroying the railway as far as Okalona, and, if possible, as far as Columbus; to march thence westward to Grenada, on the Mississippi Central railway, and then to return to Memphis.

The Fourth Iowa was just returned from the march to Hernando when it was ordered out upon this new campaign. It moved with its brigade from Memphis on the first day of June, as guard to the wagon train of supplies and ammunition. That night it bivouacked at Colliersville, twenty-four miles from Memphis. The next morning it reached Lafayette, nine miles further, where it was relieved from the guard duty, and the cavalry brigades were united. The whole division then moved by easy marches on the road to Salem, which place was reached on the 3d. It began raining the first night out, and rained heavily and often every day for a week thereafter. The roads became very heavy, and the artillery and wagons were moved slowly and with great labor. For some days the cavalry was marched at the pace of the trains, but on Sunday, the 5th, it was ordered ahead, and a detachment of Waring's brigade, with the Tenth Missouri and the Seventh Illinois detachments of Winslow's brigade, all under Colonel Kargé, of the Second New Jersey Cavalry, was sent to and beyond Ripley, with

orders to destroy the railway at Rienzi and then the bridge over the Tuscumbia River. The remainder of the division moved on toward Ruckersville. The rain that day was remarkably heavy and constant. On Monday the column reached Ruckersville, marching slowly, the infantry having very hard work with the great wagon-train in the deep mud.

Believing, upon Kargé's success, that Corinth was abandoned, Sturgis turned south, and by the worst of roads entered a region he knew to be utterly destitute. On the 7th, near Ripley, the advance, the Fourth Iowa, was attacked, and a body of rebel cavalry was developed. There appeared to be several hundred.¹ The regiment was thrown into line of battle and continued its advance. Sharp skirmishing followed, and the enemy retired toward Ripley. Two companies of the Fourth Iowa and one of the Third Iowa then charged along the road, driving the rebels into and beyond the town. The Third Iowa lost one killed, the Fourth two wounded and three captured.² Six dead rebels were found on the field. When the town was taken the division was ordered into camp, and the Fourth Iowa bivouacked on the New Albany road, four miles east of Ripley.

On the 8th Waring's brigade was held at Ripley and Winslow's moved eastward, toward Fulton, keeping the advance alone all this day and the next. The rain still fell and the march of the army was more and more impeded by the deep mud and the difficult passage of swollen streams. In the intervals of the copious showers the sun shone through a thick, still atmosphere, making it excessively sultry. Every physical

¹ This was Rucker's brigade of Chalmers' division. Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 466.

² See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

effort was toilsome and slow. About four hundred of the infantry, sick and worn out, and fifty broken and emptied wagons, were, on the 9th, started back to Memphis.

General Sturgis says that at this time he seriously considered the abandonment of the expedition. The men were greatly fatigued and the animals in yet worse condition, owing to their extraordinary labors in mud and water during eight days, the delay had given Forrest ample time to concentrate his forces in front, and the state of the roads and bridges made it probable that the artillery and train would be lost in case of defeat. In a council with his division commanders, however, it was decided that, as he had but recently abandoned another expedition charged with the same object, the march should be continued. He was also influenced by the consideration, upon information Washburn had given him, that there could not be any large force of the enemy in his front. But this information was given him at Memphis, a hundred miles away and ten days before! He says his own information led to the same conclusion, but that it was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory.

So he moved forward with a small army in very bad physical condition, in the worst of weather, over a country made extremely difficult by prolonged and excessive rains, expecting to lose all guns and wagons in case of defeat, and ignorant of the strength and position of his enemy. This is, in brief, his own statement. Comment can hardly add force to it. The statement of itself makes it painfully clear that, if he had any military judgment, it was wholly inadequate to the position he held.

In the evening of the 9th the cavalry reached Stubbs' plantation, fourteen miles east of Ripley and about ten west of Guntown, a small place on the Mobile & Ohio road. At Stubbs' the road forked, the left branch going northeast to Corinth and the right east to Guntown. The Fourth Iowa, in advance, had observed the enemy's cavalry falling back before it. The division bivouacked at Stubbs', Waring's brigade having come up from Ripley. The next morning, Friday, at five o'clock Waring's brigade moved out in advance on the Guntown road, Winslow following closely. The infantry moved later and soon fell behind. It was again dreadfully hot and sultry. At eleven o'clock Waring's brigade encountered the enemy's cavalry at the crossing of Tishomingo Creek.

Approaching from Ripley, when within three quarters of a mile of the creek the ground falls away abruptly, by a row of spurs pointing eastward and covered with thick woods, to the bottom land. The New Albany road, coming in from the southwest on this bottom, joins the Ripley road a quarter of a mile west of the creek. The space between the New Albany road and the creek was filled in with dense forest, while immediately west of the New Albany road were open fields extending to the Ripley road and to the spurs or hills on the west. On the north of the Ripley road all the bottom land was covered by forest. East of the creek and south of the Ripley (hereafter called the Guntown) road the bottom lands continued, being about one quarter of a mile wide near the road and rapidly widening toward the south, all enclosed in fields. From the eastern border of this bottom the land rose, by wooded spurs or hills similar to those

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and dates.

west of the creek, until, in the vicinity of Brice's house, it became a plateau about one hundred feet higher than the creek. Just north of the Guntown road, near the creek and opposite the fields last mentioned, was a separate hill or mound covered with wood. It was probably fifty feet high and several hundred in diameter either way at its base. The Guntown road ran partly around this mound, bearing northwestward and then east, rising rapidly to the plateau. Half a mile from the creek, at Brice's house, it crossed the road running from Pontotoc to Baldwyn. The battle takes its name from this place, though it is often called "Guntown" and sometimes "Tishomingo Creek." In the northwest angle of the cross-roads was Brice's house, in the northeast angle his store, and on the road a few hundred yards to the north was Bethany Church. This church (since rebuilt on the Guntown road) gives its name to the postoffice. North of the Guntown and east of the Baldwyn road the ground was all covered by wood, the most of it being a remarkably thick growth of blackjack oak. South of the Guntown and east of the Pontotoc road the condition was similar, except that in places the wood was somewhat open, with scattered large trees. On the right of the Guntown road, four hundred yards east of the cross-roads, there was a large cotton-field. North of the Guntown road, parallel with it and within five hundred yards, was a wooded ravine through which a small stream ran directly west to the Tishomingo. The Tishomingo is a stream of important size, and it was then full from the recent rains. Its banks were very soft, and impassable for horses in any number. The bridge was narrow and old, and was the only one on the creek within several miles.

Supposing that the enemy would offer some resistance at the bridge, Grierson sent Waring's brigade forward (it being already in the advance) and ordered Winslow's into column of battalions, to await further orders. Winslow formed his column, as directed, in the open field in the angle of the Ripley and New Albany roads. His position was thus concealed from the bridge and the creek by the intervening forest. The brigade stood in this field, mounted, awaiting orders. Waring's brigade moved on, took the bridge, though not without some opposition, crossed, and advanced toward the cross-roads.

While his brigade was waiting in the field Winslow rode forward, to observe the situation and receive orders. Grierson was with Waring's brigade, directing its movement in person. Waring was half a mile north of the cross-roads, dismounted, his line extending from the Baldwyn road toward the Guntown road. He was then engaged with the enemy, though at a distance, and was throwing shell from his two small howitzers.

It had been Grierson's belief that there were only some six hundred rebels in his front, and he had expected to drive them on quickly. Upon his report to Sturgis, to that effect, he was ordered to move, with the greater part of his division, toward Baldwyn, leaving six or seven hundred to continue the march eastward on the Guntown road, at the head of the infantry column. Sturgis then rode up to the cross-roads, apparently with the idea that his column was to progress without trouble to the railroad at Guntown, now only a few miles ahead. Grierson accordingly ordered Winslow to bring up his brigade, which was imme-

diately done. But the enemy increased his fire upon Waring's line, and there was every appearance of a serious battle coming.

There had been a great mistake. The rebels in front were not a few hundred, but Forrest's whole available force, himself at the head. They were probably six thousand, being the brigades of Bell, Rucker, Lyon, and Johnson, all dismounted, with the batteries of Rice, Morton, and Ferrell, twelve guns. Sturgis says the most intelligent officers estimated them at from fifteen to twenty thousand, but this estimate must have sprung from fears or mortification in defeat. If Forrest had had fifteen or twenty thousand, Sturgis would have lost, not the quarter, but the whole of his army. Forrest was never in command of a force as large as that, nor had he the means of collecting such a one in northern Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg. He could not have been much stronger in numbers in June than he was in February, when, to oppose the advance of General Sooy Smith in the Meridian campaign, he could not raise more than seven thousand. Indeed, notwithstanding the great advantage of complete victory in this engagement, he and his superior officer, Lieutenant-General Lee, only a month later, joining their forces and collecting all they could in the State, mustered no more than about twelve thousand.

Forrest had thrown his lines across the Guntown and Baldwyn roads, on ground a little higher than that at the cross-roads and about three fourths of a mile distant. His guns were planted near the Baldwyn road, trained to reach the cross-roads and the Guntown road. These lines were advanced as the battle progressed; but as it would not have been possible to move artillery through the blackjack, both armies were

limited to the vicinity of the roads in the use of their guns.

When Grierson found that the rebels would not be driven, he ordered the whole division into position. Waring's brigade, dismounted, on both sides of the Baldwyn road, was now in front of the enemy's right wing. Winslow's brigade was moved over the creek and up to the cross-roads, except the Third Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Dee, which, by Grierson's order, was sent back to guard the division train. The two other battalions and the Third Iowa were led six hundred yards out on the Guntown road, dismounted, the horses sent to the rear, and a line formed across the road, in a very thick growth of the small black oaks. The Fourth Iowa just filled the space between Waring's right and the Guntown road. The Third Iowa came next on the right, its left resting on the Guntown road. The detachments of the Tenth Missouri and the Seventh Illinois were posted together on the east of the Pontotoc road, to hold that approach. The whole line was, roughly, the segment of a circle, the middle being on the Guntown road, the left refused, and the right resting upon the Pontotoc road. This brought the Third and Fourth Iowa apparently in front of Forrest's centre, but the opposing lines were at all points concealed from each other by the dense blackjack. Not only all the men, but all the officers except Winslow and Noble, were dismounted. Sabres and spurs had been left with the horses, which were held in mass in the field east of the creek. It was now twelve o'clock.

The four guns of Winslow's brigade were left at the cross-roads, to be in position to defend either approach, Captains Joyce and Lee being ordered to re-

port direct to Grierson and await further orders. This was, of course, done with Grierson's knowledge and approval. Sturgis speaks of these guns in the battle as if they were immediately under his own command, and says, as the reason why they were not at first employed, that it was not possible to use them because of the dense woods between his lines and the enemy's.

When Waring's brigade was dismounted, Grierson sent a message to Sturgis, suggesting that infantry and artillery be ordered up; and when he ordered the division into position, he again sent back, urging that he be supported, but saying that he could hold his line. Sturgis ordered forward the advanced brigades of the infantry, with some artillery. But, so far from having closed up on the cavalry, as they should have done according to his orders given the day before, they were five or six miles in the rear. They were already half-broken from the hardships of the ten days' march and enervated by the great heat. They were now ordered to move at quick time, and finally at double-quick. Their fatigue, the very miry road, and the sultry air, made it impossible to do this in order. Some dropped out, in spite of the efforts of their officers, and the others plunged along in disorder. Long before they reached the battle-field they were exhausted and spiritless. It would not be possible for men, even if fresh at the start and hardened by experience and free from weight, to run five miles in that terrible heat, over that heavy road, and go into battle in good order or condition; but these men were already in bad condition and had to carry a heavy weight of equipments and ammunition. It was a foolish order, wrong and reckless. The infantry and

trains should have been held west of the creek until the general was well informed as to the force and position of the enemy. If all the cavalry, dismounted, could not hold the enemy for a time, that would be evidence of the enemy's strength, and a sound reason for keeping the infantry and trains behind the creek until a plan of operations could be intelligently devised. If the cavalry *could* hold its lines, then surely there was no need to run the infantry and artillery five or six miles in great haste and under such exhausting conditions. But the infantry came up, greatly hurried and blown, having lost a large part of their number by straggling and by sheer physical exhaustion, followed by the artillery, and that by the whole wagon train. Everything was rushed over the creek toward the enemy. By some wild order or misunderstanding, even the wagon train was being run over the bridge and parked in the open fields near it, within reach of Forrest's artillery. Nothing was left undone which could tend to make the disaster complete.

Meantime, in the front the enemy was observed advancing in close order upon the dismounted cavalrymen, who were lying on the ground awaiting attack. At the same time they opened their batteries, but their fire was too high. It was intolerably hot and stifling, lying there in the underbrush. No water had been obtained since early morning, and all suffered from thirst. Winslow walked along the line, telling the officers of the situation, and directing that the fire be carefully withheld until the rebels could be plainly seen or heard in the bushes, and that then it be poured in rapidly. The cool-headed Major Pierce repeated the orders to the Fourth Iowa, and talked to

the officers and men with his characteristic slowness, as if they were engaged in a piece of commonplace business. He thought that the position of the regiment would be better a little further forward, and he moved it up. Then the first assault upon the brigade was made. The underbrush was so thick that only occasional glimpses of the advancing enemy could be had. The Third and Fourth Iowa being in the centre and nearer the enemy than the other regiments, received at first the brunt of the attack. The rebels assailed with a determined, steady fire, and the Iowa men replied as stoutly. The crashing of arms in the thick woods was deafening. Waring's line, on the left, fell back, under vigorous pressure. This exposed the left of the Fourth Iowa, and the enemy, moving forward there, were fought at closer range than anywhere else on the line. Company C held the extreme left, and suffered severely. Lieutenant Dillon was desperately wounded, and a number of his men fell with him. Major Pierce moved back the left and, righting the line, maintained the position obstinately until the rebels were repulsed. But they soon returned at a charge. The Iowa men were ordered again to lie down, and the fire of the rebels did but little harm. And when they came near, the two regiments opened upon them so fiercely that they were almost immediately broken and thrown back. The Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois, on the extreme right, were not yet much engaged; but Waring's brigade, on the left, had retired so far that its line was near the Baldwyn road. The enemy, encouraged by the success of their attack upon Waring's line, charged again upon the Third and Fourth Iowa in the centre with increased force, and compelled both

regiments to fall back about two hundred yards ; but the lines were kept intact, a stubborn resistance maintained, and the rebels were soon again repulsed.¹ The two regiments held their ground and advanced a little to improve their position, and for some time the enemy made no further attempt upon that part of the line. They contented themselves by firing at longer range and keeping their artillery at work. But their guns were still too much elevated.

The advanced infantry regiments now came up, under Colonel McMillen, and the first brigade that arrived (Hoge's) was sent to relieve Waring's brigade of the cavalry. Colonel McMillen rode up to the front on the Guntown road, and said to Winslow that he had relieved Waring's brigade ; that soon more infantry would be up, who would relieve his (Winslow's) brigade ; that it was Sturgis' purpose to form the cavalry in the rear of the infantry ; and that he (Winslow) was ordered by Sturgis to retire and remount. The fighting described began at about twelve o'clock. At about two o'clock the infantry appeared and occupied the ground under the immediate direction of Colonel McMillen, and the Iowa cavalry began to retire. While the movement was in progress the rebels again advanced to the attack. Winslow thereupon ordered the brigade back into position, taking a line close in the rear of the infantry, telling McMillen that the cavalry would not leave at such a time. McMillen approved of this step ; and at the same time Winslow sent a message direct to General Sturgis (Grierson having retired with Waring), to report the situation

¹ These troops were chiefly the brigades of Bell and Rucker in Buford's division. Jordan's " Campaigns of Forrest," pp. 470-71.

and ask for further orders. The messenger (Sergeant John Porter, of D, Fourth Iowa) returned with an explicit order from Sturgis, that the cavalry fall back and mount. McMillen heard the messenger's report, and said that of course the brigade must return. The Third and Fourth Iowa moved out into the road, and marched in good order half a mile toward the creek, to the field where their horses were held. Winslow galloped ahead, with his staff, to get more detailed instructions. He found Sturgis and Grierson together, at the roadside west of Brice's house, and reported for orders. Sturgis said to him that he meant to use the cavalry on the flanks, mounted, and directed that the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois be left where they were (on the Pontotoc road), with orders to report to the nearest commanding officer, while Grierson ordered that the Third and Fourth Iowa be moved to the west side of the creek, and formed in the field in which they were placed at the beginning of the fighting. Grierson himself accompanied this latter movement, riding at the head of the column.

Meantime the noise of the battle was much increased, and the report came back that the infantry were driving the enemy. Sturgis himself said so, in the interview just mentioned. It seemed natural and reasonable, and the cavalrymen supposed that the battle was practically won. They had done their work in reaching and holding the position, and now the infantry was doing its part. How vastly different the situation really was from that supposed! The real situation was, that the enemy had advanced in force along his whole line, and had driven back our infantry; that he had successfully pushed his right wing beyond our

left; and that he was now almost sure of victory. The General could not or would not realize what was happening to him. Colonel McMillen was gallantly holding the centre with one brigade, but was acting according to his own judgment. He again and again sent to Sturgis for orders and for reinforcements, but Sturgis only said that he could give him no assistance; and at last he said that McMillen must do the best he could until a line should be formed to protect a retreat. Colonel Hoge, on the left, was outflanked and fell back in disorder. The small body of cavalry on the right, the detachments of the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois from Winslow's brigade, had come under McMillen's orders, as directed, and rendered him valuable aid, "fighting with distinguished bravery to the very last," as he reports. The last brigade, the Colored troops, had not come up. It was in the rear of the wagon-train. General Sturgis thought it proper to go back himself after this brigade. While he was on this errand the last straw was laid upon the unhappy infantry. Their lines were broken at several points, they were thrown into confusion, those who were not taken bravely fighting to the last, fell back in disorder toward the bridge. The whole field was lost and the whole army in danger of capture. Sturgis got the Colored brigade up in time to enable a part of it to take a share in the fighting just before the final rout. But with it appeared all the *impedimenta* of the army. This at least might have been prevented. Pack-animals, wagons, ambulances, the sick, servants, all of those necessary evils which clog an army, came dragging and straggling along in front of the guard. They ought not to have gone over the bridge, but

apparently nobody directed or managed them, and probably they went along merely because they were not stopped. They moved right on, over the bridge—a fatal bridge to many of them it was—and almost into the battle-field. Indeed the enemy's shells soon fell in the wagon-park, causing great consternation among the drivers and camp retainers. And all this was done almost, if not actually, under the eyes of Sturgis, when our infantry was being driven at the front and when anybody could see that it would be impossible to get any wheels back over the bridge in any haste.

The broken troops on the Guntown road now began to appear west of the cross-roads, with the enemy pressing after them. The whole field was in a panic. All were disheartened, pride disappeared, and all hurried toward the bridge. Men, horses, wagons, ambulances, guns, and caissons, all in confusion; except a part of each of the two infantry brigades of Wilkin and Hoge, which still held together.

But before any of this occurred, the movement of Winslow's brigade back across the creek was begun. The Third Iowa was at the head of the column. The road was then filled with a mixed throng still going toward the front,—soldiers singly and in squads, stragglers, camp-followers, servants,—all hurrying over the bridge and toward the cross-roads. It was the usual scene in the rear of an engaged army. This disorder delayed the Third Iowa in re-crossing the bridge, and Major Pierce, seeing that the Fourth would have to wait some time for a clear road, kept it standing in the field where it had just been remounted.

The Third Iowa had passed the bridge, and was moving into the position designated by General

Grierson, when the Fourth Iowa, still sitting on their horses where they had remounted, saw the battle approaching again in their front. The enemy had gained and crossed the Baldwyn road, and was driving our infantry toward the creek and the bridge.

It was plain that the infantry had been defeated and broken. Some of the enemy's guns at this time were evidently our own guns turned upon us. The fire from one of these guns ranged just over the heads of the Fourth Iowa. Terrible confusion now prevailed at the bridge, which was blocked by the flying troops, and by vehicles stuck upon it. The enemy would soon capture everything east of the creek. Major Pierce had no orders, except the one to follow the Third Iowa westward over the bridge. That he would not do under the present circumstances, and could not do if he would. There was no one to give orders, and he took the responsibility of acting upon his own judgment. He dismounted the whole regiment, sent the horses to the creek, with orders to get them over by some means or other, and then, afoot at the head of the men, he advanced and occupied the low hill or mound just north of the road, already mentioned. He says he never knew an order to be executed so quickly. This position was on the left of a small line still held by the brave remnant of an infantry brigade, who, under the faithful McMillen, were struggling desperately against the tide. From this hill the Fourth Iowa opened fire upon the advancing rebels at short range, and promptly checked them; and for half an hour it held them at that point. Colonel McMillen, in his report, speaks gratefully of this service as being very

valuable and gallant, though, unfortunately, he mistakes the name of the regiment that did it. Colonel Wilkin, Ninth Minnesota, a brigade commander, also speaks in high praise of this performance of the regiment, and of its value, though he only knew the troops as "a body of dismounted cavalry."

Meantime the bridge was cleared, and all of the infantry not already lost crossed over, as well as the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois detachments of Winslow's brigade, and some of the wagons. The four guns of Winslow's brigade had already been brought off. When all the field appeared clear, and its horses were across the creek, the Fourth Iowa fell back steadily, without haste, and passed the creek the last regiment of all. The whole of the army remaining was now on the road west of the Tishomingo, moving toward Ripley, all in great disorder, except the cavalry and remnants of the infantry brigades.

While Winslow was directing the formation of the Third Iowa in the field west of the creek, as ordered, supposing the Fourth to be immediately following, Grierson came up and said that the army was beaten and all in retreat. Shell began to fly over the position, from guns taken by the enemy. Then Sturgis passed by with his staff near the Third Iowa and the cavalry commanders, but paying no attention to them and leaving no orders. Then Grierson went forward without leaving any special orders for the brigade, and Winslow could only put it into position to follow the retreating army, which it did in close column, the Fourth Iowa in front. After two or three miles, it being observed that the rebels were pressing in pursuit, the brigade was faced about, formed squadron front, so that

it could more easily be put into action, the intention being to fight; but presently it appeared that the risk was too great, as failure would be likely to result in the loss, not only of the brigade, but of the remainder of the army. The column was accordingly again reversed, and moved forward slowly, Winslow himself galloping ahead to report to Sturgis and ask for orders. The road was seen to be filled with troops and teams utterly demoralized. Organization and order were almost wholly gone. The Second Cavalry Brigade appeared to be the only organized body of any size in the army. Waring's brigade, as was afterwards learned, had been sent forward to Ripley, and was at that time far in front. About three miles west of the Tishomingo, McMillen, with Wilkin, Hoge, and Bouton, formed a new line of the remnants of their brigades which still held together, in the hope of preventing any further loss. Sturgis says there were twelve or fifteen hundred men in this line, but that they soon gave way, and that it was impossible to exercise any further control. This line could not have given way under any immediate pressure from the enemy, because Winslow's brigade was between it and the Tishomingo, and still maintained perfect order. It is probable that the cause was the terrible spectacle of their routed and demoralized comrades moving in confusion along the road. The sight of a disorderly retreat causes fear even in good soldiers. And the spectacle then on that road within a few miles west of the creek is beyond any description. The road was filled from side to side with wagons, ambulances, guns and caissons, infantry, afoot and mounted, negroes of both sexes and all ages, all in utter disorder, all struggling to get to the head.

The road had been very bad when the columns were moving in the opposite direction a few hours earlier, but now it was far worse. It had been beaten into the deepest mud, and the big army wagons, stuck fast and abandoned here and there, blocked the way and added to the confusion. The screaming of shot and shell flying over or toward the rear of these fugitives increased their terror; and only the coming on of night saved them from destruction or capture.

When Sturgis was overtaken by Winslow, his staff and cavalry escort were in good order, but immediately in his front and rear was seen the same dreadful condition of the army. In the conversation which ensued Sturgis remarked, with an injured and disheartened tone, that his army was only a mob of volunteers, worthless in action, becoming demoralized and useless without cause. Winslow reminded him that the cavalry was intact, and Sturgis said he was glad to see that there was still an organized force in his army. On hearing that his brigade was unbroken and all in hand, he asked Winslow whether he could forge ahead of the retreating troops and stop them until they could be reorganized and re-formed. Winslow replied that he could, that he thought he could pass all the infantry by the time the first of them reached Stubbs', five miles further, and asked if that place would do. At Stubbs' the Corinth road comes in from the northeast, and the enemy might try to cut off the retreat there. It was also just west of the Hatchie Swamp through which Forrest would be compelled to move his men by a narrow road, the place of his emergence being therefore very favorable for fighting him. Sturgis said the place would do admirably, and at once ordered Winslow

to go there, stop every man and animal, and hold them until he should come up.

Winslow then returned to the rear and moved the brigade forward as fast as possible, through the woods but parallel with and near the road. When Stubbs' plantation was reached, the brigade was ahead of the flying army. The Fourth Iowa was at once thrown across the Corinth road, well out, and the Third placed behind it, at the junction, in column. By this disposition all movement was stopped, and at the same time the Corinth road was held on the left. But when General Sturgis came up he made no attempt to reorganize. Winslow reported his action; the General only replied that "the whole thing had gone to hell," that he did not expect to save any artillery or wagons; and he directed Winslow to open the road, let the broken troops pass by, and to exhort them to hurry along. He said, however, that he intended to reorganize at Ripley, and make a stand there. Ripley was fourteen miles further on, and it was now dark. He also said that he had sent Waring's brigade of the cavalry on to Ripley. Sturgis then asked Winslow whether he would undertake to cover the retreat. He said he knew it would be a hard task and full of danger and responsibility. Winslow replied that his brigade was only waiting for orders, and that it would do the best possible; but he urged again that the army should make a stand at once, and pointed out that it would be much more difficult to take a position at Ripley, because there the troops would be more scattered and unfit than ever; that those who might get so far in the retreat would certainly be exhausted; that they were likely to be without provisions and

perhaps without ammunition or artillery, since it might be impossible to get the wagons and guns through the Hatchie Swamp, even if they should escape capture in the pursuit. But Sturgis said he had directed Waring to hold Ripley, and that he would go on; and he ordered Winslow to make every effort to get the artillery and wagons through the swamp, and to cut down and abandon all that could not be saved. Some further talk was ended by the General repeating these orders positively. The cavalry then opened the road, and General Sturgis and a large number of officers with him rode off toward Ripley, followed by the disordered infantry and the mob of stragglers on foot. It was most pitiful, but exasperating, that ignoble spectacle, and the hearts of the men who still held together were filled with wrath. Many swore fiercely, and many cried with bitterness, to see the General thus weakly throw away the last chance of the day, perhaps the only chance to save the remainder of the army. But it was evident that this one brigade was to be, not only the rear-guard, but the only guard of the army, at least until Ripley was reached. It was a hard task, coming at the end of the exhausting efforts of the day and at the end of ten days of unusual strain.

The brigade was now dismounted and disposed near the place where this occurred, and the men told to get what rest they could. The officers were directed, some to obtain more ammunition for the carbines and revolvers, some to watch the road, and others to attend to the work of pulling the wagons and artillery through the Hatchie Swamp. This last was found to be almost impracticable. The road was nearly impassable there for wheels, even by daylight, but in the darkness there

was, practically, no road, and the already exhausted animals and men were quite unequal to the task. The passage was in many places blocked with teams hopelessly stuck fast. Only a few succeeded in getting through. The others were destroyed or broken down as much as possible. With persistent energy three of the guns of Winslow's brigade were dragged through. Two of those guns were never to be lost while the brave and tireless Captain Joyce commanded them. Captain Lee brought through one of his guns, but the other was lost in the mire. These three guns, with the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois detachments of the brigade, whose horses were now mostly broken or exhausted (having only the day before come in from the long and laborious march to Rienzi, under Colonel Kargé), were now sent on ahead to Ripley. When they reached Ripley they were ordered by General Sturgis to push on to Memphis. But Captain Lee lost his second gun at Ripley. The horses on it entirely broke down there, and he could not replace them; so that he had to abandon his last gun.

Meantime the remaining cavalymen lighted many fires across the line of march, hoping to deceive the enemy into the belief that a large force was encamped there. But the intense darkness of the night would probably alone have saved the retreating army from attack. There was but little rest for the cavalymen, because of the many details for different services, the constant passing of parties of the retreating troops and the natural excitement of the occasion. At about two o'clock in the morning the road was clear and no more men were found in the swamp. All who had so far escaped appeared to be now safely in front, on the way

to Ripley. Half an hour later the brigade was mounted and marched on the Ripley road, the Third Iowa in front and the Fourth in rear. The movement was made slowly, in column of fours. At daybreak the rear-guard was surprised to find that they were followed by a body of Union infantry. It proved to be a small part of Colonel Wilkin's brigade, led by the Colonel, who had re-formed and had stopped to rest for the night on the east of the swamp, probably in the very presence of Forrest's cavalry. This incident shows, as indeed do many others, that, if it was a lack of courage and spirit that caused Sturgis' failure, the lack was not wholly that of his troops. The brigade halted to let Wilkin's men pass and get well ahead. Shortly after it was again in motion rebel cavalry appeared and made a dash upon the rear. They had only been waiting for light enough to enable them to attack. General Grierson and his staff, who had spent the night at a house on the road, now appeared there and took the head of the brigade column. Upon consultation Grierson and Winslow agreed that it was not probable that there was any organized part of the army at Ripley, and that it would be prudent for Grierson to move on with one regiment, to occupy the town and prepare for defense there. The Third Iowa being in front, then rode ahead with Grierson, while the Fourth was to hold the enemy back and move slowly. Winslow remained with the Fourth. Both regiments had taken care during the night to lay in a full supply of cartridges.

It was an exceedingly hard day that thus fell to the lot of the Third and Fourth Iowa, even harder than the day before; and the service seemed comparatively

thankless, since the results were not so conspicuous as those they had achieved at Brice's Cross-roads. From daylight till nearly dark, with but short intervals, one or the other of them was, or they both were, in harassing conflict with the exultant and bold rebel cavalry. Forrest pursued closely, with all of his cavalry, confident of capturing at least the retreating footmen. He pushed the rear with great daring and persistence, impatient to reach his expected captives in front. His advanced companies frequently charged upon the rear with wild yelling; and he lost many men, not only when these assaults were repulsed, but through the hardihood of some of his men, who, reckless in the joy of victory, unnecessarily exposed themselves in coming too near. The Fourth Iowa maintained a formation by companies in echelon, the rear company always in line facing the enemy. The companies alternating in this service, there was always a line standing against assault and ready with its volleys, like a wild beast at bay showing his teeth. There were stretches of the road where the shape of the ground prevented the rebels from making these attacks, but the other parts of the ten miles march to Ripley were almost continuously ringing with the "rebel yell" and the answering crack of the Iowa carbines. The enemy were of course, comparatively, in good condition. They had won a striking victory, and were greatly elated. They knew that Sturgis had lost a large part of his army, nearly all his artillery, and all of his wagons and supplies. They had, indeed, good occasion for high spirits and high hopes.

The men and horses of Winslow's brigade had already been twenty-four hours without food and almost

continuously active, not to speak of the condition they were in at the beginning of that period. And its number was very small when compared with the number of the army it was defending or with that of the enemy it was resisting. But the men knew that the fate of the five thousand in their front, as well as their own lives or liberty, depended upon their keeping up the struggle. Though some of them fell under the rebel fire, the others were only the more bitter and determined for that; and they had the satisfaction of seeing at least as many of their assailants fall.

As the regiment approached Ripley, Forrest's men became still more truculent, and appeared in increased numbers. They pushed forward on the flanks, now on one and then on the other, attacking there as well as in the rear. It seemed impossible to hold out much longer. Winslow sent one of his staff at high speed into the town, to learn the situation there, communicate with Grierson and the Third Iowa, and see what support the Fourth could have. The regiment was then passing Llewellyn Church, in a ravine just east of the town, and the firing was very hot in the rear. Looking ahead, a body of rebels was seen hurrying from the south (the Tupelo road) along the ridge which formed the western side of the ravine. The purpose was, plainly, to cut off the brigade. Winslow ordered a demonstration by the rear companies, as if to charge the enemy nearest to them, and then abruptly withdrew the rear guard and galloped the column into the town. It was just in time.

It was about ten o'clock in the morning. General Sturgis had not made a stand at Ripley, as he had proposed. He was already gone some hours. He says, in

his report,¹ that he did effect an organization there by seven o'clock, so that "the army presented quite a respectable appearance"; but then he discovered that the cartridge-boxes were nearly exhausted, and the organization broke down again. The whole body set off promptly toward Salem, Waring's brigade of cavalry being again sent ahead. The General had left a few hundred Colored infantry in Ripley, under Colonel Bouton, who was ordered to report to Winslow. The staff-officer who had been sent ahead from Llewellyn Church now came up and reported that Grierson was with the Third Iowa on the Salem road in the west part of the town, moving north, and that Sturgis had directed Grierson that the rear-guard must hold Ripley as long as possible. It seemed as if General Sturgis was utterly indifferent, not merely to the hardships, but to the existence of the brigade.

The rebels were already pushing into the streets from the east, yelling like devils. Winslow at once ordered Bouton to form his Colored troops behind a line of fences, to open on the enemy and hold the position stubbornly. At the same time he went to the Third Iowa, countermarched it at a gallop, and charged a part of it, in column of fours, down the road on the right of the Colored line and into the rebel front. The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Jones rode at the head of the column, and the rebels were forced back in confusion. It was a sharp conflict, and the Third Iowa suffered severely, but the movement delayed the enemy for a time, and was, perhaps, the salvation of the Colored troops. Their colonel now reported that he had but three or four rounds of cartridges left, and

¹ Official report, 11 Moore's Rebellion Record, p. 162.

Winslow gave him leave to retire, with the advice to follow the other infantry to Salem with all speed.

Meantime Major Pierce had formed the Fourth Iowa across the town, on one of the streets to the left of the position of the Colored troops, and was having a hot battle with another part of the rebel force. The whole regiment was engaged, and the weight of the enemy appeared to be increasing. At the same time two other bodies of them were seen, one moving upon the south side of the town, and the other working around to the north of it.¹ The game seemed almost played for the exhausted Iowa men. No wonder they showed signs of weakening. The strain upon them had been tremendous, and to their eyes there was but little encouragement. A heavy and determined charge upon the regiment now succeeded so far as to force it back all along the line. The rebels pressed their advantage, and produced some disorder, the principal result being that the regiment was separated into two parts of six companies each. But the disorder was overcome, and all fell back to the northwest part of the town. There was nothing to be done but to leave the town while it was yet possible. The six companies from the right of the Fourth Iowa moved westward on the road to Salem, which the infantry had taken. The Third Iowa companies which had made the charge returned and took the same road, marching in rear. The other six companies of the Fourth attempted to reach the same road, but, finding the enemy in possession of it, they took the road toward Saulsbury, east of the Salem road. These latter companies did not join again until noon

¹ It was Forrest in person, with his escort and Bell's brigade, who made this attack in front, and Buford's brigades attempted the flanking. Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 478.

the next day. Captain Woods, of L, took command of them, and marched them north a few miles and then west to Colliersville. It was supposed they would be taken or destroyed, almost as of course; but they had no trouble at all, not even seeing any force of the enemy after leaving Ripley.

But Forrest made up for his failure to follow on the Saulsbury road by his energy on the Salem road. His advanced companies were, if possible, more active than ever; and, our men having shown some weakness, it was a time of great anxiety. The rebels rode immediately through the town, and kept dashing upon the rear-guard. This was now the Third Iowa. It held its post gallantly, fighting by companies, in echelon, as the Fourth had done. The Fourth, in front, began to move too fast, and, naturally, the first companies of the Third were tempted to follow at the same pace. There was great danger. That pace, if continued, would become a flight. At the request of Winslow, who was at the rear with the Third, Grierson rode to the front of the Fourth, placed himself and his staff-officers at the head of the column, and compelled the men to come to a slow walk. Steadiness and good order were then quickly restored, and the desperate conflict went on.

Two or three miles from Ripley, being alarmed by the effect upon the men of the prolonged excitement and physical exertion, Winslow and Pierce made a new effort to check the rebels. Two companies of the Fourth, D and G, under Captain Abraham, D being commanded by Lieutenant Pickel and G by Lieutenant Sloan Keck, with two companies of the Third Iowa, were posted in the woods at the side of the road, with orders to keep well together, to fire only at close

range, carefully and effectively, and, under any circumstances, to hold the position and check the enemy. The officers were told that it was a position of danger, but that it must be held to the last moment. The work could not have been entrusted to better hands. Both officers and men most bravely did their duty. Nothing was done better in all the campaign. This handful of men actually kept the whole rebel column at bay for some time, and compelled the formation of new lines of attack. The good results were, that the remainder of the brigade had a breathing-time and that all the troops in front got well ahead. The enemy at last having nearly surrounded this stubborn little body, it retired and closed up on the column. On the next attack the rear companies followed the example so well set them, and held their ground longer than had been the practice, and fired more steadily. It was an improvement, giving more confidence and coolness to the men not engaged, and enabling the alternating companies to take position at a slower pace. But the terrible tax was fast reaching the limit of human endurance. Indeed, it was necessary, from time to time, to relieve some of the men and send them ahead, who otherwise would have been lost. The men and horses still able to stand were reduced to a pitiful number. The companies now averaged hardly fifteen or twenty men each in line, and the men had been without food since the morning of the day before. The horses had not only been without food during the same time, but had not been fed regularly nor sufficiently for four or five days. And the kind of work required of the horses during this last day was the hardest upon horses of all that they do.

About five miles west of Ripley the road crossed a small creek with steep banks, spanned by a narrow bridge. The bridge was not passable for cavalry, as much of the planking was broken or gone. With a good deal of trouble and delay the two cavalry regiments forded the creek at two places. All the time the rear companies were kept briskly engaged. On the hill west of this creek the head of the cavalry column came in view of the rear of the retreating infantry for the first time that day.

Scattered about the bridge and the banks of the creek were many infantrymen, sitting and lying down, apparently utterly exhausted. They had stopped there for water or to rest, but they were now so worn out and so dull and hopeless in mind that they could not be moved. The cavalrymen tried to get them to go on, but nothing could stir them. Appeals, warnings, threats, were of no avail. They were told that the rebels would soon be there, and they could hear the firing, but their apathy was not overcome by any effort to scare them. It was a pitiful spectacle of broken spirits. They were no doubt all prisoners within a short time.

But this was not the only instance of the capture of the broken infantry in that terrible retreat. Many hundreds were lost after their escape from the battlefield. They had had little or nothing to eat since the morning of the day before, nor any sleep, and their physical powers had been taxed beyond endurance. Singly and in squads they fell or lay by the roadside or in the woods, all strength and spirit gone, wholly refusing to move. Fear of death or desire to live had no longer any influence. They were stupidly indiffer-

ent to fate. The spirit of the average man in war—the “soul,” as old writers call it—depends upon his stomach and his muscle; it has not an independent existence.

The passage of the small creek was made by the brigade at about two o'clock. There Forrest must have given up hope of success, and probably he there halted the main part of his forces, because after the creek was crossed the attacks were light and infrequent. The reason for this respite was, probably, that his men and horses had become jaded. His horses had, indeed, on that day done even more than those on the other side, as they were almost continuously hurrying back and forth and making circuits over rough country on the flanks of the Iowa men.¹

General Sturgis had been kept informed, by officers of the staff and others, of the situation and operations in the rear. He continued to move as rapidly as was possible, going through Salem and on toward Colliersville. The wretched survivors of his disaster dragged themselves along with him, still in confusion and fear, in a most pitiful condition from their toils and hunger and defeat. They had no food, and the country was utterly destitute of food; and the heat was still very oppressive. More and more of them dropped out and fell, doggedly awaiting their fate, preferring any suffering to that they were then enduring.

At last, late in the afternoon, the General sent relief to the faithful Iowa cavalry in the rear. Waring's

¹ It appears that Forrest followed as far as Salem, where he arrived at five o'clock; that there he was led to believe that only stragglers were on that road, and that Sturgis' main body was on the Lagrange road; that thereupon he ceased the pursuit himself, but ordered it continued on the Lagrange road by Buford and Bell; and that shortly afterward he recalled all pursuit. Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 480.

brigade had been up to this time marching quietly in front of all. It had not been engaged with the enemy since it was relieved by McMillen on the field at Brice's early in the action of the day before. Only one regiment was sent back, however, the Second New Jersey, under Colonel Kargé, the only regiment in the whole command then armed with the new Spencer carbine. Any troops having that gun ought to have been placed in the rear long before. The defense would certainly have been easier, safer, and more effective. The Spencer was an excellent "magazine" gun, carrying seven metallic cartridges, while the two Iowa regiments had Sharp's and Union carbines, which took paper cartridges one at a time.

The relief was timely. The Iowa men were nearly out of cartridges, some having none left and others but two or three. But at that time the enemy had not appeared in any numbers for an hour, and there was nothing very hard for the relieving regiment to do, especially as darkness would soon prevent any fighting. And, in fact, the rebels did not make any serious attack after Salem was passed.

The exhausted remnant of the Third and Fourth Iowa, their organization still intact and their column in good order, now at last found themselves riding quietly in column along the road. Though they were relieved from rear-guard duty, they kept behind the flying infantry and just in front of the Second New Jersey. It seemed to them that the troops might as well stop and rest for the night, but the front kept pushing on. Sturgis had determined to go on to Colliersville, sixty-two miles from Ripley, and there halt for rest and for supplies from Memphis.

All night long the march went on, but it was impossible to move at any but a slow rate. The men were, of course, extremely weary and drowsy. It was most difficult to keep awake, and many slept in snatches as their horses stumbled along. The torturing hours of the night dragged slowly by. At eight o'clock in the morning (Sunday, the 12th) the column reached Colliersville, and at last halted. The railway was in operation from there to Memphis, twenty-four miles, and by noon a train came out with supplies and two thousand fresh troops. At about the same time the six companies of the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Woods, who had been cut off at Ripley and had marched in company with Colonel Wilkin's infantry, came in from the east, to the great joy of their comrades of the other companies, who had feared they were lost. For the first time in over two days and nights the poor horses were stripped of their saddles and permitted to rest; and their suffering riders threw themselves on the ground, relieved at last from the tremendous strain they had borne. And both horses and men had the novel and sweet experience of eating again freely and in quiet.

Within easy reach of Memphis, with the railway and telegraph in operation, with plenty of supplies on hand, with the two brigades of cavalry still intact and two thousand fresh troops received, and the enemy not having been heard from since the evening before, it would seem only a reasonable comfort to the jaded men and animals that they should be permitted to rest at Colliersville over night. But Sturgis feared that a large force of rebels was moving upon White's Station, seventeen miles ahead, to cut him off. White's was

only seven miles from Memphis by rail, and had a garrison which could easily be strengthened from Memphis, not to speak of the impossibility, under the circumstances, that any large force of rebels could reach the place in time and in condition to fight.

Soon after dark, when the soldiers, no longer starved, were lying down to sleep, they were ordered out, to continue the retreat. The sick and feeble had been sent on by rail, and now the remainder of the infantry and the dismounted cavalry were put on cars. All the men with horses had to march. The night was dark and the march very slow, any speed being physically impossible. It took till nearly daybreak to make the seventeen miles to White's.

Any cavalryman of experience will understand what suffering, what physical pain, that last unnecessary march caused the wretched men and horses who made it. When a forced march has been continued a day or two, a cavalryman suffers a slowly increasing pain, from his cramped position and the unceasing motion of his horse, a pain that is often very hard to bear hour after hour. It is an indescribable general keen ache and rasping of the nerves; but it can be borne through an incredible length of time, because there is a gradual preparation for it. A man can bear a great many pounds of weight if they are laid on slowly, one at a time. But when the rider is at last relieved from the strain and permitted to rest and become wholly relaxed, and is then, before his rest has reached the point of comfort, compelled to mount and ride again, his sensations are exquisite tortures. Every bone aches fiercely and seems ready to crack with pain, and every muscle feels as sore and tender as if it had been sepa-

rately scourged. No experience in that terrible campaign is recalled by the cavalry with a keener memory of suffering than the dreadful march of that night.

White's Station was reached early on the 13th. There was not the least news of the enemy. The remnants of the infantry had gone on to Memphis by rail, but the cavalry was not yet permitted to move to its camps. It had been hardly an hour at White's when Colonel Winslow received an order to send all the men whose horses were still capable back to Colliersville, to protect a railway train which was being sent to bring up some more infantry who had come in there. There were hardly one hundred horses in the Fourth Iowa that could go, but all that could were turned out, under Captain Huff, of Company A, and again went twice over that wearisome road. The remainder of the brigade went on to Memphis, reaching camp there the evening of the 13th. The detachment sent back to Colliersville remained there, holding the roads beyond the town, until the last of the infantry were on cars moving to Memphis; and these men did not join their comrades in camp at Memphis until the 15th.

It is one hundred and ten miles from Memphis to Guntown, by the route the army took; so that, from Stubbs' to Brice's and thence back to White's, the brigade had marched one hundred and eleven miles in less than three days, engaged half the time in more or less active conflict with the enemy. The Colliersville detachment, in another day, added thirty-five miles to the distance. And these distances are given without counting the side marches, made in scouting and foraging, which amounted, probably, to as much more.

The campaign was ended. With what humiliation and sorrow and indignation it is recalled! That fine little army almost wholly ruined. Many regiments so broken and diminished as to be nearly useless for the remainder of the war; a third of their number killed, wounded, or in rebel prisons;¹ all the guns lost except those of Winslow's brigade and the small howitzers of Waring's; all of the great wagon-train gone, filled with supplies and ammunition; the enemy victorious and boasting, enriched by booty, strengthened by the artillery and the thousands of small arms left in their hands, and now in possession of all the country up to the very picket-posts of Memphis.

The killing and wounding of men under such circumstances seems only a cruel slaughter; and it was with deepest anger and resentment that the men of the Fourth Iowa now counted their lost comrades.² And yet their loss was very much less than that of some of the infantry regiments. By their highly creditable maintenance of order and discipline, their holding well together, and stubbornly resisting all attacks, the cavalry lost only when loss was wholly unavoidable. This is always the case where steady conduct occurs. When troops are defeated and driven, it is always safer for them to fight and hold back stubbornly, like wheel-horses on a down-grade, than to run or break.

There is one view of this disastrous campaign, however, which is a source of great pride and gratification

¹ Sturgis' report of losses, 11 *Rebellion Record*, p. 166, shows 233 killed, 394 wounded, and 1,623 missing. Forrest's loss, as stated by Jordan, in "*Campaigns of Forrest*," p. 481, was "at least 140 killed and nearly 500 wounded." It was probably much more.

² The loss of the Fourth Iowa was 9 killed, 26 wounded, and 15 captured. Some of the captured were known to be wounded. A very large number of horses was also lost, killed, wounded, or exhausted. See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

to the members of the Third and Fourth Iowa, and which has excited the admiration of many soldiers and writers: that in the midst of difficulties and discouragements so great these regiments maintained their organization and steadily did their duty at every point; that they held their post in the battle perfectly until they were regularly relieved; that they brought away successfully their two guns, the only ones saved in the army except the small howitzers of Waring's brigade; that throughout the retreat they successfully held the rear, without relief and under most discouraging and desperate circumstances, a service which alone saved the broken army from entire destruction or capture; and that they did this under the greatest physical and mental strain, without sleep and almost without food. It is a record which could hardly be excelled, and every man in the two regiments may ever feel proud of it.

It would be a further and crowning satisfaction if it could be written that the general commanding was gratified by the conduct and success of the brigade, and had made some mention of it with approval in his report. He did profess to be gratified while in the field and in the presence of danger. In a despatch to Washburn from the field, dated the 12th,¹ he said: "My lines were compelled to give way before the overwhelming numbers by which they were assailed at every point," and, "So far as I know, every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better." And then when he was overtaken at Colliersville, after the fighting was all done, he was very grateful; and he thanked Winslow, and, through him, the officers and men of the brigade, "for their invaluable service

¹ War Records, vol. 39, part 1, p. 218.

and the very gallant manner in which they had acted." He could not then speak of them too highly. But afterward, in his leisure at Memphis, came the painful duty of making an official report, and then arose the need of accounting for his failure without bringing blame upon himself.¹

It is difficult to realize that, although the Fourth Iowa, either alone or with its brigade, was conspicuously engaged in all the fighting described in General Sturgis' report, it is mentioned there only once, and then only for the purpose of casting a slur upon its colonel. The remarkable and exhausting conflicts of the 11th, lasting nearly the whole day and maintained almost entirely by the two Iowa regiments, are not spoken of at all. But the General found it easy, in seeking to magnify his difficulties, to report a pure invention, in saying that Winslow, whose command "occupied a position a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and to be permitted to carry his brigade to the rear."

General Sturgis was not at the position referred to, nor any nearer than the Brice house, which was half a mile to the rear. The position of the brigade was directly in front of the enemy's centre, and was held for about three hours against three distinct and persistent assaults. Nor did the brigade retire even when it was relieved by infantry sent by the General for that purpose, but, as has been already told, it remained and assisted Colonel McMillen in holding the line until ordered back a second time by Sturgis himself.

But, not content with this invention, the unhappy General adds the gratuitous insult that he "feared

¹ His report, 11 Rebellion Record, p. 162, and "The Other Side," a defense printed and circulated by Gen. Sturgis in 1882.

Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority," and therefore "directed him, if he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads."¹ There was not the least occasion for any such apprehension, as every man who was at the front can declare, nor did the brigade ever leave its position until it gave place to McMillen's infantry, which came up without having been asked for unless by Grierson.

All of Winslow's communication had been with Grierson, and he had not sent any report or request to Sturgis during the action, except when he sent Sergeant Porter to ask for further orders, in view of the attack which had just then been made upon McMillen's infantry. Winslow had had no personal communication with Sturgis; indeed, at that time, he had never met him. Grierson was his immediate superior officer, and his reports had been made to and his orders received from Grierson only.

Colonel McMillen, who commanded all the infantry, and who is spoken of with great praise by General Sturgis, says² that when he came up to relieve the cavalry, he found Winslow with his brigade formed across the Guntown road, to the right of the position of Waring; that the brigade was in good condition; that while the infantry was taking the place of the cavalry the enemy made a determined attack, and that Winslow then refused to retire, although ordered to do so, but remained and formed his brigade in a new line in support of the infantry; that afterward, when a peremptory order to withdraw was received, the

¹ No such order was received, and it is difficult to believe that it was sent or even thought of at the time referred to. At that time probably no one had thought of being "overpowered."

² Report of Adjt.-Genl. of Iowa for 1865, p. 133.

cavalry brigade moved off in good order; and that Winslow certainly manifested no disposition to withdraw hastily, but, on the contrary, volunteered to remain after the attack just referred to was made, until a second time ordered to retire.

Colonel Noble, commanding the Third Iowa in the engagement, was all the time at the front with his men, and was much of the time personally with Winslow. No one can doubt Colonel Noble's gallantry, his reputation resting upon three years of incessant campaigning and many battles. He says¹ that Winslow was always at his post in the battle, actively on duty and encouraging a stout resistance; that after the infantry relieved the line, he voluntarily threw the brigade into line again under a hot fire, and himself shared the danger; that it is astonishing that he could be spoken of as "clamorous for relief"; that there was less of "clamor" about him than about any man he had ever seen in the field; and that the General's "fear" that the position of the brigade might be abandoned was peculiar to the General, since nobody who knew Winslow could share it.

Major Williams, of the Tenth Missouri, then Acting Assistant-Adjutant-General of the brigade, was near General Sturgis when the dismounted men of the Third and Fourth Iowa were passing by on their way to their horses, after their line was occupied by the infantry. He says² he heard Sturgis speak impatiently of the delay there had been in bringing back the cavalry, and that he seemed displeased because it was not already remounted.

All the men of the Third and Fourth Iowa who were there knew that they were thrown into line of

¹ Report of Adj't.-Genl. of Iowa for 1865, p. 127.

² The same, p. 130.

battle again, under the fire of a third attack, after they had been relieved by the infantry ; and Sergeant Porter, before referred to, says ¹ that when this new line was ordered, he was sent back by Colonel Winslow to General Sturgis with a report of the situation and of the disposition of the brigade in support of the infantry, and with the statement that it would be so held until further orders were received ; and that General Sturgis at once sent him to the front with an order to Winslow to return his men and mount them without delay.

Major Pierce, commanding the Fourth Iowa, has declared ² that when the attack was made upon Colonel McMillen's infantry he met Winslow near the line the cavalry had just vacated ; that Winslow said to him that it was very improper to withdraw the brigade when the enemy were pressing so hard ; and that he (Pierce) was then ordered to form his regiment again in the rear of the infantry and hold the line until further orders.

Finally, General Sturgis himself says, in effect, in another part of his report, that it was at the request of General Gricerson that he authorized the withdrawal of the cavalry, and that his purpose in withdrawing it was to have it ready to operate on the flanks, mounted.

But one falsehood and one ungenerous insinuation against the officers and men who saved him and his army are not enough, in the view of this general, to draw criticism away from his own failure. He is capable of another and yet more reckless charge, conveying another base imputation upon the courage of the brigade and its commander. He refers to the defeat and rout

¹ The same, p. 134.

² The same, p. 129.

of his infantry and to the wild confusion caused among them and the wagons and artillery jammed in the road, saying: "No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass, as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, who never halted till he reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear."

It is difficult to control one's indignation under this atrocious accusation. By the context of the General's report, it is seen that the time when this flight occurred was after five o'clock, and that he (Sturgis) was then some distance west of the Tishomingo. The infantry lines were broken at about three o'clock, and at four o'clock there certainly were no Union troops, except prisoners, east of that creek. From this it is seen that the disgraceful flight referred to by General Sturgis began three miles or more west of the creek. The report, with disingenuous art, seeks to make it appear that the panic did not occur until that place was reached. It must be supposed, from his reports, that he wishes it believed that up to that point there was an orderly retreat. It is the only view to be taken if the statements in his report are true.

Every man who was there that day must deny this. The panic occurred east of the creek, and the flight of the infantry was in full progress long before it reached the place to which the report must refer. The lines were broken at and near the cross-roads, and when the defeated infantry reached the bridge it was only as a mob, excepting the small though faithful remnants who so nobly stood by McMillen and Wilkin in their repeated heroic attempts to make a stand against the victorious enemy. General Sturgis' purpose in withdrawing the

cavalry from the centre, as he himself says, was to use it on the flanks ; and when, in his presence and with his assent, Grierson ordered Winslow's brigade to the west of the creek, to form there in the fields, as has been stated, there was no other thought but that it was to be used on the one flank or the other, as occasion might require. There was no expectation at that time of the final defeat and rout. The fighting lines in front were not then in sight, and none of the infantry who had gone forward had yet come back. Indeed, at that time infantry and artillery were still going forward, crossing the bridge and moving up to the cross-roads, and many wagons and ambulances were yet to cross the creek in the same direction. The Third Iowa was, in fact, delayed in recrossing the bridge, under the order last spoken of, by the men and teams still pressing toward the front in such numbers as to fill the road and block the bridge. But before the bridge was wholly cleared of the movement forward, the panic struck the infantry, and the rush of men and teams back to the bridge was begun. Many of those yet moving forward simply turned in their tracks and ran the other way. The collision of the two streams east of the bridge produced the utmost confusion. The enemy got the range, and dropped shells there and among the wagons, parked on the east side of the creek, with such accuracy as to increase the disorder frightfully. It became impossible for the Fourth Iowa to recross the bridge, as ordered, even if Major Pierce or the regiment had been willing to do it in such an emergency ; and the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois detachments of the brigade were still on that side of the creek, faithfully doing their duty

with McMillen. The regiment, on returning to its horses from the line of battle in front, was mounted and formed, squadron front, on or very near the spot where it had first dismounted before noon. Here it was when the broken infantry appeared at the cross-roads, hurrying in disorder toward the bridge; and here it stood, without an order from any superior officer, while the routed troops streamed by in almost total disorder, and until nearly all were past except the gallant few who were still fighting and falling back under McMillen and Wilkin. It was then so near the enemy that the shot and shell which struck about the bridge and the wagon-park flew over it without harm. It was then that, without any order, and on his own judgment, Major Pierce again dismounted the regiment and seized the low hill, as already described, sending the horses toward the bridge, to be crossed when possible. And there, almost alone, the regiment held back the tide of the exultant rebels until the last of the infantry and its horses, with those of the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois detachments, had got over the creek. Unless there were some stragglers and small groups of footmen overlooked in the smoke and confusion and necessary haste of the movement, the Fourth Iowa was the last of the army to recross that fatal creek, and therefore the last to leave that disastrous battle-field.

Some civilian, not known to the writer, who says he was "an eye witness," in a published account of this battle,¹ says that "the Fourth Iowa, in rear of the Second cavalry brigade, had not yet crossed their horses over the crowded bridge . . . when they

¹ 11 Moore's Rebellion Record, p. 172.

were dismounted and formed upon the crest of the hill on the eastern bank of the creek. Here, with their carbines, under a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, they fought for thirty minutes, covering the retirement of their horses and saving the fragments of two infantry regiments threatened with complete annihilation or capture by the victorious rebels."

When the Fourth reached the position of the Third Iowa, that regiment was formed, waiting orders. There were no orders for the brigade. No attention had been given it, even when Sturgis went by the Third in position. The whole army was seen to be routed and in flight. There was no rear-guard, unless Winslow's brigade be said to be a volunteer rear-guard. It was not possible that the thousand men of these two regiments could successfully resist the whole of Forrest's army, though they would certainly have tried it if ordered. There was simply nothing to be done but to follow the retreating army. If they did wrong in that, as the General's stricture clearly implies, then their duty was to fight the rebels, many times their own number, with the short-range weapons of cavalry, alone and without orders, and without even a hope of any support. If this was their duty, the General ought at least to have told them so, since the idea could never of itself have come into the head of any man not a Sturgis. The simpler idea of duty under which the regiments did act was, that in such an emergency they must maintain order and organization, keep near the army and within reach of orders, fight if attacked, and save themselves if possible with credit.

When they had followed the retreat a few miles, the rebels again got guns near enough to shell the road.

The brigade was then faced about, formed in column of squadrons, the Third Iowa being by that movement in front. The stragglers of the infantry and a number of slow or unfortunate teams had fallen to the rear. These now passed by, and no moving thing could be seen between the head of the brigade column and the rebel front. It was when this position was taken that Winslow rode forward to ask the General for orders, as already related. He was not in front of the retreating column, as that false report, in effect, declares; but the General himself was at least a mile ahead of the brigade in the retreat. It was at this meeting that he expressed his relief to hear that there was yet a body of troops intact in his army, and asked Winslow whether he could get ahead of the flying column and stop it, to make a stand.

Colonel McMillen's statement is,¹ that a short time before dark Winslow reported to Sturgis in person, and was by him directed to proceed with his brigade as rapidly as possible to Stubbs', and halt every man there.

Winslow says² that, at the meeting referred to, Sturgis proposed that he should proceed at once to Ripley, and try to check the retreat of the army; that he (Winslow) asked if Stubbs' would not do, and that Sturgis answered that it would do admirably. Stubbs' was then only a few miles ahead, while Ripley was nearly twenty.

Major Williams, Acting Assistant-Adjutant-General, says³ that Winslow told him that evening, that he had just seen Sturgis, had been ordered by him to get

¹ Report of Adj.-Gen. of Iowa for 1865, p. 133.

² The same, p. 122.

³ The same, p. 131.

ahead of the retreating troops and stop them at a good position, and that he (Sturgis) had said that Stubbs' would do admirably.

And Major Williams adds that, when he had seen the Third Iowa reach the assigned position west of the creek, he went back toward the cross-roads, to hasten the Fourth Iowa, which, for some reason he did not know, had not followed the Third; that when he came to the bridge he found the horses of the Fourth Iowa and the Tenth Missouri in a field south of the road, under a brisk artillery fire; that wagons were then passing both ways, some toward the front and some to the rear; that that was the first intimation he had that the infantry had been driven back; that farther on he found Major Pierce with the Fourth Iowa, dismounted; that later, when the brigade was formed in column of squadrons (that is, when it was in the rear of the retreating army, west of the creek), it was all the time under a heavy artillery fire, "the shell bursting among and all around us," and that the ambulances, artillery, and most of the infantry were then in advance of the head of Winslow's column, that is, ahead in the retreat. As the retreating army must have occupied several miles of the road, a brigade which was immediately under the enemy's artillery fire could not have been at the head of the retreat, "leading the panic-stricken mass."

In the face of statements like these, made by honorable soldiers who have proved their courage and won success on many battle-fields, how base and fatuous appears the invention of General Sturgis. It is astonishing that a man could say so foolishly wicked a thing, foolish because there was not even the color of

truth in it, and the contrary could be easily proved, and wicked because it was a false and disgraceful charge against the men of that brigade who had not only done their duty as well as any troops in the army, and much better than most, but had actually saved him and his army from complete destruction.

It is true that afterward, but before the General's report of the campaign was written, several of the brigade commanders wrote letters in aid of an effort to exculpate him and relieve him from the stigma of disaster; but they did it at his request, and not one of them ventured, by a single word, to criticise or reflect upon the conduct of any officer or man of the cavalry. And it must not be imagined to be more than a just completion of a true record when it is added, that the reason why there was no letter from Winslow among those written for the General in mistaken kindness, was that he declined to write one, although the General personally requested him to do so.

The regiment was now quiet in camp, excepting picketing and fatigue duty, for about ten days, the men humiliated and resentful in thinking of the defeat of their army and of the service they had rendered, not merely without reward, but without recognition. Some of their comrades of the campaign were now in loathsome Southern prisons, others dead on the field, others lying in hospital, to die or find themselves maimed for life,—the only compensation of any, so far as then appeared, being that in their general's official report their services and their sacrifices were ignored, and their courage and faithfulness basely denied.

But nothing could save General Sturgis from the just consequence of his gross failure. He was relieved

of command, and was never again in any important employment during the war, while the officer he had so basely maligned was steadily advanced in command and fame, and the brigade he had so grossly neglected and abused pursued a career of unbroken successes so brilliant that within six months after the disaster two highly distinguished generals¹ were sharply contending for the honor of having it in one of their divisions.

General Sherman, on hearing of the disaster, immediately ordered that another campaign be made against Forrest under that fine old soldier, General A. J. Smith. Smith had just arrived from Louisiana, with two divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps. He proceeded immediately to organize and equip an army, a work requiring some time under the conditions then existing at Memphis. At the end of June he was ready to move. He made the headquarters of the movement at Saulsbury and Lagrange, towns in Tennessee about fifty miles southeast of Memphis, near the Mississippi line, on either side of Grand Junction, where the Mississippi Central Railroad crossed the Memphis & Charleston. The Mississippi Central could be used in the campaign at least as far as Holly Springs.

General Smith's army was composed of about ten thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, with the usual proportion of artillery. The infantry was in two divisions, under General "Joe" Mower and Colonel Moore, and one brigade (Colored) under Colonel Bouton. Colonels McMillen and Wilkin, who had commands under Sturgis at Brice's Cross-roads, were both out in command of brigades on the present campaign; and,

¹ Dana and Upton.

unhappily, the brave Wilkin was killed. The cavalry represented two brigades, the First, commanded by Colonel Kargé, and the Second, by Colonel Winslow, General Grierson again commanding the division. Winslow's brigade was still composed of the Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri, with a detachment of the Seventh Illinois, and Captain Joyce's two guns; and on this campaign it reported about thirteen hundred men. The Fourth Iowa furnished six hundred and sixty-nine men and officers, marching under Major Pierce, though Lieutenant-Colonel Peters joined a few days later and took command. On the 7th of July, Coon's brigade of cavalry, including the Second Iowa, was added to the division from Lagrange.

On the 24th of June the regiment mounted with its brigade at Memphis, and set out for Saulsbury. There was a halt at Moscow for two or three days. On the 28th the brigade reached Saulsbury. Here, while the infantry was assembling and the final preparations were being made, the cavalry did but little for a week, except that two companies of the Third Iowa had a sharp encounter with a body of rebel cavalry on the Ripley road, in which they gained high credit, a good omen of the success of the campaign to come.

Now occurred an event which was of the greatest value in increasing the effectiveness of the regiment. On the 4th of July, at Saulsbury, the Spencer carbine was received and supplied to all the companies, forty to each company. The surplus Union and Sharp's carbines were turned in. The very poor and inefficient armament of the regiment has already been spoken of. It is hard to believe, since the war, that it was seriously expected of cavalry that they would

do good service in the field with the antiquated and clumsy weapons given them during the first two years.

The Spencer was a rifled "magazine" gun, carrying six metallic cartridges in a tube in the stock. One more cartridge could be kept in position in the barrel. Looking at it now, it seems clumsy and heavy, and, compared with the inventions of later years, it cannot be classed very high. It did not work as rapidly and correctly as later guns do, and there was the peculiar danger of the bursting of the stock by the explosion of a cartridge, caused when the pointed bullet of one cartridge struck too hard upon the cap of the one lying before it in the tube. In the shock of riding or other rapid motion this sometimes occurred, and men were killed or dreadfully wounded by such explosions. But to have a carbine of better range and more certain shot than any other gun they knew, from which seven shots could be fired without loss of time, and without taking the attention off the enemy, was of striking value in heightening the self-confidence and improving the *morale* of the cavalry. From that time on to the end of the war Winslow's regiments not only clearly won in every contest, but they *expected* to win, and even acquired a sort of habit of looking upon every approaching fight as "a sure thing." And there was a corresponding disheartenment on the part of the rebel cavalry. They had gained a high reputation for the skill and distance of their rifle-shooting, and they had a good many of the breech-loading carbines formerly used by the Union cavalry. But they never got any number of Spencers worth speaking of; and, from the time of the fighting on this campaign, they showed a distinct unwillingness to meet their enemies. The story

was popular in the Union camps when the breech-loading magazine arms were introduced, that the rebels were saying that the Yankees had now made a gun that they loaded on Sundays and fired all the week.

On the 5th of July the army marched from Saulsbury and Lagrange toward Ripley, and the campaign was begun. The weather was very hot and the rain storms, though not so frequent as in June, often impeded the march by converting the roads into deep mud. On the 7th the column approached Ripley, the cavalry on the left flank. This evening the infantry met the enemy on the main road, while at the same time the cavalry, on the left, ran upon his right flank. A general skirmish followed, the enemy slowly falling back to the town. The Third and Fourth Iowa were both engaged in this affair, though without loss. In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated southward. The cavalry then moved from Ripley on the Tupelo road, while the infantry kept a southerly route, toward Pontotoc. By a long circuit, the cavalry rejoined the infantry at night, on the Pontotoc road. This was a reconnoissance in force, the head-quarters of the enemy being then at Tupelo. During this march of the cavalry the Third Iowa, under Colonel Noble, was detached and sent to Kelley's Mill, four miles farther east. Colonel Noble found the rebels posted in force to hold the ford at Kelley's, and then returned to the column. His left flank was attacked on the way back, but the rebels were repulsed with a loss of one killed and two captured, while there was no loss in the Third.

The cavalry, operating upon the flanks and as advanced guard, moved on toward Pontotoc. On the

9th the Tallahatchie was reached and crossed by the whole force. On the 10th the Fourth Iowa was in front, and ran upon the rebel cavalry. Immediately the lines were thrown out and the enemy pressed. After a sharp skirmish he fell back to the junction of that road with the main road from Ripley to Pontotoc. Here he was stubborn, and appeared to have a considerable force. The infantry came up on the Ripley road and took position, relieving the cavalry. It being late in the day the whole command went into camp. The next day the regiment had a very similar experience, and its skirmish at the crossing of Cherry Creek, near Pontotoc, became so heavy that the brigade was dismounted to fight on foot. But up to this time there was no loss in the regiment.

The force of the enemy was now pretty well known. Forrest's recent success had enabled him to fill up his ranks and improve his equipment. There were about twelve thousand infantry and cavalry, Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee in chief command.¹ This army was in very good condition and well equipped. On the 11th Lee made some attempt to hold Pontotoc, but by noon he gave it up, and the cavalry entered. The infantry was that night encamped south of the town, on the Okalona road.

¹ There were three divisions (Chalmers, Buford, and Roddey) and two brigades (Mabry and Neely) of cavalry, one division of infantry brought from Mobile for the campaign, and one brigade of militia under General Gholson, with five batteries of twenty guns. See Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," pp. 497, 499, and "Hancock's Diary, a History of the Second Tennessee Cavalry," p. 420. Both these authors admit that their forces numbered at least 9,000, but it is difficult to believe that ten or twelve brigades and five batteries, within a month after Forrest's brilliant success at Brice's Cross-roads, could have mustered only 9,000, while an examination of the Confederate official returns nearest in date (War Records, vol. 39, part 2, pp. 592, 624, 630) justifies an estimate of 12,000 effectives.

The cavalry was marched on toward Okalona, to develop the enemy's position, which was found six or eight miles below Pontotoc, well fortified. Winslow's brigade was dismounted and advanced to attack before the position was fully developed. There was sharp fighting, of which the greater share fell to the Third Iowa; but the brigade was withdrawn by Grierson, and the army again encamped. The next morning, the 12th, the column countermarched through Pontotoc, and moved off eastward, on the road to Tupelo. Two battalions of the Third Iowa were sent forward in advance, led by Colonel Noble, and the remainder of the brigade was assigned to duty as rear-guard of the army. The rebel cavalry was quickly at work in the rear, and the brigade had a very active and exciting day. At one time it was so serious that the rear brigade of the infantry (Colonel Bouton's Colored men) was held back to assist. The battalion of the Third Iowa left with the Fourth was, through a misunderstanding as to its position, cut off by a rapid movement of the enemy; and distinguished itself by charging directly through the rebel lines to regain its place. The two battalions in front were often engaged in skirmishing, but they constantly advanced. The enemy left a number of dead on the field in this fighting, but the Third suffered no loss.

Harrisburg, three miles west of Tupelo, was reached that night, and the next morning Tupelo was occupied. Winslow's brigade moved in front into Tupelo, and immediately set to work to destroy the railway and public property. It was soon assisted by the infantry. Meantime the heavy picket on the Harrisburg road, composed of three companies of the Third Iowa

and two (L and M) of the Fourth, was attacked by the enemy in force. The picket held its position, resisting the advance, until General Smith, having formed his lines, ordered it to retire. Five of the rebels were known to be killed in this affair, with a loss of two Iowans wounded, both in the Third. In the afternoon the enemy appeared in force in the rear and made a determined attack upon the train. The infantry guard there had a hot engagement; and at about four o'clock Winslow's brigade was ordered back to reinforce. It hurried out and immediately took part in this affair. The enemy was repulsed, and the cavalry brought the train into Tupelo at eleven in the night. Almost immediately afterward the enemy again attacked on the Pontotoc road, and Winslow's brigade was again moved out. It took position at the front, about two miles from Tupelo, and remained there in line, dismounted, all night. The rebels made repeated efforts or feints to advance, and employed their artillery steadily in throwing shell.¹ At daybreak the brigade was ordered forward for a reconnoissance in force. Colonel Winslow led, and soon developed the enemy's lines, still in position in force. A general skirmish ensued, in which all the regiments were engaged, and continued until Smith ordered Winslow to retire within the infantry lines. Then Lee and Forrest advanced in force to give battle.

Smith brought his whole army into action, keeping the cavalry on the flanks and in the rear. The assault upon the infantry divisions was met very steadily, and repulsed. It was repeated and again repulsed. The

¹ It appears, by Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," that all the fighting here mentioned on the part of the rebels was conducted by Forrest in person, with Mabry's brigade of Texans: see page 502.

rebels appeared then to grow desperate, and rushed upon the lines furiously. It was as if they had fully expected a success and were angry upon finding the undertaking so difficult. Smith's lines were forced back a little, but to no disadvantage; and again the rebels retired with heavy loss. They made two further attempts, but with no such spirit; and finally left the field. It was an excessively hot day, and for three hours, almost steadily, all of the rebels and all of Smith's infantry were engaged.

The duty of Winslow's brigade, on the right flank, was in particular to hold the Ellistown road, and prevent the use of it by the enemy. For that purpose the different regiments patrolled the country covering the road, within immediate hearing and partly in sight of the battle, but without taking a part in it directly.¹

From caution, or because of the great heat,² or for both reasons, Smith did not follow up his victory; but in the afternoon he ordered out a detachment of the cavalry to reconnoitre and discover the rebel position. This was done by the Third and Fourth Iowa. The enemy was found in position about two miles to the west of the recent battle-field; and, on the approach of the cavalry, he deployed into line and opened with artillery. After a brisk skirmish in which the Third Iowa had several men and horses wounded, the brigade was withdrawn until a suitable camping-ground was reached, where it halted for the night. All the other troops went into bivouac at the same time, and it was the general expectation that early the

¹ This battle is called "Tupelo" by the Unionists and "Harrisburg" by the Confederates.

² Many men on both sides were prostrated under the burning sun, and some died.

next day there would be either another engagement or a pursuit of the retreating rebels. But that night General Smith ordered a return to Memphis. He had achieved a substantial success, but at the cost of severe loss and weakening of his own army. The heat was intense and very debilitating; the distance to Memphis, the nearest depot, was about one hundred and fifty miles; his men were on half rations, and the animals on yet scantier forage.

Early in the morning of the 15th the column was formed for the return march, and Winslow's brigade was sent out on the Pontotoc road to reconnoitre, while the infantry divisions moved northward on the road to Old Town Creek. The brigade found the enemy in position in the woods, within a few miles of the battle-field of the 14th. The advanced regiment was deployed as skirmishers. The enemy met this movement with cavalry in equal force, but slowly retired. Unwilling to move far from the main column, and suspecting that the enemy intended an attempt to cut him off from Tupelo, Winslow, reaching a good position, decided not to proceed farther. Soon after this an order was received from General Smith to retire and take the left flank of the infantry column.

Forrest, apparently supposing that he had gained some success in this movement, rapidly advanced upon the left flank. The cavalry was held in position, and Mower's division of the infantry moved forward to meet the attack. The enemy then undertook a general charge, but, for some reason unknown (prisoners said it was the unwillingness of the troops), it came to a stop when yet several hundred yards off. There the opposing lines remained for a time, until the impetuous

Mower charged and drove back the enemy's line in disorder.

The army then resumed its march northward, but moved slowly. At the crossing of Old Town Creek, five miles from Tupelo, early in the afternoon, a fresh body of the enemy appeared in the rear, and made a determined attack with artillery. Our infantry and artillery were mostly over the creek, and Winslow's brigade was on the left flank and rear, still south of the creek. It was quickly put into position, and, the enemy advancing in force, was dismounted and brought into spirited action. All the regiments lost here in men and horses. While the fight was in progress General Mower's division of infantry came up at quick time, with a couple of batteries; and the rebels were again repulsed, and driven far beyond the field. The army then bivouacked on the Old Town Creek, but the most of Winslow's brigade was kept out all night on heavy picket posts; as indeed it had been the night before.

The march was resumed in the morning, Winslow's brigade in the rear, but there was no further fighting, except that at Ellistown the Third Iowa aided a regiment of infantry in repelling a sudden and brief attack of the enemy, the last that was made. There was no loss in the Third.

The fighting and excitement were now past, and the hardships of marching in the terrible heat, on starving rations (now reduced to less than half) and with many horses breaking down, were severely felt. The duty of the cavalry was divided between the advance and rear, but a large part of the time was spent by detachments in the search for forage. As is so often the case,

the hardship of the horses was more pitiful than that of the men. During the days of the fighting the horses had almost no food at all.

Marching by way of New Albany and Salem, moving slowly of necessity, because of the exhausting heat and the great fatigue of all in the command, in the evening of the 23d, Winslow's regiments reached their camp at Memphis, and lay down to rest with great relief and with as great satisfaction. The aggregate of the marches of the cavalry in this campaign was over four hundred miles. The losses of the Fourth Iowa were one man killed, fifteen wounded, one missing, ten horses shot, and twenty lost by other casualties.¹

It was a successful campaign, and its success was achieved over great difficulties. The army saw that there was a general at its head, and the cavalry who had been with Sturgis had a good opportunity to prove that his failure was due to mismanagement and not to the bad quality of the troops. Winslow's brigade had very promptly and successfully done all the work given to it, with comparatively little loss; and Forrest had been defeated and so severely handled that his operations in Mississippi were never afterward of any importance. From that day he had only petty successes, until his final utter rout at Selma. There was good occasion for pride; and the soreness caused by the experience with Sturgis began to disappear.

But Forrest was not yet destroyed. Within a week after his return to Memphis General Smith was half through his preparations for another campaign in Mississippi. This time the army was smaller. The infantry and artillery numbered about seven thousand, and the cavalry about five thousand.

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

The cavalry at Memphis had been, on the 25th of July, reorganized as a corps, designated the Cavalry Corps of the District of West Tennessee, and commanded by General Grierson. The fourteen regiments were thrown into two divisions, the First, commanded by General Hatch, and the Second, by Colonel Winslow. The Fourth Iowa with the Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri composed the Second Brigade of the Second Division, under Colonel Noble of the Third Iowa. The two divisions turned out about two thousand five hundred each, the Fourth Iowa contingent being about six hundred and fifty officers and men. The Fourth Iowa went out under Captain Dee, there being no field-officer then available, but, at the Tallahatchie, on the 9th of August, Lieutenant-Colonel Peters came up and took command.

The Fourth Iowa marched from Memphis on the 3d. of August, by the Pigeon Roost road, as escort to the artillery and the ammunition train. It continued in that service till Holly Springs was reached. The remainder of the cavalry left Memphis on the 5th and rode directly to Holly Springs, stopping only to bivouac. Meantime the infantry was marching by different roads, under orders to concentrate at Holly Springs. The Mississippi Central Railroad, by way of Grand Junction, was to be kept open, to forward supplies and return the sick and disabled as might be required. During the progress of the infantry to Holly Springs, on the 8th of August, Winslow's division of the cavalry (the Fourth Iowa having rejoined) was sent southward, on the Oxford road. At the Tallahatchie River, in the night, it was found that the rebel general, Chalmers, had burned the bridge and

was posted on the south bank with a brigade of cavalry. In the morning he tried to prevent the crossing by keeping up a fire upon the position of the bridge. With the aid of Joyce's guns, this was answered with such effect that the rebels were driven back from the river. They managed, however, to continue from a distance a fire sharp enough to annoy the men who were put to work on the bridge. The Fourth Iowa took part in this fight across the river, and when the new bridge was ready was the first to cross. This was before noon of the 9th. As soon as the regiment was over it was moved forward, and when the brigade was all over a determined attack was made. After some resistance the rebels gave way and rode rapidly south, to gain a new position on Hurricane Creek. Here they again occupied the south bank, supported by artillery and with Chalmers in command. Winslow's division moved to the attack in a body. While Captain Joyce maintained a rapid fire from his two guns, to cover the movement, the men dismounted, forced the passage of the stream, and charged the rebels in their position. A heavy rain had already begun, and it was now falling in torrents; but that was a difficulty greater for the enemy than for our men. The Spencer carbine could be managed well in a rain. The line never halted in the attack, and the rebels broke and retreated to Oxford. The command was mounted and marched upon Oxford, reaching there the same evening. The rebels made an effort to hold the place, but gave it up on the first advance. The division went into camp at Oxford, but was the next morning withdrawn to the Tallahatchie, and from the Tallahatchie, the next day, to Holly Springs. At Holly Springs on

the 12th, it met the infantry. For several days General Smith remained at Holly Springs, the cavalry being posted in his front and flanks, the Fourth Iowa at Lamar, nine miles northeast. On the 17th he advanced toward Oxford, directing Colonel Winslow to relieve, with detachments of his division of the cavalry, the outlying regiments of infantry at Hudsonville, Watt's Trestle, and other places, and to hold Holly Springs until the last train of cars carrying the sick and disabled and other impedimenta was on its way to Memphis. On the 18th, these duties accomplished, the division set out for Abbeville. It was now and during the remainder of the campaign commanded by Colonel Kargé, of the First brigade, Colonel Winslow being disabled by his old Mechanicsburg wound. On the next day it passed the infantry and again took the front. On the 20th it again occupied the beautiful town of Oxford, the enemy retiring before its advance without a conflict. On the 22d it was ordered to take the rear of the army on the return march to Memphis. The enemy had not yet been developed in any force. The reason of this countermarch without an important engagement is unknown to the writer, unless it was Forrest's dash upon Memphis, hereinafter described, which was made on the 21st. The cavalry was kept at some distance in the rear of the infantry on the return march, doing no service of special note. Its movement was made so leisurely that it did not reach Memphis until the 30th.

The march of the regiment on this expedition was about three hundred and fifty miles, and the roads were much of the time very heavy with mud; but

there was no material lack of food for either men or animals, and all returned in good condition, though weary enough. The return was just in time for another campaign, one of the greatest the regiment made during the war. On the very next day orders were received for a movement into Arkansas, against the famous rebel general, Sterling Price ; and at daybreak on the 2d of September all the then serviceable horses of the brigade were mounted and moving to new fields of battle.

But meantime there occurred at Memphis a military episode, dramatic and in some respects amusing, and no doubt mortifying enough to the general then in command in the city, as well as to the general then carefully seeking Forrest in Mississippi. While Smith, near Oxford, was feeling the way to a decisive engagement with Forrest, and the sanguine Washburn in Memphis was in daily expectation of news of his utter destruction, Forrest rode into Memphis at the head of two brigades of chosen troopers.

On the 18th, after ten days of manœuvring and ineffective fighting with Smith, Forrest suddenly resolved upon one of his sensational strokes. His admirers have praised it as an instance of brilliant military judgment, pointing out that the Confederate department commander and the governor of Mississippi had neglected to concentrate troops in the north of that State (as Forrest had urgently advised), that Forrest's own forces were obviously too small for a general engagement with Smith, and that Smith would certainly penetrate and ravage the State as soon as he should discover the weakness of his adversary, and drawing the conclusion that Forrest's only hope lay in some move-

ment in Smith's rear, such as would compel him to retire. But Forrest was already known to be fond of making wild dashes upon his enemy, if not erratic at least not connected with any distinct plan; and he could not have hoped to hold Memphis, except by the merest chance or luck, long enough to produce any substantial military effect. It is true that Smith did begin his countermarch to Memphis the day after Forrest's *coup*, and just after he must have had news of it, but he proceeded so slowly, spending a whole week on the way, that he could not have been under any apprehension.

Leaving Smith's front between Abbeville and Oxford, the night of the 18th, with two thousand picked men and horses from Neely's brigade of Mississippi cavalry and Bell's brigade of Tennessee cavalry, with four guns, Forrest marched west to Panola, there turned north, passing Smith's right flank, and made direct for Memphis. He left his principal division general, Chalmers, in command of the remainder of his forces, with orders to occupy Smith's attention. Riding night and day, stopping only to make rude bridges over the Hickahala and Coldwater rivers, he found himself at the Union outpost on the Hernando road just before daybreak of Sunday the 21st. He made his dispositions in the hope of capturing all the pickets without any firing, so that his men might be in the streets before their character was known; and he carefully instructed different detachments for the capture of the Union generals, the seizure of the fort and the artillery, and the release of the rebel prisoners confined in the Irving Block and other buildings. General Washburn, commanding the district, General Buckland, commanding

the post, and General Hurlbut, of the Sixteenth Corps, were specially sought, there were several thousand captured rebels in the city, and large quantities of stores and ammunition.

The weather had been very hot and sultry for several days, and during the early hours of that morning there was a thick fog. The rebels were usually overfond of yelling and shooting, and on this occasion the party charged with the duty of capturing the Union outposts quietly were unable to restrain themselves. Some of them fired at the outer post, which of course alarmed the inner post. That made a charge necessary, and the advanced rebels charged with all their customary noise. The excitement thus caused among them, with perhaps the prospect of success or plunder, turned the heads of many or the most of their column; and when they saw the camps of the Union troops they scattered among them, intent upon plunder and the capture of horses. It was only with much difficulty and delay that their officers could get enough of them together to attempt the really serious business of the raid. Then it was too late. Washburn and Hurlbut had reached Fort Pickering, and the garrison was under arms. Buckland and Dustan were among their troops, hurrying them to the various points of defense, the guards at the military prisons were strengthened, and there remained nothing of any importance that Forrest could accomplish. Indeed, his men had become so divided in attacking the different Union camps that they were compelled to fight at several places at once, without mutual support. As it was just daybreak when the attack was made, the most of the Union men were asleep or abed, and their

first intimation of danger was in the charge among their tents. Of course many were killed, wounded, or captured; but all accounts agree that in all the camps attacked the men resisted with courage and fought as well as was possible under the circumstances. In the more remote camps the men were aroused by the firing and by messengers sent in hot haste, and they turned out under orders to meet the enemy. They appear to have held together well as companies or regiments, but efforts to organize them into effective larger bodies were only partially successful, because of the haste required, the thick fog, and the confusion naturally resulting from an attack at that hour. It should be understood that the troops then at Memphis, except a few "Hundred Days" regiments¹ and the garrison at Fort Pickering, were little more than the remnants of the regiments which had gone upon the campaign with Smith. But, under the energetic efforts of Generals Buckland and Dustan, aided by Colonel Bell of the veteran Eighth Iowa Infantry, these men were moved through the city toward its southern border, and brought into some proper relation to each other. The boldest of the enemy had not advanced, or had not undertaken to remain, anywhere north of the middle of the city, and they all now fell back to the southern outskirt. Here for some time they made a stand, and there was stubborn fighting. But, as the fog lifted and the position of the enemy could be seen, movements could be made intelligently, and artillery could be used with effect. Forrest then retreated precipi-

¹ In the summer of 1864, under a special call of the President, volunteers were received and organized into new regiments, to serve one hundred days. They were to occupy posts and garrisons, and thus release experienced troops for field service.

tately to the south side of Cane Creek, above five miles from the city. From there he sent a message to Washburn, suggesting that clothing and food be sent out for his prisoners, and then moved on to the south side of the Nonconnah, a larger stream, four miles farther. Here he waited for the supplies, and upon receiving them set out rapidly again, and only halted for the night at Hernando, twenty-five miles south of Memphis. His hasty retreat is difficult to understand, as he must have known that there were not enough horses at Memphis to mount a pursuing force, and his own men and horses had just been three days and four nights on a forced march.

The immediate gain of Forrest was about two hundred prisoners, half civilians and half soldiers, but none in important positions, and about one hundred horses. The Union killed and wounded were eighty of all ranks. Forrest left behind about the same number killed and wounded and thirty captured. He had failed to reach either of the generals, his attacks on the prisons were repulsed, and he was not permitted to destroy any property; but, if the movement was the cause of Smith's return to Memphis, it was perhaps justified.

Forrest's men did not reach the camp of the Fourth Iowa, but many of the other regiments returning with Smith found their homes despoiled. That was the fortune of war, however, and everybody saw the grim humor of Forrest's audacious stroke. And the predicaments of the Union generals supplied the means for making camp jokes for an unusually long time.

Company C of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry had a conspicuous share in the fighting with Forrest. It was

detached from the regiment the first day of August, and with Company G of the Third Iowa was assigned to duty in the city under the Provost-Marshal, Colonel Geddes. Captain Beckwith was placed in command of the two companies, and they were camped in the southern part of the town, on Alabama Street. They were kept very actively employed in special scouting, making arrests, and the like, and of course sent no men on the campaign with Smith. Forrest's men passed near Beckwith's camp without seeing it, or without attacking it, but immediately afterward the colonel of an infantry regiment encamped near assumed command in that locality, and ordered the cavalry to be posted so as to hold the crossing of the Gayoso Bayou and the streets between that stream and the river. Nothing occurring there, however, and it being unknown what had occurred or was occurring in the city, Lieutenant Baker, of C, at his earnest request, was permitted to take half his company and learn what the situation was. Baker soon fell in with a detachment of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, led by Colonel Starr of that regiment, who had come in from Smith's front the evening before and was to return that morning. Finding that the rebels were on the Hernando road, Starr boldly undertook to develop their position. With his little detachment and Baker's platoon, he moved beyond the State Female College, a large brick building, the last of the town on that road. There was then a belt of woods extending across the road not far beyond this building, and the enemy's line was in the border of the wood. Starr and Baker were warned by a sharp fire, and fell back to the college building, which they used as a shelter. The rebels attacked

them there, but were driven off in confusion. Two or three times then they re-formed and made regular assaults upon the position. They even used two guns upon the building, and injured it greatly; but the cavalry obstinately held on, and with their Spencers made it a dear fight for the rebels. But Colonel Starr was mortally and Lieutenant Baker severely wounded early in the action, and several of their men fell before they gained the shelter of the college walls. Among the latter was Private Boham of Company C. Lieutenant Baker's wound permanently disabled him, and led to his death a few years later.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEFEAT OF STERLING PRICE—BATTLES OF CAVALRY ONLY—THE LAST OF THE REBELLION IN MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS.

THE operations of war are often likened to the play on a chess-board. A movement in one part of the field has its effect in another part. If you are unable to hold one position, you seek to strengthen another. If you invade your adversary's territory and fail, you must expect him soon to be ravaging your own, perhaps on distant squares.

The failure of General Banks' great "Red River Expedition" in Louisiana, in April, 1864, led to an aggressive campaign of the rebels in Missouri in October of that year, in which the Fourth Iowa, as a part of Winslow's brigade, made a splendid reputation. Hardly any campaign of the war was more picturesque than this, or more brilliant at its culmination, or more effective in its results. It is not too much to say, that all the strength gained to the cause of the rebels by their defeat of Banks in the swamps of Louisiana was dissipated a few months later by the utter overthrow of Price in a great crash of cavalry on the high prairies of the border of Missouri and Kansas.

In April, 1864, the three generals, Banks, Smith, and Steele, with over 30,000 men and a fleet of twenty

gunboats and armored steamboats, moved against Shreveport in northwest Louisiana. The capture of that place was to result in the occupation or substantial control of all Louisiana and Texas, and in strengthening the Unionizing movement in Arkansas, which was then making encouraging progress. And it was Grant's purpose, upon the fall of Shreveport, to send the successful troops against Mobile. Great preparations were made at New Orleans. Sherman went to that city for personal consultation with Banks, and sent two of his best divisions to aid him. But the campaign failed, unhappily and wholly, all the invading forces were driven back, and the position of the enemy was suddenly changed from that of hunted game to that of masters of the field. They now ruled supreme throughout Texas and all of Louisiana except the banks of the Mississippi, and in Arkansas their cavalry brigades amused themselves by raiding around Steele, cooped up in Little Rock, and attacking his outlying posts from Helena on the Mississippi to Fort Smith on the Indian border. To the people the victors were no longer the weak and hunted rebels, but the possessors and defenders of the country; and no doubt they supposed that the success of the Southern cause west of the Mississippi had been achieved. No wonder the numbers and means of the enemy were increased. Many men who had been protected by the presence of Union troops now enlisted with the rebels or were forced into their ranks under the conscription acts. Others who had been dissembling or "hiding out," unwilling to take either side, thought it safe now to join the party which appeared to have finally got the power. No wonder either that the successful

enemy should think of regaining Missouri too,—their counter-attack upon another part of the chess-board.

Among the forces aiding Generals Taylor and Kirby Smith against the Banks' movement were several divisions of infantry and cavalry in southwestern Arkansas, under Generals Price and Fagan. The most of the famous cavalry and partisan leaders of Missouri and Arkansas were then with or within control of that army, including Shelby, Marmaduke, Dobbins, Parsons, and Cabell. Price and Fagan had been operating in Arkansas, and in the enemy's plan of campaign they were kept north of Shreveport, on the border of Arkansas, to oppose the junction of Banks and Steele. Upon Steele's advance toward Shreveport they had met him in battle at Jenkins' Ferry, had defeated him and driven him back into Little Rock. They were then, practically, the masters of Arkansas, the Union troops holding little more than the three posts, Helena, Little Rock, and Fort Smith.

Missouri was the home of Price, Shelby, and Marmaduke, and of a large part of their followers. For two or three years these Missourians had been kept out of their homes. The State was in all parts infested by Secessionist emissaries and sympathizers, who were occupied in getting away the young men for the rebel army, in promoting secret societies to operate against the Unionists, and in causing disorder and crime. These miscreants would be of very great help in a rebel occupation of the State, by giving information of the disposition and movements of Union forces, pointing out places and property to be seized or plundered, and in conscriptions. And, what was more important, and no doubt the greatest temptation to Price, a man of

long political experience, his success would have an effect, perhaps a very great one, in the presidential election soon to take place. The contest between Lincoln and McClellan was pending. The South was everywhere friendly to McClellan, and placed great hopes upon his success. The occupation of Missouri would prevent a vote in that State, would increase the vote of the "Peace Men" and diminish the vote of the "War Men" in other States, and particularly in the adjoining States. Its influence might be great enough to turn the scales between the candidates. It was a scheme that must have greatly flattered the ambition of Price, who was both a soldier and a statesman. A Confederate writer has said: "Much reliance was placed, too, especially by Price and Marmaduke, upon the secret orders of the 'Knights of the Golden Circle,' or 'Golden Cross,' and upon the 'Copperheads.'"¹

The promoters of this bold campaign were so sanguine that they actually expected, not only to retake Missouri, but to hold it. The pretended governor of that State, Thomas C. Reynolds, who had never been permitted to enjoy the honors of his official position, except in a hollow and unsatisfactory manner in other States already provided with governors, was one of the schemers; and he rode with eager hopes at the head of the redeeming column, proudly insisting that the proper place for the Governor of Missouri, marching to restoration, was in the front.

Not only high hopes but virtuous resolutions filled the breasts of the leaders. They would save Missouri and drive out its vandal oppressors. It was to be "an army of occupation," as Price announced, and "not on

¹ Edwards, in "Shelby and His Men; or, The War in the West," page 378.

a raid." The people would hail their coming with joy, and gratefully bless their beneficent rule. So all the general officers, from the department commander down, and "Governor" Reynolds, joined in a chorus of proclamations and instructions, to the effect that they were undertaking a just and holy cause, that there must be no influence of personal feeling or revenge, no wanton acts of destruction or violence, nor any seizure of property except under necessity, by proper authority, and upon compensation. The division commanders accordingly issued their orders, embodying these pious resolves and warning the men that a speedy way to death would be found in any disobedience.¹

Price was singularly well fitted for the command of the enterprise. He was very popular with all classes of Missourians, including many Union men. He had been a representative in Congress from Missouri, governor of the State for several terms, and was an officer in the Mexican war. He was an excellent soldier and general, of a conservative temperament and high administrative abilities. He was held in great estimation in the rebel councils, and upon this occasion he appears

¹ This fine virtue seems to have got no further than the orders. The actual march of the invaders was as destructive as a cyclone. Neither friend nor enemy was spared. The redeemers, with faithful impartiality, robbed Secessionist and Unionist alike. They plundered and burnt houses and stores, they carried off or killed the live stock, and whatever they could not put to use they wantonly destroyed. Even their honorable guest, the "Governor," when he was at the very gates of the capital he had come to recover, complained bitterly (16 Confed. Military Reports, 464, October 10, 1864) that the plunder was so complete that he could not even get shoes for his horses; and he adds, that "the wholesale pillage of horses and mules, as of goods generally, in the vicinity of the army, has made it impossible for one to obtain anything by purchase. In fact, in an expedition designed to re-establish the rightful government of Missouri, the Governor of the State cannot even purchase a horse or a blanket, while stragglers and camp followers are enriching themselves by plundering the defenseless families of our own soldiers in the Confederate service."

to have had *carte blanche* for the forming of his army and the plan of his campaign.

As if fortune itself favored the proposed invasion, there were but small numbers of Union troops in Missouri. The department had been depleted to swell the armies of Sherman and Thomas. Rosecrans was in command, at St. Louis, with Pleasonton second, but their men were mostly militia and were scattered in small detachments, to hold posts all over the State. If concentrated they would have numbered hardly ten thousand, but if concentrated their posts would have to be abandoned, and that would be followed by great loss, expense, and trouble. There were not even two thousand men available to defend St. Louis, when that city was threatened by Price, until A. J. Smith's division of Sherman's army arrived from Cairo.

It could not have been difficult for Price to get the approval of General Kirby Smith, then commanding the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. That General, with a small force about Shreveport, could hold Louisiana and Texas for an indefinite time, while the many bands of partisan rangers who scourged Arkansas could keep the Union troops in that State closely confined to their few fortified positions.

Accordingly, in July, 1864, Price and his lieutenants with great zeal set about the organization of an army. Marmaduke, Fagan, and Shelby were to be the three division generals, and other noted rebel commanders, regular and partisan, were given the brigades. Marmaduke had the two brigades of Generals Clark and Freeman, and the two regiments of Colonels Kitchen and Wood. Fagan had the four brigades of Cabell, Dobbins, Slemmons, and McCray, and the three minor

commands of Lyle, Rogan, and Anderson. Shelby had the two brigades of Shanks and Jackman, the regiment of Coleman, and later the brigade of Tyler. The men were mostly veterans, who had been taught the lessons of war through years of incessant campaigning.

The force which marched from Arkansas was believed by the Union authorities there to be about twenty thousand men and eighteen guns, but Colonel Snead, Chief of Staff to Price, has said it was only twelve thousand men and fourteen guns. The real numbers probably lie between these reports; but by enlistments and conscriptions, and captures of arms and horses in Missouri, the force was much increased in numbers and strength. Several Confederate reports agree that a large part of their men were unarmed and remained so throughout the campaign, but the number is not stated, nor even estimated, in any report. It is probably true that Tyler's brigade of Shelby's division was unarmed, as it was picked up mostly in Missouri in the progress of the campaign, and no doubt some recruits and conscripts were received in other commands without arms. But the report of Price states that they captured in the campaign eighteen pieces of artillery, three thousand stand of small-arms, and large quantities of ordnance stores,¹ all of which must have been captured before the 20th of October and before the decisive fighting began.

It appears to have been the idea of General Washburn, then in command at Memphis, that Price ought to be met and fought before he could reach Missouri. And Grant says, in an official report,² that there was no

¹ "Southern Hist. Soc. Papers," vol. vii., p. 209.

² His general report, dated July 22, 1865: See II Rebellion Record, p. 342.

reason why he could not have been defeated by General Rosecrans (then commanding at St. Louis) before he reached Pilot Knob. If it was possible for Rosecrans to collect at St. Louis ten thousand troops from outside the State, Grant's criticism is just. Rosecrans' activity in preparation was certainly not of a kind to add anything material to his means of defense.

General A. J. Smith was on his way up the Mississippi with his division of the Sixteenth Corps, about five thousand men, under orders to join Sherman at Atlanta. At Cairo he was ordered, from Washington, to proceed to St. Louis and take charge of field operations against Price. Smith arrived at St. Louis about the 10th of September, and found his force would be less than six thousand five hundred including his own division. Rosecrans says that he (Smith) then determined not to march one or two hundred miles into Arkansas with a small column of infantry in pursuit of a larger mounted force, but to remain near St. Louis, within reach of river and railway, and await Price's movements. But if that was the plan, it is necessary to explain why Ewing was left to hold Pilot Knob with hardly a thousand men against the whole rebel army. It is difficult to see why Smith was not sent to Pilot Knob when a battle there was found to be inevitable.

In the first days of September about seven thousand troops, of whom about nineteen hundred were cavalry, were sent by General Washburn from Memphis to Little Rock. Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower was sent in command. The immediate object of this movement was, probably, not merely to forestall Price's movement, but to protect Little Rock. General

Steele expected Price to make an attempt upon that post, and he had applied to Washburn, at Memphis, for reinforcements. It was easy to see afterward that these troops ought to have been sent from Memphis to St. Louis direct. General Mower went with his infantry by boats, down the Mississippi and up the Arkansas, while the cavalry (with the exception of a detachment which accompanied the infantry) crossed the Mississippi by boats at Memphis, and marched across the country. The cavalry comprised the men who were best mounted of the two brigades of the Second Division of the Cavalry Corps of the District of West Tennessee, and was commanded by Colonel Winslow of the Fourth Iowa. There were six hundred of the First Brigade, under Colonel Kargé, and thirteen hundred of the Second (Winslow's), under Lieutenant-Colonel Duffield of the Third Iowa. The Second Brigade was still composed of the Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri. The Third Iowa was commanded by Major Jones, the Fourth Iowa by Major Pierce, and the Tenth Missouri by Major Lusk.

The Fourth Iowa crossed the river at daybreak, September 2d, on the steamboat *John D. Perry*, and the other regiments on that and other boats the same day. The weather was exceedingly hot. It had seemed nearly intolerable in the camp on the high-land at Memphis, but it was worse beyond the river in the lowland forests and gloomy swamps of eastern Arkansas. The first objective point was Clarendon, on the White River, about eighty miles west from Memphis, once a town of some note. Boats were to be sent from the Mississippi up to Clarendon, to ferry the cavalry over the White. The road lay almost wholly

in swamps, and for long distances the march was literally in mire and water. There were many bayous to cross, which were either bridged or forded with great difficulty; and it was often necessary for the men to work in the water in repairing the roads and bridges. The passage of Blackfish Lake, an enlarged bayou, was very tedious and dangerous, the only means being an old rickety flat-boat, large enough for only twenty horses. Seven men and some horses of the First Brigade were drowned through the difficulty of managing the boat. The St. Francis River was forded on Sunday, September 4th, eight miles above Madison; and in the evening of Monday the column reached Clarendon. That evening, by a boat from Memphis, came the news of the fall of Atlanta. Taken by Sherman with the armies of the Mississippi, it was to the Fourth Iowa like one of its own victories. The news flew quickly to every man, and in the roar of rejoicing there was little thought of sleep that night.

The unwholesome air and water in the marsh country through which the column had come, with the excessive sultriness, caused much severe illness among the men, so that at Clarendon, after six days' marching and wading and plunging, many were unable to go farther. These were put into hospital boats and sent to Memphis. The remainder were moved across the White River on Tuesday, by the steamboat *John D. Perry* and a little ferry-boat, the *Hamilton Belle*, and at once marched toward Little Rock. Crossing the bayou Roc Roy and bivouacking one night at Dead Man's Lake, on the 9th the column reached Brownsville, eight or ten miles from Little Rock, and went into camp. It was there to await the coming of the

infantry and to have the horses shod, a work for which time was not allowed at Memphis after the marching order was given.

The infantry arrived, by way of Devall's Bluff, on the 12th, but a movement was not begun immediately afterward, as was expected, nor until the 17th. The cause of this unfortunate delay was not known among the soldiers, but they were sure that it was much to Price's advantage and their own disadvantage. This view was justified before the campaign was a week older. Price got well started on his march while the Union army remained in camp. Colonel Trumbull, of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, who had been scouting the country with his regiment, told Winslow, on or about the 15th of September, that Price had crossed the Arkansas at Dardanelle, sixty miles above Little Rock, and was already far on his way northward, but that General Steele, still clinging to the idea that Little Rock was to be attacked, would not believe the report. Price had, in fact, crossed at Dardanelle, on or about the 10th, with the two divisions of Marmaduke and Fagan. Shelby's division was already north of the White, and was to join *en route*.

On the 17th, however, Price's movement had become undeniable, and the army marched in pursuit. The impetuous General Mower, chafing under the delay at Little Rock, pushed the column with all speed; and profanely insisted that the infantry should keep up with the cavalry. And, it appearing to be his opinion that an infantryman could wade any stream a cavalryman could ford, and that it was a mere waste of time to build bridges, his march, for a few days, almost literally stopped for nothing. By dint of much

swearing at the unhappy footmen, keeping them well wetted in the fords, and tramping far into the night, he did make them "keep up," at least once a day, during the first week of the march.

The cavalry marched at dawn of the 18th, moving very rapidly to the northeast, crossing the Little Red River near Searcy, and then the White at Maguire's Ford, a few miles above Batesville (here marching northward on the same road by which the Fourth Iowa had marched southward in May, 1862), and on the 22d came to the Black River, not far above its mouth, at a place called Elgin's Mill. The infantry had marched by another road as far as the Little Red, where the cavalry overtook and passed it. The Black River at Elgin's Mill is deep, four hundred feet wide, and has very soft banks. A bridge was absolutely necessary. There was no pontoon equipment at hand, and the engineers had considered the construction of the bridge a work of difficulty and time. It had been expected that the crossing would seriously delay the army. The cavalry reached the river early in the afternoon, when the infantry and General Mower were half a day's march behind. Winslow, with characteristic energy and without waiting for instructions, went to work. The horses were tied in the woods, and every available man was quickly employed. A large cotton-gin building and baling-press stood on the other side of the river. The large timbers of these structures were torn out, and, with others cut in the forest, were dragged to the river. The current was slow and steady. One end of one of these timbers being anchored in the bank, the other end was thrown out across the water, with guys attached. Another was

strongly lashed to its outer end, and so on until the opposite bank was reached. Several of such huge poles, thrown over the river and lying upon the water, served as string-pieces ; and the work of putting under bent supports, and of planking, was easy. Of course a report of the situation was sent back to the General, with request for instructions, but he was not heard from, nor did he arrive until in the night. Before sunrise the bridge was finished and the column was moving over. All the troops and the guns crossed on this bridge without accident before noon of the 23d.

The route now lay directly up the Black River, and was very difficult,—many swamps, many crossings of the Black and its tributaries, always by fording, and the fords sometimes deep and treacherous, the roads, where not in mire, thickly studded with stumps or filled with old corduroy work, in the worst possible condition, the forest interminable, the heat intense, the drinking-water filthy, the air miasmatic. The poor infantrymen were worked very hard in “keeping up,” but they made the whole march, to Cape Girardeau, over three hundred miles, the same as the cavalry. There was much difficulty in getting forage, and for several days the horses had very scanty allowance. The country was generally so low and swampy that there were but few plantations. By the villages of Powhatan, Pocahontas, Hog’s Eye, and Martinsburg, the cavalry at last reached the higher land of the Missouri border, and arrived at Poplar Bluffs, still on Black River, on Friday the 30th of September.

This day, in a heavy rain-storm, a party of rebel cavalry, numbering about thirty, riding southward, ran

upon the head of the column. When they recovered from their astonishment at finding themselves prisoners, they said that they had been in Price's command, but had been permitted to leave and return. They had no guards out, because they had no thought of meeting Federal troops in that region. They said that Price had already taken Pilot Knob, and was moving farther northward.

A stern chase is a long chase. Price had in fact reached Pilot Knob on the 26th, and the handful of men holding the post under that most gallant commander, General Thomas Ewing, after a rarely unequal contest lasting two days, had been compelled to evacuate. The rebels had destroyed what property was left, had appeared before St. Louis, and were now marching upon Jefferson City.

The defence of Pilot Knob was one of the most brilliant deeds of the war. General Ewing had barely one thousand men, hastily collected detachments from different commands and civilians of that region, but two entire divisions of Price's army failed to defeat him in a whole day and night of fighting, and he successfully evacuated in the face of the enemy, with all his men and movable guns, and marched to Rolla, one hundred miles, in four days, fighting incessantly two days of that time with Price's third division. For courage, coolness, skill, and success, Ewing's conduct in the emergencies of Pilot Knob has few parallels. In all the fighting he lost two hundred men, while Price left on the field more than fifteen hundred killed and wounded.

When the cavalry column reached Greenville, on the St. Francis River, about fifty miles north of the Ar-

kansas line, on the 2d day of October, orders were received to stop the direct pursuit and to proceed to St. Louis by the Mississippi.

It was a timely relief. Under the circumstances then existing there was no probability that Mower's command could do effective service in pursuit, even if in good condition, and it was in very bad condition. A month in the horrible Arkansas swamps in the most trying heat of the year, every day a day of exhausting toil, struggling through mire and water, stumbling over the wretched corduroys, patching the worst parts of the roads and dragging the clumsy wagons over them, scouring the neighboring country for the little forage it contained, drinking the vile water, getting part of the time very poor food, and seeing no good come of it all—no wonder the men were worn, weakened, discouraged, and many ill, nor that the horses and mules were in perhaps worse state. October had come and, though the days were still warm, the nights were growing cold. In the sweltering heat of the past month the men had reduced their clothing and blankets to the lightest supply possible, and more clothing and blankets must be had.

Giving up for the present all concern about Price, the march was eastward, to the river at Cape Girardeau, which was reached Wednesday night, the 5th. The sick filled the ambulances and wagons, as well as many carriages taken from the plantations along the road; many of the cavalry whose horses had died or been abandoned were afoot; everybody was more or less weary or sick. But when the boats were boarded at Cape Girardeau, on the 6th, they found grateful rest and good food; and the next day the worn soldiers

were in comfortable quarters in Benton Barracks at St. Louis. The Fourth Iowa had nearly the same quarters it had there in February, 1862.

The cavalry was kept two or three days in the barracks, getting horses and clothing, and taking rest, the infantry being meantime sent on transports up the Missouri River. On the 11th the cavalry left Benton Barracks and marched westward, by Washington, toward Jefferson City, which latter place Price had undertaken to besiege. At Washington Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen, of the Tenth Missouri, joined, and was placed in command of the brigade. He had been sent by General Washburn from Memphis for that purpose, at Winslow's request, having been absent on "Veteran" furlough when the command left Memphis. Colonel Noble, of the Third Iowa, and Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, of the Fourth, had both been detained at Memphis on special duty.

Price's force was by this time increased, by recruits among the Secessionists and by conscripts, to some twenty thousand; and he had taken horses enough to keep them well mounted. To meet him there was a force of about eleven thousand infantry and artillery under Generals A. J. Smith and Mower and about six thousand five hundred cavalry immediately under General Pleasanton. In the west, however, Curtis and Blunt were coming forward with Kansas militia.

Pleasanton's command was a provisional cavalry division, composed of the three brigades of Sanborn, Brown, and McNeil. Winslow's command was formally added at Independence on the 22d as a single brigade. The brigades of Sanborn, Brown, and McNeil were Missouri cavalry, organized for home service. There

were no guns with Winslow's brigade, but there were eight with the Missouri cavalry.

Winslow's brigade marched rapidly up the south side of the Missouri River, independently of other troops. Indeed, Smith's infantry and the Missouri cavalry were already at and beyond Jefferson City, Price having abandoned his attempt upon that place and marched to the west.

On this march the Fourth Iowa had occasion to deal with Union troops who refused to serve, the only instance of the kind known to the regiment during the war. A regiment or a brigade (it is not now remembered which) of Missouri infantry, encamped near Washington, had refused to go aboard the boats there waiting to carry them up the Missouri to fight Price. They said that the time for which they had enlisted was about to expire, and that if they should go upon this campaign they might not be released when their time was up. Their officers could not manage them, and the commander applied to Colonel Winslow for aid. The Fourth Iowa was sent. On approaching the camp, the regiment was deployed into line around three sides of it, the river being on the fourth, and closed in. The Missourians were then seen in their open camp, their arms stacked and themselves idly waiting events. Seeing themselves surrounded they became excited, and their officers again tried to persuade them to obey. The cavalry steadily closed in upon them, but did nothing else. Presently one company fell in and took arms, and the cavalry halted. Other companies followed the example, and soon all marched sullenly aboard the boats. Whether there was any more trouble from them the cavalry never heard.

Winslow's brigade continued its march, moving from daybreak till late at night every day. At Sedalia on the 20th it overtook and passed the infantry under Smith. This was the last seen of any infantry in the campaign. Smith tried one or two days more to reach the enemy; but the victory of the cavalry at the Big Blue on the 23d rendered any further efforts of the infantry unnecessary, and it was returned to St. Louis. On the same day Pleasonton ordered the cavalry to hasten forward to Independence; and the brigade reached that place on Saturday the 22d, after having marched three hundred miles in twelve days. Pleasonton was already there with the three brigades of Missouri cavalry. He immediately directed Winslow to take his brigade out to support Brown's brigade, which was then in the western border of the town, engaged with the enemy and using artillery. Earlier in the day Blunt, with a division of Kansas mounted militia, had had a severe engagement with the enemy at Independence, and had taken two of his guns and a number of prisoners.

The regiment had never been under Pleasonton before. The arrival of this brigade of veteran soldiers had been awaited with anxious impatience by him, it being his purpose to give vigorous battle as soon as it should come. Price's divisions had been fought several times, in minor and indecisive engagements, but had not been brought to a stand. On the 21st Curtis, coming from Kansas, had undertaken to stop him at Little Blue River, but had been beaten and driven back beyond the Big Blue near Kansas City.

Winslow moved his brigade at once through the town, and came upon General Brown. He was near

his guns, which were firing on the enemy's position about a mile away. His regiments were dismounted and in line, half a mile in front of the guns and quite as far from the rebel line, doing nothing. It was growing dark. Brown ordered Winslow to move his brigade forward and relieve his (Brown's) men, saying that they were out of ammunition.

The brigade took the front at once. The Third Iowa was dismounted, the Fourth was held in its rear in the road, mounted and in column of fours, while a detachment of the Tenth Missouri was sent to the left, with orders to find the enemy's right, and by rapid firing and vigorous shouting give signal for a general attack. Very quickly the ball opened, and the men of the Third rushed upon the enemy's line. It was partly concealed in a strip of woods along a small stream. It proved to be an advanced line. It was driven back quickly and with spirit upon its support. Following up this success vigorously, the Third Iowa compelled the whole rebel force to fall back and took possession of the field. The enemy here were probably only one division, the others having followed Curtis and Blunt toward Kansas City. It was now after dark, but Winslow pressed the command steadily forward until, at ten o'clock, the enemy had been driven across the Big Blue. This was at Byram's Ford, about ten miles southwest of Independence and nine south of Kansas City.

The Third Iowa should have great credit for this bold and soldierly achievement. The Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri were kept close up, ready to be used in a minute, if required; but the Third did the fighting alone and in close range. When the bank of

the river was reached the brigade rested upon its arms. While awaiting the order to attack, the Fourth Iowa, mounted and occupying the road, was for some time under fire. The enemy firing from higher ground, their balls flew over the men of the Third Iowa in front, and caused a good deal of involuntary dodging, and some pointed comments in the Fourth. Major Pierce dismounted the regiment for better protection. A few men and horses were struck, but none seriously hurt. Private John Koolbeck, of F, orderly to Colonel Winslow, was severely wounded in the left arm.

It was a watchful night. At dawn Sunday morning, the 23d, Winslow was moving to reopen the battle, when he received an order directing that Brown's brigade take the front and begin. Brown marched his men in column upon the ground, and he and Winslow were in consultation, when Pleasonton rode up and ordered Brown under arrest. Colonel Phillips was next in rank in Brown's brigade, and succeeded to the command; but Pleasonton directed Winslow to take both brigades and "conduct the fighting in front."

Winslow accordingly ordered Phillips to dismount one regiment, and move it at once to the river bank. At the same time he dismounted a part of his own brigade in support, while the Third Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Dee, which had been watching during the night, was concentrated and sent to the right, with orders to wade the stream and effect a lodgment on the other bank. Before those dispositions were completed the enemy opened, from the bushes and felled trees on the opposite side of the river and from a higher position farther back, a hot fire of small-arms and artillery. The enemy here must

have been the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke, the battle with Curtis at Westport, a few miles to the north, the same morning, having been fought by Shelby's division alone.

On our side of the stream were abrupt hills one hundred feet high. The only road to the ford descended by a long slope along the rocky face of one of these hills, against which the bullets were incessantly pattering. The stream was two hundred yards in front and south of this hill. The dismounted Missouri cavalry cautiously approached the brow of the hill and rushed down the road to the river. Then Captain Dee, with the Third Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, approaching by a deep wooded ravine on the right of the road, dashed into the stream, among the rocks and fallen trees, and after some exciting exposure, reached the other bank and held the ground. At this moment Phillips' Missouri regiment, near the river, stopped and threw themselves upon the ground. They had lost a few men, and found the rebel fire too severe. Winslow rode down the hill to the water, and again ordered them to charge across, upon the first rebel line on the other side, calling their attention to the success of Captain Dee and his men, who were already on the other side.

The Missouri men then made another effort, and got over. The rebels immediately fell back upon their second line, on the higher ground. The remainder of the Fourth was at the same time crossing the river at the ford, dismounted. The moment all were over, both the regiments were quickly moved in line across the open level fields bordering the river, to the foot of the position now occupied by the enemy.



BATTLE OF THE BIG BLUE,
OCT. 23, 1864.

- | | |
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| a. Battery planted by Pleasanton. | f. Phillips' Missouri brigade, position before final assault. |
| b. Dee's Battalion of Fourth Iowa, advancing to the attack. | g. Fourth Iowa (1st and ad battalions), position before final assault. |
| c. Dee's Battalion, position after crossing. | h, i. Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri, position before final assault. |
| d. Phillips' Missouri regiment, first position. | k. The advanced line of the rebels. |
| e. Phillips' Missouri regiment, second position. | l. Main line of the rebels. |

This position was on a plateau covered thinly with small oaks, descending to the fields just mentioned by a precipitous ledge of rocks fifteen feet high, running parallel with the river about eight hundred yards, and broken only by a few narrow rifts or gorges. Six hundred yards back of the precipitous ledge were fields, and beyond these fields west and south were large woods.

Winslow directed this movement in person, and at the same time ordered the mounted men of both brigades left on the north side of the river, to cross and be ready for action, watering their horses as they came over; and a staff-officer was sent to Pleasonton to request that a battery be placed on the bluffs on the north side, to open fire over our men upon the enemy's position. From the bluffs mentioned, the main rebel line could be seen, formed in the edge of the woods beyond the plateau already mentioned, the division of Marmaduke, supported by that of Fagan.

While these dispositions were being made, heavy firing was heard on the right in the direction of Westport, a small town a few miles south of Kansas City. Curtis and Blunt, with a large force, chiefly of Kansas militia, were engaged there with Price's left. Upon the approach of Price to Kansas, the population of that patriotic State took arms almost *en masse*, and hastened to the border to defend their State against invasion. Major-General Curtis, being then in command of the Department of Kansas and Indian Territory, directed these troops, with Major-General James G. Blunt second in command.

All being ready, Winslow ordered Phillips' brigade, which had been dismounted and on the left of the

road, to rush up the slope and across the plateau, in a charge upon the enemy's right, with the object of turning it. His own brigade was held in position on the right of the road, ready to follow up this movement. The men of Phillips' brigade, bravely led by their officers, attempted to charge, but when on the plateau and exposed to the rebel fire, they broke and fell back, and took shelter behind the bank of the river. Lieutenant Hodge of Winslow's staff gallantly attended this unsuccessful charge, and tried to rally the men. Winslow then ordered the Fourth Iowa to charge from its place on the right of the road and the Third to follow fifty yards behind, while the Tenth Missouri was directed to support these regiments, and Phillips' men to join in the general charge the moment the Fourth Iowa passed into full view.

The movement was instantly successful. The Fourth Iowa scrambled through the gorges and clambered up the rocks, re-formed hastily at the top, and dashed across the plateau with their biggest yell. They had learned that the best and safest charge is the quickest and boldest one. When they got near enough they added the ring of their Spencers to their charging cry; and Winslow had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy break and his own men disappear in the woods, closely following up their advantage. The crack of their carbines steadily decreasing in sharpness showed that the rebels were beaten. While directing this charge, and when half-way across the plateau, Winslow was severely wounded in the left leg by a rifle-ball. He had his boot pulled off, and, finding that no bones were broken, threw the leg over the pommel of his saddle and kept the field, pressing forward zealously the work so well begun.

His fine bay horse, "Bill," well known in the regiment, was wounded in the leg at the same time. He was led with the command to the Arkansas River and back to St. Louis, but only to be burned, with many other animals, on the steamboat *Maria* on the way from St. Louis to Louisville.

Winslow ordered forward the mounted part of his command, to pass the dismounted men and pursue the flying rebels. General Pleasonton, who came upon the ground at this time, approved of these movements, and sent forward also Sanborn's brigade, now united and across the river. But when Sanborn reached the front the enemy had been driven by Winslow's brigade through the woods, a mile in width, to the open prairie beyond.

While the battle was in progress, the Kansas troops, under Curtis and Blunt, had been fighting near Westport a varying battle with the rebel left wing under Shelby, but had now won, and were driving Shelby.¹ But the victory of Winslow's brigade at the river compelled Price to concentrate his forces, and turned his march into a retreat. From that time he bent all his energies upon an escape from the State with as much of his army and *matériel* as he could save. He at once turned to the south, and, directing Shelby to join him without delay, marched for Arkansas at extraordinary speed. At about one o'clock the same day, in order to cover his retreat and to protect his left, he caused a stand to be made against the advance of Sanborn's brigade, which had entered the prairie

¹ A writer in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," volume iv., page 377, treats these two battles as one. He says the "fighting extended over five or six miles in area, and at some points was furious. At times as many as forty or fifty guns were throwing shot and shell, grape and canister."

and taken the front, under orders to relieve Winslow's brigade. Sanborn came upon Shelby's own brigade, posted for the purpose mentioned, and immediately made a charge upon it; but his regiments were roughly handled by the enemy, driven back, and scattered.

Winslow's brigade having been relieved and directed to feed the horses, was turned into a cornfield by the road. The bridles were taken off, and the men were husking and feeding the corn. Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen, of the Tenth Missouri, was then in command of the brigade, Colonel Winslow being in the hands of the surgeon.

The noise of Sanborn's battle was heard, then his men were seen falling back, and then the rebels appeared in a heavy line behind them, about half a mile in front of the cornfield. The country was prairie, with intervals of cornfields and wild grass. The rebels were on higher ground, the approach to them up a long, gentle slope. When they observed another body of their enemies they halted, and turned one or more of their guns upon the cornfield where the horses were feeding. There was bridling and mounting in hot haste, the rail fences were thrown down, and almost as quickly as it can be told the brigade was ready for action. Colonel Benteen in the finest spirit, at once ordered an advance. *Forward!* rang from a score of bugles; he rushed the brigade into column of companies, his own regiment in front, and led in a gallop directly at the enemy's line. The rebels turned all their artillery upon the column, but the fire was too high, and no time was allowed for depressing the guns. Within a minute or two, artil-

lery would be of no use. They saw it, and poured in their small-arms with desperate speed. The air was black with smoke, the earth trembled with the rush of that solid column of a thousand horses. There was no sound from the men but the hoarse screaming of the bugles. Not a shot was fired, not a shout heard. They rode as one man, steadily, with fixed faces, without check or waver, sweeping upon their enemy like fate. An officer on General Blunt's staff, Captain Roe, who witnessed this charge from a distance, has, with a soldier's zeal, declared it the finest scene he ever saw. Within two minutes the head of the column was within short range. Benteen ordered, *On the left into line!* and the bugles sounded, *Charge!* The enemy stood no longer, but broke and fled in the utmost precipitation. The brigade pursued four miles, until the rebels gained the cover of a range of low wooded bluffs behind a rocky creek, near Little Santa Fé.

The enemy's loss was reported at fifty killed and wounded and about one hundred captured. The only loss in Benteen's brigade was in the Tenth Missouri, one man killed and one wounded.

General Curtis now appeared, with Blunt and the Kansas troops. Being superior in rank to Pleasonton, he took command of the united forces. He ordered the troops into bivouac, and did not renew the pursuit until nearly noon the next day.

Winslow, having had his wound dressed, was put in an ambulance which followed the army until dark, when he reported to Curtis and Pleasonton. They congratulated him upon the brilliant victory, and said there was no expectation of again overtaking and bringing Price to a stand. Pleasonton then directed

him to go to St. Louis for the purpose of attention to his wound and to his general health, which had been poor for some time. Upon his reaching St. Louis, General Rosecrans gave him a month's leave of absence.

Meantime the enemy had had fifteen or twenty hours in which to get ahead, and he improved the time. The country was all open prairie, without fences; and Price, to move the faster and keep his men well in hand, marched in four columns side by side. A wide smooth swath was made in the prairie grass by the tread of his many thousand horses.

Curtis' column started at about eleven o'clock of the 24th, the Kansas troops in front. The line of march lay nearly south, along the State line between Missouri and Kansas. The rebels fired the prairie to impede the pursuit, but as they had themselves in marching beaten the grass flat, the fire would not burn enough for the purpose. The pursuit was very rapid until midnight, and then slower, the enemy being felt as the Osage River (here and above called the Marais des Cygnes) was approached at the Trading-Post. At about two o'clock in the morning, at the end of a continuous march of over sixty miles, the men were halted and allowed to lie down; but it was very dark, no fires could be lighted, the rain began to fall, and it was very uncomfortable. Shortly before daybreak the order to mount was quietly given. Winslow's (now Benteen's) brigade was moved out a little in advance of the place of halting, and formed in line of battle across the road and through cornfields on either side of it. It was raining steadily and the darkness was dense. Orders were given in low tones, and the line

moved slowly forward. Nothing was seen, nothing was heard but the rustling of the wet corn as it was brushed aside or broken down by the horses. Suddenly a line of flashes burst across the front, and there was a rattle of small-arms which seemed very near. But the flashes were surprisingly high in the air, and no balls were heard to whistle. Again and again a line of fire high in front, but no *z-z-zip!* of bullets. It was amazing. The Fourth Iowa, on the right, was dismounted and moved forward, up until apparently almost under the fire. Slowly came the dull light of a rainy morning. The enemy's position was at last made out. It was on a steep and rocky ridge, perhaps two hundred feet high, extending across the front, a very unexpected object to the men who for days had seen only the level stretches and gentle swells of a great prairie. Firing from this high and abrupt ridge the enemy's balls had gone so far above the heads of the Union men that they had not even been heard. The rebels had occupied the ridge to cover their crossing of the Marais des Cygnes, a work in which they had been engaged all night at a point about a mile farther south.

As soon as the position was seen, the Fourth Iowa was ordered to take it. Its line was then in the corn-field, near its border at the foot of the ridge. In a minute the men were over the fence and clambering up the hill. The rebels, seeing them coming, kept up their fire with much spirit, but there was good shelter for the assailants behind rocks, trees, and stumps, and the balls still flew too high. Before the line reached the top the enemy ceased firing and disappeared. The first men of the Fourth to get up, excited by success,

and without waiting for orders, ran across the narrow plateau which then appeared, but only to see the enemy's rear line enter a wood at the foot of the hill on the south side. It was Price's rear-guard and the last of his regiments on the north side of the Marais des Cygnes. The Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri were hurried forward mounted, moving by the road around the eastern extremity of the ridge. They could not reach the ford in time to cut off any large part of the retreating column, but they took about a hundred prisoners and a number of wagons loaded with provisions on the north bank of the river, while by firing across they compelled the rebels to abandon two field guns which they were trying to haul up the muddy bank on the south side.

In the movement upon this ridge an incident occurred which became popular in the newspapers as one of the little stories of the war. When the crest of the ridge was reached from which the rebels had just been driven, Lieutenant Sloan Keck and the writer were near each other, moving forward with the line of the regiment. The ground was covered with deep grass, and there were scattered trees and rocks. Suddenly a little cry was heard quite near at hand, like the cry of a child. In a moment it was repeated, and then, looking about, we found, lying in the grass close under a rock, a little girl, hardly more than six years old, with blue eyes and light hair, and very pretty, bare-headed, and in a "homespun" dress. She had a school-book in her hand, but "the cat had her tongue." She hung her head and was mute to all questions. It was hardly full daylight yet; she must have been there all night. It was a long distance from the road we had


last seen, there was no house in sight, and the only human beings near were the men who had just been fighting with guns across the spot where she was lying. Yet she did not appear to be much scared. She admitted, with a nod, that she could go home if she were in the road, but a man was sent with her to see her cared for at the nearest inhabited house. Afterward, on descending the hill, a school-house was seen, and it was supposed that the child had been there the day before when the rebel army appeared, and that, in trying to avoid the soldiers on her way home, she had undertaken to cross the hill and had lost herself, falling asleep when night came on.

The enemy had broken up the road through the ford, and it was only very slowly that our column could cross; but it was done at last, Benteen's brigade being the last over. On the other side the brigades were quickly formed and pushed on. The rain had ceased, the clouds had cleared away, the sun was shining brilliantly, and the air was delightfully bracing. The march was rapid, in column of companies, and the talk was that Price would be overtaken and compelled to fight before many hours. Nine miles from the crossing of the *Marais des Cygnes* and three south of the present town of Pleasanton, he was found drawn up in line of battle. This line was formed in front of Mine Creek, a tributary of the Osage, the immediate purpose being to cover the passage of Price's train across the marshy valley of that stream and to check the pursuing forces.¹ As has been learned since, there were here two divisions of the rebels, Fagan's on the right and Marmaduke's on the left. The third division, Shelby's, had crossed Mine

¹ This battle is often called *Osage*, sometimes *Mine Creek*, but the name *Marais des Cygnes* is used by both sides.

Creek and gone on in charge of the train. The line was well formed, in two ranks, with a projecting angle near the middle and a battery planted at the apex of the angle and on each wing. It ran across our road, along the foot of a low ridge or swell of the prairie, which concealed it from the view of our column while it was forming. The ground was entirely open and covered with prairie grass. Our column came on at a trot. It was making up the time lost at the ford. It overtook Phillips' brigade of the Missouri cavalry, and marched abreast of it on its left, the road separating the two brigades. As soon as the heads of the brigades appeared, the enemy opened their batteries. Phillips' brigade fell back, and was more hurt by the artillery than it would have been if it had not done so. The other brigades and Curtis' Kansas troops were yet miles away, and did not get near enough to take any part in the battle. Benteen's brigade was moving by company front, the Tenth Missouri in advance, the Fourth Iowa second, the Third Iowa third, and the small remaining contingents of the Fourth Missouri and Seventh Indiana (Kargé's Memphis brigade) in the rear. Colonel Benteen at once ordered it into column of regiments, each regiment front into line, and then ordered a charge.

Immediately the whole brigade was at the top of the slope, and the two opposing forces were in full sight of each other and within short range. In view of the numbers engaged the spectacle is probably without a parallel in the war. The rebel force was much the greater. Allowing for Shelby's absence and the losses of recent marching and fighting, there must have been seven or eight thousand on that field.



BATTLE OF THE MARAIS DES CYGNES (OR "OSAGE," OR "MINE CREEK"),
OCT. 25, 1854.

- a, a, Road (then) from Trading Post to Fort Scott.
- b, b, Present road.
- c, Widow Regan's house.
- d, Jones' house.
- e, McAuley house (then).
- f, " " (now).
- g, g, Fagan's Division.
- h, h, Marmaduke's Division.
- i, i, i, Two, four, and two guns.
- k, Benten's (Winslow's) Brigade.

- 1. Tenth Missouri.
- 2. Fourth Iowa.
- 3. Third Iowa.
- 4. Seventh Indiana and Fourth Missouri, detachments.
- l, Phillips' Brigade.
- m, m, Second position of the enemy.
- n, n, Second position of Benten's Brigade.
- p, p, Third position of the enemy, on one of the large "mounds" peculiar to the country.

They were the two divisions of Marmaduke and Fagan, directed by Marmaduke. Price had gone on with Shelby, to arrange for the capture of Fort Scott, a considerable town then only twenty miles ahead, leaving orders with Marmaduke to hold the crossing of Mine Creek. These two divisions must have numbered eight or nine thousand when they entered Missouri. They no doubt lost in the fighting on the Blue rivers, but they had also received many recruits in Missouri, no doubt many more than their actual losses up to this time. The seven or eight thousand here credited to them are much more likely below their real number on this field than above it. Benteen's brigade had in column about eleven hundred. It was certainly within one hundred of that number, greater or less. It is true that Phillips' brigade (about fifteen hundred) was near enough to support Benteen's, if it would, but the rebels had just seen it fall back ; and, in fact until the rebels were actually defeated and broken, Benteen's brigade was the only force fighting.

Colonel Benteen's order to charge was instantly obeyed. The Tenth Missouri started forward with their "yell" and their bugles sounding, but when they had covered half the distance, the enemy showing no sign of breaking, they hesitated and stopped. Their colonel urged them with great spirit, and they made spasmodic efforts to brace up, but failed. There was immediate alarm and danger that the whole brigade would be thrown into confusion. The enemy opened fire with small-arms from their horses all along their lines. Again and again Benteen ordered the charge, and many of his regiment made brave efforts to overcome the singular balk. Some got forward a little

farther, but the line could not be moved. He persisted most heroically in trying to break the unfortunate situation. He rode directly in front of his men, within pistol-shot of his enemy, hatless, white with passion, waving his sword and shouting the order to charge. His trumpeters repeated it, and all the trumpets in the column answered with the same piercing notes. Then, for a few moments, the two opposing lines of men simply stood, glaring at each other.

The situation was one of great advantage to the enemy, if seized with spirit. He ought to have charged at once and fiercely. He did make the attempt. As his orders were heard and his lines began to advance, with their charging "yell," it was a desperate position for our brigade. But there was a man in the Fourth Iowa equal to the occasion. Major Pierce, commanding the regiment and then in his place on its right, seeing he could not in line get through the confused line of the Tenth Missouri stretched along his front, with great courage and promptness resolved upon an extraordinary step. He left the right and galloped to the left of the regiment, which projected beyond the left of the line of the Tenth Missouri, perhaps as much as the length of two companies, which were therefore immediately in front of the enemy's right. He instantly ordered a charge of his own regiment, and led it himself in a dash at the enemy's right.

There is nothing like that movement taught in military science, but the Major had the good fortune to give the order just when the minds of his men were ready for it. They could all see plainly that the case was desperate, that something must be done in a moment. The companies nearest the Major (A on the

extreme left and K next) responded instantly, and having a clear front, were the first to reach the enemy. The other companies had to force their way between the men of the Tenth Missouri, and were a little later. Indeed the most of the Tenth, encouraged by the spirit of the Fourth, joined in the charge. Pierce and the men nearest him struck the enemy's line like a thunderbolt, and broke it wholly away at that point.¹ The other companies struck it in succession from left to right, and it all fell away like a row of bricks.² The Third Iowa, led by Major Jones, instantly followed the example of the Fourth, struck the enemy near his centre, where it had some stubborn fighting and suffered severely, but gained a brilliant success. The rebels were so confused and at so short range that they could not well use the muzzle-loading guns with which the most of them were armed, but they kept some of their artillery firing till the gunners were shot or captured. Phillips' brigade, seeing the success, joined in the battle, and the rebel line was routed along its entire length in a few minutes. There was no bridge and the ford was immediately choked by the crowds who tried to use it, and then each regiment plunged into the stream at the point nearest it and scrambled across. Yet not all were so ready to flee. Some commands led by braver officers, or many dauntless

¹ It is said that the Major and his adjutant, Lieutenant Sloan Keck, actually put *hors du combat* with their sabres in this crash, the former nine and the latter six of the enemy.

² A Confederate officer who was on staff duty in Fagan's division has told the writer since the war that it was Freeman's brigade that first broke, that they were "Missouri men," and that no other brigade in the army would have broken in their position. But a biographer of Shelby, who served with him in the campaign, says that Freeman was in Shelby's command, and Shelby's division was not in this battle. See "Shelby and his Men," by Edwards, page 359.

individuals, remained on the field and fought desperately hand to hand until killed or wounded or compelled to surrender. In that bend of the creek, not many acres in extent, within a few minutes, three hundred of the rebels were killed or wounded and nine hundred captured. The artillerymen seemed the most obstinate among the rebels, perhaps because they realized how small was their chance of getting their guns over the creek. In the battery at the middle angle of the line they fought at their posts against overwhelming odds until all their guns were lost, one of these guns being taken by a squad of F of the Fourth Iowa, led by Sergeant Loughridge, only after every man upon it was struck down. Marmaduke was captured trying courageously to hold his division together, and Cabell and Slemmons, the ablest of Fagan's brigadiers, who would not leave the field while any of their men remained. Five colonels and many lesser officers were also captured.

Some of the enemy who had passed the creek before the fighting began had been held in line between the creek and the Jones house. Using these as a centre Fagan tried to form upon them those who had crossed after the rout. He placed this line behind a small miry brook which crossed the road at right angles half a mile south of the creek. Benteen was already crossing his advance, there was not time for careful dispositions, and the demoralization of the defeat was still in his men. Benteen had hardly dismounted his line (because the ground was marshy and covered with thickets) and begun to move forward when Fagan's line broke. Perhaps he ordered it to retire. At any rate he moved it at once and rapidly to a hill about a mile south of

the creek and half a mile west of the Fort Scott road, which here curved to the east and upon which Price was marching some miles ahead with Shelby's division and the train. This hill was one of the "mounds" peculiar to that region. It was about two hundred feet high, quite bare of trees, of rather abrupt slopes to the north, east, and west, and descending toward the south very gradually, so as to disappear in the plain within a couple of miles. In a remarkably short time Fagan had collected and re-formed here the remainder of his and Marmaduke's divisions. But he had no guns, the half of his own division was captured or scattered, all the generals upon whom he had relied were gone, and the help he had looked for from Shelby did not come. Pleasonton led the dismounted men of Benteen's brigade up the road as far as the McAuley house, just opposite Fagan's position on the hill, and sent back to hurry up Phillips' and Sanborn's brigades. Not to lose any time, however, Benteen's men were formed along the road, in line parallel with the hill, and advanced toward it, with the view to attack as soon as support should appear. The enemy fired upon the line with small-arms at long range. Excited by this, or misunderstanding orders, the line kept advancing, as if to make a charge upon the hill. The first of the guns which Pleasonton had got over the creek was now opened upon the enemy's position. Then their lines showed signs of breaking. The first of the Missouri brigades appeared on the road, and Benteen was ordered to charge, but before his men were half-way up the slope Fagan's lines had broken and his disordered troops were all galloping off toward the Fort Scott road.

When Benteen's brigade had first appeared before their lines Marmaduke and Fagan sent a message to Price, in front of his train some miles ahead, that they were about to be attacked by three thousand of the enemy. Price says he was then preparing with Shelby for an attack upon Fort Scott, that he at once ordered Shelby to go to the rear with his (Shelby's) old brigade, and himself went back at a gallop, but that on the way he "met the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable confusion, deaf to all entreaties and command, and in vain all efforts to rally them."¹

The Missouri brigades, being already mounted, followed them by the road. The dismounted Benteen's brigade was permitted to rest until the horses came up and the scattered men were brought together in orderly form. The loss of the brigade in all the fighting was ten killed and nearly fifty wounded. In the Fourth Iowa one was killed (Lieutenant Hira W. Curtiss of F) and six were wounded.² But the enemy lost, in addition to the twelve hundred men and officers already mentioned, three battle-flags and seven guns. Of the guns the Fourth Iowa took five, of the flags two, and of the prisoners two hundred and forty. One of these two flags, taken by Sergeant George W. Miller, of H, was that of the Fourth Missouri, a famous Confederate cavalry regiment. It may still be seen in the State arsenal at Des Moines.³ Men of the Third Iowa captured the rebel generals Marmaduke (afterward Governor of Missouri) and Cabell.

¹ Price's report, in Southern Historical Society's Papers, vol. vii., p. 209.

² See Appendix: "Engagements and Casualties."

³ Sergeant Miller had the honor of being sent, in December, as a special messenger with this flag to the Adjutant-General of Iowa.

Phillips and Sanborn pursued the rebels to the crossing of the Little Osage, near old Fort Lincoln, but there Shelby had posted a brigade to cover the passage of the train. Pleasonton sent back to hurry up Benteen's brigade, but Price, having got his train well ahead, withdrew from the river and formed the whole of Shelby's division on Charlot or Marmiton Prairie, a few miles beyond it. Fagan was sent on with all the other troops, with orders to push the train over the Marmiton River, below Fort Scott, and make all speed for the shelter of the Ozark hills in Missouri.

Benteen's regiments came up to the Little Osage at a trot and there passed the Missouri brigades. Their losses of the morning, especially in horses, had thinned their numbers, and the remaining men and horses were greatly worn. They had marched a hundred miles within little more than a day, with little or no sleep, and had been fighting substantially all the morning. When the head of the column came into Charlot Prairie, there was Shelby's line in full view. Almost immediately some one gave an order to charge—a mistake, because the distance between the forces was at that moment too great, especially so in view of the condition of the horses. It was a full half mile or more. The brigade was formed into column of regiments, however, the Tenth Missouri in front, the Fourth Iowa second, and galloped directly at the rebel centre. The men probably expected an easy success over the weakened divisions they had defeated a few hours before. They did not know that they were to meet the famous fighting Shelby and a division not yet engaged. Shelby opened his guns on the charging column, and, when it was nearer, a spirited fire from small-arms. Only a few men were

struck, but the horses were doing badly, all of them slow and many half-exhausted, and the line was in very bad order. It had been impracticable to keep the jaded animals in line in so long a run, and there were practically no lines at all. The fire of the enemy added to this disorder so disconcerted the men that they hesitated and finally stopped when within only a few hundred yards of the enemy. The officers instantly set about re-forming their lines on the spot, but Major Pierce conceived the idea of moving his own regiment obliquely to the right, to give it a clear field, and did so at once, leading it thus in an independent charge against Shelby's left. The rebels broke there before they were struck, but their centre and right held on. The Fourth Iowa was then alone on Shelby's left flank, no other troops having followed it. The other regiments had remained in front of Shelby's centre, only falling back a little. Shelby, seeing the advantage, ordered an advance toward the front. The unfortunate men of Benteen's regiments heard the order sounded along the line, and saw the line begin to move upon them. Pierce, seeing that his movement was not supported, fell back to the position of the brigade, many of the men being wounded in the retreat, himself among the number. At this critical moment two howitzers, which Pleasonton had galloped up to support the charge, were opened upon the rebels. This checked them, and the fire being continued Shelby withdrew from the field, probably also because he saw more troops coming up behind the howitzers.

The Missouri brigades, led by Pleasonton, followed to the Marmiton, where they had a little fighting with Shelby's rear; but Price had got his train and the

remnants of his demoralized regiments over and night had come on. Benteen's men were left to rest, with leave to move into Fort Scott, now only a few miles, at leisure. It was twilight then, and no one cared to move another step. There was no food there in the wild prairie, but even the eight miles to Fort Scott were too much to do then. The exhausted soldiers dropped upon the frosty grass to sleep, holding their horses by the bridles.

The simple and brief story of a fine soldier of the regiment, who took part, in the ranks, in this campaign, is very eloquent: "Not many times during the war was such a call made upon the powers of men and horses as was made upon our brigade during these two days. The distance marched was one hundred and eight miles. We had but two feeds for our horses, and only twice were we able to make coffee. And when the second day's work ended, we lay down in the open prairie, horses tied to wrists, without food, without fire, cold, hungry, and very tired, after fighting almost continually from dawn till dark."

In this last engagement of the day the Fourth Iowa had none killed and only five were wounded, of whom one was Major Pierce, commanding the regiment. He received a very painful shot in the foot, from which he never entirely recovered. There was no loss in the other regiments of the brigade.

The next morning the brigade, very greatly fatigued, moved slowly on to Fort Scott, and remained there resting that day. General Blunt, with his Kansas troops, took the advance; but Price's retreat had now become a desperate flight. After his defeat on the 25th he never stopped marching till he reached Car-

thage, Mo., over sixty miles. To hasten his march he destroyed nearly all his wagons and artillery ammunition, abandoned or killed his unserviceable animals, permitted his dismounted men to scatter and save themselves as best they could, paroled his prisoners, and devoted his whole attention to his getting away.¹ Blunt overtook him at Newtonia, beyond Carthage, where he had a fierce battle with Shelby. With the aid of Sanborn, however, who came up while the battle was still on, Blunt drove the whole of Price's remaining column in the utmost haste toward Arkansas.² After resting overnight, Benteen's brigade pushed on to join in the pursuit, but the enemy was not again overtaken; and there was no more fighting.

It was the end of October. The line of march was down the Ozark range, from Newtonia, by Granby and Cassville, to Pea Ridge, and thence through the Boston Mountains of northwest Arkansas into Indian Territory. Major Pierce's wound proved to be so severe that he could not keep the saddle, but had to turn back at Cross-Hollows. So the command of the regiment fell upon Captain Dee. The weather became very cold, snow fell often, and ice formed every night. There were no rations left for the men, except sugar and a scant allowance of coffee; and but little forage was found for the horses. A few poor cattle were picked up here and there and killed for beef, a little flour and corn-meal and quantities of apples were found, but rarely was there food enough. On the 1st of November the commissaries could get nothing but

¹ Price says he went to Carthage "for forage." See his report before cited.

² This was the last engagement of the war, of any moment, west of the Mississippi.

some flour and corn-meal. They divided that, one pint of each to each man, and no more food was issued till the 11th. Of necessity every man became an independent forager. But the country was very poor. The southwest corner of Missouri and the adjacent parts of Arkansas and Indian Territory are mountainous and rough. The tillable land is very scanty. Little valleys along the mountain streams and irregular little corners between the hills were then occupied by meagre fields. The houses were small log-cabins, isolated, with wide tracts of rocky hills between; but the people had mostly fled or concealed themselves on the approach of troops. The hungry soldiers searched every house, taking up the floor, prying through the loft, sometimes finding a little meal or a piece of pork, or hurried about the small fields in the hope of gleaning a few ears of corn. There was but scanty reward for themselves and less for their horses. In the evening of the 2d there was a severe storm of rain and snow with high winds. No one could sleep or keep dry. On the 3d it snowed all day, and grew very cold at night. On the 5th, Cane Hill, Arkansas, was passed and the "Cherokee Nation" (the Indian Territory) entered. No more white settlements were seen. The weather continued stormy, snowing or raining most of the days and freezing every night. When Webers' Falls was reached, on the Arkansas River, near Tablequah, the Indian capital, on the 7th, Price's remnant of troops had crossed.

It was utterly impossible to follow farther. The pursuing cavalry was in a wilderness, in snow and ice, without food or forage, and, as the march was begun in mild weather, without sufficient clothing. The

horses were worn out, and many of the men were already on foot. The suffering soldiers lay down that night on the bank of the river, wet, cold, hungry, and exceedingly weary. Another snow fell in the night, and was everywhere deep in the morning. The horses could not get even the dry standing grass they had been eating the day before. The men had no bread or meat, and coffee and sugar were now measured like gold.

It was the 8th day of November, and the day of the Presidential election. A vote was called for. In spite of their hardships, and of the certainty of further suffering before food or comfort could be had, the men promptly responded. The Fourth Iowa Veterans were unanimous for "Lincoln and the vigorous prosecution of the War."¹

The poor remainder of Price's rebels were permitted to go their further way unmolested. Some remained in the Indian Territory, finding they were not pursued; others halted on the Arkansas border; while a faithful few held on with Price, who never stopped till he reached Laynesport, in Arkansas, on the Louisiana border, where he remained with a small command, inactive, till the end of the war.

Winslow's brigade had already been ordered to Nashville, to join the army of General Thomas, then about to engage in the great contest with Hood. When the vote was completed that morning, it set out for St. Louis. The distance was about five hundred miles, only one fifth of which, at the eastern end, could be covered by rail. The long march was made by new roads where practicable, in the hope of finding

¹ The cry of the War party in the political campaign of that year.

food for men and horses. For seven days together the men were without any bread, and five days together the horses had no food except the coarse grass they could pick where it was high enough to stand above the snow. On the 9th a small quantity of corn was found for the horses, and on the 11th there was a good supply. On the 14th, at Prairie Grove, in Arkansas, the column was met by a train sent to its relief from Fort Scott, carrying bread and coffee, and the same evening a flock of sheep, which by some means had escaped both armies, fell into the hands of the starving men. At last they were no longer hungry. They fared badly enough during the week following, but had at least coffee and bread. After a march of extraordinary toil and suffering, from over-fatigue, the severe cold, insufficient clothing, and the bad condition of the horses, the brigade reached Rolla on the 27th. There were delays in getting cars, and the men were not all in St. Louis until the 30th. There the brigade was quartered at once in Benton Barracks, the Fourth Iowa in nearly the same buildings it had occupied in February, 1862.

The value of this campaign hardly needs to be stated. The disastrous defeats of the enemy in the last week of October tell the story; and the ruin of his political scheme was even more hopeless. Price's twenty thousand had melted to nearly nothing.¹ He had no army worth mentioning after that, nor does he again appear in the record of the war in any affair of consequence. No campaign was attempted by the rebels west of the

¹ Rosecrans says that "on rebel authority Price lost 18,000 to 19,000 men" in this campaign. A division staff-officer of Price's army has assured the writer that they crossed the Arkansas River "a mere handful of men, with two guns."

Mississippi after his overthrow. Our cavalry had achieved a series of brilliant victories, and was full of confidence and spirit for future campaigns. It had fought five battles in rapid succession, without rest in the intervals, and with unbroken success. And it had lost in men only twenty-two killed and mortally wounded and ninety-three otherwise wounded. The number of horses lost is not known, but it must have been nearly as great as the number with which the campaign was begun. At least a thousand, perhaps two thousand, were taken from the enemy.

But the marches and hardships were as striking as the battles. Within about twelve weeks Winslow's brigade had marched nearly two thousand miles, the first weeks in most oppressing heat, and the last four in snow and ice, many days being bitterly cold.¹ The last three weeks of the time the men had but scanty rations, one week almost none, there being two days literally without food. Many of the horses had been broken down and abandoned, and on the return march their owners had to walk. Of course in a campaign so long and active army clothing would go to pieces. Many of the men had not enough left to keep them warm. On the ice and frozen ground their cheap army boots gave out, and a large number of them were not only dismounted but nearly barefoot. Many were hatless, all were ragged and shivering. All the remaining horses were greatly jaded, many permanently injured, and none were able to move with speed. At the end of the march there were not one hundred

¹ Diaries written at the time show that, of the twenty-seven days marched in November, on twenty-five there was snow or ice and frozen ground, and that at least one day (when it happened that a thermometer was seen) the temperature was at zero.

horses in the whole brigade able to carry their owners. From Tahlequah to Rolla, four hundred miles, in bitter weather, without shelter, without sufficient food, that shabby and weary column painfully dragged itself along. Twenty days and nights it took, though every man burned with desire to reach the end. Whether friend or enemy, who could have looked upon those poor fellows without a swelling heart?

But it was not only the soldiers who thought well of this campaign. General Pleasonton issued the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
FORT SCOTT, KANSAS, Oct. 26, 1864.

General Orders }
No. 6. }

The Major-General commanding this division composed of troops from the Department of the Missouri and Winslow's brigade of cavalry, congratulates the officers and men upon the brilliant success which has crowned their untiring efforts in this decisive campaign.

The battles of Independence, Big Blue and of the Osage River have resulted in the capture of Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, four colonels and nearly 1,000 prisoners, including a large number of field-officers, several thousand stand of arms, the destruction of a large portion of the enemy's train and the routing of their army. The gallant action of Phillips' brigade of Missouri cavalry and Winslow's brigade in capturing eight of the enemy's guns on the Osage was so distinguished as to draw praise from the enemy.

The night fighting of Colonel Winslow on the Big Blue deserves the highest commendation.

By command of Major-General PLEASONTON,
CLIFFORD THOMPSON,
A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
WARRENSBURG, MISSOURI, Nov. 3, 1864.

General Orders }
No. 11. }

Winslow's brigade of cavalry being about to leave for another department, the Major-General commanding takes this occasion, not only to express his regrets at separating from such glorious troops, but also to recall more especially than was done in General Orders No. 6 from these Headquarters, the splendid manner in which this brigade fought at the Osage, capturing five pieces of artillery from the enemy, with a large number of prisoners, and carrying by a daring charge the most conspicuous and important position on that brilliant field.

By command of Major-General PLEASANTON,
CLIFFORD THOMPSON,
A. A. A. G.

And General Rosecrans, commanding the department, issued a long congratulatory order, reciting the circumstances and steps of the campaign, a part of which is here given :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
ST. LOUIS, Mo., December 8, 1864.

General Orders }
No. 220. }

I. The reports of the commanders of troops in the late campaign against Price furnish a record so brilliant, of arduous service and gallant fighting, that the Commanding General deems it a duty to express to the officers and men of his command his admiration of their behavior, and to congratulate them and their fellow-citizens upon the results.

VI. On the 8th of October, when General Pleasanton assumed command at Jefferson City, he sent General San-

born, with all his mounted force, to follow the rebel track and harass them until our remaining cavalry could join and the infantry supports come up. . . . Pursuing their retreat westward and keeping them between you and the Missouri River, you waited the arrival of Winslow's command, 1,500 strong, which had followed the enemy from Arkansas, and when, on the 19th it joined, forming the Provisional Cavalry Division of 6,500 men under Gen. Pleasonton, you moved on the foe, overtook and gave them the first taste of your sabres on the 22d at Independence, where you routed Fagan and captured two of his guns. On the 23d you passed the Big Blue and fought them from seven in the morning till one, routing their main force and throwing them beyond Little Santa Fé. On the 24th, at midnight, after marching some sixty miles, with little water and less food for men or horses, you again overtook them at the Marais des Cygnes, routed them with loss; and thence you pursued them to the Little Osage Crossing (Mine Creek) where two advanced brigades, under Benteen and Phillips, charged two rebel divisions, routed them, captured eight pieces of artillery and near one thousand prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. Sanborn's brigade again led in pursuit, overtook them and made two more brilliant charges,¹ driving everything before it across the Marmiton, whence the enemy fled, under cover of the night toward the Arkansas. . . .

VII. The substantial results of this brilliant series of operations are, that the enemy having entered the State with a mounted force of veteran troops estimated at from 15,000 to 26,000 and eighteen pieces of artillery, with vast expectations of revolutionizing the State, destroying Kansas and operating on the Presidential election, after having

¹ This is an error. It was Benteen's (Winslow's) brigade that "led in pursuit," overtook and again charged the enemy, and again drove them from the field over the Marmiton; if Sanborn's brigade was there, it was left in the rear as described on page 326. It was Blunt, with his Kansas cavalry, who directly pursued from the Marmiton to Newtonia, and there fought and won a battle before Sanborn came up. See Rosecrans' official report, Moore's "Rebellion Record," vol. xi., p. 510, in which this claim is not made.

added to his force 6,000 Missourians, has been defeated in all his schemes, his mischief confined to the narrow belt of country over which he passed; and, routed by you in four engagements, he has lost ten pieces of artillery, a large number of small arms, nearly all his trains and plunder, and besides his killed, wounded and deserters, 1,958 prisoners whom we have now in possession, the enemy's forces at their recrossing the Arkansas being reduced by demoralization, desertion and losses, to less than 5,000, but partially armed and mounted, with three pieces of artillery. All this has been accomplished by less than 7,000 cavalry,¹ most of whom never before saw a great battle; and your entire loss in killed, wounded and missing, is only 346 officers and men.

The records of this war furnish no more brilliant or decisive results.

VIII. To Maj.-Gen. Pleasonton and his officers and soldiers of the Provisional Cavalry Division, by whom this work was wrought, the General Commanding tenders his thanks for their gallantry and efficiency in the campaign, and congratulates them on having acquired the true spirit of cavalry service.

IX. A department order will announce the regiments entitled and the names of the engagements they are to inscribe on their banners.

By command of Maj.-Gen. ROSECRANS,
FRANK ENO, A. A. G.

In his account of the campaign ² Rosecrans somewhat modifies some of the numbers in this order. By that

¹ This ignores the Kansas troops, under Blunt and Curtis, who numbered as many more, and whose separate fighting at Independence, Westport, and Newtonia, certainly did much toward the success of the campaign.

² Rosecrans' Campaigns, in the "Report of the Committee on the Conduct of War for 1865," vol. iii., pp. 55 and 117. See also his official report of operation in "Rebellion Record," vol. xi., p. 510.

report it appears that Price's troops were "variously estimated at from 15,000 to 26,000, reinforced by 6,000 armed recruits from Missouri," that "on rebel authority Price lost 18,000 to 19,000 men in his great raid, as well as 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,958 prisoners, and a large number of horses, mules, wagons, ambulances," and that the Union loss was 681 officers and men, of whom 174 were killed, 336 wounded, and 171 missing.

The "estimate" of Price's forces is certainly too high. From all reports and accounts it cannot be believed that his army when he entered Missouri exceeded 14,000 men and 16 guns. Colonel Snead, of Price's staff, has said¹ that Price had only 12,000 men and 14 guns at that time. And he says that only 8,000 of the men were armed; but in the many Confederate reports and accounts which have been preserved the unarmed men are never mentioned in any number more than one brigade. In fact, after many unarmed recruits were added in Missouri, all the unarmed men were formed into a single brigade, which was commanded by a Colonel Charles H. Tyler; and the Confederate brigade was comparatively small, usually numbering only ten or twelve hundred, rarely as many as two thousand. In Price's report, however, it appears that he captured small-arms at the different towns and posts occupied by his troops *en route* in Missouri, to an aggregate of three thousand, as well as some field guns.² But he collected recruits in Missouri,

¹ "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," vol. iv., p. 375.

² Price says he took 18 pieces of artillery, but 16 were those left in the works at Pilot Knob by Ewing, which were probably too heavy or too much damaged to be of use to Price. Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, vol. vii., p. 209.

both volunteers and conscripts,¹ at least six thousand, some of whom probably were unarmed. On the whole, it is reasonable to believe that when he reached the Little Blue, where the attacks upon him began, he had 20,000 men, of whom 2,000 were unarmed, and 16 guns. But his organization, or the hold of his inferior officers upon their men, must have been loose; for his army melted away like snow under the sun when once it was defeated. More than half his men must have deserted on the march after the battle at the Big Blue; and when he crossed the Arkansas, within two weeks after the Big Blue, he had 2 guns and less than 5,000 men.

¹ Colonel R. J. Hinton's "Invasion of Missouri and Kansas in 1864."

CHAPTER IX.

BETWEEN CAMPAIGNS—THE WINTER OF 1864—1865—
EXPIRATION OF THE THREE YEARS' ENLISTMENT—
ANOTHER RAID THROUGH MISSISSIPPI, IN HOOD'S
REAR—PREPARING FOR THE LAST CAMPAIGN—
SOLDIER LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT

THERE was a week of rest at St. Louis for the men of Winslow's brigade, who had returned from the Price campaign. They could not be moved to Nashville at once, for lack of means. The unprecedented ice in the river had brought great confusion and danger into the problem of transportation. Movement by steamboats was greatly delayed; and the consequent excessive over-burdening of the few Illinois railways made it impossible to transport troops promptly. But the ill-fortune of the War Department in the bad weather was the good-fortune of the poor troopers. Nearly all of them were exhausted, nervous and ill, the effects of the prolonged campaign and its extraordinary hardships. Now they had good quarters in Benton Barracks, and nothing at all to do for eight days.

The first day of that period, however, was not restful. It was marked by an incident unique in the history of the Fourth Iowa—the "Bread Riot." Coming into a post so old and well organized as Benton Barracks, the men naturally assumed that they would

immediately receive their proper rations. But the commandant, Colonel Bonneville, was an old officer of the regular army and a martinet. The cavalry was not all reported till late on the 30th, and he thought it was not yet properly within his command, and therefore not yet entitled to be supplied from the post commissariat. But, being quartered in the post, of course any commander or commissary outside would simply have referred any requisitions for rations back to Colonel Bonneville. The Colonel could not be satisfied that night. The men only knew, however, that they wanted food, and that there was "red-tape" in the way. They grumbled bitterly and justly, convinced that they needed and deserved full rations at once. Early in the morning, without waiting for the commandant to be clothed with the particular additional authority he deemed necessary, parties of the discontented slipped away from their quarters, bent upon finding food. They came upon the commissary's buildings and a large bakery where bread was made for the fortunate troops whom Colonel Bonneville acknowledged to be within his command. That was too much for them. They demanded bread of the bakers. The bakers naturally refused to issue it in that way, and prudently closed the doors and windows. The rioters laughed at that, went through the doors and windows without unfastening them, and carried off a large quantity of bread. But they took it to their quarters and shared it with their comrades, a generosity which led to the punishment of some of them.

When the commandant was informed he at once ordered the marauders under arrest, and sent a lieu-

tenant of infantry with twenty men to take them. Their comrades were in full sympathy with them, indeed they were now accessories after the fact, as lawyers say. They closed the doors of their barracks and said opprobrious things to the helpless lieutenant from the windows. After a time of heated discussion, however, the company officers deemed it their duty to open the doors and permit a search for any men who might have the bread in their possession. But the bread was now well distributed, and while the lieutenant and his guard were peering about the bunks they suffered a fusillade of loaves and pieces of bread fired from other directions, though, when their officers remonstrated, all the men stoutly denied having thrown any. This experience, together with his failure to make any arrest, spoiled the lieutenant's temper and threw the waspish colonel into a great rage. He immediately put one or two regiments of infantry under arms, and ordered them to take the rioters in the Fourth Iowa, even if to do so it was necessary to take the whole regiment. His wrath was directed especially against that regiment, because it had happened that his lieutenant's search and attempt at arrest had begun and ended in its quarters. This wild order was near causing a bloody and wholly unnecessary conflict. With amazement and hot indignation the Fourth Iowa men saw the infantry drawn up in front of their quarters. The innocent not only sympathized with the guilty, but deemed themselves now greatly wronged. Nearly all the men, filled with passion, seized their arms and cartridges, and rushed upon the parade ground in front of the infantry. A mistaken order, a false step, would have been the

signal for a terrible scene. The officers of the regiment, whose position was most difficult, because they knew their duty and yet sympathized with their men, exerted themselves to the utmost to restore order. By orders and threats, remonstrances and promises, they at last induced the men to be quiet until a conference was had with the commandant. Captain Abraham, then in command of the regiment, and other officers with him, told Colonel Bonneville plainly that they could not surrender any men under the order because they deemed it disgraceful, but that they would prefer to be arrested and cashiered themselves. The colonel, who was sobered on seeing the storm he had raised, finally agreed to leave the matter to the usual methods of arrest and court-martial, stipulating, however,—martinet to the last!—that the “insurgents” should retire to their quarters as they had been ordered to do, before the infantry was withdrawn. This last the men flatly refused to do, and the affair looked dark again, until an infantryman in the line, whose fellow-feeling may have sprung from experience, cried “Bully for the cavalry!” Instantly the cry was repeated by many of the infantry, so many that their officers either would not or could not stop it. It put the cavalrymen into good humor, and with cheers for the infantry they went back to their barracks. The infantry marched off, the trouble was over; and soon after full rations were issued.

Upon investigation, some of the men boldly admitted that they had been in the plundering party, and others were arrested upon evidence. A court-martial was convened, and, after a trial lasting several days, eight men were convicted and sentenced to terms of

imprisonment in the Jefferson City penitentiary. Three of the eight were Fourth Iowa men.

Gradually the ice was so far opened as that on the 9th of December the men and horses of the brigade were sent aboard the steamboats at St. Louis.

The Fourth Iowa was embarked on the *St. Patrick*, the horses being placed on barges lashed to the boat. But it was a very difficult and tedious passage, and while the brigade was struggling with the ice in the rivers, Thomas was fighting the great battles with Hood in which it was to have had a hand. Several days were spent in getting to Cairo, and several more lost there.

Meantime General Dana, assuming that Thomas could now spare the brigade, had renewed his efforts to have it returned to Memphis, but both Sherman and Thomas had specially ordered it to Nashville, and Upton was determined to have it in his new division in Wilson's corps. He visited the brigade on the boats at Cairo, as if it were already his, and every one who met him felt the influence of his zealous spirit and shared his desire. His persistence with the authorities carried the day, and the brigade went on to Louisville. In the very cold night of the 22d of December, and in a deep snow, the regiments were landed at Portland, just below Louisville. A march of several miles was made to and through the city, ending at a grove south of it, where a bivouac was made in the snow. The next day a camp was established near Fort McPherson and the Nashville railway, and there the brigade stayed nearly two months. The other brigade of Upton's division was also encamped there, and the place was called "Camp Upton," in compliment to the general.

That part of the brigade which had remained at Memphis had not been permitted to lie quietly in camp while their comrades were chasing Price. The number left in camp when the Price campaign was begun had been increased by men sent back, sick, wounded, and dismounted, until now in each of the three regiments there were as many at Memphis as at Louisville. Parties of rebel cavalry, both regular and guerilla, were constantly moving through those parts of Mississippi and Tennessee near Memphis, and up to the time of Hood's defeat they were very bold. It was even supposed at times that there was danger of an attack upon Memphis. There was seldom more than a small force available for its defence; and all the cavalry was kept actively at work upon reconnoitring, scouting, patrolling, and expeditionary duty in all parts of the region mentioned. Nearly every day from early in September till January found some or all of the duty men of the Fourth Iowa and the other cavalry regiments on the road, scouting or on more important expeditions. Sometimes these marches occupied four or five days, and mounted rebels were met and shots exchanged. A favorite and frequent practice of the guerilla parties was to lie in ambush and fire upon the smaller parties of Union soldiers, the miscreants instantly running away and scattering through the forests, where they were at home.

The most important movement from Memphis during this period was one made in December, through central and eastern Mississippi to Vicksburg. General Dana, then in command at Memphis, had orders to send a cavalry force to break up the Mississippi railroads again, for the purpose of cutting off communication

between Hood's army in Tennessee and the south and southwest. He accordingly directed Colonel Winslow to organize the men of his division then at Memphis into two brigades for the proposed movement, and Colonel Osband's brigade of colored cavalry was added to the force. Winslow objected to his own regiments going upon such an expedition, and referred to his orders from General Thomas to take them to Nashville. He was then impatiently awaiting the return of the men who had been in the Price campaign, expecting thereupon to join the two parts of the brigade and move to Nashville. It was finally agreed that the matter should be referred to General Halleck at Washington, whereupon Winslow and an officer of General Dana's staff went to Cairo, and each telegraphed from there direct to Halleck, stating the facts and asking for instructions. Halleck replied by telegraph, suspending the order of General Thomas for the time, and directing that Winslow take orders from General Dana, but adding that the delay in reuniting the command should be made as short as possible, and that the Memphis portion should go to Louisville immediately after the present movement.

Dana proposed to place Winslow in command, but General Grierson was then at Memphis, superior in rank, and Winslow was unwilling to take the command unless it were first offered to Grierson, but offered to go in command of a brigade. In a conference between the three, it was so arranged. Eight hundred men from the Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri regiments had horses able to march. The only full company in the Fourth Iowa was C, which, being on special duty with the provost-marshal

at Memphis, had not gone on the Price campaign. The three regiments composed the Second Brigade of the Cavalry Division of the Department of the Mississippi. There was a First Brigade, under Colonel Kargé, numbering about fifteen hundred more; so that, adding Osband's colored men, Grierson's column contained about three thousand five hundred. The Fourth Iowa was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Peters, with Major Woods second. No artillery was taken, nor any wagons, a fortunate omission, since any heavy wheels would probably have been lost in the bottomless mire such as was encountered many days. Twenty days' light rations were carried on pack-mules.

The column left Memphis the 21st of December, marched east along the Memphis & Charleston railway, thence south by Ripley, to Tupelo, Okolona, and Egypt, on the Mobile & Ohio road, thence by Houston and Bellefontaine to Winona, Vaiden, and West Station on the Mississippi Central, and thence by Lexington and Benton to Vicksburg, arriving there on the 5th of January. The main line of march was four hundred and fifty miles, but all of the command marched many miles more, large detachments being sent out to make demonstrations upon different places, and to capture and destroy property. These detachments were kept very busy. The Mobile & Ohio road was broken up in many places, from Guntown to Egypt, and the Mississippi Central from Grenada to Vaiden. The Third Iowa, under Colonel Noble, went alone from Winona to Grenada, and destroyed at the latter place large machine-shops and much other property which the rebels had constructed and accumulated there since the visit of destruction made by that regi-

ment in August, 1863. Captain Beckwith, with one hundred and twenty men of the Fourth Iowa, went south, by way of Greensboro, to Bankston, beyond the Big Black River, and destroyed large factories engaged there in making cloth and shoes for the rebel armies, with quantities of goods and materials.

There was more or less skirmishing every day, but there was no delay for fighting except at Egypt. The enemy had collected about twelve hundred men at that place, with four guns, and had constructed some defenses. General Gholson was in command. General Grierson attacked with a part of his force (not including Winslow's brigade) and after an hour's fighting, General Gholson being killed, the rebels broke and fled, leaving nearly five hundred in Grierson's hands. Many of Gholson's men had, however, refused to fight. The prisoners were mostly from one regiment, who declared that they had not fired a gun, and that they had intended to be captured. These men were chiefly "Galvanized Yankees."¹ While the engagement was in progress two trains approached from the south with reinforcements. Grierson intercepted and attacked them. The first train was immediately abandoned, captured, and destroyed; the second escaped.

Colonel Osband's Colored men, destroying the railroad below Winona, met a detachment of Wirt Adams' cavalry, and had a brisk fight, in which the rebels were reported to have lost fifty killed and wounded.

The weather and the roads were nearly all the time

¹ A colloquial description of men who had been captured or had deserted from the Union armies and who took arms with the rebels to escape prisons. Of course they had no heart in the cause, and they had learned that, as the Confederate authorities would not trust such men on the great outer lines, they were likely to have easier and safer service in the interior.

indescribably bad. Either rain or snow fell many days, and there was hard freezing many nights. The roads were almost continually in deep mud, often under ice or frozen crust, and often covered with water for long distances. Artillery or loaded wagons could not have been taken through.

The loss in Grierson's command was one hundred and twenty killed and wounded and seven missing. That of the enemy was about two hundred killed and wounded and six hundred prisoners, with five thousand stand of arms, four thousand being new English carbines on their way for Forrest's men. About eight hundred horses and mules and one thousand negroes were taken into Vicksburg. The property destroyed was many miles of railroad and telegraph, many bridges and railway trestles, fourteen locomotives, ninety-five cars, over three hundred army wagons, thirty warehouses filled with army stores, cloth and shoe factories employing five hundred hands, five hundred bales of cotton, tanneries, machine-shops, corn and hogs in large quantity. Of the wagons captured, about two hundred had been taken by Forrest from Sturgis at the battle of Brice's Cross-roads in the preceding June.

The campaign was entirely successful and of great advantage to the cause. Grierson had his usual good-fortune in evading or misleading the enemy, so as to avoid conflict with any large force. The command returned from Vicksburg by boats, but Winslow's brigade was not delayed at Memphis. It was permitted to proceed immediately, by the rivers, to Louisville, the camps and the men left at Memphis having been already moved.

Among the minor expeditions from Memphis in this period the one most serious in results was that of the 14th of December, under Captain Huff. A detail of forty-six men from A and B of the Fourth Iowa was placed under that officer, with orders to patrol the roads toward Colliersville. He had no special instructions, but he was familiar with the service and with the country through which he was to go, and he knew that there were general instructions to officers sent upon that service, requiring the exercise of the greatest care. Near White's Station, about six miles east from Memphis, he had an engagement under unusual circumstances, and suffered a disastrous defeat. He was moving eastward, toward White's, at a walk, with enclosed fields on his right. His advance-guard had not yet reported any rebels seen. Across the fields to his right, about half a mile away, he observed a body of horsemen moving in the same direction in which he was moving. He knew there was a road there which converged with his own road and joined with it a mile or two ahead, and he knew that about half-way to this junction there was an open place, without fences, where horses could easily pass from one road to the other. There were some hundreds of the unknown men—Captain Huff says four hundred. Many or all of them wore blue coats, which circumstance, together with their moving eastward, as if from Memphis, led the Captain to suppose that they were Union cavalry on a scouting expedition. He took no means to verify this supposition, and both columns moved on toward the junction of the roads.

Huff's advance-guard (a corporal and four men) had just reached the top of a small hill when they were

observed to fire a few shots and disappear down the road on the other side. Huff hastily assumed that there were rebels in front, and he hurried his men forward at a run. The stranger troops did the same, but when they reached the open space they rode across it at great speed, toward the Iowa men. Huff says he thought they meant to get his road and reach the scene of the firing before him. Instead of turning up the road, however, upon this idea, they wheeled to the left, poured a volley into the Fourth Iowa, and charged. Huff tried bravely to get his little command into position for defense, and did return the fire and kept the rebels off for a few moments; but they were too near and much too strong for him. And a portion of them quickly outflanked him. His command was broken to pieces, with a loss of three killed, eight wounded, and twenty captured, himself being among the prisoners. The remainder escaped and rode back to Memphis. A larger detachment was then sent out, which brought in the killed and a few wounded who had not been taken away, but found no enemy. Captain Huff and his fellow-prisoners were confined at Andersonville, the survivors remaining captive till the end of the war.

The rebels engaged were from the Second Missouri Cavalry, commanded by a Major Carpenter, assisted by the guerrillas of Dick Davis and Ford, notorious leaders of that region.

But Captain Huff suffered more than defeat and capture. He was dismissed from the army for his management of this affair. There was inexcusable injustice, however, in dismissing him without any trial or opportunity for defence or explanation, and while he was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, an injus-

tice which was tardily remedied by a hearing granted upon his application after the war was over; but the War Department finally, in August, 1865, revoked the dismissal and gave him an honorable discharge.

Another of the marches from Memphis is deemed worthy of note, for the unusual character of a part of it as well as a part of the captures. About the 1st of December it was reported at Memphis that the rebels had succeeded in floating down the Big Hatchie (which empties into the Mississippi about fifty miles above Memphis) and across to the Arkansas shore a large lot of arms and quinine. Lieutenant-Colonel Yorke, of the Second New Jersey Cavalry, was sent with two hundred men of his own regiment and one hundred from the Fourth Iowa, to capture the property. Captain Beckwith commanded the Fourth Iowa detachment, which consisted of Company C, under Lieutenant Dillon, and a part of D, under Lieutenant Ogg. The party took transports at Memphis in the morning, and landed in the afternoon at the place indicated. There it was learned that the report was correct, and that the arms and quinine had been hauled into the interior by ox-carts the day before. The country was the southern part of the remarkable sunken lands of the "New Madrid Earthquake" of 1812, which were transformed by that memorable catastrophe into swamps and lakes. There was no road. The carts had disappeared into the swamp westward by a blazed way, very tortuous, and heavy with mire. It was late in the day, and it was reported that there was a large body of rebels in the neighborhood. Colonel Yorke hesitated whether to march at once or wait till morning. Captain Beckwith advised

going at once, and the Colonel, having decided to do so, gave him the advance as a reward for his zeal. This was of peculiar advantage to the Fourth Iowa, because the horses at the rear of the column found the work much harder than those in front. The first hundred horses beat the spongy soil and water into deep mire, and the night was so dark that each man was compelled to follow his leader. After eight hours of such marching, at midnight, Captain Beckwith and his men reached the borders of a lake, and the trail disappeared in the water. Colonel Yorke came up after a time, with the head of the Second New Jersey, but at the end of two hours more all of that detachment had not arrived. It was supposed that the missing ones were unable to get through the swamp because of the exhaustion or miring of their horses. Captain Beckwith had carefully guarded against such losses by strict orders to his men never to halt, even for a moment.

The other side of the lake could not be seen, there was no guide, and Colonel Yorke was at a loss. After a time, however, a Fourth Iowa picket brought in two ox-carts and their drivers. They were part of the train which had carried the arms, and were on their return to the river. This showed that the rebels believed that their movement was undiscovered. One of the drivers was willing to act as guide, and, putting him in front, the column moved into the lake. It was three o'clock in the morning and very dark. The guide said the lake was two miles wide. The great trees of the dense forest which had occupied the land before its sinking were still standing, just as they were killed by the water fifty years before. Long ago

stripped of their bark and smaller branches, and bleached white by the weather, they were still erect, and filled the scene on every hand, dimly shining in the gloom, innumerable ghosts of lives suddenly cut off. The water varied from the horses' knees to their breasts. Men who ventured out of the track of the guide were sometimes caught by deep water, and thereafter moved with care. Reaching the west shore, the guide led northward a couple of miles, to the position of the rebels. It was just daybreak, and their camp was surrounded at once. There were only a few rebels there, and they surrendered after several shots, by which no one was hurt. They had concealed the valuable stores on an island in the lake, where the captors found about a thousand rifles, many revolvers, and a large quantity of quinine and other medicines. The arms were destroyed. The quinine was taken back to Memphis, but it is said that not all of it went there by the proper military channel. It was reported for weeks afterward, that there were troopers in the camps at Memphis who had quinine to sell.

The object of the expedition being gained, the cavalrymen leisurely took breakfast, and then set out for the landing on the Mississippi, the Fourth Iowa having still the post of honor, the rear of the column. The entire day was spent in the struggle through the swamps, but the command was all aboard at dark, and in camp at Memphis before morning.

Early in December, 1864, the regiment lost about two hundred and fifty officers and men by reason of the expiration of their term of service. The men originally enlisted were mustered in mostly on the 23d and 25th of November, 1861, for three years.

That time was now served out, and those who had not re-enlisted were entitled to a discharge. There were some such men in each company, nearly all of whom were men who were not eligible to re-enlist under the regulations of the War Department within the time limited. There were also some officers who preferred not to remain longer in the service, namely, Major Spearman, Quartermaster Raymond, Captain Drummond of K, Lieutenants Gilmer of G, Stamm of H, and Bereman of K. These men (except those of Companies H and L, who went a month later) were, about the 5th of December, sent to Iowa in a body, honorably discharged, the service they had promised having been fully and faithfully performed.

The men who remained were not at all disturbed or discontented upon seeing their comrades go home at the end of the term, when they might have gone themselves. No regrets of the re-enlisted were heard; on the contrary, the veterans cheerfully teased the others about their discharge until they must have been heartily sorry that they had not become veterans too. Otherwise this apparently very important point in the history of the regiment was hardly remarked by any one. The veterans, having re-enlisted before the expiration of their first term, probably felt they were already well on their way through the second; and before the end of 1864 it was generally expected that the end of the war would be reached in 1865.

The men of Winslow's brigade were hardly out of the way on Grierson's expedition into Mississippi, when their camp became a scene of busy preparation for the removal to Louisville. The dismounted and disabled men were employed several days in packing and load-

ing on steamboats the camp equipage and baggage of all, and on the 2d of January these men, with the property in their charge, arrived at Louisville.

The Grierson raiders, from Vicksburg, arrived on the 16th, with Colonel Winslow and Lieutenant-Colonel Peters. In the meantime the regiment at Louisville had been commanded by Major Pierce, who was, however, still disabled by the wound received in the Price campaign.

The whole command was at last together again, and the work of instruction and preparation for the spring campaign, already begun by General Upton, was carried on with renewed spirit. It was now known what the regiment was to do as soon as the weather would permit. In fact, on the 10th of January, Upton informed the officers of the brigade that he was ordered by Thomas to move as soon as possible to Eastport, Miss., on the Tennessee River, the rendezvous for the great cavalry campaign to be made by Wilson.

The organizing and refitting of the division for the most effective work went on with great activity. Upton, Winslow, and Alexander were untiring in their efforts, and all of the officers showed a spirit more zealous, perhaps, than at any former time. A large number of horses was required in Winslow's brigade, the recent campaigns having reduced by more than half the list of those serviceable. The arms were looked to with close care, and every private and corporal was expected to show at any time a Spencer carbine in perfect condition. Only the sergeants were now armed with revolvers, and they were not required to carry carbines. In discarding the revolvers the men were saved materially in the weight to be carried, and the

Spencer answered practically the purposes of both pistol and gun. The War Department had at last been convinced that the long, clumsy, dragoon sabre was not the best, and in December, at Memphis, the men of the regiment there received the comparatively light and effective modern cavalry sabre. It was some inches shorter, and with the scabbard considerably lighter, than the old one, and the change was so heartily approved that at Louisville the remainder of the regiment and the whole brigade were equipped with it. All other accoutrements were looked to with the same care, and much time was given to inspections, to the turning in of the less serviceable equipments, and to practice with the new. Vacancies in commissions were filled with special care, and the officers were continually instructed and put to various tests respecting their fitness for service. Able-bodied men on detached service were recalled, and their details, when necessary, were filled with men less capable of field duty.

Not much could be done at Camp Upton in out-door instruction or evolution, because the weather was almost continuously very bad. That prolonged and terrible winter (it began early in November and continued well into March) was a most serious and costly obstacle to all military operations. Nearly every day of the time spent at Louisville was marked by snow or ice, rain or thaw. When out-door drill or movement was impracticable, the most of the men had several hours a day for their own uses. At first their principal efforts were directed toward their personal comfort. To keep their quarters warm on the freezing days and to keep out the water when the thaws came, were objects which every day presented questions of lively concern. It

will be interesting to the friends of soldiers to read, that at this time, in the midst of a remarkably severe winter, these troopers were supplied with no shelter except "shelter-tents." A shelter-tent is simply a piece of stout cotton cloth (lighter than duck) four feet wide and six feet long. Each man could have one, and two men, by fastening their "tents" together at the longer side and stretching them over a ridge-pole three feet from the ground, were fairly protected from dews and light rains. But even the toughened veteran could not make himself comfortable in such quarters in a hard winter. Many devices were tried to obtain warmer shelter, but without much success until "pay-day" came. Then, with hardly a murmur, the men went to the lumber-yards of Louisville, bought boards with their own money, and with these and their shelter-tents they quickly constructed small huts, in which it was possible to get warm.

In spite of the harsh weather and the rigid requirements of duty at Camp Upton, the men were contented and happy during this interval of campaigns. They were now sure of the success of their cause. Hood had been defeated, and his forces were dissipated. It was hardly possible that Lee could withstand Grant in another campaign. Sherman had proved the weakness of the Confederate powers by marching directly through their country. Their troops in the West could not cross the Mississippi to reinforce their armies in the East. It was no longer possible to muster Confederate forces between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies strong enough to meet even the single army then in Tennessee under Thomas. It was with a certain impatience, therefore, that our men now looked

forward to an early end of the war. They were philosophers, however, and the expectation of release did not make them discontented with their present lot. There is a soldiers' philosophy sure to be acquired by veteran campaigners. By years of experience these men had learned how to make the best of their circumstances. Their life was one of hardships and dangers, but they had undertaken it voluntarily, there was no other way to gain their grand object, and the hardships and dangers they had already undergone only fitted them the better to meet those that were yet to come. Experienced soldiers, whatever their private thoughts and feelings may be, acquire a habit of treating their trials and risks, outwardly at least, in a spirit of carelessness and indifference. It is their philosophy, and it is a very real part of their lives. On the whole, they would say, it is easier and safer to do your duty and obey orders; anyhow it is better to be jolly whatever the circumstances are.

The education or development of the volunteers in the Civil War was remarkable. The soft, untried boys of 1861 became not only "veterans," but men, with the patient intelligence to grasp, and the ready courage to assume, the duties of men. Three years in the mighty school of war were equal to a lifetime in the employments of peace. In active military service man finds his most effective training. Even if the war be without any high moral purpose, the development of the manly powers in those who are in the field, directly engaged in the contest, is very great; but to endure hardships, disease, and excessive physical toil, to try again and again with patient persistence, after disappointment or failure or disaster, to overcome the obsta-

cles and resistance presented by nature and the enemy, always spurred on by a burning zeal toward an exalted object,—this indeed makes a man. Self-reliance, readiness, patience, cheerfulness, contempt for petty ills and difficulties, a just respect for the ability of adversaries, a quick discrimination between pretenders and true men, between the shirkers and the faithful, an instinctive hold upon essential things, with indifference to non-essentials,—these are among the qualities which are strongly developed and cultivated in men by life in the field.

But history is a record of results, rather than of the means by which results are achieved, and it is only a small portion of the soldier's life that gets recorded. An assault that carried a fort or was repulsed, a battle that gained or lost the control of a river or a railway, a forced march that compelled the capitulation of a city or was checked and brought to naught—in the broad view of history these do appear; but the school of the soldier, his training and development, the work of preparation which makes his success possible, is not told in books. The history of the first year of the war shows at what enormous cost campaigns are made by untrained men, and how small or uncertain are the results they are likely to achieve, while through the second, third, and fourth years there appear, steadily and in greatly increasing proportions, the vast benefits of the schooling of experience. Many battles were fought before the end of 1862, all of them with great pains and struggle in the preparations and at great cost in life and money, but only a few of them had brought any substantial success or produced any important effect in subsequent operations. In 1864

effective success had become a habit, and each campaign made the next easier to conduct and more terrible to the enemy.

The instructions given by officers and by the books of regulations and tactics, in drilling and in field-schools, were, of course, of much value in their way, but events moved so rapidly in the vast field the armies occupied, and the movements in successive campaigns were so nearly continuous, that there was little time for teaching by rules and books. Not many of the two thousand regiments of the volunteer army had the fortune of any regular or extended instruction or drill. At any rate, that was true of the war in the Mississippi valley, and especially true of the cavalry arm. The practice of separating cavalry regiments into parts, and sending the different parts upon different services, so that a whole regiment was seldom within reach of its commander for many days together, prevailed widely during the first years of the war; and it was a practice most injurious and demoralizing. Among the serious evils that followed it was the almost inevitable failure or inability of the several detachments to keep up any important amount of drill or instruction.

It was in the practical school of the necessities and emergencies of each day, therefore, that the volunteers were made soldiers. In the camp, on the march, on picket or skirmish-line, foraging or defending a foraging-train, in observing and emulating or criticising the conduct of his fellows or of the enemy, the evolution of the effective soldier from the green volunteer went on with unceasing activity and increasing speed. In camp he was every day learning better how to take care of himself, of his health, his food, his strength;

and his zeal in the care of his horse and arms became his pride, not from any vanity, but because actual experience had taught him the practical value of such care. On the march he studied to save his horse and himself from any unnecessary exertion, never flagged in watching the chances for forage, went hungry himself rather than let his horse lack corn, exercised a stoical self-control in husbanding his rations if they were scanty, and never lost sight of the object of the campaign. If he did not really know that object, he always thought he did, which is much the same thing. In the duties of the camp and bivouac, of the mess, the picket and minor guards, in the cultivation of cheerfulness and of a spirit of patience and endurance under hardships, in the dangers of the skirmish-line, fighting in the advance of a marching column or on its flank, making a dash upon some point, standing under fire, receiving an attack,—nearly all his many and varied ordinary duties go to the formation of that hardy character which at last, on the supreme occasion, makes possible the soldier's glorious deeds.

It is this daily life of the volunteer which yet awaits its historian. And the years go so fast that those who, with skilful hands, could do it far the best, those who were themselves a part of that life, will soon be mustered-out again, and for the last time.

In 1861, in a fever of wrath and impatience, the volunteers hurried into the field, without any training except very little of the crudest drilling, often without any proper organization and without any complete or effective armament, without any care for health or any economy of energies, but always free and noisy with discussion and criticism of every step of the authorities,

civil and military. In 1865, the same men had become cool, cautious, conservative, self-contained, had forgotten how to boast, and had ceased to make plans of campaign for the generals.

The average volunteer when he first went out constantly insisted upon his "rights" as a soldier. He knew every article and every privilege he was "entitled to," and he meant to have them all. He accepted everything the quartermaster had to issue, and promptly gave him to understand that he knew very well what other goods were "allowed by the regulations" and were not yet supplied. And both the quartermaster and the regulations being in his judgment deficient, he made further additions himself, by gift from home or by purchase at the nearest town or of the sutler. Many a volunteer in his first campaign was seen to struggle along with a burden like a peddler's pack, containing perhaps a "comfortable" to be added to his blanket, or a pillow, or an extra pair of boots, or books, or some product of domestic art, designed, with sanitary or gustatory view, to "regulate" the physical system or give a relish to the plain army rations. With most men one campaign was quite enough to put an end to all such foolishness; and, as to the average soldier, it may be said that, though in his first campaign he tried to see how many articles, and how much of them, he could carry, in his last he devoted all his ingenuity to choosing the fewest in number and the least in weight. The same man who in his first march carried as a matter of course an iron picket-pin weighing a couple of pounds, would, after experience, if four horse-shoe nails were ordered to each man on beginning a march, take care that not

one nail more should get into his saddle-pocket; and, though he had at first carried with his picket-pin a lariat-rope weighing several pounds, in later campaigns he had not only "lost" both pin and rope, but would cut off the surplus ends of straps and bridle-reins, to gain a little more in the reduction of his horse's load. When he first went a-soldiering he received both hat and cap, but after a little experience he was of opinion that a hat not in actual use was of no use, and the extra one had to go. And so went, piece by piece, all the extra garments provided in the beginning for a full supply and for the occasions of display contemplated by the regulations. "Sunday is just as good as any other day" was the economical view, and the clothes which the United States gave him for the serious business of marching and fighting, the United States ought to be proud to have him wear in the nonsense of parades and reviews. The shifts and devices to which he resorted to make up for any deficiency or scantiness of wardrobe were endless, and were practised cheerfully, with perennial jokes. At first every man carried a pair of blankets, and some added an extra single one. But after 1861 hardly any cavalryman carried more than a single blanket and a poncho¹ or rubber-blanket. Nearly all the men "bunked"

¹ The "poncho," of Mexican origin, was a piece of black enamelled or oiled cotton cloth, about five feet by four, worn over the shoulders by means of a slit in the middle, through which the head was thrust. It was of course worn only in rains, but at other times was useful as a protecting wrapper for blanket and overcoat. It was superseded by the "rubber-blanket," which was much better for all purposes. This was somewhat larger, but lighter and much more flexible; and, having no slit in the middle, it was not only a perfect guard against dampness when spread on the ground as a bed, but could be stretched over the sleeper as a simple tent in case of rain. It was not a blanket in the usual meaning of the word, but was made of muslin or light cotton cloth, coated on one side with rubber.

(slept) by twos, and having thus two woollen blankets and two rubber ones, nothing essential to a good bed was lacking. One rubber-blanket spread on the ground (of course it would be spread upon hay, straw, "fodder,"¹ or leaves, if either could be obtained dry), a woollen blanket upon that, the other woollen blanket over the sleepers, and the second rubber-blanket over all, was as much as any reasonable man could ask. A saddle and a pair of boot-legs made a pillow, and with a camp-fire near the feet, and no expectation of being called out for duty during the night, there was a couch for a king.

That turning out for duty in the night was one of the terrors of camp-life. There were few tempers so sweet as to be proof against the test. To be compelled to give up a warm nest, with sleep half done, and stand in the cold mists of the night, may soon put one into a chill so severe that only the sun or a good fire can remove it.

If camp-fires could not be permitted, it was usually difficult to keep warm at night. No clothing or blankets could do so much for the comfort of men lying on the ground. The thing most necessary for sleep seems to be to keep the feet warm. It was very common to see the soldiers sleep on the ground without other covering than their clothes, only taking care to have a fire kept alive near their feet. If the value of fire had been as well known in the first year of the war as it was afterward, no doubt the sickness of that year would have been much less than it was. It has been

¹ "Fodder" in the South was the leaves and tops of corn, stripped from the stalks in the fall, bound into sheaves, and stacked like hay. It was of special value in that country, where hay was scarce and costly.

remarked of soldiers that the rarest courage among them is the "courage of two o'clock in the morning." It is a fact that the belligerent spirit is at its weakest in the hours just before daylight. The reason usually suggested is, that at that time the stomach is at its farthest from food; but as good a reason, if not a better, is that when a man turns out at that time he is apt to become chilled, the circulation is slow and feeble, and the limbs do not freely respond to the will. There is another influence, too, in that peculiar fear which any man feels when he cannot *see* the enemy, or at least see the place where they are. Plenty of food in some degree prevented this chill and fear, especially coffee, and in some cases alcoholic stimulants were of value; but a fire was better than food, drink, and clothes.

Then nothing did so much to encourage cheerfulness and comradeship as the camp-fire. There was no picketing so tedious, no march so wearisome, wet, or cold, no lack of food or forage so serious, but that, when at last in camp, with fires brightly burning, the cross speeches and ugly spirits disappeared, and the trials of the day became the subjects of jokes and mutual chaffing. If there had been reverence enough among the veterans to be the basis of a new religion, their gods would have been Fire and Coffee.

For, next to fire, the one thing indispensable to the soldiers was coffee. There must have been very many who, when they enlisted, were not in the habit of drinking it, or drank it very little; but camp-life soon made it a necessity to all. The active campaigner was sure to take it as often as he could get it. No other article of either food or drink could approach it in

value in the estimation of a man who had to march or work by day or watch by night. Tea was a part of the army ration, but there was little demand for it, and commissaries in the field were seldom provided with it. Fortunately, as coffee in the berries could not easily be adulterated, and its bulk was, comparatively, not great, the army nearly always had it in fair quality and sufficient quantity. Indeed, the amount allowed by the army regulations was more than enough, and when the full ration was received the surplus was a valuable means of barter. It was a luxury to the Southerners, who were deprived of their usual supply by the blockade and their poverty. To them it was something like the visit of an angel when a Union soldier appeared with a little coffee to trade. With that coin he could buy anything, everything, he might fancy. I remember a purchase made by a comrade catering for my mess, of a large "Dutch oven," two roasting pigs, a bushel of new potatoes, and a "nigger" cook, for a pound of the delectable berry. The cook, however, the seller may have considered elusive property at that time.

The commissaries were sometimes able to issue the coffee roasted and ground, but usually it reached the men in the whole berries, and sometimes still green. Many were the devices for roasting and grinding it on the march or in bivouac. Sometimes, when there was no way at all of grinding, and either time or patience was unequal to the tedious task of crushing with the butt or muzzle of a gun or pistol, the berries were boiled whole; but that decoction was not satisfactory, being apt to be thin and weak. Of course boiling was the one method of producing the drink. In a

regular camp this was done in camp-kettles, in quantity sufficient for a mess of six or eight men or more, but on a march and in bivouac each man was provided with a small tin pail (usually made by himself from an emptied fruit can), in which he could make a quart for one or two men. This rude little kettle was seen hanging to every saddle on a march, and three or four or half a dozen times a day, if halts were made long enough, or opportunity offered, small fires were started and water set on for making coffee. If the column should move before the boiling was done, why, a soldier's blessing upon the inconsiderate commander; if while the cooling was in progress, the steaming pails would be carried along in the hand until the liquor could be drunk in the saddle. Many a time the little pots were set a-boiling in the halt that preceded an engagement, to provide a brace against the coming contest.

It was of course within the power of a commanding officer to diminish the food-supply of the soldiers, and that was often done, sometimes because the supply was limited, and sometimes in preparing for a campaign, for the purpose of reducing the impediment of a wagon-train; but very seldom was the coffee ration cut down, even though in fact the men could have got on well with three quarters of the fixed allowance.

All other articles of food belonging to the army ration failed to some extent at different times, sometimes through the exigencies of field service, sometimes by inefficient management of officers, sometimes because of bad quality. On the whole it must be said, however, considering the many great difficulties in the way of such a government as ours in supplying armies

in so wide a field of operations, that the commissary service was remarkably good. The ration described in the army regulations was good and ample, and in all camps on or near any permanent line of transportation it was usually supplied with regularity and in full.¹ The Western cavalry, however, was kept so constantly in motion, the average regiment spent so large a part of its time on the march or in bivouac, sleeping each night in some new place, that to them the ration came to mean only hard bread, meat, sugar, coffee, and salt. The other articles of the regular ration were looked upon as unsubstantial luxuries, which might be sought by the pampered fellows who lived in camps, but which were beneath the serious consideration of real soldiers. On many of the campaigns of our regiment, however, it was only necessary to carry coffee. The equivalent of the other four of the five articles named could be got in the country.

Potatoes were seldom issued to the volunteers, perhaps because enough could not be obtained in the North; but the ubiquitous cavalymen found compensation for the lack of the potato ration in issuing to themselves, from the fields and stores along their lines of march the much more desirable sweet-potatoes so generally cultivated in the South. "Desiccated vegetables" were sometimes issued by the commissaries

¹ The ration allowed the volunteers of the United States Army in the Civil War, that is, the allowance for one day, was :

To each man 12 oz. of pork or bacon, *or* 20 oz. salt or fresh beef, and 22 oz. flour or soft bread, *or* 16 oz. of hard bread, *or* 20 oz. corn-meal.

And to every 100 men 10 lbs. green coffee, *or* 8 lbs. roasted coffee, *or* 24 oz. tea, 15 lbs. sugar, 15 lbs. peas or beans, 10 lbs. rice or hominy, 4 qts. vinegar, 1 qt. molasses, 3 lbs. 12 oz. salt, 4 oz. pepper, 4 lbs. soap, 20 oz. candles, and when practicable 30 lbs. potatoes.

in lieu of potatoes, but the men did not find them palatable and did not care to receive them. They were potatoes, carrots, and other roots, shredded, mixed, dried, and pressed hard, to be cooked by boiling.

Of course some knowledge of cooking, in its ruder forms, was necessarily acquired by nearly every soldier in the field. On marches the men did not object to the simple cooking required, and very largely it was done each man for himself; but in camp it was, to most men, very irksome, because there the work required was greater, and was more disagreeable, being done for messes, from four to eight men in a mess, or sometimes for the whole company. In the first year those who found the work tolerable were usually hired by the others, for money or by release from certain other duties, to cook for all the mess. But later the camps were always filled by negroes, escaped slaves, many of whom were employed by the messes as cooks. In 1863 the War Department authorized the regular enlistment of two negroes in each company of the volunteers as "Undercooks," and from that year the rolls of many companies regularly bore the names of two undercooks each, who were paid by the United States.

The cooking utensils were camp-kettles and deep pans, all made of sheet-iron, without covers, from two to four of each to a mess. Any other utensils desired were usually bought by the men, though at posts the quartermasters sometimes supplied spoons, tin plates, and cups. On a march, however, the cavalry wanted nothing more than the little tin pail, already described, for coffee, a spoon, and a sheath-knife or large clasp-knife. Even a cup was not thought essen-

tial, as the pail could be made to answer both purposes. With these tools two men together can cook meat, coffee, and bread. Pork, ham, beef, or chicken, were broiled over the coals on sharpened sticks. When hard bread was exhausted, flour or meal could be mixed with water and salt in the little pails, and baked on a hot stone, or on the end of a stick, or in corn-husks.

The cooking by the negroes for the messes and companies must have been, usually, very bad. Probably it violated every hygienic principle, but an active out-door life develops an irresistible digestive apparatus, and in camp any critics of the cook are apt to meet with certain practical discouragements at the hands of the other members of the mess, of such a character as that one seldom dares to make a second attempt. On a march, whenever they could, the soldiers would persuade or hire the women whom they found in the houses along the way, generally black women, but sometimes white, to cook for them, thus getting much better cooking, and often much better food, than they could get in camp. The black women were invariably delighted by such an opportunity, and often refused compensation, unless it was offered in the form of coffee or salt.

Though the United States did not think of supplying towels, each man habitually carried one, and bathing was so far considered one of the necessities that when a man was suspected of neglecting the rite too long, he sometimes found himself practising it involuntarily, with the active assistance of his comrades. This assistance was not rendered merely for fun, however. The chief purpose was sometimes very serious, having rela-

tion to that other war in which soldiers are often compelled to engage, though its operations are usually concealed, against those obscure but horrid enemies of man, *Pediculus vestimenti* and *Phthirius inguinalis*. Nearly all the men kept tooth-brushes, and those who did not usually pretended that they had lost theirs, that is, they were ashamed to be thought not to use them. A few men had hair-brushes, and nearly all had combs. Those who had neither said they were superfluous, as it was easy to do without them by keeping the hair trimmed very short.

Except on long marches, the men could usually get from their quartermaster-sergeants all the clothing they wanted. The annual allowance of the regulations for clothing, in addition to the wages, was \$42 to privates and a little more to non-commissioned officers. The price of each article was fixed by the regulations, and remained the same throughout the war. If any one "drew" to an amount exceeding his fixed allowance in any year, the excess was deducted from his monthly pay, while if he drew less the difference was added to his pay. But the yearly allowance consisted of one overcoat and about two suits complete of other articles; and some men actually saved money from their clothing accounts every year after the first. These were thrifty fellows, who tried to save, who were willing to take stitches in time, and to think of the danger of scorching their clothes about the camp-fires.

The monthly pay of the volunteers the first year of the war was: To privates, \$13; to corporals, \$14; to sergeants, \$17; to first (or "orderly") sergeants, \$20; to sergeants on the non-commissioned staff, \$21; to hospital stewards, \$30. It was soon raised to \$16,

\$18, \$20, \$24, \$26, and \$36 respectively. But it was always, after 1861, paid in paper, and, because of the vast quantity of paper-money issued, the consequent scarcity of gold, and the uncertainty of the result of the contest, the value of the soldiers' pay fell off steadily, until, at the worst, it was but little more than one third of the above sums. At one time the privates were fighting for hardly \$6 a month in real values, and after 1862 they never had as much as \$8 a month. This refers not merely to the value of the paper-money, as quoted on the exchanges, but to its practical purchasing power. The necessities of life had to be paid for at the rates here mentioned; and the predicament of soldiers who had families was very hard. Those who had capital or income from property willingly sacrificed it to the support of their families while they remained in the field, but those not yet so fortunate suffered much in mind. Their army pay was far too small to support even one person in comfort, and their wives lived in constant anxieties and painful struggles, often compelled to accept the aid of "relief committees" or kind neighbors.¹ Many a soldier spent absolutely nothing for himself, but sent home his entire pay, as well as some small part of his clothing allowance, and was still the prey of distressing thoughts, knowing the then excessive cost of bread and clothes in the North. But they steadily went on fighting, and re-enlisting to continue the war. They were in dead earnest; it was not the pay they wanted; and this heroic experience

¹ The pay was not only very small, but it was received very irregularly. Nominally, it was paid every two months, but in fact, the troops in the field were seldom paid at intervals of less than four months; and the cavalry, often campaigning beyond the reach of paymasters, were occasionally compelled to wait six, and even eight, months for their little money.

must have had a great share in the development of that strength of purpose and of fighting quality, and that stoical self-repression, which in time distinguished the volunteers.

The mass of the volunteers never permitted themselves to doubt that they would succeed in putting down secession. Privations were, perhaps, irksome at first, but later they were treated with indifference or jocularly. The one thing only that was great was to beat the enemy, and the immediate, telling, means of beating him were the only things important. The chief things to be considered, according to the minds of the veterans, are tersely mentioned by Sherman, in a letter to Thomas, preparatory to the Atlanta campaign: "When we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one change of clothing, five days' bacon, twenty days' bread, and thirty days' salt, sugar, and coffee: nothing else but arms and ammunition." The one grand purpose absorbed all life, and circumstances received attention only in proportion to their value toward that purpose. First of all the soldier cared for his arms, and, if in the cavalry, his horse. Upon the effectiveness of these tools he saw that all depended. Though he seemed indifferent about his health, he was really very careful of it, having a plenty of fixed opinions as to the quality and relations of food, being suspicious and self-denying about drinking water, anxious to keep his head covered and his feet warm at night, and convinced that woollen clothing was better than cotton or linen in a hot climate. There is a true description of him of which the following is a part: "The American soldier is patient and enduring, good-natured and jolly; makes fun for his comrades, or teases them,

as he is inclined; will do anything for a bunk-mate, from washing his shirt or taking his round of duty when sick to lying for him when in difficulty with the officers; can eat raw pork on a march, but won't drink much water, says it's not healthy; gets corn for his horse, *somehow*, the first thing after a halt, his own supper next; carries his pockets full of cartridges¹; spends all day Sunday cleaning his gun; has re-enlisted and means to see the thing through; thinks army contractors and Copperheads have prolonged the war; does n't have a high opinion of officers, thinks there are lots of privates who could take their places and do a great deal better; believes Abe Lincoln is an honest man, and is doing about what is right; will vote for him, or any other man who can put down this rebellion; is willing anyhow to do his share, and hopes, when the war is over, to see Jeff Davis and the Copperheads go to destruction together."²

His greatest pride was in being able to keep cool in times of trial. Under fire he would pretend to be indifferent, ridicule the rebels for not shooting better, tease a comrade for being startled or dodging, load and fire his gun with ostentatious deliberation, and speak with contempt of his own wounds; and, whenever he got near enough the enemy to be heard, chaff them and swear at them in high spirits. A good story, illustrating these qualities, comes from Meade's army in Virginia: It was a cold morning, and the skirmish lines of Meade and Lee were very near each other, with the little stream called Mine Run flowing between. A sheep appeared and walked along the run, on the rebel

¹ That is, in addition to those in his cartridge-box.

² *U. S. Service Magazine*, vol. iii., p. 17.

side. One of the rebels shot it, and then advancing, seized the prize. Instantly he was covered by the gun of a Union vidette who had crept near, with the order—"Divide 's the word, or you 're a dead Johnny!" There was nothing to do but agree, and the sheep was skinned and divided between the two, amid the cheers of their comrades who were looking on.

It should not be supposed that the soldiers were wholly indifferent to the things they were willing to sacrifice. On the contrary, in camp or when there was no great affair on hand, they demanded everything they could get; and at the point where the quartermaster and commissary ceased to respond, they showed untiring spirit and art in many efforts to better their condition. Materials for comfort in camp and additions to the larder would suddenly appear, the source of which it was not always discreet to inquire. One of the highest encomiums upon a man in the minds of his comrades was that he was "a good forager"; and as to certain of the men, it was as if by instinct that they would discover the hiding-place of hams, catch a chicken or pig without effort, or find sweet-potatoes where others had failed.

But their skill and ingenuity were as freely supplied to the great cause. There was no need or obstacle encountered by an army, or a regiment, or a squad, but there was a man on the spot able to meet it. Every commanding general has remarked this, and probably every regiment could cite instances of inventive successes in its own experience.¹ From building a bridge

¹ Grant said, in his report of the Vicksburg campaign: "It is a striking feature of the present volunteer army, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, but that accomplished adepts can be found for the duty required in almost every regiment."

or running a steamboat to dressing a wound or "doctoring" a horse, there was no work delayed for lack of volunteers to do it. And their zeal in the work and pride in being charged with it made them reckless of exposure. Whether in water, in bitter cold, under a burning sun, or in front of the enemy, it was all one, the work would be done.

And their duties were performed, as nearly all their life was lived, in the best of spirits. It was only in "fatigue" duties that cheerfulness failed. The cavalry had to load and unload, at wharves and railway stations, a great deal of grain and hay, and the infantry had to do the same as to ammunition and general stores. These and similar duties the most of the men would shirk if they could; but there was fun in all other employments, and no end of it in the idle days of camp, when such days came.

Races and athletic games and competitions occupied a good part of the time when the camp remained long at one place. Horse-racing, though forbidden or discouraged in some cavalry camps, was encouraged or permitted in others to such an extent as to produce a demoralizing effect upon the men. Minor games and contests, and practical jokes, supplied plenty of amusement. Every company could boast two or three inveterate jokers, who were never happy except in tormenting some one of their comrades for the amusement of the others. Of course the victim had to bear the rack good-naturedly. The man who resented or resisted was lost; he was the butt of the jokers ever after. It was the least of his sufferings that he would become the subject of unending tales and jokes, often pure inventions, in which he was always put into an absurd

or ridiculous position. Even the men who really said and did foolish things did not become more famous.

The value of this latter class was probably not fully appreciated. They managed to raise the spirits of their comrades so often that their loss would have been serious. Those who were in the Fourth Iowa do not appear great when compared with those spoken of in the literature of other regiments, but they did pretty well. One of them, being the quartermaster-sergeant of his company, was charged with the custody and issuing of clothing. His *forte*, however, was that of a student and military critic, and he could not take time for shopkeeping accounts. He issued clothing when his men applied, but did not trouble himself to make entries; and of course there were wicked men who got articles from his store without his leave or knowledge. But the day came when he had to furnish an account, and he had no goods. His genius was equal to the occasion. He took the company roll, and distributed the whole amount of goods he had received fairly and equally along the list. This may not have been displeasing to those who had received more than the average, but those who had received less expressed their discontent in such vigorous and pointed language that the sergeant found it prudent to remain in concealment a few days. The captain of the company was appealed to, to correct the charges; but he was as famous as his sergeant for being unable to see an absurdity. He could think of nothing better to do than to take the case to the commander of the regiment. That officer, vexed at having such an affair brought to him, when the captain reached the end of his tale of the sergeant, immediately advised killing

him. "What!" exclaimed the startled captain. "Kill him!" gravely repeated Colonel Peters. "But do you really mean," asked the alarmed captain, when he had caught his breath, "do you really mean that I have the power to do that for such an offense?"

In another company one of these men supplied his fellows with jokes nearly every day. At one time he had a horse he called "Old Bob." Old Bob was an erratic beast, given to rubbing his master against trees, lying down with him in the water,¹ and other disagreeable pranks. On one occasion he was nervous, and would not stand quietly while being saddled. "Stand! you old fool," cried his master; "stand still!—Old Bob, you never stand still except when you lie down!"

He was with his company in one of its earlier engagements. He drew one of the horse-pistols with which the men were then armed, and fired it. The recoil of those pistols was remarkable, and this time it half threw the man off his horse. But he had not intended to fire, and did not know that he had fired. He had another idea of the cause of the disturbance. His sergeant presently found him behind a tree, tugging at the barrel of his pistol. "What's the matter?" demanded the sergeant. "Why, I can't get the thing out." "Get what out?" inquired the sergeant. "The ball! Them damn Johnnies has shot right into my pistol, and I can't get it out."

Another of these geniuses was once part of a force sent out on a reconnoissance. The place reported to be occupied by the rebels being reached, they were found

¹ Horses will sometimes lie down when they go into water, even if saddled and mounted. Of course the plight of the rider is the delight of his comrades.

not only in front but on both flanks. The commanding officer promptly withdrew some miles, occupied a secure position, and awaited the movements of the enemy. But the soldiers, learning a few facts and exaggerating them, as soldiers are apt to do, supposed that there was imminent danger of the loss of the whole force. This particular critic was filled with admiration of the conduct of the commander. "I tell you what!" said he, "Colonel —— was in a mighty tight place. He was plumb surrounded, and he had to either cut his way out or fall back for reinforcements."

But these makers of entertainment found their rivals when the recruits came. And they found some revenge as well, for all classes of old soldiers would seize every opportunity of getting fun out of the green ones. Their wonderings and blunders, their horror of hardships, their absurd ideas of actual war, made jokes as plenty as blackberries, and presented irresistible temptations to mischievous veterans. There was no end to the devices by which they were tormented, to make more fun. Of course those who were only ignorant soon learned their lessons, but those who were both ignorant and credulous had to suffer long. To get one of them arrested for firing his gun was easy.¹ To make him present a ridiculous appearance in public by some unconscionable advice as to the use of his equipments was often possible. One of them was once induced, on a return march, to carry an old soldier's gun as well as his own, being persuaded that it was better for both horses to have their loads equalized. It was not uncommon to get them to demand butter or eggs, or other

¹ It was a serious offense to fire a gun when not in an engagement or under the immediate orders of the proper officer.

impossible things, of commissaries or quartermasters, and they were frequently persuaded to go to some fine house, or to the quarters of a high officer, upon a careful explanation of the reasons why, in spite of outward appearances, that was the best place to get their washing done.

As they had many exaggerated ideas of the circumstances of campaigning and fighting, it was easy to make some of them swallow big stories of conflicts and deeds of daring. Old soldiers never tired of drawing the long bow, to scare or impose upon the recruits. Perhaps it was in that seductive amusement that they acquired a habit which seems to have clung to some of them ever since. But it was not only recruits upon whom they practised this art. There were some opportunities in the field, and many when at home on furlough, for telling tales to make civilians open their eyes in wonder, and they were not neglected. One instance, put into rhyme by a witty civilian whose credulity was overtaxed, is here preserved :

“ Tell me, O gunner of Battery B !
O hero of Valley Pine !
Some glorious deed of the battle-field,
Some wonderful feat of thine,
Some skilful move in the fearful game
Of war that has been played
On yon bloody field, whose broken squares
With blue and gray are laid.”

“ Well, stranger, here all day long
I fought my gun, till every round
Was spent ; I had some powder left,
But never a ball could be found.
So I trained my gun on a rebel gun,
And so true was my range and aim
That a shot from his gun flew plump into mine,
And finished the load of the same ! ”

“ Enough ! Enough ! O gunner bold !
O hero of Valley Pine !
Alas ! I fear me thy cannon’s throat
Can swallow more than mine.”¹

But credulity was not confined to the recruits, nor to the ranks. There were officers who were easily imposed upon, and they were not spared. One is remembered in the Fourth Iowa who caused much hilarity. He would gravely wear, upon all occasions, all the feathers and toggery mentioned in the regulations for any occasion, and he grieved over the difficulty of transporting on marches a large trunk for his clothes.² When he first appeared in the camp, at Helena, fresh from Iowa, and was having his quarters prepared, a waggish officer advised him to provide against the big snakes, which, he said, came from the neighboring forest at night in great numbers and took possession of all the tents, searching for warmth. In much alarm the believing officer had his cot raised in the middle of his tent, on slender improvised legs, several feet high, his new friend assuring him that the serpents would not be able to get up there.

The Fourth Iowa was well acquainted with a general in high command, who was, in his way, as easy to impose upon. The tale of an imaginative “female

¹ But the gunner’s experience was not without at least one close precedent. In 1863, when the revolution of Salnave was in progress in Hayti, the British ship of war *Bulldog* appeared off Cape Haytien and fired upon the town and fort, to punish the people for an insult to the British Consul’s flag. An old cannon on the fort was struck by one of the shot directly in the muzzle. The shot went to the breech, knocked the gun to a distance, and in 1888 was still in it. Even the dull soldier who supposed that the enemy had thrown a bullet into his pistol could cite instances of bullets meeting in the air between contending forces. There are two examples of such an encounter in government museums at Washington.

² The baggage of a regimental officer seldom exceeded one small valise.

spy " was enough to induce him to send fifteen hundred cavalry on a march of sixty miles, upon the hope of capturing a subordinate rebel general away from his command. He was always easily exercised by stories of the expression of rebel sentiments. A couple of days after Forrest's raid into Memphis, perhaps when he was smarting under the mortification he must have experienced in that affair, he was told that the citizens were about to bury a rebel captain who had been killed in the engagement, and that there was a Confederate flag in the coffin. This heinous crime certainly could not be permitted. He promptly ordered out Captain Beckwith (of the Fourth Iowa) with one hundred cavalry, to arrest the wicked rebels. The captain, vexed and humiliated at being sent upon such an errand, took revenge by construing and executing his instructions literally. He marched his command to the cemetery, carefully surrounded the whole body of mourners, and marched them all, men, women, and children, hearse and other vehicles, through the streets, to the general's quarters. The general's disgust with this performance was only increased when he found no flag in the coffin.

There were certain eccentric characters in the regiment (as no doubt there were in most regiments) who furnished much of the daily entertainment. Those who did not discover their ability to interest their comrades were of course the more constantly interesting, and were usually very effective soldiers, being much in earnest in all they did. Some of them not only distinguished their own companies, but spread their fame into other regiments. One of them was a man named Ridenour. He was of Dutch birth or

descent, and had lived in the wilds of Arkansas, from which his comrades called him "Arkansaw." He was about thirty years old, wholly uneducated, but by nature shrewd, and he had acquired in a high degree that self-possession and practical wisdom which appear in men whose lives are much given to hunting and traversing an unsettled country. When the war broke out the Secessionists persecuted him in Arkansas, and he moved into Missouri. Finding himself still among Secessionists, he moved again and again northward, and finally crossed the border into Iowa. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry was organizing, and his wrath was at the fighting point. He went into Company C, and gave it a fame more or less startling and humorous to the end of the war. His consuming, deliberate passion was to "git even with the Secesh." He was in more battles, big and little, than any man in the regiment, because he sought every opportunity to get into an engagement on his individual responsibility, without the knowledge or consent of any officer. His courage, like his appetite, was perfect on any occasion. He seemed wholly unable to comprehend tactics, regulations, or discipline, but he had the craft of woods and swamps and obscure roads in a remarkable degree. It seemed to be irksome to him to go anywhere by the highway. He often went, sometimes with leave and sometimes without, on an independent march, a "short cut" across the country, or foraging in a new region. Sometimes he disappeared and was gone for a day or more, suddenly reappearing without any report of himself. His return was always marked by some savory addition to the larder of his mess or some increase in the personal property of himself or his friends; but he

was dumb when called upon for an account of his movements. His great point was a fast horse. He bent his efforts to the capture or "confiscation"¹ of horses, and was continually seen trying a new horse in comparison with his last one; and he always kept the fleetest. Again and again, from the column on a march or from a picket post, he was seen, coming in "on the home-stretch" like the wind, with a party of the enemy after him; but he always had the best horse, and it was usually loaded with property not known to the regulations. If he had belonged to a "bummer" command, he would have been King of the Bummers.

On one occasion, his command being on a march in Mississippi, at a place where the road was to turn an angle, he obtained leave to "cut across" the country. His reason for going, if he had one, is forgotten. He took two others of his company, and started through the woods. Approaching a house on a byroad, they saw three horses saddled and hitched at the gate in front. Satisfied that three rebel scouts were in the house Arkansaw immediately "charged," but his two men failed to follow him. The rebels ran out and opened fire, and he found himself alone on the field. He ordered the enemy to surrender, all the time blazing away with his revolvers, for he always carried from two to a dozen, but the order was treated with contempt. The battle raged until one of the rebels was killed and another wounded. The third only surrendered after Arkansaw had struck him on the head

¹ "Confiscation" was the appropriation of any personal property one might take a fancy to, without careful inquiry as to its ownership. If it was found in the enemy's country, of course it was fair prize, the fate of war; if in the camp of your friends, that was the fate of war too, and you had to risk only the chance of discovery.

with an emptied pistol. The advance of the column found the champion on the road, standing guard over two prisoners and three extra horses, with a dead rebel on the field.

Another story told of Arkansaw is yet more picturesque. He was one night sent out on a scout, alone, to get certain information. At a place some miles in the enemy's country, he deemed it prudent to conceal his horse in the woods and proceed afoot. He reached his object and was returning, still dismounted, when he observed a body of rebels between him and camp, coming toward him. He climbed a leafy tree by the roadside, partly to conceal himself and partly in the hope of learning something from the rebels as they went by. He did learn something, but the lesson was long and irksome. They stopped near his tree, and finally established a picket post under it. And he had to cling to his perch all night; but, with his inevitable good luck, he saw them move away in the morning, leaving his way clear to camp.

It was Ridenour's remarkable fortune that, in all his private campaigns and adventures, he was never wounded or captured.

It would be a mistake to imagine, from all that has been said, that the soldiers were content to spend their spare time in mere fleeting fun. While they were disposed to get fun out of nearly all experiences, they were also capable of combining entertainment with profit, or at least with intellectual employments. Nearly all were readers, and perhaps all were letter-writers. Books were read and passed around until they fell into tatters, and they were not always novels either; and newspapers were swallowed, from the first

column to the last, with the utmost avidity. The postmaster was the most popular of their comrades. No one grumbled at his being relieved from other services, in view of his carrying the mails, though often for weeks together, unfortunately, he had nothing to do, because his command was beyond the reach of the post-office. But the failure of the mails to come did not much diminish the writing of letters to go. Besides letters to their families and friends, some wrote war news for their home newspapers, and some faithfully kept diaries throughout their service.

It hardly need be said that there was always the deepest interest in political affairs, with perennial political discussion. The Fourth of July, Emancipation Day, and other occasions were sure to find speech-makers among the privates as well as among the officers, and no good Union soldier omitted an opportunity to present his pet argument on the war to any "rebel," citizen or soldier, whom circumstances compelled to listen. Whenever the Union forces captured the capital of a State, a number of the men would take possession of the state-house, organize a legislature, and proceed to debate the questions of the time, with many proofs of ability and parliamentary knowledge. The Secessionists, however, were roundly abused, and invariably voted down; and the sitting always ended with the unanimous repeal of the ordinance of secession.

The soldiers in camp produced, too, their full share of the vast quantity of verses inspired by the war. It cannot be said that many of them were very good, but then the soldiers were not so likely to be serious in their appeals to the muse as the people who witnessed

the contest from their homes, a point of view from which all the operations of an army, and therefore of the soldiers, seem very terrible. So the poetry of the camps, even when written by capable versifiers, was apt to be humorous. Indeed, serious verses were generally concealed by their authors, or entrusted to a chosen few, in fear of the merciless jokers. Humorous verses found appreciative readers, and serious ones, if once caught, were made humorous by force. But not many of the poems of the soldiers, beyond those already printed in the literature of the war, could have been worth preserving, unless to amuse. One of those that came in the way of the writer is here given with that purpose. It is believed to have been written quite seriously. It was found among papers lost by William H. Landreth, who was with Shelby in Price's army, in Missouri, in 1864, when the Fourth Iowa, with other regiments, was fighting and driving those famous rebels. We know William's name by finding it signed to the "balled."

BALLED.

- 1 father father bild Me a Boat
an put it on the oasen that I may float
her father was welthy he bilt her a Boat
an put it on the oasen that She Mite float
She stepte on the Boat She cride out Goy
Now Il find my swet salar Boy.
- 2 She hadent bin Sailen far on the Main
She spide three Ships come in from Spain
She hailed each captain as he drew ni
an of him She did in quire her Sweet Salar Boy
- 3 Captain Captain tel me trew
if my sweet William is in your crew
Il tel you far Lady Il tel you My Dear

your Sweet William is not hear
 At the head of rocky island as we past By
 Will was took Sick an thare did die

4 She stove her Boat a ganst a Rock
 I thout in my Soal her hart was Broak
 She rong her hand She toar her hare
 Jest like a lady in dis pair

5 go bring me a Cher for to set on
 a pen an ink for to rite it down
 at the end of evry line She dropt a teer
 At the end of evry vers it was O My Deer

6 go dig my grave booth Wide an deep
 put a marvel Stone at my head an Feet
 an on my brest you may carv a dove
 to let the world no I dide for love.

Comradeship among the soldiers was, however, not limited within regiments. In the infantry there was, naturally, a closer acquaintance between regiments than in the cavalry. The infantry regiments lived and moved very near each other, and had many camp and campaigning experiences in common, while the cavalry, in its earlier history, was so scattered, broken into detachments for service in widely separated places, that any fellowship, or even acquaintance, between regiments was impracticable; but, in later years, when the cavalry was used in divisions and brigades, and the regiments were encamped as near each other as practicable, there appeared a very agreeable sense of mutual interests and an increasing *esprit de corps*, which must have had a strong influence in subsequent operations of the brigade.

The Fourth Iowa served with the Third Iowa and the Tenth Missouri almost continuously from the fall of Vicksburg, and the three regiments marched and

fought together in every campaign after 1863. It is certain that every man remembers the association with gratification. The increasing acquaintances among the men personally, the confidence felt in either regiment, fighting alone, that the others were faithfully waiting to assist or relieve, and the sense of power when operating together, produced by a long series of joint successes, naturally developed a fine comradeship. Each regiment was uniformly generous toward the others, and each felt and showed a genuine pride in the deeds and the fame of its fellows. If either passed the others, going to the front, or upon any honorable or agreeable errand, there was no feeling of jealousy or resentment, but "Bully for the Fourth Iowa!" or "Bully for the Third!" as the case might be, would ring along the column left behind, with many other encouraging cries, while "Here come the Tenth devils! Bully for Missouri!" expressed the admiration of the Iowans for the fighting quality of the Missouri regiment. The last campaign, in 1865, brought the friendly corps still nearer, in action and interest; and when at last they parted, disbanded, the separation was as much a cause of sorrow as that between any of the companies in either regiment. They had become a solid corps, and their career as a brigade showed clearly the good effects of the policy of keeping a regiment intact and of operating the same regiments together as much as possible.

Specially interesting among the fellow-troopers of the Fourth Iowa in the field were those from Kansas. They were seldom met east of the Mississippi, but they had a share in nearly all affairs in Missouri and Arkansas. They were generally very spirited and self-reliant,

good fighters, tough campaigners, but impatient of discipline or work. They were colloquially known as "Jayhawkers," and had a reputation throughout the army for the speed of their horses and the lightness of their fingers. They were inveterate horse-racers, and whenever, in the camp of a neighboring regiment, a pistol, saddle, blanket, or canteen disappeared, the loser was advised to "look in the —th Jayhawkers."

Two or three of the Kansas regiments, among them the Fifth, were in camp at Helena, sometimes brigaded with the Fourth Iowa. At the same time the Second Wisconsin Cavalry was there, a fine, soldierly, highly respectable command. One of the Second Wisconsin died, and his comrades, with proper decorum, prepared for a regular military funeral. Some went out and dug the grave, and returned to camp before the funeral procession moved. It happened the same day that the Fifth Kansas also had on hand the body of a departed patriot. Not being given to idle ceremonies, they simply carried it off to the burying-ground, intending there to dig the grave and despatch the business without unnecessary expense of time. The Wisconsin party had not yet arrived, and the Kansans found a grave ready and waiting for a tenant. What was the use of digging another? The defunct "Jayhawker" would not care who prepared his "home."¹ They dropped him in, quickly filled in the earth, and went back to their camp or their horse-racing. Presently came the mournful column of the Wisconsins, marching as a funeral guard of honor, with solemn tread and

¹ The volunteers commonly spoke of the rude graves of their dead comrades as "soldiers' homes," a facetious perversion of the name usually applied to asylums for soldiers.

wailing dirge, their fallen comrade borne at their head. The diggers led them to the spot where they had left an open grave. The rest may be left to the imagination. But the Second Wisconsin had had experience: they recognized the genius of the Fifth Kansas. Only the "Jayhawkers" could steal a grave!

But we have not yet mentioned one of the agencies by which efficient soldiers are made, perhaps the greatest of all, namely, good officers. The laws of war and the regulations of an army necessarily invest the officers with very great powers over the men, so great as that, under poor officers, even the best of men may become poor soldiers. The men who filled the ranks of the regiments enlisted in 1861 and 1862 must have been substantially equal in intelligence and courage in all parts of the North, yet, although some of the regiments very soon passed their callow period and reached efficiency, others progressed by slow and uncertain steps; although some quickly distinguished themselves for courage in action and endurance in marching, others failed or became demoralized under either test. There was no such difference in character between the men as would explain this wide difference in conduct. You would certainly find poor officers in the less efficient regiments. General McPherson, himself a model officer, when, after the Vicksburg campaign, he tried to get authority to reorganize his command, with a view partly to greater efficiency of officers, said to the Adjutant-General: "My experience has shown that the value and efficiency of a regiment depend almost entirely upon the officers; that there is no such thing as a worthless regiment, as far as the enlisted men are concerned, when the officers, from the colonel down, do

their whole duty." The men realize clearly that the officers are in superior and powerful positions, but have keen eyes for their mistakes and weaknesses. An officer may easily lose the respect and confidence of his men by any persistent misconduct or failure of duty, even though they are themselves much more guilty. If they see that he does not provide for them as well as he could, or that he does not enforce obedience to orders, or that in the field he does not lead them where they know they ought to go, they must, naturally, distrust him and fear that in some emergency they will fall into disaster by his fault. Having no other head, they feel as if they had no head, and so are likely to break or fail under any trial. And having once tasted the humiliation of failure, they are discouraged and spiritless; they have become poor soldiers. Quite the opposite character could have been developed in the same men by officers having only fair courage and zeal on the field and spirit enough to compel obedience to orders. No doubt volunteers have often grumbled and threatened under the alleged severity of their discipline, especially where it followed a period of laxity, but the truth is they really respect the man who insists upon obedience, and, after his success, they are loud in admiration of his discipline. The average man talks as if he considered himself equal to the ordering of all things about him, but secretly he would prefer to have another man take the responsibility in any of the great acts of life. The most of men are glad to say that they did this or that or the other under the orders of somebody in higher position.

When it is considered, then, that in the volunteer regiments during the last two years of the war the

officers were mostly men who had won their commissions by meritorious conduct in the field, and whose qualities were well known to the men in the ranks, since it was from the ranks they had been promoted, it will be understood that one of the most potent factors in the making of efficient soldiers was in this evolution of efficient officers.

The Fourth Iowa's experience in respect to officers was about the average. There were some who were not very efficient, but the most could be said to be good, and during the last years, by experience and by the processes of elimination and the survival of the fittest, the official corps was probably, on the whole, as good as that in any other regiment. Indeed, it plainly appeared while in the camp at Louisville, that the officers had acquired the right hold upon the men and that the men really held them in high respect and confidence. This period is spoken of in particular because it was at the end of a year of "veteran" service, a year of heavy and very trying campaigning, and at a time when a number of officers had just been created from the ranks.

The regiment was particularly pleased at this time to hear of the promotion of its colonel. He was now brevetted brigadier-general, to date December 12, 1864, "for gallantry in the field," a reward well earned. The gratification of both officers and men was marked by the presentation to the new general of a beautiful sword and a fine watch. They succeeded in surprising him with these on the 1st of February, the entire regiment forming about his quarters, and Colonel Peters making the gift with a happy little speech.

One of the institutions of the regiment not yet mentioned ought not to be overlooked, especially as it too now showed much improvement. This was a private brass band, which had been organized and maintained among the soldiers. The loss of the regular regimental band, in 1862, was much regretted, for soldiers are very fond of music, and a volunteer band was often suggested. In 1863, upon a subscription among the officers and some of the men, a set of instruments was purchased; and the men who undertook to play them were encouraged by relief from certain of their duties as soldiers. Only a few of them had had any experience, but under their untiring leader, Levi W. Little, of E, they came to play very well; and they maintained their position as "The Band" till the regiment was mustered out. Their great difficulty was in getting time enough for practice, it being their duty, of course, to go upon campaigns like other soldiers; but, as they did not go upon the Price campaign, they had a good opportunity to advance their art during that time, and at Louisville and afterward they were able to give much pleasure to their comrades nearly every day.

The time was rapidly approaching for the spring campaign. It was Grant's expectation to have the troops in the field, from Richmond to New Orleans, in the latter part of February. The campaign in which Winslow's brigade was to take part was intended to be one of the first to be started, as it was to be in the far South. Before the end of January Upton was directed to move by boats up the Tennessee to Eastport, Miss. But the ice was still blocking the Ohio, and a week of February had passed before it was so far broken up as

to permit the passage of boats. That no time might be lost, Upton had his first brigade (Winslow's) on the bank of the river at Portland, just below Louisville, on the 5th of February, ready to embark and take advantage of the first opening in the ice. But the troops had to stay there, in bivouac, nearly two days before they could begin embarking. At last, on the 7th, they went aboard, but the boats were so small that the movement was very tedious. Eight boats were required for the Fourth Iowa alone. At least twenty must have been required for the brigade. The progress of the fleet was much impeded by the ice in the Ohio, but on the 10th it passed Paducah and entered the Tennessee. A few days later the brigade landed at Waterloo, near Eastport, Miss., and marched to the cantonment of Wilson's cavalry at Gravelly Springs, in Alabama. The three regiments occupied a part of the quarters which had just been vacated by General Knipe's division. The same day they were shown that they had come under a new *régime*, and began to see great things in the approaching campaign.

CHAPTER X.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN—CAVALRY AGAINST FORTIFICATIONS —EBENEZER CHURCH—THE FALL OF SELMA.

At the beginning of 1865 it was easy to see that the Confederacy was on its last legs. In 1863 it had undertaken, by conscription laws, to drag into the field every man able to bear arms. In the summer of 1864, in desperate efforts to resist Grant in Virginia and Sherman in Georgia, the conscription was enforced without mercy, and even boys, old men, and invalids were put to service wherever possible. As Grant then said: "They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. A man lost by them now cannot be replaced."¹ And he added that, in addition to losses in action, they were then losing, from desertions and other causes, at least one regiment a day. About the same time Davis said, in a public speech, that two thirds of the Confederate soldiers were absent from duty, most of them without leave.² For a year every important movement of the Union forces

¹ Grant to E. B. Washburne, letter dated August 16, 1864.

² Speech to the people at Macon, Ga., September 23, 1864: 11 Moore's Rebellion Record, pp. 148, 342.

On the 31st of March the Confederate "Bureau of Conscription" was abolished. The reason must have been that it had become utterly ineffective. Its books of that date showed that sixty thousand of the sons of proud Virginia alone were "absentees" from the army, that is, mostly deserters! See "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," vol ii., pp. 463, 464.

but one had resulted in defeat and loss to the Confederates. They could not replace their men, and their means of replacing *matériel* became poorer day by day. In Virginia they were almost surrounded, and for a long time had been acting only upon the defensive, unable to risk any general conflict. Sherman had swept Georgia, from the mountains to the sea, as with a broom. He had taken Savannah and the gates of South Carolina, and was marching steadily northward, fighting, but always winning,—marching like a resistless fate, “on to Richmond.” All of the North Carolina coast was ours, and the western part of that State was of little value to the rebels, in view of the disaffection of the people and the permanent presence of Union forces in East Tennessee. Though Sherman’s army was now withdrawn from Georgia, the Confederate government had only a qualified hold upon that State, because of the implacable opposition maintained by its governor to the plans of the Confederate president. This governor was “Joe” Brown, who was then, as he still is, extremely popular in the State. He reminded Davis that this was a “war for State rights,” and flatly told him that no more troops would be sent out of Georgia, but that the men of Georgia would be occupied first in defending their own State. The government was only a confederacy anyhow, and Georgia was an independent State! This cruel turning of the doctrine of secession upon itself exasperated Davis to the last degree, and it must have caused utter dismay throughout the Confederacy. Probably, in its moral effects, the grim attitude of the irascible governor did more to overthrow the cause of the South than any victory of the Union arms. A rattlesnake was one of the chosen emblems

of the Secessionists: in the rage of desperation the serpent had struck its fangs into its own heart.

By the disastrous defeat of Hood and Forrest at Franklin and Nashville, the rebels not only lost their only considerable army west of the Alleghanies, but they were unable longer to dispute the Union possession of Tennessee, Kentucky, northern Alabama, or northern Mississippi. All of the rebels who could be got into the field in Arkansas and Missouri in the autumn of 1864 were defeated in October, under Sterling Price, in a series of brilliant cavalry engagements on the border of Kansas, and were hopelessly routed and dissipated. The great river was ours from Cairo to the Gulf, and the "Trans-Mississippi Department" of the Confederacy was no longer of any certain value to their cause.

Looking at the map, then, we see that early in 1865 the Confederate armies were in actual control of only a small part of the territory of the seceded States east of the Mississippi, namely, that part of Virginia lying south of the James and west of Richmond, the middle part of North Carolina, and parts of Mississippi and Alabama. The truculent Governor Brown had shut the gates of Georgia in their face, and Texas and Louisiana might as well have been beyond seas. But there was a line of cities within the territory they still held where army and navy supplies were manufactured or stored, which were fortified and garrisoned. These, with their cruisers on the seas, were the whole of the possessions of the enemy by which they could fairly hope yet to win in the war.

There was no longer any reasonable hope of recognition by any foreign power. England had been com-

pelled to acknowledge her duty in respect to the privateers, and the Confederacy had reached the limit of its power at sea. The blockade of the Atlantic ports by the Union navy was substantially effective, and there was no counting upon *matériel* of war to come from other countries. Even supplies which could be produced at home had become extremely meagre. It was with great difficulty that the rebel troops could be fed, and people in the cities not attached to the armies were pinched for food.¹ As to clothing, they were almost as badly off. The destructive raids of the Union cavalry had left them but a few woollen and cotton mills, and their supply of raw wool and cotton was very scanty. They had no money. One gold dollar would buy a thousand paper ones. The Congress adjourned at Richmond, in March, without making any provision for the currency. What could Congress do? There was no bullion, coin had wholly disappeared from trade, and the Secretary of the Treasury had already reported a deficiency of four hundred millions of a paper currency that was not current except under the compulsion of bayonets or the alternative of confiscation.

A few more blows, and the Confederacy, as a government, with its armies, must fall. It seemed inevitable that the army under Lee would be overthrown in the next campaign; and if at the same time successful attacks were made upon their principal remaining sources of supply, the rebels would have to face not only the necessity of creating a new army when all white men capable of bearing arms were already

¹ In Richmond, in March, 1865, prices were: Beef, \$15 a pound; bacon and butter, \$20 a pound; corn-meal, \$140 a bushel; flour, \$1,500 a barrel; slaves, \$10,000 each; and so on.—“A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary,” vol. ii., pp. 453 to 461.

enrolled, but the vast and increasing difficulty of maintaining it.

So, in February, 1865, in anticipation of his own early movement, Grant issued orders for expeditions of cavalry from different points in the grand line, with the objects of penetrating the enemy's country, distracting his attention, preventing the concentration of his forces, destroying his depots, and at the same time supporting or aiding the movement of the three great armies led by himself, Sherman, and Canby. Sheridan was directed to move with his corps from the Shenandoah Valley upon Lynchburg, take that city and destroy the railway and canal, then march south and join Sherman, who was then moving north in South Carolina with but little cavalry. Characteristically, Grant closed his instructions to Sheridan with "I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this." Thomas was directed to send Stoneman from East Tennessee, with a division of cavalry, into South Carolina, to make a diversion in favor of Sherman's movement, penetrate to Columbia, and return to his camps through North Carolina, by way of Salisbury. But, Sherman having passed through South Carolina before Stoneman was ready for the march, he was directed to move through the Holston country, toward Lynchburg, destroying railways, salt-works, and other property of value to the Confederate cause, at the same time holding the passes of the mountains against any retreat of Lee to the west. A third cavalry expedition, of seven or eight thousand men, was to march from Vicksburg east to Meridian, to destroy the railways and supplies there, and move thence in aid of Canby in his intended operations

against Mobile. The fourth one, which proved to be far the greatest in its marches, its successes, and their results, was directed against central Alabama, primarily with a view to insure success to Canby in his campaign against Mobile, by drawing the enemy away from him.

The expedition from Vicksburg was not made. The prodigious rains in Mississippi presented such obstacles that the troops intended for that march were sent to Canby at New Orleans, and moved with him against Mobile by water. Sheridan marched to White House, connected with Grant's right just in time to assist in opening the campaign against Lee, and had finally the honor of striking the last blows at Lee's army near Appomattox. Stoneman made his march through the corner of North Carolina and into Virginia, nearly to Lynchburg, then turning south, raided through North Carolina, destroying large quantities of railway and military property in both States, and defeating the enemy with heavy loss in a pitched battle at Salisbury.

For the movement into Alabama, Grant's instructions were,¹ "to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, so as to insure success to Canby, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and resources, and to destroy or capture their forces in the field." He suggested that Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points against which the movement should be directed, but said that the thing of importance would be to "penetrate deep into Alabama." And with wise caution, he added that discretion should be left to the

¹ Grant's "Report of Operations," dated July 22, 1865. See his "Personal Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 612.

officer commanding the expedition, to go where he might find it best to gain the objects proposed. He also advised that not much artillery be taken, and that not less than eight horses be put to each gun and caisson. And, finally, he said, "your cavalry should rely upon the country for supplies."

Thomas, understanding that the expedition was to be conducted chiefly as auxiliary to Canby's operations against Mobile and Selma, directed Brevet Major-General James H. Wilson, who commanded the cavalry of the grand military division,¹ to fit out an expedition of five or six thousand cavalry, to "make a demonstration upon Tuscaloosa and Selma." But Wilson begged for orders to take a larger force and for leave to act independently of the Mobile campaign. It was his belief that three of his divisions would be able to *take* Tuscaloosa and Selma. Thomas yielded, and Grant sent special orders giving Wilson the amplest authority and discretion.

The spirited and accomplished young general had now assumed, with prompt eagerness, a very great responsibility, but he saw the situation before him with clear eyes, and with the splendid confidence of the true soldier he felt success already within his grasp.

In the East the Confederates could hardly be said to maintain any extended military lines, but in Alabama and Georgia they still had one, complete and of the last importance to them. The great rivers of these States flow southward, the important railways run east and west. Where the railways crossed the rivers

¹ The "Military Division of the Mississippi," which embraced the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee.

were the principal cities. The lower valleys of these rivers, extremely fertile, furnished a very large part of the food required by the rebel armies.

In these cities were gathered great quantities of supplies and were established the most of their remaining foundries and factories. A glance at the map will show the uniform sweep of the line of these cities, from Meridian, on the Mobile & Ohio road, in Mississippi, by Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon, to Augusta, on the Savannah. They stand at remarkably equal intervals along the line. Each was, in its way, of almost as much importance to the enemy as any other, all were fortified, and the fortifications at Selma, Columbus, and Macon were very strong. No doubt the Confederate authorities deemed this line their last and sure defensive position if they should fail farther north. They were still actively employed upon an elaborate scheme of defenses for it, were collecting vast quantities of stores in its depots, and were well provided with the means of concentrating troops to defend its posts. At Selma there was a large naval foundry, other foundries and iron-works, an extensive arsenal, powder-mills, many factories producing materials for war, a great deal of railway property, and many storehouses of military and naval goods. At Columbus were collected, on a still larger scale, similar depots, properties, and supplies, together with three large cotton-mills, a navy-yard completely equipped, and a formidable ram, the *Jackson*, finished, with its machinery and guns in place, and nearly ready for action. At Meridian, Montgomery, and Macon, cotton, food, and army stores were constantly being gathered by a special force; and the

Confederate laws for "pressing" supplies were unique in their sweeping character and merciless exactions.

On the Black Warrior River, in Alabama, about fifty miles north of the line described, was the town of Tuscaloosa, in a position not only to control the rich valley of that river and of the Tombigby, but to be a principal outpost for either Meridian or Selma. In a similar position as to Selma and Montgomery stood the little town of Montevallo, which was not only their outpost, but was of much importance in itself, as being on two railways and the principal town in the iron- and coal-mining district of Alabama.

The Fourth Iowa Cavalry became a part of Wilson's corps. First, however, in pursuance of the policy of concentration inaugurated by him, it was ordered to Nashville, to join the army under Thomas. This order was received on the banks of the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory, where the regiment had just ended, in snow and ice, the brilliant campaign against Price. Hood was then advancing into Tennessee, Thomas was preparing to receive him, and great battles were expected. The Fourth Iowa was to have a hand in the contest. There was no delay—not a day. The next morning after the order was received, November 8th, election day, after the men had voted for "Lincoln and the vigorous prosecution of the war," the march began for Nashville. How difficult now to realize that, though the battle at Nashville was fought more than a month later, this column could not reach the field in time! The line of march was very long, from Weber's Falls on the Arkansas, by way of Pea Ridge and Springfield, to Rolla and St. Louis, thence by railroad and river to Cairo and Louis-

ville. The movement was much delayed by the freezing weather, the scarcity of forage, the extremely jaded condition of men and animals, and finally by the ice in the Mississippi and Ohio; so that when the command reached Louisville the conflict between Hood and Thomas was over, the battles of Franklin and Nashville had been fought, and there was no enemy within Thomas' reach.

Wilson's command was the "Cavalry Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi." It comprised all the mounted troops of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, numbering in the aggregate about thirty thousand, though, for lack of good arms and serviceable horses, hardly twenty thousand were fairly equipped for the field. Fortunately for Winslow's brigade, it was as well armed and mounted as any brigade in the corps.

Of the seven principal divisions of the Corps three were assigned to this campaign, the First, commanded by Brigadier-General Edward McCook, the Second, by Brigadier-General Eli Long, and the Fourth, by Brevet-Major-General Emory Upton. The Seventh Division, under General Knipe, had been sent in February, by steamers, down the Tennessee and the Mississippi, to join Canby in his operations against Mobile. The Sixth Division was left at Pulaski in Tennessee, for local operations, but two regiments were first taken from it and put into the Second Brigade of the Fourth Division. The Third and Fifth divisions being more deficient than the others in arms and horses, were further stripped to supply the chosen divisions, and remained at Nashville. Each of the three chosen divisions was composed of two brigades, of three or four

regiments each; and the whole force numbered about thirteen thousand five hundred men. But fifteen hundred of this number marched dismounted, as guard to the train, being men with good arms but without serviceable horses. These men were, however, mounted on captured animals before the campaign was far advanced. Nearly all the regiments were fully armed with the Spencer carbine.

There were three batteries of four guns each, one attached to each division. Captain Beck's Eighteenth Indiana Battery was with the First Division, Captain Robinson's Chicago Board-of-Trade Battery with the Second, and Captain Rodney's Battery I of the Fourth United States Artillery with the Fourth.

The brigades were organized as follows: In the First Division, the First Brigade, Brigadier-General John T. Croxton, was composed of the Eighth Iowa, Second Michigan, Sixth Kentucky, and First Tennessee Cavalry, and the Fourth Kentucky Mounted Infantry; and the Second Brigade, Colonel Oscar H. La Grange, of the First Wisconsin, the Second and Fourth Indiana, and the Fourth and Seventh Kentucky Cavalry. In the Second Division, the First Brigade, Colonel Abram O. Miller, was composed of four regiments of mounted infantry, the Seventeenth and Seventy-second Indiana, and the Ninety-eighth and One-hundred-and-twenty-third Illinois; and the Second Brigade, Colonel Robert H. G. Minty, of four regiments of cavalry, the Fourth Michigan, the Seventh Pennsylvania, and Third and Fourth Ohio. In the Fourth Division, the First Brigade, Brevet Brigadier-General Edward F. Winslow, was composed of the Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri Cavalry; and the Second

Brigade, Brevet Brigadier-General Andrew J. Alexander, of the First and Seventh Ohio and Fifth Iowa Cavalry.

In Winslow's brigade the Third Iowa was commanded by Colonel John W. Noble (now Secretary of the Interior), the Fourth Iowa by Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Peters, and the Tenth Missouri by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick W. Benteen; and the three regiments numbered in the field about two thousand four hundred men and officers.

But with much regret on the part of the other companies of the Fourth Iowa, Company G was detached for special service. At Gravelly Springs it was taken by General Upton as his escort, and throughout the campaign it served directly under him. It was commanded by its Captain, Alexander Rodgers, but both of its lieutenants were, in January, appointed on Upton's staff, First-Lieutenant Sloan Keck as aide-de-camp and Second-Lieutenant Peter R. Keck as acting ordnance-officer of the division and as aide-de-camp. The company and both the lieutenants had very active and distinguished service throughout the campaign.

Our regiment was now extremely fortunate in its general commanders. The three generals, corps, division, and brigade, were all young men,¹ of high spirit,

¹ Wilson and Winslow 27 and Upton 25. Both Wilson and Upton were educated at West Point, the former being captain of engineers and the latter captain of artillery in the regular army. Wilson was on the staff of Grant in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns, in which he so distinguished himself as to gain the commission of brigadier-general of volunteers. He persistently and courageously exploited his belief in the capacity of cavalry, when it was the fashion among the generals to belittle that arm. He insisted that the treatment and management of cavalry were radically wrong; and, being appointed head of the Cavalry Bureau at Washington early in 1864, he made practical application of his principles, so far as circumstances made it possible to do so, and soon achieved very encouraging results. But Sheridan wanted him in the field, and

great courage, untiring energy, and all zealously of opinion that good soldiers are made only by careful and intelligent training, steady discipline, the best equipments, prompt promotion for merit, and manly personal treatment. Each of them was highly distinguished in daring and successful campaigns in 1864, Wilson and Winslow in the cavalry and Upton in the artillery and infantry. Wilson, in command of the cavalry of Thomas' army in the great crash of arms with Hood, had made his troopers so terrible to the enemy that in the crisis of battle came Hood's despairing cry to Chalmers: "For God's sake drive back the

in the summer of 1864 he took command of the Third Division of Sheridan's cavalry, and immediately made a raid around Lee's left to his rear, to the great consternation of the enemy and the great fame of the cavalry. He had demonstrated that cavalry, rightly managed, can go almost literally *anywhere*. His idea was, simply, that cavalry should be used in masses, and not in petty detachments scattered about an army of infantry, that the men should be used and treated as *soldiers*, and not merely as escorts, messengers, and foragers. In the autumn of 1864, when Thomas was to be left in charge of the field west of the Alleghanies, both Grant and Sherman heartily joined in designating Wilson as the man to command the cavalry.

Upton's fame, though not as wide as Wilson's, was as high. He graduated at West Point just as the war broke out, immediately went to Washington to drill the volunteers, served on the staffs of generals the first year, became colonel of a New York regiment, fought in all the great battles of the Army of the Potomac for three years, always with the greatest spirit and courage, being several times wounded, and closed his career in the East by splendid service in Sheridan's battle at Winchester, where he reached the command of a division on the field, covered it with glory, fell severely wounded, and won another promotion. When Wilson was given leave to choose his new division commanders, his first choice was Upton.

Winslow had had no military education when he entered the army. He had been a bank clerk and had just begun a career as a "contractor" in the small railway-building then in progress in the West. He was of delicate constitution, but his intelligence and quick use of the lessons of experience supplied as far as possible the lack of scientific knowledge of war, and his remarkable energy and confident spirit more than made up for any delicacy of health. His natural qualities fitted him rarely for the army, perhaps especially for a cavalry commander.

Yankee cavalry, or all is lost!" And Upton and Winslow, each in his last campaign, had won a general's star for gallantry and brilliant success on the field.

The forces of the enemy available for defense were, as well as has been learned, as follows: Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor, then in command of the Confederate "Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana," who had relieved General Hood, at Tupelo, after his defeat by Thomas in December, was at Meridian, with an army of infantry and artillery; but he had lately sent a portion of his troops to aid in the defense of Mobile. Forrest, who was now also a lieutenant-general, was in command of all the cavalry of Taylor's department. In March his headquarters were at West Point, Miss., immediately covering Meridian, but within reach of Tuscaloosa. He had small bodies or bands of mounted men in all the remoter parts of his department, but those under his immediate orders were now reorganized into three divisions, numbering in the aggregate about thirteen thousand.¹ His division commanders were Major-Generals James R. Chalmers, who had three brigades of Mississippians; William H. Jackson, who had two brigades from Tennessee and a regiment from Texas; and Abraham Buford, who had four brigades of Alabamians and Kentuckians. The brigade generals were, some of

¹ Jordan says, in his "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 657, that Forrest's departmental command embraced about ten thousand men, but later, p. 658, he says that at the middle of March the effective men of Chalmers' division were four thousand five hundred and of Jackson's three thousand eight hundred. The number of Buford's is not given, but it contained four regular brigades. If Buford's brigades were of average strength with the others, Forrest had fifteen thousand men immediately in hand. If they averaged each one third less than the others, he still had twelve thousand five hundred.

them, well known to the Iowa cavalry in Mississippi campaigns, as Wirt Adams, Peter B. Starke, Frank C. Armstrong, and Tyree H. Bell.

In February Taylor and Forrest were fully informed of Wilson's preparations and of the general purpose of his campaign; and Forrest disposed his cavalry accordingly. Buford was posted at Montevallo. Chalmers and Jackson held the Tombigby and Black Warrior rivers, covering Columbus on the left and Tuscaloosa on the right. Wirt Adams' brigade of Chalmers' division was left on the border of Mississippi, to guard the Mobile & Ohio railway; but when the campaign approached its crisis Adams marched east into the Black Warrior Valley, and did effective service against one of Wilson's brigades then detached there.

On the 16th of March Taylor and his division generals held a council,¹ in which they took it to be settled that the place first to be assaulted was Selma; and they laid their plans for its defense. They could then have concentrated at Montevallo or at Selma, within a few days, at least fifteen thousand men and forty guns. Yet, when the conflict came their forces were so disposed that they could nowhere get more than five thousand together for the defense of any position. This was the fortunate result of Wilson's plan of misleading his enemy by moving in strength on different roads. That method of marching, followed by the actual detachment of one brigade against Tuscaloosa, caused the rebels to keep their greater strength west of the Warrior and Cahawba rivers until Wilson, by bold and rapid marches, had got so near his goal that their concentration had become impracticable.

¹ "Southern Hist. Soc. Papers," vol. vii., p. 485.

The men of Winslow's brigade were in high spirits, as, indeed, were their comrades of the whole command. The great successes of their late campaigns were fresh in their minds. They had found how much more effective they were with good arms than they had been with bad. They had proved in more than one campaign that cavalry, moving in an organized body of good size and operating independently of infantry, could do service worth recording in history, could do something infinitely better for their own fame than that hard, wearing, and thankless work in which they had been so much engaged, the scouting, reconnoitring, and skirmishing for armies of infantry. They had before them now an opportunity of repeating the Price campaign, with a larger force, better equipped, much better organized and managed, and in pursuit of grander objects. There was a feeling as of being at last freed from an unfair and ignorant restraint, as of being at last recognized as a distinct and effective arm of the service, capable of making a telling campaign as cavalry which could not be made by infantry.

When the brigade arrived at Eastport from Louisville in mid-winter, as told in the last chapter, it was marched thence across the State line and put into camp near Gravelly Springs in Alabama. This camp was a part of the corps cantonment, which covered much of the space between Eastport and Gravelly Springs, along the north bank of the Tennessee. There had been long and heavy rains. The streams were all high, the ground everywhere very wet and soft, and the camp, in consequence, very disagreeable and uncomfortable. The rains continued with unwelcome frequency, though by the middle of March they

had so far diminished that the rivers began to recede, and the first part of the intended march being through a sandy hill country, on the 20th movement was found practicable. Between the 14th and 20th all the divisions crossed the river and went into bivouac on the southern side, ready to march the moment the roads would permit. The Fourth Iowa crossed at Chickasaw, near its camp, on the 20th.

While the cavalry was at Gravelly Springs it had practical proofs of the belief of its generals in the value of military training and discipline. The government of the corps was made step by step more careful and rigid. Infractions of discipline were promptly, and sometimes conspicuously, punished. Vacancies in offices were filled by appointment of those seen to be the most meritorious, though often to the great dissatisfaction of the men of particular companies, who found it very hard to give up the "right," as they deemed it to be, of choosing their officers. All the men not actually on other duty were every day put through drills, inspections, and movements of instruction, regardless of the bad weather. The closest attention was given to the care of the camps, horses, and equipments, although it was exceedingly difficult to keep them in good condition when the rain poured upon them nearly every day. It was hard work, and so much more strictly required than before that many found it very irksome. But all must have understood the object of this careful training, and must have appreciated its good results. They saw that it would have been far better for the regiment if it had had such schooling during the earlier periods of its service.

One marked feature of this school period was the change in the tactics. When the regiment entered the army its instruction was based upon Scott's Tactics, a work which had been in use in the cavalry service more than twenty years. But General Scott's book was not used long by the volunteers. In their first year the War Department laid it aside and adopted General Cooke's. The difference between the two systems is wide, arising chiefly from the different formations of the line. Scott's line is formed in two ranks and Cooke's in one. The character of the evolutions is, of course, substantially the same in both systems, but the differences in detail are so great that a knowledge of the one system is not of much value in a study of the other. For three years the regiment had been working under the Cooke system, and many of the men, enlisted after the regiment took the field, had never had any instruction under Scott's. The reason for the change was in the fact that in the wooded and hilly country in which the troops were to operate a continuous line of any length was impracticable. A brigade of twenty-four hundred mounted men (and several of the brigades were as large as that) in single rank, allowing the proper intervals, would be more than a mile and a half long; and to get a corps, or even a division, into a single line, in position for practicable operation, would be rarely, if ever, possible.

But General Wilson went no further under the old system than to require the double-rank formation in mounted movements. The single rank was retained in dismounted operations, and it happened that nearly all the fighting of the campaign was done dismounted, so

that the men were surprised and gratified to find that in actual combat they were ordered according to their accustomed methods.

The drilling and instruction were varied a little, however, by the familiar service of scouting. Several detachments were sent out, at different times, in different directions. One, under Captain Abraham of the Fourth Iowa, composed of two hundred men, half from the Fourth and half from the Third Iowa, was absent several days, marched as far as Florence, Ala., and brought back fifty-six prisoners and many captured animals.

At last, on the 20th of March, as has been said, the rivers were falling and the roads were drying. At dawn of the 22d the three divisions were in the saddle and the campaign was begun.

Every man carried five days' light rations, one hundred cartridges, two extra horse-shoes and eight nails, with two days' grain for horses. On pack-mules were placed five days' hard bread and ten days' sugar, coffee, and salt; and there was a small wagon-train carrying eighty rounds more of cartridges, twenty days' sugar and salt, and forty-five days' coffee. The food was assigned for sixty days, and any lack was to be supplied by that process which seems rather indefinite in words, but is well defined in the mind of the experienced trooper—"living on the country." The small allowance of bread and grain was intended to provide only for the march through the northern part of Alabama, a region very poor at the best, and now wasted by two years of war within its borders.

Fifty of the wagons carried a light pontoon equipment of thirty canvas boats.

All the divisions moved in a southeasterly direction, on two roads, Long and McCook taking the road by Cherokee Station and Frankfort, while Upton moved on their left toward Russellville and Jasper. It was Wilson's plan to move in two columns, on different roads, with a view to disconcert the enemy, mislead him as to the objective point, and prevent his massing his forces. The plan succeeded perfectly. Upton's division moved rapidly, the weather being fine and the roads dry, passing by Barton to Throgmorton's Mill. Near the latter place Winslow's brigade camped the first night. The next day the march of the division left Russellville on the right, Long and McCook not having come up, and brought it in the evening, without any special incident, to Newburg, where it went into camp. On the 24th Winslow's brigade moved separately from Alexander's, through a very rough and difficult country, by way of Kinlock, until it reached the wild and picturesque Sipsey Creek. This was crossed on a high and shaky bridge, and the brigade bivouacked near Hubbard's Mill. On the 25th the march was down the Sipsey Valley, though the hills were so bold and near each other that there could hardly be said to be a valley. The country was covered by an interminable pine forest, without settlements, but two cabins being passed within thirty miles. Alexander's brigade rejoined Winslow's that day, and both camped at Clear Creek, on the Jasper road. The next day the brigades again parted, Winslow's moving to Bartonville and Hanly's Mill, east of Jasper, toward Elyton. It was intended to cross the Sipsey again, and then, moving eastward, the Mulberry River, the western fork of the Black Warrior; but

there was no bridge over the Sipsey, and the stream was too swift and deep for fording. The brigade moved down its west side, to the Mulberry, then to the mouth of the Blackwater, crossed the Blackwater there after dark and by a very difficult ford, and camped at Burnham's Ford on the Mulberry. Burnham's Ford was a long and dangerous one. All the next day, from dawn till night, was spent in efforts to improve it and in getting the horses over. For the pack-train a raft had to be built, which was floated back and forth by the use of ropes.

The next object was the crossing of the Locust, the eastern fork of the Black Warrior, twenty miles ahead. All the streams of the region were already high, from recent rains, and it was again raining heavily and steadily. There was reason to fear that the Locust might become impassable. The men had hardly got their camp-fires lighted in the wet woods, after crossing the Mulberry, when "*Boots and Saddles!*" was sounded and the march was resumed. There was never so dark a night as that. It rained heavily and constantly. It poured. The tread of the horses was an unceasing splashing in mud and water. All the night was spent in making the distance of twenty miles, and it was day-break when the head of the brigade reached the Locust. The river was full and swift, and rapidly rising. A short halt, for the examination of the ford and for volunteers to try it, and the head of the column went in. But the passage was found to be not so difficult nor so dangerous as that of the Mulberry. The brigade was all over by noon; and during the afternoon it made twenty miles farther, to Elyton, going into bivouac west of that village, at Hawkins' plantation, the first

farm of any importance seen since the march began. Large quantities of bacon and corn were stored there. The rough and barren mountain country was behind; the army was in the border of a land of plenty.

It seems a grave mistake on the part of the enemy, that they did not resist Wilson in this mountain region. His divisions were separated, and, owing to the topography of the country, it would have been difficult or impracticable to bring either to the support of another; the roads were often very narrow and difficult, the streams were numerous and to be crossed only by fords, which were usually dangerous and always far apart; and the passes between the hills were sometimes capable of very easy and effective defense by small forces. An intelligent and determined campaign of resistance in this country would certainly have gained much time, and might have been wholly victorious; but Wilson's divisions spent a week in marching through it, without a skirmish.

Winslow's brigade had not yet seen the enemy, but Alexander's had just reached his rear at Elyton; and a little earlier the column had passed a position which had been recently fortified and was naturally very strong, but which was abandoned without defense.

On the 29th Upton's division was delayed a few hours, waiting for the train to come up, but got off before noon, and marched rapidly toward the Cahawba River. The iron and coal region of Alabama was entered. Here the enemy had thrown up extended lines of fortification, to protect their iron-making establishments; but they were all deserted upon the approach of the Yankees. This day the Third and Fourth Iowa reached and destroyed, by fire and explosion, the

first of the iron-making plants, the *McIlwain* and *Red Mountain*. It still rained heavily, and when the *Cahawba* was reached, late in the afternoon, that river was very high. The rebels had just ceased their busy labor of felling large trees into the ford and into the road descending to the water. It is far easier to do that kind of work than it is to undo it; and, after great labor and difficulty throughout the night, only one regiment, one of Alexander's, was over. The remainder of that brigade bivouacked on the north bank.

Arriving at the ford in the night and finding Alexander's brigade thus delayed, Winslow sent out scouting parties, to learn where the railway, which had been observed along our left during the day, crossed the river. The crossing was found a few miles farther down, near Hillsborough. Winslow at once moved his brigade there and occupied the position. There was a "lattice" bridge, high, with long trestle-work approaches at each end, and the whole built of wood. The roadway was open between the ties, as is usual in railway bridges, but, fortunately, some new cross-ties were found near the track on our side of the river. Winslow sent a report to Upton, but, without waiting for orders, put to work as many men as possible, tearing up the iron rails and laying the new cross-ties between those already down, so as to make of all a close floor. Every one was eager to get over, and as soon as daylight had overcome the thick clouds and rain so far as to allow the men to see to walk on the ties the work was begun. The strongest men were in front, as many as the space would permit, loosening and throwing off the rails with improvised tools, while the

roadway was filled with a close procession of men in rubber blankets, hurrying up with the spare ties and returning for more. It was in the dull, slaty light of early morning in a driving rain—the swollen, rushing river, the high, narrow bridge, the surrounding dark forest, the two thousand horses and the unemployed men standing in silence while the men employed pushed their work with nervous energy, the sharp orders of officers, with anxious outlook in fear that the enemy would appear on the opposite bank before the last ties were laid—the scene is one that must still be very distinct in the memory of all who were there. Within a few hours the bridge was finished with a floor eight feet wide and three hundred yards long, and the advanced companies, in single file, were carefully leading over their trembling horses.

General Upton came up while the troopers were crossing, and was surprised and delighted to find that the passage which he had expected to be very difficult was so rapidly made. Alexander's brigade immediately followed, and, the train, having been left behind, the division moved swiftly toward Montevallo, the Fourth Iowa leading. The same day the two other divisions crossed the Cahawba by this converted railway bridge (the ford they had attempted having become quite impassable), and followed Upton's, but did not move so rapidly.

The heavy rains and swollen streams had made the movement of the column slower than had been calculated, and Wilson was now anxious to reach Montevallo before the enemy could prepare for a strong defense there. He therefore on the 29th determined to leave the train behind, between the Warrior rivers, under

a strong guard, and push the fighting men forward as fast as possible. To cover the train in this position and at the same time to develop the strength of the forces which the enemy might be able to move against him from the west, he detached Croxton's brigade of McCook's division with orders to march upon Tuscaloosa, take the city, destroy all public stores and buildings, bridges and factories, and rejoin the main column, by way of Centreville, near Selma. Croxton executed his orders fully, but was unable to rejoin the corps, because of the strength of the enemy in his front (Jackson's division and Wirt Adams' brigade), and was compelled to carry on a separate campaign, which was entirely successful and remarkably picturesque.

Very soon after crossing the Cahawba bridge, the Fourth Iowa found rebel cavalry in front, but apparently not in force; and those seen kept carefully at long range. Chalmers' division was believed to be hurrying to the defense of Montevallo. No time was lost, although detachments were dropped out of the column to destroy several iron-works and collieries which were in operation near the line of march.

An officer of the Fourth Iowa that afternoon found and arrested at the front a man in citizen's dress, who, on being questioned, told so important a story that he was sent to General Winslow, who sent him to General Upton. He said that his name was Millington, that he was an Englishman and a civil engineer, and that he had been employed in the planning and construction of the fortifications of Selma. He drew on the ground a plan of the works, showing them extending in two lines around the city, in the form of the arc of a circle, the Alabama River being the chord; and he told with

intelligence and clearness how it was intended to make the defense of the works, and what the means of defense were. It looked very formidable, and he thought cavalry could not possibly take the place. The "well-drawn sketch and complete description of the defenses of Selma" spoken of in General Wilson's report were obtained from this man, and were of great value in determining the plan of attack upon Selma.

At about four o'clock the enemy, having been driven all day, became stubborn and seemed disposed to make a stand. They were of Buford's division, from the brigades of Roddey and Daniel Adams. The Fourth Iowa being in front, Colonel Peters sent Major Woods with two companies (F and L) to make a circuit to the left and come up on the enemy's flank. Woods had a skirmish on his way, in which he had one man wounded; but before he could reach his intended position the rebels fell back, and the remainder of the regiment drove them at high speed into and beyond Montevallo.

Large quantities of corn and other stores were found at Montevallo, and earthworks showing that it had been intended to defend the place. Upton's division camped in the town, and the next morning awaited there the coming up of the First and Second divisions, being employed meantime in destroying as much of the captured supplies as could not be used by our troops. Detachments were sent out from both brigades during the day, to destroy iron-works and a rolling-mill near. On one of these errands Colonel Benteen was sent with the Tenth Missouri. His objective was the *Bibb* iron-works, a large establishment a few miles south of Montevallo. A regiment of the enemy was found on guard there, detached from Roddey's brigade for the

purpose, but the Tenth Missouri at once attacked, gained possession of the works, and destroyed them in the face of the enemy. The division had now destroyed, at different places, four iron-making establishments, the *Red Mountain*, *McIlvain*, *Bibb*, *Central*, and *Columbiana*, with a rolling-mill, the *Cahawba*, all in the service of the Confederate government, and five collieries.

About noon, and while the First and Second divisions were arriving at Montevallo, the enemy attacked the picket on the Selma road, south of the town. General Wilson, just then arrived, ordered Upton to move his division out at once, which was done. Alexander's brigade was in advance, and soon met the rebels, charged them with great spirit, and drove them steadily to Six-mile Creek, killing, wounding, and capturing a considerable number. It was learned that the enemy in front were Roddey's and Crossland's brigades, and that Forrest was commanding in person. In this affair Company G, of the Fourth Iowa, Upton's escort, was engaged, and Lieutenant Peter R. Keck, of that company, then acting on Upton's staff, so distinguished himself, even after his horse was killed under him, that he was recommended for promotion by Upton for gallant conduct on the field.

Winslow's brigade, which had been kept closed up on Alexander's, was ordered to pass to the front. The Tenth Missouri led the brigade, under Colonel Benteen, and found the enemy in a strong position on the crest of a hill. Along the foot of the hill in their front and across the road ran a creek. Its banks were steep and miry, and it was passable only by a bridge which stood directly in front of the enemy's position.

rebels made a flank attack, a thing Forrest was much given to. The head of the Fourth Iowa had just passed Six-mile Creek, and was at the foot of the hill which rises from the south bank. Immediately in its front marched Rodney's battery of the Fourth United States Artillery, which occupied the road all the way up the hill and for some distance along its top. At the top of the hill the road made a considerable turn to the left, and the head of the battery column had passed around the bend. Upton and Winslow had gone on, and were with the advanced regiment. Suddenly firing was heard in front of the Fourth Iowa, on the right flank of the battery. The artillerymen were seen in confusion. As it was known that the enemy had been beaten, and were being driven in front of the division column, this firing on the flank near the rear of the column could not be understood. Colonel Peters and another officer rode up the hill to learn what was the matter, and at the top they saw at once, without having to ask any questions. There was a body of rebel cavalry in the woods close on the right flank. They had chosen the best point of attack, at the bend in the road, and were now firing briskly on the broken artillery column. They were very near, a party of officers showing themselves within easy pistol-shot. Colonel Peters at once ordered up the Third Battalion, Major Dee leading it at the head of the regiment, and also the three companies of the First Battalion, under Captain Abraham, next following. The Second Battalion was then in the rear of the pack-train, half a mile or more farther back on the road. The seven companies galloped up, instantly dismounted in line, and advanced with great spirit and with a ring-

ing fire from their Spencers. The rebels fell back in disorder to a railway embankment. This was in a very good position for defense, and they made a stand behind it, dismounting a part of their men to fire from shelter along its crest ; but the advance was not halted a moment. The line was upon the embankment and over it in a time hardly longer than is taken in telling it ; and the rebels broke and fled on their horses. The pursuit was continued a mile or more, when an aide from Winslow arrived, with an order requiring the regiment to proceed immediately to the front on the road. The companies then returned to the road, mounted, and hurried forward.¹ The enemy lost five killed and many wounded and captured. In the Fourth Iowa there were none killed and but five wounded.²

It was an eventful day in the Fourth Division. All the regiments had been engaged, each had had an opportunity to charge, and everywhere there was complete success. General Upton said in his report that they had "ridden down the enemy in every conflict during the day," while Winslow wrote, "I have no doubt that the manner in which this day's work was done tended much to render our subsequent victories the easier achieved," and Wilson, "The gallantry of men and officers had been most conspicuous throughout the day, and had resulted already in the establishment of a moral supremacy for the corps."

¹ The number of the enemy engaged here was difficult to determine, owing to their concealment in the woods as far as possible, but there appeared to be three or four hundred. From a prisoner's statement they were from Crossland's brigade ; but Jordan describes an attack made in the same manner and at or near the same place and time, by Forrest in person with his escort. Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 663. But Jordan mentions circumstances which did not occur in the affair here described, and which were indeed impossible.

² See Appendix : "Engagements and Casualties."

The division camped that night near Randolph, in excellent condition, and with a deepened interest in the absorbing subject, the intended attack upon Selma. It was now forty-five miles distant, and would be reached within two days, if there should be no great delay. Everybody saw that its capture was a great undertaking, but nobody thought of it as of a thing that *could not* be done. Every man seemed to feel that it *would* be done. A spirit of great cheerfulness and confidence was established throughout the army.

Early next morning, the 1st of April, the corps moved on, in close order, through Randolph, Upton's division there turning to the east, on the Maplesville road, while Long's division and LaGrange's brigade of McCook's kept the main road to Selma. By despatches found on a courier taken by Upton, Wilson was informed of the present disposition of the rebel forces, and at the same time he had news of the other brigade of McCook's division (Croxtan), which was now occupied with Jackson's division, near Trion, trying to prevent it from joining Forrest. Thereupon Wilson ordered McCook, with LaGrange's brigade, westward to Centreville, to take and hold the bridge over the Cahawba there, and then to move against Jackson, break up his force, form a junction with Croxtan, and bring the whole division down the Selma road. At the same time he directed Long and Upton to push on toward Selma, to drive Forrest as rapidly as possible and give him no time to breathe or gather his forces in front. Both divisions found rebels in front, and kept up very lively skirmishing until they reached Ebenezer Church, where the two roads on which the divisions were marching converged.

Here Forrest made a stand with all the force he could collect, cavalry and artillery, with a reinforcement of infantry from Selma. General Long reached the position first, and attacked at once with his advance. He first threw a battalion, mounted, against Roddey's brigade, broke it, and produced such confusion that Forrest's utmost efforts in person were required to save his line.

This battalion, numbering two hundred, was from the Seventeenth Indiana, and was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White. It charged mounted, with sabres, and got literally into the midst of the rebels, was surrounded on all sides, and every man in it had to fight at his best. The rebels, magnifying the number of their assailants, brought all their artillery and most of their troops into the action. Colonel White especially sought to capture a battery at the junction of the roads, and he did reach it, but could not hold it against the odds. He wheeled and cut his way out, but with heavy loss. Captain Taylor, who commanded one of the companies, singled out Forrest, and fought him face to face, reckless of the fire of other rebels. Forrest was wounded, but the daring Taylor was killed. When White's men reached the guns their impetus was so great that they rode right over them, and one of the guns was dismounted by a horse striking it with such force as to break one of the wheels to pieces. The horse was killed by the blow, and the rebels say that when his rider was thrown he was immediately killed by one of the gunners with a handspike.

Meantime, Upton, having a longer road, but anticipating an opportunity to flank the enemy at the

junction of the roads, had hastened his march. Alexander's brigade was in front, and reached the enemy before Long could get into position to support the charge of White. Hearing the noise of White's fighting on his right, and supposing it to mean that Long was engaged there in force, Alexander advanced at high speed until the right of Forrest's line was developed. This line was formed on the south side of Bogler's Creek, and extended from Mulberry Creek westward, across the Selma road, at least a mile, to a high, rough ridge, which fell away abruptly on the west to Bogler's Creek. The greater part of its length ran through thick woods, and it was strengthened by slashings of trees and barricades of rails. Six guns were planted at the junction of the roads, four bearing upon Long's advance and two upon Upton's. The men were, of course, dismounted, and every preparation was made for a decisive engagement. Forrest meant, at the least, to check Wilson and hold him long enough to enable Jackson and Chalmers to cross the Cahawba and join him. Forrest's biographer says that he had here scarcely fifteen hundred men,¹ but he admits three of Forrest's cavalry brigades, Roddey, Dan Adams, and Crossland, with a force of infantry from Selma which in different Confederate reports appears as a regiment and a battalion. If there were but fifteen hundred, the cavalry brigades must have averaged only four hundred men each, while in his other divisions Forrest's brigades at that time averaged sixteen hundred men each.² Consider that inconsistency with the length of his line in position and the

¹ Jordan's "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 665.

² The same, pp. 657, 658.

persistent habit of the Confederates in minimizing their numbers, and it seems probable that Forrest had in this engagement nearer four thousand than fifteen hundred men.

Finding that he had reached the enemy's main line, Alexander deployed two regiments to his right, the Fifth Iowa and First Ohio, intending to connect with Long's left, dismounted them, and immediately advanced. The battle was fierce and close,¹ but the infantry on the rebel extreme right soon broke and fell back on the Selma road. The veteran dismounted cavalry held on for half an hour. As soon as Upton could get Alexander's brigade out of the way, he ordered up two regiments of Winslow's to attack on Alexander's left. The two regiments happened to be the Third and Fourth Iowa, the Third in front. They galloped forward in column, and reached the scene just as the rebels were finally giving way under Alexander's splendid assault. The Third Iowa, led by Noble, succeeded in striking their flank, and had a sharp conflict with a body of them who attempted a stand, losing several men wounded and a number of horses. Then Forrest's defeat became a confused flight, and the Third and Fourth Iowa pursued him to Plantersville, two hundred prisoners falling into the hands of the Third on the way. Two guns, about one hundred killed and wounded, and about one hundred prisoners were his losses to Alexander, and Forrest himself was wounded, while Long gained the gun which had been dismounted in White's fierce charge and thirty prisoners. Company G of the Fourth Iowa,

¹ In one company, C of the Seventh Ohio, every man was killed, wounded, or had bullets through his clothes.

then with Upton, took part in this battle, and was highly praised by the General for its very prompt and spirited action; and Captain Clark of the Fourth Iowa, then serving on Winslow's staff, distinguished himself in the attack made by the Third Iowa.

While these vigorous blows were being given, McCook and LaGrange were riding at a trot toward Centreville, forty miles west of Randolph. With their one brigade they were to effect a junction with Croxton, whose immediate enemy then greatly outnumbered him, or at least prevent that enemy from crossing the Cahawba to join Forrest. They occupied Centreville, crossed the Cahawba, and advanced on the Tuscaloosa road until they met the enemy. There, at Scottsboro, they had a severe skirmish, and learned from prisoners that they were confronted by Jackson's division, and that Croxton had the day before, after fighting with Jackson, retreated to the north, toward Elyton. McCook thereupon moved back over the river, and destroyed the bridge behind him, thus preventing Jackson from crossing in time to join Forrest in the defense of Selma. This brigade did not reach the corps again until the 6th, after Selma had fallen.

Winslow's brigade was stopped at Plantersville at dark, the remainder of the corps came up, and all went into bivouac around that village. The corps was held close in hand, for the next day it must move upon Selma. Twenty-five miles it had marched that day, fighting for the road nearly all the way.

It is the morning of Sunday, the 2d of April, and Selma is only seventeen miles ahead. The men are called before daybreak. With unusual care the preparations for battle are made. Arms, horses, and

equipments are looked to very closely. All servants, non-combatants, and led animals are sent to the rear. The column is stripped of every impediment, like a race-horse. The sun is not yet risen when the troops are mounted and in the road, in a compact column of fours. Everything is in order. The men are very quiet. They talk less than usual, and in lower tones. Everybody expects a bloody contest. The savage Forrest is at bay, and will fight behind fortifications. The prospect is that every man will be a part of this battle and will have plenty to do.

Long's division is in front, and Upton's does not move till about nine o'clock. The march is on the Plantersville road, directly toward Selma. Mile after mile is passed. Ten miles are gone, and the skirmish-line not yet engaged. What does it mean? The generals could, perhaps, form a better judgment, but the men had expected another battle before the works were reached. But neither generals nor men knew then how much discouraged the enemy were by their reverses and their failure to understand the double movement of Wilson's divisions. They did not know that Forrest had given up hope of success in the field, and had hurried into the fortifications. He offers no further resistance outside, except by skirmishers, who steadily retire. At about two o'clock the column is within six miles of the city. Long's division is then moved off westward, to take the road from Summerfield to Selma, while Upton's continues on the Plantersville road. Winslow's brigade is in the front of the division, and the Fourth Iowa in the front of the brigade. It happens to be this day the turn of the Second Battalion to lead the regiment, and it is in its place,

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led by its gallant major, Woods. His orders are to drive the rebel skirmishers without stopping until they enter the fortifications.

It is well worthy of note here, as showing the zeal and faithful service of this regiment, that not only were the major and all the captains of this battalion in the field and at their posts on this campaign, but all the field and staff officers (except Major Pierce, then in the hospital from a wound received in battle), and all the captains and very nearly all the lieutenants of the regiment were there too. Any one who has been engaged in active campaign will know that this is not a common record.

Selma comes into view at two miles' distance. The Union troopers look down upon it from a low plateau. Every heart is tense with suppressed emotion. In this scene, so beautiful in the soft sunlight of a spring afternoon, there will soon be a fearful change. Of the fierce conflict that will come the assailants must think, not merely whether it will be victory or defeat, but whether victory or ruin. They know how small is their chance of safety if they fail, for the enemy's divisions are behind as well as in front, and hundreds of miles separate them from the nearest friendly line.

It is a small city, on the north bank of the Alabama. The open plain upon which it stands extends two or three miles from the river northward, to the foot of the plateau on which the invaders stand. The city is reached, on the north side of the river, by four principal roads. The Burnsville road runs in from the east, near the river and substantially parallel with it. The Plantersville road (which, near Selma, becomes the Range Line road) runs in southerly, the Summerfield

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road southeasterly, and the roads from Marion and Cahawba, joining within a mile of the city, enter directly from the west, by a bridge over Mill Creek. At the points where the Range Line and Summerfield roads enter the outer fortifications, they are a mile or more apart. Half a mile west of the Summerfield road, and parallel with it, runs Mill (or Valley) Creek, which falls into the river a mile below the city. This creek is deep and has boggy borders, in itself almost a sufficient defense against attack from the west.

Extended and heavy fortifications have been built around the city. One line of continuous works stretches entirely around it, a distance of over four miles from the river above to the river at the mouth of Mill Creek below. Twenty-four bastions, constructed to mount from one to three guns each, stand at intervals, connected by heavy entrenchments and redans, so as to form a solid line. The ramparts are from eight to twelve feet high and from ten to fifteen feet thick at the base. That portion of this line which occupies the space from the Range Line road eastward over the Burnsville road to the river is built lighter than the remainder, because it is fronted by almost continuous swamps. Through the swamps, roughly parallel with the line of the works, runs a stream called Bench Creek. This creek takes its rise in another marsh lying between the Range Line and Summerfield roads. At this season it is impracticable for horses at all places, but there are bridges on the Burnsville and Range Line roads. In and about the marshy parts of the ground between the Range Line and Summerfield roads are several thickets and groves, affording opportunities for concealing bodies of advancing troops; but

the ground for six or eight hundred yards next east of the Summerfield road is entirely open and is drained well enough to be practicable for a charge against the works.

The fortifications are earthworks, fronted by wide, deep ditches, partly filled with water. The ditches are perfectly enfiladed from the bastions. Along the counterscarp of the bastions and ramparts and along the parapets of the rifle pits is planted a line of sharpened palisades. Within this line of works, midway between it and the outer streets of the town, is another line not yet finished. There are four heavy redoubts or bastions for large guns, standing at intervals so as to command the several roads, but connecting curtains have been as yet only partly finished. All these works have been constructed with the best engineering skill and with great care. There are thirty-two guns in position upon them, so mounted that their fire can be concentrated upon either of the roads. Three of them are mounted in a bastion on the outer line, just west of the Range Line road, upon which the Fourth Iowa is approaching. Directly behind this battery, on one of the inner bastions, in a similar position as to the Range Line road, is mounted one of the big guns of the defense, a 30-pounder Parrott.

The defenses are held by six or seven thousand men, under Lieutenant-General Taylor, with Forrest second in command. Most of their troops have had much experience.¹

¹ The two sides have differed widely as to the number of men who held the defenses of Selma. The belief of the Union generals was (and the army remained there a week after the capture) that there were about seven thousand. Confederate officers and writers have, since the war, given the number as very small, a "mere handful," a "few small regiments of home-guards and militia,"

The enemy's rear in front of Major Woods move toward the city without stopping, contenting themselves with firing back upon his advance from time to time. When the city comes into view, and it is seen that no serious fighting will occur outside the fortifications, the rear company of the battalion, C, is left at the head of the regiment, and the Major, with his three other companies (I, F, and L), commanded by their captains, Jones, Dana, and Pray, moves on to complete his orders. On the Range Line road they descend the slope of the plateau, and pass one of the groves described, which stands just to the right of the road. A line of rebel cavalry, about two companies, had been

and the like. No official report of either Taylor or Forrest appears to have been made. In Taylor's "Destruction and Reconstruction," a history of his doings in the war, is an account of Selma, in which he gives Wilson's strength, but not his own. Jordan, in his "Campaigns of Forrest," page 673, intimates that there were 3,100, but, in describing the commands, he omits entirely the brigades of Crossland and Adams, which, on an earlier page, he says were at Ebenezer Church the day before, and therefore by fair presumption had fallen back with Forrest upon Selma. But Selma was of very great, if not of vital, importance to the Confederate cause. In supplies, factories, foundries, and production of ordnance and ammunition, not more than two other places were as great. The commander of the department himself went there to take charge of the defense, and though his department had been depleted to strengthen Johnston in front of Sherman, yet he must have had *some* infantry and artillery in the two States he controlled which could have been sent to Selma. The chance of the defeat of the cavalry in the field under Forrest was alone a sufficient reason for concentrating infantry and artillery in the fortifications. And Jordan says, page 673, that there were "other forces in the place" besides Forrest's. As is shown on page 442 *ante*, Forrest must have retreated from Ebenezer Church the night before with over three thousand. On the way, Jordan says, pages 671, 673, he was joined by another of his old brigades (Armstrong), 1,400 strong. Here were at least 4,400 veterans. It is incredible that Taylor had not gathered, with a full month's notice of the campaign and of its object, at least a couple of thousand in infantry, artillery, home-guards, and militia. Nearly three thousand men were killed, wounded, and captured in the defenses, and it is certain that very many escaped in the darkness. The roads east and west were entirely open to them and safe, and even the Confederate accounts agree that their men broke and fled in numbers early in the engagement. We conclude that at least six thousand manned the defenses.

drawn up with right flank resting on the road, midway between the grove and the outer line of works; but as soon as Woods' men appear in front of the trees this line melts away. At the same moment the first gun of the defense is fired. It is the 30-pounder, and the shot flies over these advanced companies. This announces to Woods that his orders are fully executed, and he shelters his men, to await further orders. The men are now dismounted and the horses sent to the rear. The position of I is on the road, to the left of the front of the grove. L is on the left of I, in a line reaching from near the road to the border of the swamp. F is for the present on the road in rear of I, partly sheltered by the grove.

Meantime General Wilson has reconnoitred the defenses and made his dispositions. Long's division, except one regiment, which he has posted at the creek in his rear, to protect his led horses and pack-train, is formed, dismounted, across the Summerfield road, with its right resting near Mill Creek, half a mile from the works and parallel with the line of that portion of them which lies across and immediately commands the Summerfield road and Mill Creek. His line is concealed from the enemy by a low hill or ridge. Robinson's battery is posted just east of the road, in front of Long's left. The horses of the division are held at the creek, half a mile to the rear of the line. Winslow's brigade is halted at Shackelford's house, on the Range Line road, about a mile from the works. The Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri are dismounted and moved to a point opposite Long's line, and a few hundred yards behind Major Woods' companies, where they are formed in line, the Third on the right and the Tenth on the

left of the Range Line road. The First and Third battalions of the Fourth Iowa, with Company C of the Second Battalion, being intended for a special service, as will be described, are dismounted just in front of the Shackelford house and directed to remove their sabres and spurs. They are later to be formed on the left of the Tenth Missouri, and to be the left of the whole line of attack. The men are directed to make coffee, as there appears to be time enough for that valuable bit of preparation for work. On the road near Shackelford's, Rodney's battery is posted, and a little farther back Alexander's brigade is halted and held mounted. Only one man in eight has been left behind with the horses, but in the absence of all of McCook's division and of many detachments sent upon different marches and duties, Long has in line only about two thousand men and Winslow about fifteen hundred.

In Wilson's plan of attack, which Long and Upton know and fully approve, Long is to assault the works in his front just at dark, while Upton, keeping his main force concealed, but within easy support, is to penetrate the swamp on his extreme left with a small picked force, suddenly and at all hazards rush over the works there, and throw the enemy into confusion by falling upon his right flank inside his works. A single gun by Rodney is to be Long's signal, and it is to be fired when Upton is ready and darkness is so far advanced as to favor the movement of his forlorn hope.

The generals having learned that the works in the swamp are lighter than on other parts of the line, assume that they are not so strongly manned; and it is at Upton's special suggestion and request that he is charged with the duty of making the

daring attempt there. While these preparations are going on, other guns on the works have joined the big Parrott, and the battery on the Range Line road is throwing shell and canister with great activity. It is a mighty noise, with wicked whistling of missiles, though as yet without any serious effect in that part of the field.

Now, about four o'clock, Upton is seen riding toward Woods' command from the rear. He dismounts, leaving his horse with a soldier, passes by the left of F, takes Sergeant Loughridge, who has the nearest platoon of that company, with Pickens and another, privates, and the four creep through the swamp on the left, for a close observation of the position. On the way the General talks with the soldiers, and speaks of the plan of attack. He requests them to look out landmarks well, as they will be needed to guide the assaulting force when night falls.

Upton is very zealous in this enterprise by way of the swamp, and proud of his responsibility in having charge of it. He is full of the idea that such an attack will succeed with very small loss of men. He and the three soldiers, getting into the swamp, move forward through it, concealed sometimes by the bushes and trees and sometimes by creeping through the tall grass. They get so near the enemy's line that they can observe the character and armament of the works for some distance. It is seen that if troops can pass the swamp, they will be directly under the works. But the General, not satisfied yet, leaves the Sergeant and his men, and creeps through the grass and bushes still nearer, taking nothing with him but his field-glass. After a while he returns and goes with the soldiers

back to his horse. He is then fully confirmed in the plan described; and says that three hundred men can get through that swamp, and, as he expresses it, "roll up" the rebels behind the works, so that in the general assault the whole place can be taken without losing twenty men. The three soldiers are much impressed by their distinguished companion in the reconnoissance and by the prospect before them for the night, since they understand that their own regiment will be the one to go upon the desperate errand. Indeed, the Fourth Iowa was actually chosen for the distinguishing service, and Colonel Peters was notified to be ready for such an order.

But the execution of the plan is very unexpectedly precipitated, and to a certain extent disarranged. It is five o'clock. Everything is ready, and only the coming of twilight is awaited. Suddenly a great increase in the firing on the right is heard. It is Long's division advancing against the works. A regiment holding his rear has been attacked by Chalmers, and he takes the responsibility of solving the difficulty thus created by assaulting the enemy in his front. He sends back another regiment to strengthen the defense of his rear against Chalmers, and then leads the remainder of his line, himself on foot, at a rush across the open ground in front of the works. With great roar and crashing the enemy opens all his guns that have range. At least twenty are trained on the Summerfield road, while eight or ten are employed against the Range Line road. But the small-arms are more deadly. In a few minutes more than three hundred of Long's men are killed or wounded, and he too is fallen, with three of his colonels; but his men dash on, scale

the palisades, plunge into the ditch, scramble up the escarpment, and are fighting hand-to-hand on the parapets. For a time the battle hangs there, but the extraordinary vigor and impetuosity of the assault cannot long be resisted. The rebels break wherever Long's men reach them, and are forced back upon their inner line. A most courageous attack, a most brilliant success.

Of course, the bold, splendid movement attracts the attention and intensest interest of all the rest of the army. Not knowing the plan of attack, the men of Upton's division suppose that Long has begun the battle under orders, and every moment look for their own orders to advance. Major Woods, with the three companies of the Fourth Iowa, seeing the Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri move up to his rear, has already advanced his position. F is now in the open field on the right of I, and the whole line is within four hundred yards of the works and in front of the bastions commanding the Range Line road upon both the lines of defense. Here his men lie down, concealed from view from the enemy's parapets, to await further orders. But the right of Woods' line is a long way from the left of Long's. Hearing the noise of the guns opposing Long's advance, and presently seeing Long's rushing line, Woods understands it to be his duty to charge too; but he has no orders. He is not long in doubt, however. An officer of Winslow's staff appears and orders him to charge. His companies rush upon the works in their front with splendid bravery, and quickly carry the position. Dana with Company F springs over the palisades and upon the parapets at the three-gun battery and immediately captures it,

while Jones and Pray dash in on the Range Line road or over the works on its left. Five guns and a whole regiment (the Fourth Alabama), with its colonel, fell into their hands. But in the conflict the gallant and accomplished Jones is killed. The victors, flushed with their success, go like the wind across the space between the two lines of works, to seize the inner line. Woods' men and the left of Long's find themselves in a race for the big Parrott gun on one of the inner redoubts, the one just west of the Range Line road. It is able to fire one shot more; and then Long's men, ahead in the race, have killed or captured the gunners, who refuse to leave their post. The general-in-chief of the unfortunate Confederates has already run away,¹ giving up the battle as lost before it was begun; but his lieutenant, the courageous Forrest, a host in himself, mans the works with the confident determination of the true soldier, and forces into the trenches every man able to hold a gun.

Understanding instantly what Long has attempted to do, Wilson promptly and wisely decides to support him with the whole force. He hurries forward the batteries of Robinson and Rodney, and orders them to fire incessantly, to give an impression of numbers of guns and to conceal the noise of the fighting with Chalmers. At the same time he sends to Upton an order to assault vigorously on the left, but events move with such speed that before Upton can receive the

¹ Taylor says, in his "Destruction and Reconstruction," p. 219, that Forrest appeared in Selma, announced the enemy at his heels, and told him he must "move at once, to escape capture," and that he "barely escaped"; but Forrest must have been in Selma before two o'clock, and Jordan says, in "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 672, that he arrived at ten, and, p. 673, that Taylor left at two, which was full three hours before the attack.

order the outer works are broken, Robinson has driven the enemy from the bastions on the Summerfield road and has planted his guns in the very gateway, while Wilson himself, fired with the splendid spirit of the battle, is leading a charge upon the second position at the head of his own guard, a squadron of the Fourth United States Cavalry. Then comes the obstinate fight of Forrest behind the inner line. The first charge upon it, made by a few hundred farthest in advance, is repulsed, but a second, in which the Fourth Ohio, Fourth Michigan, and Seventeenth Indiana join, is successful. Forrest himself there breaks, and with his guard flies through the streets and out by the Burnsville road. His right hand, Armstrong, with his brigade, follows or leads his movement. There is no head to the rebels; they become a mob. The moment the inner line is broken on the Summerfield road, Upton orders a mounted charge by the Range Line road. The two battalions of the Fourth Iowa are the men nearest their horses. One of Winslow's aides, Lieutenant Pickel, comes at a tearing gallop across the fields to the position of the Fourth Iowa, with an order to Colonel Peters to charge the battalions, mounted and in column, through the works on the Range Line road. In one moment sabres are on and spurs re-strapped. In another a column of fours is in the road, galloping down, Company C in front and Colonel Peters at the head. Now Captain Hodge dashes up with another message, *General Winslow orders the Fourth Iowa to charge at once! Spare no horses!* No horses are spared. Like a hurricane the column rushes through the gap on the Range Line road and upon the inner line. Once there, it is but one move-

ment to deploy and dash against and through the enemy's broken regiments. It is a fearful scene: the clatter of the arms, the snorting of the horses and the thunder of their feet, the shouts of the officers, and the wild yells and cries of the men, the incessant flashing and cracking of carbines and pistols, the desperate efforts to escape or find shelter by the rebels who have lost their arms or their courage, and, as the battle decreases, the increasing confusion of accumulating bodies of prisoners, the excited search of parties of the victors who have become separated from their comrades, the riderless horses flying wildly about.

When this charge begins some guns on the inner works are still firing, but now all have ceased. The enemy flee in all directions, in great disorder, though some keep up an irregular fire as they run. The brave Taber, Chief-Trumpeter, ringing *Charge!* upon his bugle without ceasing, is killed at the head of the regiment.¹ The different companies of the regiment sweep all the streets. Some obstinate rebels keep up a fire from corners and windows, but the most are concerned only in hiding or getting out of the way. The head of the column gallops first to the river, and searches anxiously there for a bridge, which it is hoped will be found and saved; but the enemy have had only a pontoon bridge, and that they had already cut and floated down the river, with all the steamboats which had been at the landing. Prisoners are taken in large numbers on all sides, and presently find themselves shut up in the big new prison pen which has

¹ This is the man who distinguished himself at Marais des Cygnes, where he sat upon his horse, directly under the fire of Marmaduke's division, sounding the *Charge!* until his regiment had broken the enemy to pieces.

just been completed within the inner line of works for the confinement of the Yankee cavalry when caught. But night has fallen, and those who have managed to keep ahead of the charging troops are saved by the darkness. Those who hide in the town are taken during the night or in the morning. Some escape by rail to Meridian, the commanding general taking care to go first and on a special engine. This thrifty soldier has provided for himself in advance. Considerable numbers escape to the east by the Burnsville road and to the west by the Marion road. The First Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, led by Captain Abraham, pursue some miles on the Burnsville road, capturing many more, with yet more guns. Lieutenant Ogg, with Company D, is the first to reach that road; and he rides so close upon the enemy that his company is mistaken by them for one of their own. Two guns with their caissons and prisoners, several times the number of his own men, fall into his hands. Company C, first at the river, follows eastward the river road, by which Armstrong and his remnant have fled, and its captures are five hundred men with their arms and thirty wagons with their mules attached.

Forrest led his broken regiments a few miles on the Burnsville road, and then across the country westward to the Plantersville and Selma road. This he followed to Plantersville, where he turned west, crossed the Cahawba, and on the morning of the 4th reached Marion, twenty-five miles northwest of Selma, where he found several of his brigades and the remainder of his artillery, which he ought to have had at Selma two days before.

On the Plantersville road he had opportunities to

indulge his butcher nature, and he seized them with savage pleasure. That road was still practically occupied by Wilson ; his rear had not arrived at Selma, and there were troops on it upon various duties, perhaps some stragglers. Forrest met several small parties, all of whom he killed, or wounded so that they were supposed to be dead, regardless of their surrender. One of these parties was a small detachment of regulars, twenty-five men and two officers of the Fourth United States Cavalry, which was returning from scouting duty and had bivouacked for the night. Trusting to their picket and supposing themselves to be practically within the lines of the army, the weary men in bivouac were all asleep. Forrest silently surrounded them, and his men dashed upon them with the ferocity of wild Indians, killing and wounding every one, utterly regardless of their cries of surrender. What chance they had to fight is shown in the fact that Forrest's only loss was one man wounded. Forrest's accomplished biographer gives a whole page to this affair, with laudation, though he had space for only two pages for the defense and loss of Selma.

The Fourth Iowa bivouacked on the field at midnight, between the lines of works, just west of the Range Line road ; and in the morning saw and learned what it had helped to achieve. Its own immediate captures were nearly 1,500 prisoners, including 2 colonels, 3 majors, and 76 lesser officers, 9 guns, 8 caissons, nearly 700 horses, 3 battle-flags, and a large quantity of small-arms. Its losses were 2 killed and 7 wounded,¹ and a number of horses killed and wounded.

These were the only losses of Upton's division.

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

The losses of Long's division were 42 killed, 270 wounded, and 7 missing.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded has not been reported. It was probably less than Wilson's, but their other losses were vast and irreparable : 2,700 prisoners, including 150 officers, many colors, 32 guns in use on the defenses, 44 siege guns and 26 field guns in foundries and arsenals, with carriages and caissons, 66,000 rounds artillery ammunition, and over 100,000 rounds small-arms ammunition, the Selma Arsenal, being 24 buildings filled with machinery and munitions of war, the powder-mills and magazine, being 7 buildings containing machinery, 14,000 pounds of powder, and great quantities of cartridges, 3 large foundries for casting naval and military guns and the tools and machinery of war, the nitre works, consisting of 18 buildings fully equipped and in operation, 3 full plants of iron-works in operation, many machine-shops and factories making all kinds of machinery, tools, and equipments for use in war, and many storehouses filled with quartermasters' and commissaries' supplies in large quantities.

Wilson's cavalry are proud of their capture of Selma. They had taken by assault this strongly fortified city, with a fighting force actually less than half that of the rebels in the works, for less than two thousand were engaged in the battle from both divisions, this number not including the two battalions of the Fourth Iowa which made the mounted charge. It was Armstrong's brigade immediately in Long's front, a famous corps of veterans, numbering fourteen hundred as even Jordan admits,¹ while Long's line certainly con-

¹ "Campaigns of Forrest," p. 673.

tained less than sixteen hundred. No more brilliant and effective attack than that of Long's men could be made. The fire upon them was so hot that about one fifth were down within the very short time required for a swift run over a distance of three hundred yards. But the survivors never faltered. They rushed upon the works with splendid spirit, and though, as they mounted the ramparts, they were exposed to an enfilading fire upon both flanks, they clung to all they had gained, and soon joined in another charge upon the second line, which they carried with unabated vigor, a shining crown upon their first success.

General Taylor's account of the taking of Selma is so extraordinary and misleading that it ought to be noticed. One cannot but think, on reading it, that he was very weak, if not cowardly, in his conduct of the defense. He believed that the force with which Wilson started from the Tennessee was ten thousand, and he must have supposed that the fighting force before Selma was much less than that, decreased, as naturally it would be, by detachments, by the casualties of campaigning, and by the care of the trains and the wounded, even if he did not know, though probably he did, that both Croxton's and LaGrange's brigades were then absent. He could not have believed that the attacking force was substantially greater in numbers than his own. He says Forrest's men were "jaded by hard work"; but Forrest had only been defending and falling back for a few days, and the men who were constantly attacking and flanking him during that time, and who had been marching steadily for thirteen days, must have been at the least equally jaded. He says: "Our information of the enemy had

proved extremely accurate, but the Federal commander moved with unusual rapidity and threw out false signals." He refers, no doubt, to Wilson's marching his divided army on two or more roads and to Croxton's movement from the right against Tuscaloosa, in which, by getting westward of that place before attacking it, Croxton led Jackson to imagine he was going to Columbus in Mississippi. He goes on to say that when Forrest "advised him of this deceit" he "directed such railway plant as we had to be moved out on the roads, retaining a small yard-engine to take me off at the last moment. There was nothing more to be done. Forrest appeared, horse and man covered with blood, and announced the enemy at his heels, and that I must move at once to escape capture. My engine started toward Meridian, and barely escaped."¹

As there was no fighting at all, nor any pursuit, for a day and a night before the assault was begun upon Selma, it must be either that Forrest pretended that desperate haste and put on that blood for the occasion, or that Taylor ran away the day before the battle.² But though Taylor "saw no more to be done," and found discretion to be the better part of valor, Forrest remained and defended the city with great spirit.

Although the loss of Selma was beyond repair, although it was defended by the larger part of all the forces that could be gathered from Alabama and Mississippi, except those in the forts at Mobile, and although the battle was the very rare if not unprecedented one of cavalry against fortifications, the language above quoted is substantially all of General

¹ "Destruction and Reconstruction, by Richard Taylor, Lieut.-Gen.", pp. 219, 220.

² See note, p. 455, *ante*.

Taylor's report of the affair. He is polite enough to say, however, with the peculiar priggishness which one cannot avoid remarking throughout his book: "I have never met this General Wilson, whose soldierly qualities are entitled to respect, for of all the Federal expeditions of which I have any knowledge his was the best conducted."

CHAPTER XI.

WHERE NEXT?—"ON TO RICHMOND!"—MONTGOMERY, COLUMBUS, WEST POINT, AND MACON FALL BY THE WAY—TWICE MORE THE CAVALRY CARRY FORTIFIED CITIES BY STORM—THE LAST BATTLE OF THE WAR.

THE noise of the conflict had hardly ceased when Wilson was busy with the question what next to do. He knew that all of his superior officers were thinking of his movement as, first of all, a help to Canby's campaign against Mobile, but then, from the highest authority, he had leave to do whatever in his own judgment might be most effective against the enemy. He realized the importance of Canby's success, but he had now learned the strength of the rebels at Mobile, and his own success at Selma had made it impossible for them to obtain any substantial reinforcement. He had already given Canby great aid, had already struck the blow which made the fall of Mobile inevitable. Canby's strength was four times as great as that opposed to him, and he was sure to succeed. There was nothing important to do west of Alabama, or nothing to which the forces there were not equal. At Richmond, Grant and Lee were still opposed, and the great decisive contest was about to be begun. Sherman was somewhere in the Carolinas, marching toward Richmond, and the Confederate powers were straining every nerve to collect forces sufficient to defeat him and

prevent his junction with Grant. To the east from Selma lay the greater portion of the grand line of fortified cities, workshops, and storehouses, the enemy's only remaining great source of supplies. Clearly, the corps could do the most effective work against the enemy by breaking up the remainder of this last great line, destroying his fortified cities and shops and stores, all the time marching to the aid of Sherman, perhaps to the aid of Grant in the last and greatest crash of the war.¹

Wilson gladly seized upon an offered opportunity of a meeting with Forrest, and in the conversation with him became satisfied that Croxton was safe, that the enemy could not be materially strengthened at Mobile, and that his own march to the east could not be successfully opposed.

He returned from the interview determined to march with all speed directly through the enemy's country, toward Sherman and Richmond. Montgomery, Columbus, Macon, and Augusta would have to be taken in battle, but it was never doubted that the corps could take them. Every energy was bent upon a start to the east.

The work of clearing up the debris and destroying the public property at Selma was pushed with increased force. The moment the pontoon-train arrived, all the men who could be employed were at work on the bridge, for it was necessary first to get south of the Alabama. The river was so swollen that all the pontoon-

¹ It should be borne in mind that Wilson did not know that Grant had begun his campaign against Lee, nor any more of Sherman than that he had left Savannah for the interior of South Carolina. Though Richmond fell on the same day with Selma, its fall was not known in Wilson's corps until nearly three weeks later.

boats would fill only half its width. The bridge must be nine hundred feet in length. Some barges and scows were found, and others were constructed, to piece out the distance, but the tremendous current and the drifting trees made the work most difficult. General Alexander, who was voluntarily assisting at the bridge, nearly lost his life and was severely hurt in one of its disasters. General Winslow was placed in command of the post, and had immediate charge of the government of the city and the destruction of the captured property. The prisoners were released on the usual parole, after Forrest had offered to exchange and then refused to exchange on equal terms. Afterward Confederate officers easily decided, upon some pretense, as they had done in other cases, that the paroles were "invalid," and promptly put the paroled men into their ranks.

Early the next day after the capture Upton was sent with his brigades to the north, with orders to march as far as the Cahawba on the Marion and Centreville roads, look out for Chalmers' division, which was believed to be in that region, and prevent it from moving toward Montgomery; and, if possible, to connect with Croxton, who had not yet come in from Tuscaloosa. McCook, who had been detached at Randolph, on the 1st, with LaGrange's brigade, with orders to join Croxton and bring him in, had not yet reported.

Accordingly, Winslow's brigade, under Colonel Noble, without the satisfaction of looking over the city or the field it had helped to win, marched away on the Summerfield road toward Centreville. Alexander's brigade took the Plantersville road. Noble's column reached the Cahawba at Johnson's Ferry, seven-

teen miles from Selma, where it bivouacked. The next day it marched, by Perryville, toward Randolph, and then again to the Cahawba, opposite Centreville, made twenty-three miles, and again bivouacked on the Cahawba, not yet learning anything of the rebel forces or of Croxton. On the 5th it marched on the road to Randolph some hours, when it was ascertained that McCook, with LaGrange's brigade, had met the corps train, and countermarched with it for Selma. McCook had encountered some of Jackson's cavalry at Scottsboro and had skirmished with them, but did not venture an engagement; and he had heard from prisoners taken there that Croxton had been beaten by Jackson and driven toward Elyton. Upon these reports Upton turned his brigades also toward Selma. The march was by the road upon which Long's division had advanced to the battle of Ebenezer Church a few days before, and both brigades bivouacked that night south of Plantersville, very near the camps in which they lay the night before the attack upon Selma. The next day Noble's brigade marched to Selma, by Summerfield, reaching the city at sundown, in a rain. It was immediately sent out on the Range Line road a couple of miles, to camp. The rain was very heavy, and camping in a newly ploughed field, in darkness and in a rain, is far from pleasant.

The destruction of the public property in Selma was going on, explosions were incessant, and all night the city was lighted by the flashing of powder in the magazines and the burning of buildings and military stores.

The next day, April 7th, was a day of rest to the jaded troops, but the heavy rains made it uncomforta-

able. They were awaiting the end of the pontoniers' work on the bridge over the Alabama. The work was very difficult and tedious, because of the great current and the drift produced by a high freshet. The bridge broke away several times, twice with troops on it, and several men were lost by drowning; but on the 8th and 9th Long's division and LaGrange's brigade were crossed. At night of the 8th Upton's division moved down to the river, to be ready to cross, but one of the breaks then occurred, and the division bivouacked on the north bank. It was nearly noon on the 9th when the last of Long's division was over and Upton's could begin crossing. Under the pressure of the column the bridge sagged very much. In the middle it was one or two feet under water, so that men and horses waded on the planks a good part of the way. While the Fourth Iowa was on it, it broke again, and part of it drifted away. Several men were thrown off, but all were recovered. Night came on before the bridge was repaired again. The sky was hung with thick clouds, and it was very dark. Light was necessary, and torches were not effective over so wide a space. Several wooden buildings on the banks nearest the bridge were successively set on fire to light the way, care being taken, of course, to remove the tenants where there were any. This made a good light most of the time and presented a most picturesque scene.

The big river rushing full between its banks, the many busy men at work about the bridge under the sharp orders of the officers, the endless stream of soldiers coming down out of the darkness on one side into the glaring light, leading their horses, splashing through the water on the sunken planks, and disappearing in

the darkness beyond, the crowds of wondering and excited negroes looking on, the great flames of the costly torches, throwing every object into high relief against the dense blackness surrounding all;—it would be, perhaps, as difficult to paint it with a brush as it is to describe it with a pen.

The Fourth Iowa was the rear of the corps in crossing the river. By midnight of the 9th all the regiment was over and bivouacked half a mile south of the bridge. General Winslow, being in command of the post, remained in the city, with his aides, orderlies, and a few troopers, until morning. Immediately after he had crossed, the pontoniers began to take up the bridge.¹

On the 8th another effort had been made to reach the lost Croxton brigade. A detachment of sixty men from the Second Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, commanded by Lieutenant Reynolds of F, with another detachment from the Third Iowa, the whole under Captain McKee, of the Third Iowa, was sent again to the Cahawba. The march was to Johnson's Ferry and then to Fike's Ferry on that river. At the latter place a body of about two hundred rebel cavalry was found. Lieutenant Reynolds, who was in front, immediately attacked them, and the Third Iowa quickly supporting

¹ When he had ridden a couple of miles beyond the river, Winslow found that he had left his watch in the Gee House in Selma, where he had slept the night before. Lieutenant Pickel, of the Fourth Iowa, one of his aides, volunteered to go for it. The army was then all south of the river, and the rebel advance may have entered the town. Pickel rode back with only an orderly. The pontoniers had not yet removed the planks of the bridge, though their work had just reached that point. The two volunteers hurried across, galloped to the hotel, found the watch under the pillow where it had been left, and recrossed safely. The pontoniers, who had waited for them, at once cast off the bridge from the Selma side, for rebel troops had just appeared in the streets.

the attack, the rebels were driven across the river, losing a number wounded (whether any killed could not be learned) and twenty-four of their horses with equipments. One man of the Fourth Iowa was severely wounded in the face, and died of the wound a few weeks after, at Selma.¹

The corps had now taken the first step toward its new goal. It was in the heart of the enemy's country, with the Alabama behind it, impassable, the bridge destroyed. It was necessary to abandon for the present the hope of a junction with Croxton, but it was known that he was east of the Cahawba, where he would be well able to take care of himself, because the most of the enemy would now be drawn to Wilson's march; and it was assumed that he would learn the direction of that march, and would thereupon himself move eastward upon a converging line. These views were fully justified by events, though Wilson moved so rapidly that Croxton did not accomplish his junction until it was too late for him to render further service with the corps.

Deducting Croxton's brigade and the numbers lost by the casualties of the campaign and the battle,² the corps now mustered less than ten thousand on all duties. But at least seven thousand were fighting men, all in excellent condition, and inspirited by their brilliant successes.

Every care was taken to secure the highest degree of mobility in the column. All unserviceable animals were replaced by sound ones, selected from the cap-

¹ See Appendix : " Engagements and Casualties."

² The wounded had been left with surgeons and nurses at Selma and Ebenezer Church.

tured. Shoeing and harness received close attention. The wagons, the pack-train, and the pontoon-train were reduced to the narrowest limits, and the surplus destroyed. Half the pontoon-boats shared the same fate. All camp followers and negroes were rigidly excluded, except the able-bodied negro men willing to enlist, who were formed into regiments, one to each division, and marched with the column. About one half of these black recruits could be mounted on horses and mules at once, and all were mounted within a few days. They marched and kept up well, provided their rations themselves by foraging, and did much of the heavy labor required at different places. Probably no column marching during the war was so clean and well-trimmed for active movement and effective fighting as was Wilson's between Selma and Columbus. In high spirits it turned its face to the east, and set out for the Carolinas and Virginia.

The first objective was Montgomery, the capital of the State and former capital of the Confederacy, fifty miles distant.

On the 10th the march led through the villages of Benton and Church Hill. LaGrange's brigade had the advance, and Winslow's the rear. On the 10th and 11th LaGrange had several skirmishes with Clanton's brigade of Buford's cavalry. Forrest had chosen to remain west of the Cahawba, and he took no further part in the campaign. On the 11th the column reached the Big Swamp, and spent many hours trying to improve the road which led through it for a mile and a half. Large quantities of logs and fence rails were thrown into it, on an old corduroy road; and it was only barely passable after great labor. The horses

of LaGrange, with the guns of his division, had made the road nearly impracticable, and it was after midnight when the last of the corps got through.

The march of the afternoon had been over low, wet lands, in damp, heavy air, under a cloudy sky. The swamp was dark and dismal, in its mysterious, impenetrable depths of dense forest and tangled brakes standing ever motionless in the black water and slime. As the horses dragged themselves out on the eastern side, covered with mire, their riders, surprised and pleased, found that they rose abruptly to high, dry land. Radiant gleams shone through the trees ahead, and then suddenly they emerged from the forest upon an open prairie, flooded with the silver light of a glorious full moon shining from a clear sky. Night was never so beautiful. An enchanting scene of splendor after the hideous swamp! The very air was new and delightfully sweet. The soiled and tired troopers were suddenly in another world. Soon the road ran between fields bordered by hedges of Cherokee roses, now in their early bloom and spreading their rich fragrance abroad. An hour later came the village of Lowndesboro, long noted as the home of wealthy planters. The way led through its principal street, a long, wide avenue bordered by great live-oaks. It was past midnight. No living creature appeared in the town, not a light was seen, not a sound heard except the subdued rattle of arms in the column. Even the horses' feet were hardly heard as they trod the sandy way. The broad white houses stood back from the avenue, surrounded by trees and shrubbery in ample grounds, brilliant with broad patches of the wonderful moonlight. Roses and jasmines gleamed in white stars

against their dark foliage, and filled the soft air with delicate odors. It was a dream world, through which the war-worn soldiers marched silently in the deep shadows of the oaks.

Not far beyond Lowndesboro the men lay down in bivouac, their dreams of to-morrow's battle intermingled with charming scenes of peace and beauty and the fragrance of endless gardens.

Early on the 12th the head of the column approached Montgomery, LaGrange's brigade in advance. The city had been fortified by a long line of heavy earth-works, and contained large quantities of cotton and war supplies.

General Wilson expected to take it, but expected to fight for it. The soldiers supposed of course that there would be a battle. One of the most noted cities in the Confederacy, its former capital, would not be lost without resistance. A long halt that occurred in Upton's division, two or three miles out, they assumed was required in preparing for the attack; and they looked carefully to their arms and equipments. But the enemy, after a sharp skirmish with LaGrange outside their works, abandoned the field and retreated rapidly to the east. The halt was occasioned by the appearance on the road of the mayor and principal citizens, who came out to surrender their city.

In careful order, every man in his place, with flags and guidons flying and bugles sounding, the ten thousand troopers rode through the city. With prolonged cheering they saluted the flag of the Union flying over the stately Capitol. Never was any time lost by the busy Yankees between the taking of a city and the flying of that flag from its highest point. It

was a beautiful day, the streets were lined with door-yards filled with bloom, and all the people came out to see.

At the same hour, at Smithfield, in North Carolina, then the head-quarters of the grand army to which Wilson's cavalry belonged, there was another scene of rejoicing upon an occasion worth many Montgomerys. That morning Sherman published an order to his army,¹ in which he announced that Grant had taken Richmond. "Glory to God and our country," he added, with fervid patriotism, "and all honor to our comrades in arms toward whom we are marching! A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, and the great race is won."

If the general could have made that order known that day to all of his army! That news, coming with the capture of this capital city, would have caused such a scene of joy in the Cavalry Corps as could not be described. But the cavalymen were contented as it was, though they supposed that Grant and Lee were still obstinately pitted against each other at Richmond and that Sherman was struggling against combined rebel armies in South Carolina, though they knew that they were themselves deep in the enemy's country, hundreds of miles from any support, though they knew that they must succeed or meet the worst of disasters. They too are "marching toward their comrades in arms" under Grant. The great goal of all is Richmond.

But the veteran troopers will make their work complete as they march; they will leave in their rear no means of defense or supply, by which secessionists

¹ Special Field Orders No. 54, Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, April 12, 1865.

may hope to continue the rebellion after defeat in the field.

Colonel LaGrange, without stopping to see the prize, pushed on to the east after the enemy. Within two or three miles he came upon Buford, who, with some part of his division, sought to obstruct his advance. He immediately attacked, and the rebels quickly gave way, losing thirty of their number and Buford's flag.

Before evacuating Montgomery the rebels set on fire nearly all the cotton there, some ninety thousand bales, but they had not time to destroy other public property, which was now seized and burned, to a great amount, by McCook. Five guns with their carriages and five steamboats with full cargoes of commissary supplies, sent away from Selma to escape capture, also fell into his hands, and were destroyed.

Six companies of the Third Iowa were detailed under Major Curkendall for provost duty in the city. The remainder of Winslow's brigade moved to the eastern suburb, and went into camp. The next day a part of it lay there, while several detachments were sent out to destroy the Confederate *matériel* of war within reach. One of these detachments was from Companies H and M of the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Whiting, who was ordered to march to Judkins' Ferry on the Tallapoosa River, and, if he could cross there, to move thence to Wetumpka and destroy the bridge over the Coosa at that place. The Tallapoosa was found too high for fording, and details sent up and down the river six or eight miles found no boat or means of crossing. Captain Whiting then marched down the Tallapoosa to Gregg's Ferry, where he unexpectedly came upon a detachment of forty Union cavalry under Major Wes-

ton, of the Fourth Kentucky, who had been sent by LaGrange to capture some steamboats said to have been run up the Coosa.

Weston, bent upon reaching his object, was crossing his men in two leaking canoes, without their horses. Captain Whiting sent fifteen men from each of his two companies, under Lieutenants Sheafor and Blasier, to aid the enterprise, and agreed with Weston that he would remain there to support him in case he should be driven back, and that if a boat should be captured, they would go together on it up to Wetumpka and destroy the bridge. The combined party marched through the swamp between the Tallapoosa and Coosa, about six miles, and found three steamboats on the Coosa, which surrendered almost as soon as ordered. The boats were filled with army supplies which had been run off from Montgomery. Major Weston put his men aboard, ran down and took on the horses and remaining men, and proceeded to Montgomery. The men captured on the boat said that there were about eight hundred rebels holding Wetumpka, and to the same effect was the statement of some "Johnnies"¹ seen by Captain Whiting earlier in the day. Weston and Whiting thereupon agreed that it would be imprudent to make an attempt upon the bridge.

The scene with the rebels Whiting had met was picturesque. While he was waiting at Judkins for news of a ferry-boat by which to cross the river, an armed man was seen on the other bank who kept carefully among the trees. He was invited to come out and have a talk, with the promise that he should not

¹ The good-humored nickname of the rebel soldiers. The corresponding nickname of the Union men was "Yanks."

be fired upon. He then stepped out, and, in answer to questions, said he was a "Johnny" and that there were more there. Whiting asked him to bring them all out, under the same promise, when about twenty appeared, stood with arms at rest, and talked across the river about the war. They said there was a report that Lee had evacuated Richmond, and they guessed the war would not last much longer; but, in reply to eager inquiry, they were not able to tell anything more. The parties separated like friends, neither attempting any injury upon the other. The captured boats and cargoes were of course destroyed at Montgomery; and Captain Whiting rejoined the regiment the next day on the march toward Columbus.

Leaving Montgomery on the 13th, Wilson's next great object was the crossing of the Chattahoochee, about one hundred miles to the east. This large river, navigable to Columbus for boats of heavy draught, could be defended by a comparatively small force if no bridge were left for an enemy's passage. The bridges at Columbus, directly east of Montgomery, and at West Point, forty miles north of Columbus, where the Atlanta and Montgomery railway crossed the Chattahoochee, were known to be defended by strong works; and the few bridges at other places would be destroyed upon the approach of any Union force.

Upton's keen disappointment in losing the opportunity at Selma, through Long's early success there, led Wilson to offer him specially the responsibility of the Chattahoochee. Upton accepted with delight. Wilson gave him a free field, generously refraining from any particular instructions, and added LaGrange's brigade to his command for the occasion. The extraordinary

zeal of that born soldier, Upton, springing not only from his enthusiastic devotion to his profession of arms, but also from his burning patriotism, was now at its highest. He saw success as if he were already on the soil of Georgia, and was impatient of the three days' march that lay between. He determined to send LaGrange against West Point, and to move with his own brigades directly upon Columbus. If he should fail at Columbus he could join LaGrange and force a passage at West Point. As LaGrange would have the longest march, he was placed in front, with orders to drive the enemy unhesitatingly at every meeting and permit no delay.

LaGrange was already, on the 13th, ten miles east of Montgomery, and had had more fighting with Clanton's brigade near Mount Meigs. On the morning of the 14th, beyond Mount Meigs, he again ran upon Clanton, and found him rather more obstinate than before. Clanton had adopted the practice of dismounting and firing from behind hastily constructed barricades, though invariably dislodged in a dash of the advanced company or regiment. He persisted in a running fight of this kind for thirty or forty miles, losing twelve men and many horses killed, and about one hundred prisoners, as well as his brigade-flag, and being nearly captured himself. This daring cavalryman, LaGrange, was sure to reach the head of every body of the enemy he was sent against. He had with him at the end of this campaign the flags of all the three rebel generals who had the ill-fortune to meet him between the Alabama and the Chattahoochee. Late in the day the rebels in his front gave up the contest and disappeared.

On the 15th, at Tuskegee, he received his final orders from Upton, and left the Columbus road. On the 16th he appeared before Fort Tyler, at West Point, on the Chattahoochee, and distinguished himself by achieving alone one of the three splendid victories of the campaign.

Fort Tyler was a large, massive redoubt, standing on a hill in the western border of the town, nearly opposite the bridge. It was surrounded by a deep, wide ditch, and the slope of the hill, serving as a natural glacis, was obstructed by abatis and slashings of timber. Three guns on the parapets were intended to cover the bridge and its approaches, one of them a 32-pounder siege-gun. The garrison was commanded by General Robert C. Tyler, famous among the rebels for fighting qualities, with Colonel James Fannin second. The whole force numbered two hundred and sixty-five, as many as could well be used in the work.

Eager to gain a crossing of the Chattahoochee before Upton could reach Columbus, LaGrange rode with his advance, and arrived within sight of the fort and town some time before his main column. Impatiently waiting, he planned his movements. His skirmishers had driven in the enemy's pickets, and observed the large ditch. The Fourth Indiana being the first regiment to arrive, one battalion was retained, mounted, on the road which led through the southern part of the town to the bridge, and the remainder was concealed and held in reserve. Detachments of other regiments were dismounted, directed to appear on three sides of the fort and make a show of attack, to engage the enemy's attention. Lieut. Rippetoe's two guns aided the deception by keeping up a fire across the parapets. Other

men were set to work making three "bridges," upon which to cross the ditches. These bridges were sections of a picket-fence found at hand, covered and strengthened by long boards. These were to be carried by the men at a run, and put into place under fire.

These dispositions made, LaGrange ordered the mounted battalion to move upon the bridge, and himself went with it. These men rode straight through the town, galloped to the bridge, and charged directly through it. A body of the enemy's cavalry was seen approaching on the other side, and the utmost haste was urged. The movement being observed from the fort, the big gun opened on the bridge. When the first men entered the bridge, they saw dismounted rebels trying to fire it with lighted turpentine-balls. In the middle they suddenly came upon a gap in the floor six or eight feet wide, where the planks had just been taken up. It was fifty feet to the rocky bed of the river below. No time to halt or hesitate. With spur and nerve the horses were jumped clear of the chasm, the enemy on the bank were instantly charged and routed, the fires quickly beaten out, and the bridge fairly captured.

But the big gun was now trying hard to destroy the prize. There seemed to be some difficulty in elevating it, and its shot had as yet struck short. The fort must be taken without a moment's loss of time. LaGrange at once rode back, bridging the gap by relaying the planks. The gun was doing better, and it killed his horse as he left the bridge. Quickly mounting another he was in a few moments with his battery. He ran the two guns up within six hundred yards, and ordered them to fire as rapidly as possible. One, a

10-pounder Parrott, throwing percussion shells, was directed to silence the big siege-gun. In the fine service of this gun fourteen shots out of forty-two struck the body of its target; and all the guns on the fort were quickly dismounted or silenced.

At the same time, twelve men, stripped of arms and equipments, took each of the three picket bridges, and, under cover of sharpshooters, ran to the ditches, one party on each of three sides of the fort. These parties were immediately followed by dismounted men, who were to cross on the bridges and charge the ramparts. In spite of the sharpshooters, the enemy opened a hot fire from the parapets, but the brave fellows with the bridges got them into place. The charging party faltered, some of those in front sprang into the ditches for shelter, and the remainder fell back. The enemy, encouraged by this, threw lighted shells over the parapets into the ditches. Some were extinguished in the water, others by stamping, and others the beleaguered men with reckless courage threw back into the fort still lighted.

The reverse was only momentary. Another dash upon the bridges was made, the determined men crossed in a terrific fire of small-arms, rushed over the parapets, and captured the garrison at the muzzle of the carbine. The surrender was formally made to LaGrange by Colonel Fannin.

General Tyler, 3 of his officers, and 14 of his men were killed, while 28 were wounded, mostly shot about the head, and 219 became prisoners. LaGrange's loss was only 7 killed and 29 wounded, a remarkably small loss considering the difficulties of the assault and the desperate resistance of the enemy.

Besides the guns and the fort, the enemy lost 500 small-arms, 19 railway engines, 240 cars laden with army supplies, and quantities of provisions in store-houses.

The detaching of LaGrange's brigade left Winslow's in front of the main column, with the Fourth Iowa in advance. The rebels were seen only in small, vanishing parties of mounted men; and after passing Society Hill in a drenching rain, the whole force went into bivouac. At Society Hill there was a show of Union sentiment among the people, the first met on the expedition, ladies appearing at their doors and windows and waving their handkerchiefs to the passing column.

The next morning, the 16th, as the column moved out, it was inspected and prepared for conflict with all the care and rigor that had been observed on the morning of Selma, and every soul was filled with the hopes and fears of another hazardous battle.

As has already been said, Columbus was then of great value to the rebel cause, made still greater by the fall of Selma. It had a population of about twelve thousand. The factories, workshops, stores, equipments, and materials there were much greater in extent and quantity than the Confederacy had possessed at any place except Richmond. It had become an important naval port, with a navy-yard well equipped; and at this time a large new ram was there, the *Jackson*, almost finished, having her armament and supplies on board and then receiving the last of her machinery. In March, 1865, a proposition was made and pressed by a large party in the Confederate Congress to remove their capital from Richmond to Columbus.

In contrast with the good fortune at Selma, where a plan of the fortifications had been obtained and where the works were fully seen before they were attacked, nothing definite was learned of those at Columbus before they were captured. They could not be seen even by day until the observer came within rifle-shot, because of the thickly wooded and hilly country ; and now they were to be assaulted by night. It was not till the day after the battle that an intelligent idea of their plan or strength was gained.

On the Alabama bank of the river was the suburban village of Girard, scattered on both sides of Mill Creek, which is a considerable stream flowing from the northwest and falling into the Chattahoochee opposite the middle of the city. Two wooden wagon bridges, about half a mile apart, each a thousand feet long, connected the city with this suburb. At the lower bridge came in the roads from Eufaula, Sand Fort, and Crawford, and at the upper those from Summerville, Opelika, and Salem. Five hundred yards above the upper of these bridges was a railroad bridge, by which the Columbus & Western Railroad entered the city. Immediately about Girard, and for some miles on all sides of it in Alabama, the country is very hilly. These hills are from one hundred to four hundred feet higher than the river, usually steep, separated by very narrow valleys, often mere ravines (except that the valley of Mill Creek in its lower two miles is more than half a mile wide), and mostly covered by a thick growth of small oaks. South of Mill Creek these hills extend, in a range or broken ridge, from the Eufaula road several miles northwestward. North of the creek they form a lower and more compact ridge, which begins

in front of the upper wagon bridge, runs parallel with the creek, and rises gradually to Summerville, a village two or three miles from Girard. The road to Summerville begins at the upper wagon bridge and finds its way in curves along this latter ridge. The banks of Mill Creek, for a mile from the Chattahoochee, were so high and steep as to be quite impracticable for any troops.

The defenses of Columbus were the work of an accomplished engineer. Including the outlying forts they were perhaps too extensive for the forces and guns available to man and equip them, but no doubt sufficient men and materials had been promised. Whether any defenses immediately for the protection of the lower bridge were intended is not known, but the hills in that region are so steep and high and the ravines so narrow that a comparatively small force could defend that bridge well without fortifications. The works constructed consisted of an extensive and strong *tête de pont* covering the upper wagon bridge and the railroad bridge, with outlying forts and rifle-pits commanding the approaches by the roads and the Mill Creek valley. This *tête de pont* was a continuous and skilfully constructed line, beginning at the river on the brow of the bluff which formed the north bank of Mill Creek, skirting that bluff westward through two or three blocks of the village, then running north and northwestward, crossing the Summerville road and then running behind it and nearly parallel with it, to a point a mile from its beginning, then turning east, keeping always along the commanding brow of hill or ridge, with lowland or ravine in front, and terminating at the edge of an abrupt hill or cliff overlooking the

Rifle pits.

30 yards square, 4 guns.

tte, 2 guns.

y fort, 200 yards long, 4 guns.

tte, 1 gun.

y fort, 150 yards long, 3 guns.

same as *b*, 4 guns, steep hill.

y fort for 3 guns, steep hill.

same as *b*, though larger, for 4 guns.

y fort, same as *f*, for 3 guns.

same as *h*, for 3 guns.

ry, 6 guns, supporting *b*.

4 guns, covering lower bridge.

4 guns, covering Navy Yard.

2 guns, covering upper bridge.

4 guns, covering railroad bridge.

nder's advance, checked by burning of
dge.

Winslow's Brigade, from Crawford road.

wa, 6 companies, dismounted, in line.

owa, 11 companies, in column.

Missouri, 8 companies, in column.

Brigade, awaiting orders.

f, 40 yards square, with 4 guns, 1 bomb-
banquette, and ditches.

f, 30 yards on each side, with 3 guns, and
tte.

f and *h*, 150 yards long and 50 wide,
bomb-proofs, continuous banquette, and deep

d, 200 yards long, 60 wide, 4 guns, 2 bomb-
continuous banquette, and deep ditches.

1. The ram *Jackson*.
2. Navy Yard.
3. Steamboat landings.
4. Court-house.
5. R. R. station and other buildings.
6. Eagle and Phoenix Cotton-mills.
7. Columbus Iron Works (Gun Foundry).
8. Rolling-mills.
9. Boiler-works.
10. Commissary Department.
11. Hospital.
12. C. S. A. Gov't offices.
13. " " shops.
14. " " laboratory.
15. Murray's Gun Shops.
16. } Gutcher's Wagon Shops.
17. }
18. Button Shops.
19. } Dillard's Shoe Shops.
20. }
21. Hospitals.
22. Keath's Sword Factory.
23. Jakes' Shoe and Harness Shops.
24. Barrenger & Moten's Gun Foundry
and Caisson Works.
25. Hyman's Sword and Bayonet Factory.
26. Hyman's Pistol Factory.
27. Brown & Smith's Wheelbarrow and
Button Shops.
28. Kelley's Glue and Oil-cloth Factory.
29. Kemp's Oil-cloth Factory.
30. The Greys' Armory.

river. It consisted of two heavy forts, one at each of the main angles, connected by rifle-pits. The fort in the village was a large, square bastion, mounting four 12-pounder howitzers, with perfect sweep of the Summerville road, the Mill Creek valley, and Broad Street toward the lower bridge. The weight of this fort was increased by six 10-pounder Parrotts planted in the streets near it. The fort at the upper angle was larger and heavier, in shape a crescent with angles, two hundred yards long and fifty broad, mounting four heavy guns, and provided with banquettes for riflemen. On the right of this fort was a lunette mounting one gun, and on its left within a few hundred yards, in the line of rifle-pits, another lunette mounting two guns.

Extending westward from the left wing of this larger fort, interrupted only by a steep and narrow ravine, was a line of rifle-pits which reached to and across the Summerville road and ended in the ditch of another fort, similar in plan and size to the one last described. To one approaching by the Summerville road this portion of the defenses, with the forts *d* and *g* on its flanks, as shown on the accompanying sketch, would naturally appear to be the main line.

In front of the two large forts described, and of the greater part of the rifle-pits, were slashings of trees which there had formed thick woods.

Five other outlying forts, *g*, *h*, *i*, *k*, and *l*, had been completed at the points indicated on the sketch. The one marked *k* stood in the valley, on somewhat rising ground, covering the Crawford road, the Salem road, and any crossing of the creek within a mile above. It was the counterpart in plan and weight of *f*. Four of the others were very large redoubts, two square and

two pentagonal, constructed for three or four guns each, and each planted on the top of a steep and thickly wooded hill. They were provided with ditches and curtains of rifle-pits where the ground was not too steep. These were designed to command the Salem and Crawford roads; but, upon all that he has learned, it is the belief of the writer that at the time of the battle guns were not yet mounted in any of these five forts.

In addition to the guns in the defenses about Girard, three guns were mounted in an earthwork at the east end of the lower bridge, ranging the approach to that bridge through Girard; two brass howitzers, for grape and canister, were at the east end of the upper wagon bridge, to sweep the passage-ways; and five were planted in a corresponding position to defend the railroad bridge. Twenty-seven guns in all were in position and manned by the enemy, and all appeared to be used in the battle except the two at the upper wagon bridge.

If there were no troops in the outlying forts when the battle commenced, the *tête de pont* and its curtain as far as the fort *f* were certainly well manned. There were nearly three thousand men in them, well armed and with ample supplies of ammunition. No doubt they were partly militia, but there were at least some regiments of regular Confederate troops from Texas, Alabama, and Georgia.¹

¹ Governor Brown had for some time maintained an "army" of his own—the militia of the State. He called it the "Georgia Line," and was very proud of its organization and efficiency, as also of his being its "commander-in-chief." He spoke to General Wilson with great praise and zeal of his "Georgia Line," and he was sure that if the other regiments had done as well at Columbus the result would have been very different. This body was immediately commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, and must have numbered on the rolls at least thirty or forty thousand. It embraced all the men able to bear arms under sixty

General Buford, who had persistently fought Wilson's advance from Selma, though with no delaying effect, appears to have joined the troops in the works, with some part of his command, and to have assisted in the engagement.¹

The whole defensive force was commanded by Howell Cobb, who had been Secretary of the Treasury under President Buchanan, President of the first Congress in the Confederacy, and was now a major-general in the rebel army. Among his lieutenants were Colonel Von Zinken, then commanding the Post of Columbus, and Colonel C. A. L. Lamar, a Georgian of prominent family, who had been notorious as the owner of the yacht *Wanderer*, a "slave pirate." The famous or notorious Robert Toombs was there that day, too, though he seems to have rendered no military service and to have left the city before the action.²

Sunday was the day of Columbus as it had been of Selma. Alexander's brigade led the division, and that brilliant cavalryman was to make the first onset. There could not have been a finer leader. Tall and of most years of age not actually in the Confederate army. But when a battle was imminent, the number of those who neglected the call to arms was so great that the law against absentees, though very severe in penalties, could not be enforced. The proclamations, orders, threats, and appeals of Brown and Smith, and other officers in Georgia, which filled the newspapers during Wilson's advance upon Columbus, brought to the defense of the border not two thousand of this militia. But the Governor and his General did not themselves yet realize what Wilson's cavalry could do. Though they knew that Selma was destroyed and that Montgomery had fallen on the 12th, on the 15th they issued further orders allowing the delinquent militia three days more to report at Columbus; and neither the Governor nor the General got to Columbus in time to command their troops in its defense on the 16th.

¹ The *Macon Daily Telegraph & Confederate*, of April 18, 1865.

² Toombs was a conspicuous and noisy "fire-eater" before the war, long a member of the United States Senate from Georgia, the first Secretary of State in the Confederate government, and later one of its senators and a brigadier-general in its army.

manly figure and bearing, strikingly handsome, always carefully dressed and splendidly mounted, of intense nature and spirited movement, he was the very type of knightly cavaliers. At noon he reached the village of Crawford, twelve miles from Columbus. A small body of cavalry, posted there for observation, fell back before him, and he moved directly on toward Columbus. Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston, with his First Ohio Cavalry, was in front. At the Wetumpka Creek, a branch of the Big Uchee, six miles from Columbus, he found the enemy's outpost and had a fight. The rebels had destroyed the bridge, and resisted his passage. But to the experienced Ohians the business of flanking and seizing the position was easy, and the bridge was quickly reconstructed. Then, after a rapid walk of two or three miles, the rebel pickets were driven in, and it was evident that the defenses of Columbus were near at hand.

As already said, in effect, only a little general information had been obtained as to the enemy's position or fortifications, nothing in detail, but it was known that the country was thickly wooded. It would necessarily take some time to gain a fair knowledge of the works by reconnoitring in such a country, and the enemy ought to have the least possible time to strengthen his defense or destroy the bridges. Upton determined to attempt one of the bridges by mere audacity. If that should not succeed he would examine the defenses with a view to regular assault.

Alexander was therefore now directed to move rapidly, in fours, directly on the road to the lower bridge, and take it if within possibility. Without any halt, and making no change except to increase his

speed, he rode right on. Approaching the fort *i*, he detached the advanced regiment, the First Ohio, under Colonel Eggleston, with orders to ride down any force that held the road, and reach and seize the bridge in the shortest possible time. Colonel Eggleston ordered a trot at once, and then a gallop. Flying by the fort *i*, and between *k* and *l*, these gallant troopers dashed right toward the lower bridge. They knew nothing of the defenses nor of the position of the rebel troops, they knew only that that road led to the bridge. The fearless Colonel rode directly in the front, and Alexander kept close in support with his two other regiments. No fire of importance was met until the head of the flying column was turning the first curve of the road, where it crosses Stumpy Creek. On turning this curve it received a fire from the front and on its left flank. The guns on the fort *b* added their fire, but the distance was rather too great for effect. There was no hesitation, the regiment galloped right up the road (somewhat up-hill here) to the second curve, and the rebels there fell back in haste. The bridge was now directly before the daring riders, hardly half a mile away, but the fire was constantly increasing; they came nearer and nearer the guns of the fort *b*, and the three guns planted at the east end of the bridge opened with direct range. Still Eggleston rode on. He had nearly reached the crossing of Bridge and Abert Streets in Girard, hardly three hundred yards from his goal, when he saw the bridge suddenly enveloped in flames. It had been prepared with cotton and turpentine, and the moment had come when the enemy saw that nothing but flames would keep it from the Ohio men. There was nothing for

Eggleston to do but to retire. The remarkable depth and steepness of the banks of Mill Creek in Girard made it impracticable to advance from the south against the works defending the upper bridges; and indeed Eggleston was ordered to retire to the hills on his right if he should fail. As soon as he saw the bridge burning he checked his column, and fell back as quickly as possible. Under the fire of Rodney's battery, which now galloped into position and threw shell for a time, Alexander came up to the junction of the Sand Fort road, and moved his whole brigade up that road, overlooking the valley, where he was finally instructed to remain and await further orders. It was now between two and three o'clock.

Before he ordered Alexander to move upon the lower bridge, Upton detached two companies of the Fifth Iowa, under Captain Lewis, and sent them to reconnoitre a by-road leading northward toward Summerville. When Winslow came up he directed him to move his brigade in the same direction, to a point which he described as near the Opelika road; and while Alexander saw with keenest regret the failure of his hopes, Winslow was moving to the opposite flank of the defenses, to make the successful attempt.

Meantime, two hundred men of the Tenth Missouri were detached, under Captain Young, and ordered to ride with all speed, by a detour, to Clapp's Factory, on the Chattahoochee, three miles above Columbus, where it was learned there was another bridge. Captain Young reached the place in good time, but the enemy had already destroyed the bridge.

When the news of Alexander's disappointment came back, Upton determined with Winslow's brigade to

assault the works on the Opelika (Summerville) road, and he set out at zealous speed upon a general reconnaissance of the defenses in that region. He divided his staff into as many observing parties as there were officers, reduced his escort to a squad, to provide orderlies enough, and exhorted all to the utmost diligence. Emulating the fearless example of their chief, these officers rode almost under the guns of the enemy, two of them, Major Woods and Lieutenant Sloan Keck of the Fourth Iowa, actually coming upon the enemy's exterior line at different places, and escaping only by the speed of their horses, each of them losing an orderly, captured. One of these orderlies, Robert C. Wood, of A, Fourth Iowa, was held by the enemy during the assault a few hours later, at a point near where a building was burned by them for the purpose of showing the assaulting line to their gunners. Seeing his friends by this light, Wood escaped, joined them, and immediately returned with comrades and captured the colonel and the adjutant of the regiment which had held him.

Winslow's brigade was moved around the front of the fort and across the country, crossing the Columbus & Western Railroad, to a point near the Salem and Opelika road, which appeared to be the place intended by Upton, and there, concealed by a wood, it was halted and dismounted, to await further orders. The firing upon Eggleston's advance was heard, and the exchange of shots between Rodney and the enemy's batteries, but from about three o'clock there was ominous quiet. At about four o'clock Wilson appeared near the head of Winslow's brigade, with his staff and escort, and there awaited the development of Upton's movements.

But Upton's absence was prolonged. He was not heard from until sunset, when he came up himself at a gallop; and the three generals were quickly in consultation. It appeared that Upton had lost some time after his reconnoissance in looking for the brigade farther north. The misunderstanding was probably due to the fact that there were two Opelika roads, both the Salem and the Summerville roads leading to that town. By this mishap it appeared to be now too late to attack that day, and Upton was much disappointed. Winslow, vexed at the possibility of any criticism in respect to the delay, at once said that he was ready to attack at any time, and would do it now. Wilson said that the men were not green soldiers, and that they had showed at Franklin and Selma that they could fight by night. Upton seized the proposal with pleasure, and rode off with Winslow at the head of the brigade for the Summerville road, Wilson and a part of his staff directly following to overlook the movement.

By a circuitous route, to avoid observation, the column moved through fields and woods to its new position; but it was quite dark when its head reached the Summerville road, a few hundred yards in front of the fort *f*.

While the brigade was waiting in the woods, Winslow had ascertained the position of the works between the Summerville and Salem roads, as well as the distance and way to the upper wagon bridge. A citizen taken near the place had given information, upon which he had framed a rough plan of the main points of that portion of the field, which proved to be substantially accurate; but nothing better was known, and the evening and night were cloudy, so that dark-

ness came early and nothing could be seen. The existence of the line from *b* to *d* was not known at all, and the works from *d* to *g* were believed to be on the main line. Immediately on the determination to attack by night Winslow issued his orders. The other brigades were not waited for. Wilson sent to Minty (leading Long's division) orders to close up on the Crawford road, but he was far in the rear, and camped for the night, after hearing of the battle, ten miles west of the field. Alexander was directed to remain in position on the southern ridge, holding the Eufaula and Sand Fort roads, and there await further orders.

Now the six companies of the Third Iowa at the head of the brigade column (the other half of the regiment had not yet come up from Montgomery, where it had remained on special service), numbering three hundred, were quietly dismounted and formed for a charge, their left resting on the Summerville road. They thus stood parallel with the fort *f* and its curtain of rifle-pits. Colonel Noble himself led these companies. The Tenth Missouri (about three hundred and fifty men after Captain Young's detachment) under Colonel Benteen, next in order in the march of the day, was moved forward to the Summerville road, and held there, mounted, in column of fours, ready for a charge if the dismounted men should take the works. The head of its column was a few hundred yards behind the left of the Third Iowa. The Fourth Iowa, coming up after the Tenth Missouri, was halted in the woods on the hill opposite the fort *f*, with its head in the rear and to the right of the Third Iowa line. It was now eight o'clock. There had been developed a line of skirmishers of the enemy outside of their works and about two hundred

yards directly in front of the Third Iowa line, whose fire had been drawn by Captain Lewis' two Fifth Iowa companies, which had acted as advance-guard to Winslow's movement across the country, but up to this time there had been no other firing.

As these dispositions were made under cover of darkness, and as silently as possible, it was supposed that the enemy had no knowledge of them, but, just as the order for Noble to charge was uttered, the darkness was turned to light by a furious fire from the rifle-pits in front and the guns in the fort *d.* Fortunately the range of all was too high.

The Third Iowa immediately charged, and, although its line was thrown into disorder by the slashing through which it had to work its way, a portion of the men quickly got into the rifle-pits, where they bravely held on, under cross-fire, until their comrades joined them, when the rebels hastily evacuated all the works on that line and fell back. It being supposed that Colonel Noble's work was done, his line was held just inside the works he had taken, its left on the road, and, under the belief that the enemy's main line had been broken, a mounted charge was ordered. Wilson, watching the operations of his lieutenants with the keen interest of the soldier and the delighted approval of the commander, had already directed Colonel Benteen to move forward. Winslow now ordered him to move down the road, charge toward the bridge, and take it; but Upton, for some reason, when the movement was only started, detached but two companies, and ordered Benteen to remain for the present with the others.

These were the two companies in advance, the senior

officer being Captain Robert B. M. McGlasson. This fearless soldier led his men down the road, and, though astonished to find another line of fortifications in the way, he boldly rode through them on the road, with such coolness and self-possession, indeed, that the enemy supposed his party to belong to their own force. But once inside, he galloped directly to the bridge, captured its immediate guard (fifty men), and attempted to hold the position. One of his lieutenants, Frederick Owen, actually led part of his men across the bridge, and temporarily held the battery there. But the enemy discovering what had happened, and seeing that McGlasson was not supported, began to close in upon him, firing from all sides. Having no shelter, and seeing that he must lose his command or ride back the way he came, he preferred the ride. He recalled Owen, and led a tearing gallop back through the lines, all the time under fire. In a few minutes he was again near the fort *f*, with nearly all his men.

The mistake as to the position and plan of the fortifications being thus discovered, the Third Iowa was hurried forward, wheeled to the left, and ordered to charge upon the works in their front, which proved to be those between *c* and *d*. To do this the line must descend the slope of a ravine through thick woods and rise on the other side through a slashing. Noble led this charge, as he did the former one. Winslow remained with him until he entered the slashing, and then turned his attention to the Fourth Iowa, which he had meantime ordered forward on the road.

The enemy, apparently expecting the new attack, now increased their fire. All the guns from *d* to *b* and at the railroad bridge, and all the rifle-pits, were in a

continuous blaze. From the vast noise they made, it seemed as if the rebels would annihilate the last of their assailants, but all of their fire was still too high. No artillery was used on the Union side. In the darkness of the woods, lighted only by the fire from the enemy's guns, the Third Iowa went down the slope, scrambled across the ravine and through a marshy brook, and then rose through the slashing on the slope of the works, but they were much separated by the obstacles in the way, and the few who first reached the line supposed that their comrades were destroyed. Parts of three companies, however, with great bravery seized the nearest angle of the rifle-pits and held it obstinately, driving off or capturing the defenders. Their comrades, who had almost reached the rifle-pits toward the lunette *c*, finding themselves, as they supposed, unsupported, and the rebels returning upon them, were compelled to retire to the road. When, thereupon, only a portion of the Third could be immediately rallied at the road, it was feared that the regiment was cut to pieces; but meantime two battalions of the Fourth Iowa,¹ the First and Second, had been dismounted and brought up at a run to reinforce the assault. The Third Battalion was left mounted in the road, its head just above the works first taken, ready for a mounted charge. The First Battalion, led by Captain Abraham, and the Second, by Captain Dana, ran down the road to a point a little lower than that recently occupied by the Third Iowa, faced to the left, and, without a moment's halt, advanced against the works in their front at a charge. Upton and Winslow

¹ A, D, K of the First Battalion (G then detached), and C, F, I, L of the Second, numbering, dismounted effectives, not more than 350.

both superintended this movement, and Wilson came down to look on. That portion of the Third Iowa which had not reached the works now bravely took position to the left of the Fourth, and joined in the charge. The battle-cry was *Selma!* With great cheers the officers and men plunged into the ravine and up the slope, finding ways among the fallen trees as if by instinct, and still under the fire of all the guns and of the rifle-pits in their front not held by the Third Iowa. The obstinate possession of the Third and this new assault were too much for the enemy. They broke from all the works in the vicinity of the lunette *c*, and the new assailants were quickly on the parapets at *c* and below, crying "*Surrender! Throw down your arms!*" to the dismayed Confederates.

Both Upton and Winslow had ordered that no prisoners be taken, so that the bridge might be reached with the greatest speed. When they saw that the men had, practically, all the rifle-pits, they hurried down the road to the point where it enters the works, and there kept shouting to the victors then rushing down the line: "*Selma! Selma! Go for the bridge! Take no prisoners! Go for the bridge!*" The Iowans, possessed of the one idea, rushed along the rifle-pits, looking eagerly ahead for the bridge, not stopping to take prisoners, only shouting to the rebels to throw down their arms, and leaving them behind in the trenches, in the utmost confusion.

Captain Abraham's companies, A, D, K, understanding that they must follow the line of works until they should see the bridge, crossed the Summerville road along the entrenchments and approached the fort *b*, captured the battery in the street after a hand-to-hand

struggle with the gunners, and attempted to scale the ramparts from which the enemy were still fighting. A second effort carried them in and gave them the prize. Disarming the defenders and leaving a few men in charge, these companies rushed down Brodnax Street toward the bridge. Captain Dana, by luck or a different understanding of orders, left the line of rifle-pits where the road crossed it and led his companies, C, F, I, and L, by the road directly toward the bridge, which brought them to the goal perhaps a little ahead of A, D, and K. But the broken regiments of the enemy who had fled from the works were now crowding across the bridge, and the battalions of the Fourth Iowa came together upon their rear in the entrance, and were at once so mixed that there could be no telling with certainty which was in front.¹ It was a covered wooden bridge, with two carriage-ways, and the whole space was now filled with the flying rebels and the advancing Iowans. Indeed, it was so dark that the Iowans passed many of the rebels in the passage without knowing it, and reached the other side before them. The air was full of the odor of turpentine. The angles of the woodwork had been stuffed with cotton saturated with that fluid, so that the whole could be burned instantly in case of defeat in the works; but the persons charged with the duty of set-

¹ It is not possible to settle clearly the question of precedence among the companies in the taking of this bridge. At least four companies earnestly contend for it. There are circumstances which appear to weigh about equally in favor of C, F, and L, but in the darkness and confusion of the passage and the high excitement at the taking of the battery, it is not probable that any one observed clearly his comrades; and it is certain that men of at least six of the seven companies were met by fighting rebels at or near the Columbus end of the bridge. If there was any difference of time between the companies in reaching that end, it was so small as to be hardly appreciable.

ting the fire could not determine the moment of action, perhaps because enemies appeared before their friends were all through. One rebel did strike a match, but he was crushed in the act by a clubbed carbine in the hands of a man of Company K.

For the possession of the battery at the east end of the bridge there was a sharp contest. The officers and men in charge of it fought with determination. They had not been able to fire through the bridge as intended, because their own friends were in the way, but they tried manfully to save their guns. In the struggle here several of the Fourth were wounded and Sergeant Jones of L was killed—the last man of the regiment killed in action, as Lieutenant Heacock of F in the same battalion was the first. Lieutenants Miller of L and Dillon of C were conspicuous in making this assault, and Private William Scott of F unhorsed the rebel commander. The brave gunners were all killed, wounded, or compelled to yield, the bridge was saved, the victory of Columbus was complete. It was the last battle of the war,¹ and the crowning blow was struck by the Fourth Iowa.

Seeing that the dismounted men had gained the rifle-pits and the fort *b*, the mounted charge was ordered, and almost immediately Winslow had the Third Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, led by Major Dee, galloping down the road in column of fours, himself in front. The mounted men rode through the bridge among the last of the dismounted battalions, passed the captured guns, and charged into the streets, meeting the enemy at the first street from the bridge, passing and capturing numbers of them, with desultory firing on both sides, and turning the defeat into a hopeless rout. One

¹ There were several minor conflicts later than this, but none upon any plan or of any importance.

company hastened to seize the battery at the lower bridge, two others galloped through the streets to capture retreating bodies, and the fourth sought the railway to intercept any train that might be leaving. Not knowing the way, this last company lost some time, and when the station was found a considerable train had got away toward Macon, filled with officers, soldiers, and citizens of position.

The capture of all the rebels remaining in the defenses and all the dismounted in Columbus followed as a matter of course. The whole engagement and occupation were completed within an hour. There was no more noise, except the occasional cheers of the victors. The burning buildings in Girard, which the rebels had fired to light their operations, continued to cast a lurid glow upon the scene of the conflict.

The victory was perfect, and the battle one of the most splendid in which the Fourth Iowa had ever fought. To carry these defenses by storm with a few hundred dismounted cavalry, in the night and with no certain knowledge of their position or strength, defended as they were by nearly three thousand men and twenty-seven guns, was an extraordinary feat. These achievements of Winslow and Noble and their men must stand high among the heroic deeds of the war.

Thus fell Columbus, the key to Georgia. It was four hundred miles from the point at which its captors had entered the Confederate lines. Though the great events of the preceding fortnight in Virginia and North Carolina had made the engagement unnecessary and unimportant, it should be remembered that it was fought by men who were ignorant of those events, and who were inspired only by a determination to suc-

ceed and by the belief that they were fighting a great battle for the cause.

As a compliment to him upon his brilliant success, General Winslow was placed in command of the city, and he appointed Colonel Noble Provost-Marshal.

The next day came the counting of the losses and gains and the destruction of the enemy's property. To the great surprise of all, the whole loss of the brigade was found to be only 24 killed and wounded. Of these, 11 were in the Fourth Iowa.¹ But the enemy had lost 1,500 killed, wounded, and captured, 27 guns mounted in the defense and 36 in arsenal, a great quantity of small-arms, and their new ram, the *Jackson*, with its 6 additional guns. Among their killed was Colonel Lamar, of "slave-pirate" fame before mentioned, who fell near the bridge.

The Fourth Iowa had captured 941 prisoners (mostly in the city) including 67 officers, with 12 guns, 16 caissons, and 7 battle-flags.

The next day General Winslow, with large details of men, destroyed 125,000 bales of cotton, 20,000 sacks of corn, 15 locomotives, 250 cars, the two remaining bridges on the Chattahoochee, the round-houses, machine-shops, and other property of the railway, a naval armory, the navy yard, 2 rolling-mills with great quantities of machinery, the arsenal and the nitre-works of the Confederate War Department, 2 powder magazines, 2 iron-works, 3 foundries, 10 or 12 mills and factories making cotton-cloth, paper, guns, pistols, swords, shoes, wagons, and other military and naval supplies, an immense quantity of small-arms, accoutrements, equipments, and army clothing, of which no account was

¹ See Appendix, "Engagements and Casualties."

taken, 69 pieces of artillery with their caissons and carriages, over 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and the ram *Jackson*. This ram, after being visited and examined by many of our officers and men, was burned as far as possible and floated down the stream and sunk. It had a square turret, was clad with four inches of iron, and had six long 7-inch rifled guns in the turret, one in each corner, on a pivot or turn-table, and one in the middle of each side, so that the guns could be trained to fire two in front and two in rear, or three in broadside. These guns were said to have been made in Richmond. The Confederate gun-boat *Chattahoochee* was destroyed below the city by the rebels, to prevent its capture.

One of the captures at Columbus, though of minor importance in itself, was specially gratifying to the Union soldiers. It was that of the *Memphis Appeal*, a notorious Secessionist newspaper, truculent, mendacious, and inflammatory to the last degree. It belonged at Memphis, Tenn., but when Memphis fell its owner and editor had taken it from there to Grenada, Miss., where he called it the *Memphis-Grenada Appeal*; thence again he had to fly, before Grant, to Jackson, Miss., where his paper became the *Memphis-Grenada-Jackson Appeal*. Driven from Jackson by Grant again, he went to Atlanta, Ga., but the next year he fled before Sherman's attack, and settled at Montgomery, all the time printing his peculiarly wicked and vicious stuff. Wilson's advance had compelled him to move from Montgomery to Columbus, where he had not had time to set up his presses. Colonel Noble, as Provost-Marshal, seized the plant, and destroyed it with conspicuous care in the principal street. The

proprietor, Dill, he arrested and found as meek and peaceful by profession as a lamb. He was required to give a bond against the future publication of the paper, and he took an oath binding him against any inimical or unfriendly acts of any imaginable kind, in preparing which Colonel Noble gave play to a lawyer's ingenuity, comprehensiveness, and sense of humor.

General Winslow being in command of the city, his brigade remained there all day the 17th, busily engaged with Alexander's, in the work of destruction. By fire and explosives the property described, with the buildings containing it, was destroyed or broken beyond repair; and, as the devoted buildings were scattered in all parts of the city, there was all that day, on all sides, a roaring of fires and an unceasing crash and rattle of explosions. The scene baffles description. Its like did not occur in the war, except when, two weeks before, the same troops did similar work at Selma. The labor and excitement of it were very fatiguing; and the brigade was glad to have it end that night, and to move on the next morning against Macon.

CHAPTER XII.

THE NEXT GOAL, AUGUSTA—BUT THE CAMPAIGN ABRUPTLY
CLOSED AT MACON—THE END OF THE WAR—HOW THE
NEWS CAME FROM GRANT AND SHERMAN.

THE work of destruction at Columbus was not yet done when the spirited Wilson was pressing on to new fields of conquest. Confident now that his corps would sweep through Georgia and the Carolinas, he was impatient of the days that must be spent on the march. The grand battles of the war might be fought on the border of Virginia before he could reach the field. But the enemy's means of carrying on the war must be crippled and destroyed on the way. Augusta, two hundred and forty miles from Columbus, was the gateway of South Carolina and contained an extensive arsenal, with military factories and general supplies. Macon stood midway, also containing an arsenal and army supplies. Both cities were fortified and were expected to resist. Both were already preparing for resistance in great excitement.

Wilson sent word to Canby at Mobile, and through Canby to Sherman, of his successes and his present intentions. Long's division (now Minty's, because of Long's wound), arrived at Girard on the morning of the 17th, crossed by the captured bridge, and halted

for a few hours east of the city; but that night it was well on the way toward Macon.

The same afternoon LaGrange had set out from West Point for the same place, eager to be the first to reach it. There was a race, on converging lines, in which LaGrange would have won, but for the necessity of waiting half a day for one of his regiments, which had been sent around by Columbus. As it was, he arrived only a few hours behind Minty's advance.

The march from Columbus to Macon was made by roads to the north of a direct line, in order to reach the railway and factories at Thomaston and to cut the Atlanta railway. The first place likely to be defended was the crossing of Flint River, at the Double Bridges,¹ fifty miles from Columbus. Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard, with his own regiment, the Fourth Michigan, and the Third Ohio, detached from Minty's division for the purpose, made a forced march during the night of the 17th, reached the river at sunrise, surprised the enemy posted there, and took the bridges at a charge and without loss. The rebels lost several killed and wounded, fifty captured, three pieces of artillery, a wagon-train loaded with supplies, and one hundred and fifty horses and mules.

But one more serious attempt was made to oppose Minty's march. At Mimm's Mills, the crossing of Tobesofkee Creek, about fifteen miles from Macon, in the afternoon of the 20th, three hundred rebels were in position. They were posted behind the creek, and sheltered by heavy barricades of rails and by the mills. They had set the bridge on fire, after tearing up part

¹ The Flint is a large river, flowing here around an island, and crossed by two long bridges.

of the planking. The Seventeenth Indiana, led by Colonel White, now in the advance of the division, came up at a trot, received a volley, though without loss, and at once attempted to cross the burning bridge. The gap in the planking stopped the horses, but the men, with splendid audacity, sprang to the ground, crossed on the burning stringers, and charged the defenses. The enemy fled from such an attack in a panic, so demoralized that they threw away their guns, blankets, and all that could impede their flight.

Colonel White now put his command into close order, waited for the division to approach in his rear, and moved steadily on toward Macon. There was still one position, Rocky Creek, which might be defended before the enemy retired within the fortifications of the city.

General Howell Cobb had reached Macon, with a portion of the troops who had escaped from Columbus, and had taken command. He was assisted by Generals William W. Mackall and Hugh W. Mercer, of the Confederate army, and Generals Gustavus W. Smith and Felix H. Robertson, of the Georgia militia, who added to Cobb's troops enough to make the aggregate about three thousand five hundred.

The city was well defended by art and by nature. The Ocmulgee River, covering the north and east, was impassable, and over the high ground on the west and south ran a line of earthworks, bastions and rifle-pits, stockaded as at Selma, continuous from the river above to the river below.

The flaming appeals to citizens and stringent orders to soldiers, usually published on the advance of Union forces, were not wanting. As an example of those often seen on such occasions, the following are copied

from the *Macon Daily Telegraph & Confederate* of April 18, 1865 :

FALL IN!

From what facts we can gather, it seems Columbus fell into the hands of the enemy last evening. We know none of the particulars. The next point attacked will probably be Macon. It must and can be successfully defended!

If every man who is interested in the safety of his property, the sanctity of his home, and the honor of his State, will at once hurry to this point, there is not the shadow of a doubt that this raid can be beaten and driven back. There is no time to be lost. The people should organize at once. It will be a burning shame, if some three or four thousand Yankees be permitted to capture and plunder the principal cities of Georgia. Forrest, with his gallant band, is rapidly advancing in their rear, and should they attack Macon, we have but to make a firm defense, to insure the destruction of these Yankee robbers!

We tell the people of Middle and Southwestern Georgia, that here is the place to defend their homes and their property. Woe be to them, if by their supineness and inactivity they permit this city to fall into the hands of their foe! Their homes will be desolated, their property stolen, their wives and daughters outraged and insulted.

As certain as the sun shines we can whip the enemy if the men within easy distance of this city will hurry to the rescue. If all come who can and should, there will be no fight. The enemy would not dare attack such a force as can be concentrated here in the next three days. That the citizens will do their duty, we cannot doubt. When Stoneman attacked Macon our people turned out *en masse*, and the result was that this celebrated raider and a large portion of his band were brought captives into town. They will prove as ready to defend themselves now, as three companies are already organizing. Push on the good work. Remember, everything is at stake—property, home and honor. Fall in!

HEADQUARTERS, MACON, April 17, 1865.

General Orders, }
No. 7. }

I. Every man in the city capable of bearing arms in defense of his country, is required to report forthwith to Captain G. S. Obear, at E. J. Johnston & Co.'s Store, commanding local troops, for enrollment in one of the local companies for city defense.

II. All officers able to bear arms, not on duty, will assemble at the City Hall at 2 P.M. to-day, to be assigned to such duty as they can best perform.

III. All detailed and furloughed soldiers in the city, except those in the employ of the Quartermaster and Commissary of Post, Ordnance establishment and Engineer Corps, if unconnected with any local company, will forthwith unite themselves to some such organization.

IV. An alarm of two guns fired from the City Hall will be a signal for rendezvous of the local troops.

By command of

W. W. MACKALL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

The advance of Upton's division left Columbus at daybreak of the 18th, although the work of destruction was not yet completed. Flames were still seen and explosions still heard as the head of the column moved away from the devoted city. The division took Minty's road as far as Thomaston, and then marched farther north, to reach the railway at Barnesville. Parties were sent out on both flanks, to destroy bridges and factories. The night of the 18th was spent at Thomaston, where Minty had destroyed the cotton-mills for which that town had been noted. The day and night of the 19th were spent in destroying the railway and other public property beyond Thomaston as far as

Barnesville. On the 20th the Fourth Iowa, being in the advance of the brigade, moved down the Atlanta and Macon railroad to Forsyth, and that night it was busy until two o'clock in the work of destroying it some miles east of Forsyth. How well that night and that work is remembered! The last act of war by the Fourth Iowa!

It was fine weather. Every man was in high spirits. The successes achieved were so distinct and effective, the conquest of the enemy so complete, the end of the war seemed sure at no great distance of time. Somehow it was like holiday work. The men tore up the track, piled the ties, placed the rails, and set the fires in the best of humor, talking confidently of the taking of Macon the next day. They supposed that the Second Division would be in front at Macon, and that their own next great opportunity would be at Augusta.

The writer, who was overlooking the work, sometimes lending a hand, left the spot for a time, and went with a friend to a negro cabin near by, to employ the "aunty" to make some corn-bread. It was after one o'clock in the morning, and it was reasonable to be hungry. The household was all up. With such a scene and such noises near there was no sleeping. The bread had to be waited for, and when it was done it was without salt,¹ but it answered the purpose. On returning to the railway it was surprising to see that none of the men were at work. They stood about in groups, thrown into relief by the line of fires in which the ties were burning, and were talking, though very

¹ In the later years of the war the people in some parts of the South were wholly without salt.

quietly and not much. They had heard news that was stunning, it came so suddenly; and indeed nobody could believe it. It was a report that Wilson had been informed that Richmond had fallen, that Lee and Johnston had surrendered, and that hostilities were at an end.

No more hostile work was done. The men went into bivouac, and sat about the fires, or lay down, in silence. If they spoke, it was in subdued tones. It was as if they were dazed. They resisted belief, they dared not trust the story.

About five o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th, when Colonel White, with his Seventeenth Indiana, was within twelve miles of Macon, driving rapidly before him a force of rebels who had resisted his advance, he was suddenly confronted by another party carrying a white flag. It was General Robertson, sent by General Cobb, with a letter containing a copy of a telegram, as follows:

GREENSBORO, April 19, 1865.

Via COLUMBIA, 19; *via* AUGUSTA, 20.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. COBB:

Inform General commanding enemy's forces in your front that a truce for the purpose of a final settlement was agreed upon yesterday between Generals Johnston and Sherman applicable to all forces under their command. A message to that effect from General Sherman will be sent him as soon as practicable. The contending forces are to occupy their present position, forty-eight hours' notice being given on the event of resumption of hostilities.

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Second in Command.

White sent the letter back to Minty, and awaited orders. Minty sent it farther back, to Wilson, but at

the same time sent a staff-officer forward to Robertson, to tell him what he had done and direct him to return immediately to his lines, there to await his reply from Wilson. But Robertson declined to receive an oral message, and insisted that he should have a written one. Later this proved to be only a bit of punctilio, but Minty, associating it with the fact that the flag-of-truce party had just given practical protection to a fighting force, feared that the enemy were attempting to deceive him while they gained time for the strengthening of their defense at Rocky Creek, now only a few miles ahead. He therefore directed White to give Robertson five minutes to get out of the way, and then to push forward. Upon this Robertson retired, and White, who shared Minty's apprehension of the enemy's purpose, followed promptly when the time expired. Within two miles he overtook Robertson's party, covering a battalion of the enemy's cavalry. The whole body moved so slowly that the officer commanding White's advance was satisfied that the purpose was to delay him. Under his orders, therefore, he charged along the road, scattering the rebels and pushing his way forward to Rocky Creek, where he arrived just in time to drive off another force and extinguish the fire which they had set to the bridge.

Wilson, as soon as he received the message, galloped to the front, with the purpose to halt his column outside the fortifications and make inquiries of Cobb. He too was slow to believe a report so momentous coming through the enemy. But, before he could reach the front, Colonel White, finding that the enemy still persisted in firing upon his advance, and that on falling back from Rocky Creek they continued firing upon

him until they entered the works, pushed directly after them and demanded their surrender. The troops in that part of the line yielded without further conflict, and White rode to headquarters in the city, where Cobb surrendered the place unconditionally.

The captures included 3,500 prisoners of war, of whom 4 were the generals already named and 300 were inferior officers, 5 colors, 60 guns, 3,000 small-arms, the arsenal filled with ammunition and ordnance stores, and large amounts of quartermasters', commissaries', and medical supplies.

White's loss had been one man killed and two wounded in the fighting on the road during the day.

General Cobb protested against the capture, declaring it a violation of the armistice between Sherman and Johnston referred to in his letter; and when Wilson came up he insisted that the troops ought to be withdrawn from the city and held at the point where they were met by the flag of truce. But, as the officers in the advance were properly obeying orders in all they did, and as Wilson, on receiving the letter, had made every effort to reach the head of his column,¹ with orders to have it halted outside the fortifications until he could be satisfied as to the authenticity of the report, and as the peculiar conduct of the flag-of-truce party had justified the suspicion and the vigorous pressure of the officers commanding the advance, and as the news was wholly from an enemy (no message

¹ A cavalry division makes a long column, and on this occasion the advanced regiment was eagerly pushing its way a remarkably long distance ahead of its division. When Wilson received Cobb's letter he was six miles back of the point where the flag of truce was met, and nearly twenty from Macon. With six miles' start and the impression in his mind that the enemy were trying to deceive, no wonder that White reached the city first.

being received purporting to come from any Union officer), the protest was deemed unreasonable. Cobb himself no doubt soon thought better of it, for, though he remained nominally a prisoner of war several weeks thereafter, he freely and without reservation turned over to Wilson all troops and property within his control, and busied himself in a very frank and manly manner in assisting to establish order, to restore confidence among the people, and to have them cheerfully obey the new authorities.

There was not much sleep in the bivouac of the Fourth Iowa in the woods by the railway that night of the 20th of April. The men were disturbed and nervous the next morning when they turned out in column, the more so because they were not required to march at daybreak, an order which had become so common that it seemed a matter of course. It was as late as eight o'clock when the regiment moved, and there was no strictness in the order of march. Officers and men alike seemed to have forgotten their smaller duties. All were absorbed in their thoughts and hopes. Nobody could believe the report, but everybody secretly longed to believe it. It was much easier to think of the probability of a battle at Macon, and as mile after mile went by all ears were more and more alert to hear the guns in action. Even when at last the works were seen, with no sign of defenders about them, the impression was only that that was unreal and that something real would happen at any moment. So it was like a dream to ride at a walk by frowning bastions mounting silent guns, and down through a city at peace.

Winslow's brigade was moved across the Ocmulgee,

and encamped in a wood of small pines on the low sandy hills rising from its northern bank. The weather was hot, and had been so for some days; and the men immediately employed themselves in constructing bowers to protect themselves and their horses from the sun.

Wilson that morning sent a message, by the enemy's telegraph, to Sherman, at Greensboro, N. C., reporting his occupation of Macon and the news he had received from Cobb. In the evening he had a reply by telegraph, which was afterward repeated by letter, confirming Cobb's news, and directing him to desist from further acts of war until he should hear that hostilities were resumed.¹

Wilson thereupon despatched Captain Lewis M. Hosea, of his staff, to Sherman, with full reports and instructions, and sat down to await definite orders.

¹ HEADQUARTERS, GREENSBORO, N. C., April 21, 1865—2 p.m.
Major-General WILSON,

Commanding Cavalry, Army United States, through Major-General H. Cobb:
The following is a copy of a communication just received, which will be sent to you to-day by an officer:

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
RALEIGH, April 20, 1865.

“Major-General WILSON,

Commanding Cavalry United States Army in Georgia:

“General Joseph E. Johnston has agreed with me for a universal suspension of hostilities, looking to a peace over the whole surface of our country. I feel assured that it will be made perfect in a few days. You will therefore desist from acts of war and devastation until you hear that hostilities are resumed. For the convenience of supplying your command, you may either contract for supplies down about Fort Valley or the old Chattahooche Arsenal, or, if you are south of West Point, Georgia, in the neighborhood of Rome or Kingston, opening up communication and a route of supplies into Chattanooga and Cleveland. Report to me your position through General Johnston, as also round by sea. You may also advise General Canby of your position, and the substance of this, which I have sent round by sea.

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General Commanding.”

Please communicate above to the Federal commander.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Of course the troops were kept well in hand and the horses carefully provided for, as at any moment might come an order to resume hostilities; but nothing of note was done in the corps for ten days. The most serious problem was that of food. Except coffee and sugar, all the provisions with which the campaign was begun were long ago gone, and the stores found in Macon must be distributed not only to the corps but to the prisoners and the citizens. But, after a week, no further orders or instructions being received from Sherman, the prisoners were all paroled.

On the 28th came a white flag from Mobile, with the news from Canby that he had taken that city on the 12th, and had sent troops to occupy Selma and Montgomery.

On the 29th news of the approach of Croxton was received, and two days later he appeared with his brigade. He had been thirty days in the enemy's country, without any communication with any friendly force. He was detached with 1,500 men, and lost 172, mostly by capture of foragers. He had taken nearly 300 prisoners and 4 guns in action, had destroyed 5 iron-works, 2 nitre-works, 3 factories, many mills and bridges, the military university at Tuscaloosa, and many accumulations of supplies. After several days manœuvring and some fighting with Jackson's division, he took Tuscaloosa the night of the 3d, and destroyed all public property there, thus executing the orders upon which he was detached. When he then attempted to follow the corps, he found Jackson in his way. Then, for ten days, he moved about Tuscaloosa, east, west, and north, seeking to evade Jackson and communicate with the corps, mean-

time being attacked by Wirt Adams with two brigades, sent over from the Mississippi border for the purpose. This attack was firmly received and repulsed, with rather severe loss on both sides. Adams thereupon, though he claimed the victory, marched back into Mississippi. Then at last Croxton rightly moved east, on the guess that the corps had gone in that direction. Crossing the Warrior rivers and the Cahawba, north of Elyton, he learned on the 18th that Wilson had taken Montgomery and gone toward Georgia; and though he was only near Montevallo on the day Wilson entered Macon, he marched almost directly toward Macon, following the shortest course that he could have chosen if he had known precisely the line of Wilson's march. He had some fighting with parties of the enemy's cavalry, the last engagement, on the 23d, at Blue Mountain, near Talladega, with several hundred rebels under General Hill,¹ attaining almost the dignity of a battle and being the last fighting done by any of the corps.

This extraordinary march of Croxton, over six hundred and fifty miles in length, without knowledge of the position or strength of the enemy in the country and with but two bits of news of the movements of his corps, ought to rank with Grierson's famous march through Mississippi in 1863. And it happened, that, going by this unintended route, Croxton was able to make complete the destruction of the iron-making plants and nitre factories in Alabama, one of the special objects of the campaign of the corps.

Close upon Croxton's rejoining, on the 1st of May, came the historically famous order of the Secretary of

¹ Probably Colonel Benjamin J. Hill of the 35th Tennessee.

War of the 21st of April, annulling Sherman's convention, and directing that hostilities be resumed at once and the rebel chiefs be captured. A few days later were received the remarkable orders of General Halleck to army commanders (issued on the 26th, after he had learned that Johnston had finally, on that day, fully surrendered all his command to Sherman), directing them to "obey no orders of Sherman," and to "push forward and cut off Johnston's retreat." But Secretary Stanton's order was deprived of effect in Georgia, in respect to a renewal of hostilities, by the news then already received of the regular and entire capitulation, on the 26th, of all the enemy's forces commanded by Johnston and Beauregard, being all then east of the Chattahoochee.

Thus, then, on the 1st of May, at Macon, the campaign was closed. There might be further work for the cavalry in the field west of the Chattahoochee, or against partisan or guerrilla bands east of it, but the great prospect of a share in the grand campaign of Richmond was lost,—there could be no more war in the Atlantic States.

The command had been forty days in the enemy's country, beyond supply or support of other troops; had crossed many rivers, some of them large, all but one at high flood, and only two by bridges already constructed; had taken by assault three fortified cities, and captured in action of the enemy more than half its own numbers, with artillery and small-arms many times the whole of its own equipment, breaking up and dissipating the enemy's forces in two States; had destroyed or caused the destruction of cotton of the value of over one hundred million dollars, and other

property of the Confederate war department of fully twice that value.¹ Every other campaign of the war sinks into insignificance when compared with this, in respect to the destruction of the enemy's means of carrying on hostilities. And the whole command was in excellent condition, animated by a perfect *esprit de corps*, taught by the finest experience what deeds lay within their power, and confident now that they could do anything that men may dare.

In the spirited language of Wilson: "These troopers never went around a place they should have gone through. They justly claim that they never got within sight of a gun that they did not take, whether posted in open field, behind breastworks, or beyond streams; that they never made a charge that failed, never lost a bridge of their own nor permitted the enemy to burn one over which he was retreating." Upton, with the soldierly confidence which so eminently characterized him, declared after Columbus, that "with his single division he could traverse the Con-

¹ These values are given as of the standard at that time prevailing in the North. In the money of the Confederacy they would be at least two hundred times the amounts here stated. In gold perhaps one hundred millions could have replaced the property destroyed.

Within thirty days the corps had marched an average of 525 miles, fought 5 important battles and many minor engagements, captured nearly 7,000 men in arms, including 5 generals and nearly 500 lesser officers, 23 colors, 288 pieces of artillery, about 100,000 stand of small-arms, 2 gunboats, 5 steamboats filled with army supplies, about 5,000 horses and mules, 7 foundries, 7 iron-works, 2 rolling-mills, 7 large machine-shops, 13 factories for clothing and army equipments, and many minor factories, 5 collieries, 4 nitre-works, 3 arsenals and contents, 1 navy-yard and contents, 1 powder magazine, 1 naval armory, 1 military university, 35 locomotives, 565 cars, 3 principal railroad bridges and a number of smaller ones, 235,000 bales of cotton, and immense quantities of quartermasters' and commissaries' stores.

The march from Montgomery to Macon, a distance of two hundred and fifteen miles, was made in six days, with two decisive battles fought midway for the passage of the Chattahoochee.

federacy from end to end and from side to side, carrying any kind of fortifications by assault, and defying capture by any kind or amount of force that might be sent against him." And Winslow closed the campaign with this order:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
FOURTH DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., April 22, 1865.

General Orders }
No. 2. }

Soldiers: The Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding congratulates you upon the success which has crowned your efforts.

In one month you have marched six hundred miles, engaged the enemy in force four times, completely routing him on each occasion.

You have captured on the field of battle 3,100 prisoners, 11 stand of colors, 33 guns, 25 caissons, and 3,500 small-arms. You have aided in destroying vast arsenals, foundries, factories, and workshops, with their contents. The enemy cannot recover from these terrible blows.

You have proven that cavalry can successfully assault fortified positions. Dismounted, you drove the enemy in greatly superior numbers from his strong works in front of Columbus. Mounted, you dashed through his lines, astounding him by your audacity and its results.

While we rejoice, let us not forget the fallen!

By command of Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Winslow.

A. HODGE, A.A.A.G.

The actual captures of the Fourth Iowa in the campaign, made distinctly apart from other troops, were 2,438 of the enemy,¹ including 146 officers, 21 pieces of artillery, 10 flags, about 2,000 stand of small-arms, and about 1,000 horses.

¹ Three times the number of the regiment engaged in the campaign.

The entire loss of the corps was 13 officers and 86 men killed, 39 officers and 559 men wounded, and 7 officers and 21 men missing.

The loss of the Fourth Iowa was only 1 officer and 2 men killed, 2 men mortally wounded, 22 men wounded, none missing, and 150 horses killed, wounded, and abandoned.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE DEATH OF LINCOLN—PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF DAVIS
—ARREST OF STEPHENS, TOOMBS, MALLORY, REAGAN,
HILL, AND JOHNSON—OCCUPATION OF GEORGIA AND
FLORIDA.

MUSTERED OUT!—HOME!

AMONG the crowning events of that last week of April, two of the most conspicuous have not been told. At about the same time, perhaps on the same day, the 23d, the soldiers were thrilled by the news of the assassination of Lincoln and the flight of Davis. The first was not credited, and the men were slow to believe it even when confirmed. The tale could be easily invented, and it was hard to realize that such a crime could be committed in the free United States. But even while the men refused to believe it, they were deeply and dangerously affected by it. Their expressions and conduct were so plainly marked that the officers watched them for some days in much anxiety. They were now freely mixing with the citizens, and paroled rebel soldiers were passing daily by thousands on their way to their homes. Distressing results might have followed any indiscreet word or act on the part of a Southerner in those days.

The effect of the assassination upon the negroes was, however, still more distinct. They were frightened. They had looked upon Lincoln as a sort of great master, a savior of their race. In their minds, vaguely, he was something more than man, and it was a shock to find that he could be killed. The overthrow of slavery was due to his personal decree and power, and now they would be bound again and made to suffer cruelly for accepting the liberty he had offered. For days the trembling creatures could not be induced to leave the camps, and it was only slowly and with difficulty that they could be made to realize that their former masters were finally deprived of power over them and that the results of the war could be secured without the hand of the Emancipator.

Fortunately, the flight of Davis and his Cabinet served to occupy in part the attention of the corps at this time. It was at first assumed as most likely that they would be caught before they could reach Georgia, but Wilson, without orders, took care to prepare for their capture if they should cross the Savannah. Though unable for some days to move bodies of troops in such a manner as to gain any material advantage, he had the railroads carefully watched, kept control of the telegraph, and observed the movements of all men of influence. Immediately upon news of Johnston's final surrender, he sent Upton to Augusta, with a small detachment, and ordered the main body of the division to Atlanta, under Winslow. McCook, with a detachment of his division, was sent to Albany, with orders to extend his movement and control from there to Tallahassee, while Croxton, with the remainder, was held at Macon, to watch the line of the Ocmulgee.

Minty, with the Second Division, was sent to the southwest, to occupy the country from the Ocmulgee at Abbeville across the Flint to the Chattahoochee at Eufaula. The ostensible and immediately practical object of these dispositions was to occupy the country, to preserve order, to secure military prisoners and property, and to hold strategic points and lines of communication; but all the commanders were directed to maintain a vigilant watch for Davis and other Confederate chiefs. Within a few days, however, direct orders were received to pursue and capture Davis, and the watch became a search in all the divisions.

From Southern citizens, paroled Confederates, and other sources, Wilson had been able to obtain some information of the movements of Davis and the circumstances of his flight, from which he believed that the plan was, to cross the Savannah above Augusta, toward either Athens or Dahlonega, to move thence southwest through northern Georgia and Alabama, and finally to reach Kirby Smith in Louisiana, where, with an army which had not weakly surrendered and would never surrender, Davis insisted that the fortunes of the Confederacy would yet be saved. Upon this belief Wilson increased his guards to the northwest and ordered the lines to be further extended. Later news and instructions were sent to Alexander, who had already gone to Atlanta, a detachment from Croxton's brigade was sent into Alabama, to watch the mountain country between Talladega and the Chattahoochee, and Winslow, ordered to Atlanta with the remainder of the Fourth Division, was to watch and scout the space from Croxton's left on the Ocmulgee to the Chattahoochee.

At daybreak on the 5th of May the Fourth Iowa

left its hot camp on the Ocmulgee, crossed the river, moved out through the charming suburb of Vinefield, and took the Atlanta road. It found itself at the head of the division, and the men knew the objects of the march. The column moved rapidly, and by night was beyond Forsyth, thirty miles from Macon, though the great heat made it necessary to halt several hours on the way. The next day, the Second Brigade in front, the march extended to Griffin. Now, having passed the left of Croxton's line along the Ocmulgee, a careful watch was organized. The column was stretched out as far as possible, every man was reminded of the possible glory awaiting him, many scouts and side marches were made, and every road, lane, and possible passageway was watched. It was feared that Davis would try to escape alone, or with only one or two attendants, since no rebel troops in a body could now reasonably hope to get through the country. As the report that he had crossed the Savannah and was moving southwest was fully credited, every man was filled with exciting hopes. Not only the detailed guards, but nearly every man and officer, were on the alert that night and several nights following. Many of the scenes, and even of the petty incidents, of those days are still recalled.

Perhaps the sharpest impression was made by a handbill, which, on the 7th or 8th of May, suddenly appeared on trees and buildings at the side of the roads, offering a reward of \$100,000 for the capture of Jefferson Davis! It was strange and hard to realize. Not the least of the strangeness was in the fact that the bills could remain in place, that there was nobody in Georgia to tear them down, nobody to fight those who put them up.

Companies were detached and left or sent to occupy different places deemed important in respect to the roads or the topography of the country, while Winslow with the remainder of the division and the heads of the regiments moved on to Atlanta. The men in the marching column were now much interested in the scenes along the road. About Lovejoy's and Jonesboro every hill and ridge was crowned with the defensive earthworks which had been thrown up by the opposing forces of Sherman and Hood eight months before. Indeed, the entire road to Atlanta for thirty miles was marked by these significant signs of the close and bloody contest. The little pit of a vidette, the redan of a picket post, the light entrenchments and rail barricades of a skirmish line, and the massive bastions and rifle-pits of main lines, they seemed at places to cover the whole face of the country, showing that the struggle had been at arm's length, and that both advance and retreat had been made only step by step and with determined obstinacy.

On the 9th the headquarters of the division, the brigade, and the regiment were established at Atlanta; and, excepting a small force to hold the post, the remaining companies were distributed about the country in all directions, in the effort to catch the rebel chiefs. But it was not to be the fortune of the Fourth Iowa, nor of its brigade or division, to catch the great one. Only one thing worth recording occurred within the division in the search for Davis.

General Alexander had been sent by rail to Atlanta, ahead of the division, with five hundred men chosen from his own brigade, under orders to scout the country toward Dahlonega and Dalton, connecting with the troops of

General Steedman expected down from Chattanooga. He and others, or all, of the division and brigade commanders were authorized to send out detachments disguised as rebel soldiers, in the hope of obtaining exact information of the position and movement of Davis and his escort. Lieutenant Joseph A. O. Yeoman, First Ohio Cavalry, then on Alexander's staff, volunteered for this service, and at Atlanta was placed in command of twenty picked men, disguised as Confederates. This daring young officer, already highly distinguished for bravery in the late campaign, led his men directly toward the Savannah, struck Davis' line of march, and boldly added his party to the column. He found that Davis had an immediate escort of about one hundred, covered by the remnant of Wheeler's cavalry corps, numbering about two thousand, in two divisions, under General George G. Dibrell, with General Samuel W. Ferguson second. General Wheeler, by arrangement with Davis at Charlotte, N. C., had gone back to Greensboro to get more troops, but Davis the same day found it prudent to leave for the south without awaiting his return. A train of ten or twelve wagons accompanied the column, which were popularly said to be loaded with many millions in gold coin. They were probably loaded chiefly with provisions and ammunition, though there was some specie, probably several hundred thousand dollars.

Yeoman and his men marched with the column several days, and until it reached Washington, a town about one hundred and twenty miles northeast from Macon and about midway between Augusta and Athens. Here the faithfulness of the rebel soldiers gave out. No doubt they realized that they must soon

meet Wilson's men if they continued to move in a body, and that it was not good to be killed when the war was really over, when there was no longer anything practical to fight for. Probably, too, they were demoralized by their knowledge of the treasure they were guarding, and thought they had better make sure at least of their pay, because at any hour the fortune of war might put them into a position in which they would certainly get nothing. Officers and men alike refused to march farther, and insisted upon a share of the money. Davis found it impossible to move them, and he was left to his fate by all except a few officers and about fifteen soldiers. The others received or took a part of the coin, either as arrears of pay or by mere distribution, and promptly disappeared. The deserted chieftain in bitter sadness was compelled to abandon his plans. Now he sought only to flee the country. He undertook to reach the Gulf by the shortest route. Mounted on a good horse, with his wife and his score of faithful followers, he moved directly south. Knowing that Macon was occupied by Wilson, he kept well to the east of that city, and rode night and day for the Florida coast.

Yeoman suffered a keen disappointment. He had not only been seeking information, as instructed, but had been boldly planning to seize Davis and carry him off. He observed the halt and apparent irresolution at Washington, and gained some information of the trouble. He had been thus far kept at a distance from Davis by the close care of the guards, so that when the force broke up and moved in parties in different directions he was at a loss. He divided his men as well as he could, and sent them on different roads, but lost sight of Davis.

Among the detachments sent out in various directions from Macon, one furnished by the Fourth Iowa, from Companies A, D, and K, commanded by Captain Abraham, was started on the 3d of May for Washington. He arrived there on the 6th, hardly a day after the disbandment. He must have passed the Davis party, then on its way south on a road farther east, within a few miles.

Abraham promptly confirmed Yeoman's report, but Wilson had already, upon that report and upon other information received at the same time, become convinced that Davis would attempt to reach Florida. He therefore urged the greatest vigilance in watching the Ocmulgee, and sent one hundred and fifty men of the First Wisconsin, of Croxton's (McCook's) division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harnden, with special orders to march as rapidly as possible to and down the Oconee River. The next day, the 7th, he was so impressed by the idea that Davis was somewhere east of Macon and moving southward, that he ordered out another regiment, the Fourth Michigan, of Minty's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin D. Pritchard, to march at the highest speed down the right bank of the Ocmulgee and cover all the crossings to the mouth of the Ohoopee.

Colonel Harnden left Macon the evening of the 6th, marched southeast to Dublin on the Oconee, thence south near the right bank of the river, and finally southwest to Brown's Ferry, near Jacksonville, where he crossed the Ocmulgee. Colonel Pritchard went directly down the right bank of the Ocmulgee, and met Harnden at Abbeville early on the 9th. Harnden had got directly upon the track of the Davis party, who, he believed, were moving southwestward, not more than ten or twelve hours ahead. He therefore

took the road toward Irwinville, twenty miles southwest of Abbeville, while Pritchard, following his orders, which covered the capture of other rebel chiefs as well as Davis, continued his march along the Ocmulgee. Within a few miles, however, he obtained information which convinced him that Davis and other noted rebels were in the party on the Irwinville road. He turned his column about, marched at the utmost speed by a circuitous route south of the main road to Irwinville, and reached that village before daybreak of the 10th. He was in time. Davis had halted to let his party sleep a few hours, and was in camp a mile east of the village, on the Abbeville road. Pritchard found the camp, and, dividing his men, surrounded and approached it closely without being discovered. As soon as the coming day gave light enough he sprang upon the camp, and the famous President of the Confederacy was a prisoner, though he almost escaped to the forest covered by feminine garments. With him were taken Mrs. Davis, John H. Reagan, his Postmaster-General, Colonel Burton N. Harrison, his private secretary, six other officers, and thirteen soldiers.

Colonel Harnden had the trying disappointment to find himself only a few minutes too late, but he philosophically took the head of the column, on the return march to Macon, as guard of the great captive. Both Harnden and Pritchard were rewarded for their success, as well as for honorable and efficient service in the late campaign, by promotion. They were brevetted brigadier-generals. It should be said that neither Harnden's nor Pritchard's men knew that a reward was offered for the capture of Davis until they returned to Macon.

On the 13th, the news of the capture reached Atlanta, and orders were despatched to bring in to that post all

the outlying detachments of the division engaged in the search. On the 14th, Davis and his wife passed through Atlanta, by rail, on their way to Augusta and Savannah, thence to go by sea to Washington. The party stopped at Atlanta to take breakfast and to have some cars added. Of course many of the Fourth Iowa and other soldiers gathered at the station to see the object of their greatest hatred, but he was treated with not the least unkindness. In adjusting the bell-rope in the reconstructed train a considerable portion of it was left temporarily in Davis' car, as is often seen on trains. In pulling from another car that portion flew about, and for a moment caught around Davis' head and shoulders. He put up his hands to throw it off, when his wife came and helped him, with the remark, "It's not time yet for *that*, Jeff!"

Though the Fourth Iowa did not have the fortune to capture Davis, it brought in others of the noted Confederate leaders. One of its detachments from Company F, under Sergeant Loughridge, arrested Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President, at Athens; another, from Company E, under Captain Saint, the notorious Robert Toombs, senator, cabinet minister, and general, at Washington; another, from Company H, under Captain Fitch, Stephen R. Mallory, the Secretary of the Navy, and Benjamin H. Hill, senator and general, at LaGrange; and another, from Company L, under Captain Pray, Herschel V. Johnson, who had been the candidate for Vice-President on the Democratic ticket with Stephen A. Douglas in 1860. Unfortunately, the officer sent for Toombs suffered him to slip away, and he escaped to Mexico.

These prisoners, with others, were sent north by way of Chattanooga, and were all afterward released with-

out trial. Three of them, Mallory, Hill, and Cobb, were started together for New York, guarded by a detail from the Fourth Iowa, under Sergeant Charles F. Craver of E; but Cobb was released at Nashville, probably because he was considered a military prisoner rather than a political one.

Meantime, and even while the search for Davis and his councillors was in progress, there was plenty of work laid out for the troops. The corps was charged with the occupation of nearly all Georgia and Florida. The paroled soldiers of Lee's army began to arrive in Georgia before the end of the month, and when Johnston's were added, early in May, the numbers increased to several thousand a day. Those belonging to other commands who had not yet been paroled, gathered from all directions, assembled at the towns, and gave their paroles in large numbers. Nearly sixty thousand were paroled by authorized officers of Wilson's corps before the end of May, of whom one tenth were officers. Over five thousand were paroled by Captain Abraham, of the Fourth Iowa, at Washington.¹ The able-bodied

¹ To show the form of these paroles, a copy of one in the writer's possession is here given :

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., May 10, 1865.

I the undersigned, H. J. Moody, a Private of the 13th Georgia Infantry, do solemnly swear that I will not bear arms against the United States of America, or give any information or do any military duty whatsoever until regularly exchanged as a prisoner of war.

(Signed)

H. J. MOODY.

Description : Height, 5-6 ; Hair, light ; Eyes, blue ; Complexion, fair.

I certify that the above parole was given by me on the date above written on the following conditions : The above-named person is allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the military authorities of the United States so long as he observes this parole and obeys the laws which were in force previous to January 1, 1861, where he resided.

By order of Brevet Maj.-Gen. Wilson.

G. H. KNEELAND,
Captain & Provost-Marshal C. C. M. D. M.

paroled soldiers in Georgia alone on the 1st of June must have much outnumbered the combined Confederate armies east of the Alleghanies on the 1st of April, if their own reports of their numbers in the field are to be credited. It seems to be true that hardly one fourth of the Confederates were in the field or on duty in the last campaigns. Where were the others?

All these men had to be cared for to some extent. Many of them and their families must have had hard times that summer, for it was late to plant, and stored provisions had been consumed and destroyed by both armies for a whole year. General Wilson issued to them the stores of the Confederate forces wherever they could be found, and his own as far as he dared; and after the railway was opened to Chattanooga the United States commissaries and quartermasters were directed to supply them with necessities. The condition of the poor, and even of families formerly prosperous, was meantime most pitiful. Wholly unable to get food in the desolated country about Atlanta, they gathered in the town, and accepted even the smallest charity in food. Large numbers of them had no shelter, nor any means of paying for anything they received. Even refined women had no better protection than was afforded by the covers of the old carriages or wagons in which they came. The court-house and the churches, being the only public buildings left in Atlanta after Sherman's destruction, were used as far as possible for these unfortunates; but when the Chattanooga railway was again in operation they were better cared for.

Some of these people had gained a little money or bread through the winter and spring by a peculiar

industry, which failed for lack of a market when the Union army again occupied the country. It was often observed about Atlanta, that the trees near entrenchments were marked with ragged holes and that the surface of the earthworks had been much dug up. This was explained by the pathetic story that the poor people of that desolated region had been digging for bullets shot in battle between the hostile forces in Sherman's campaign, and had sold the lead to the Confederate ordnance officers for a little money or meal.

The railway to Chattanooga was a subject of deep interest to the troops at Atlanta. That was the way home. The route to Savannah and by the sea was like the way to another world. From the 1st of May, when they knew that the war was over, their desire to go home, and their conviction that they ought to be permitted to go, grew stronger every day. They had an idea that when the railway was open to Chattanooga the government could manage affairs in Georgia with a small number of troops, and that the most of the regiments would be free to be discharged. They had enlisted for the war, and just as soon as the war was really ended they ought to be released.

So the two subjects of all others most interesting up to July were the muster-out of other regiments, news of which was constantly heard, and the work on the railway. It had been destroyed several times between Marietta and Atlanta, the last time with special care by Sherman, when he set out on the "March to the Sea." Two very large bridges were required for the Chattahoochee and the Etowah, as well as many lesser ones, and thirty or forty miles of the track required reconstruction. General Winslow personally

superintended the work, pushing it with his characteristic energy, and General Steedman was busy at the Chattanooga end. Captain Whiting of the Fourth Iowa, a practical constructor, directed the bridge-building, and heavy details from the regiment and division were constantly employed under him. Early in June the road was opened, and the news brought great satisfaction and very pleasing hopes of muster-out to the Fourth Iowa and its neighboring regiments.

Immediately came plentiful supplies and regular mails from the North. For more than two months there had been but little news beyond that contained in Sherman's military despatches to Wilson. The railways in the Carolinas being broken up, the only route from the North was by sea from Washington to Savannah, thence by river to Augusta. Sherman had come to Savannah about the 1st of May, to provide for the supply of the corps, and a few days afterward small quantities of commissary stores were received at Atlanta and Macon. There was not enough at Savannah to justify the issue of full rations, but coffee and sugar were again furnished, after ten days of disagreeable deprivation; and with these and the captured Confederate hard-bread and meat, which were thought to be very poor in quality, the men had managed for a month more. But the absence of letters and newspapers from the North was a greater trial. One or two mails had come by Savannah, but many had accumulated at Chattanooga, and when at last these arrived, all together, there was but one thing lacking to complete happiness,—release from the army.

When the brigade first came to Atlanta it was encamped on the road extended from Peachtree Street,

about two miles from the court-house, which then stood on the site of the present capitol. After some weeks the Fourth Iowa was ordered to provost duty in the city, and Colonel Peters was assigned to the command of the post. Many companies and detachments were, however, kept on duty at out-lying towns. They were chiefly occupied in preserving order, protecting property, and paroling Confederate soldiers. In this service Captain Abraham with parts of A and D, was at Washington; Captain Fitch, with parts of H and B, was at LaGrange, and afterward at Madison; Captain Pray, with L, was at Griffin, and other officers with detachments at other towns in the district. A detachment from H and B, under Lieutenant Blasier, went to Augusta, and held the great arsenal and powder-works there, until relieved by infantry. Lieutenant Reynolds, with part of F, made a forced march to Dalton, to carry the news of the capture of Davis to General Steedman. All of the regiment not on detached service was kept very busy with the care and government of Atlanta. Business quickly revived there, the building of new stores and dwellings began, and after the railway was opened to Chattanooga, the city very rapidly regained its former importance. The headquarters of the regiment and the post were in the court-house, the tents of the field-and-staff were pitched in the adjoining grounds, and the companies not detached were camped in vacant lots half a mile to the east.

On the 7th of June an order was received from the War Department,¹ under which, on the 8th, in honor of the dead President, thirteen guns were fired at dawn,

¹ General Orders No 66, War Department, A. G. O., April 16, 1865.

the post flag was run to half-mast at sunrise, one gun was fired every half-hour until sunset, and a national salute of thirty-six guns closed the day. All troops were paraded in the morning to hear the order read, all employments then ceased for the day, and the customary badge of mourning was worn on the colors and on the swords and left arms of officers.

Of course the 4th of July of that year was celebrated with great feeling in all the armies of the United States. Colonel Peters made considerable preparations for it at Atlanta. He collected all the troops within his reach, put them into the best order, and, with several military bands, paraded the streets, not forgetting the important feature of suitable speeches in the court-house grounds. As he had hoped, the citizens showed interest in the movement, some of them even gathering to hear the speaking, and a good indication of the temper of the people was obtained.

But it was not possible to get the soldiers to take any more than a passing interest in any subject but the one great one of discharge. No suggestions of the condition of the Southern States, or arguments as to their duty, could much affect their fixed idea that it was a wrong to keep them in the service in time of peace when they had enlisted only "for the war"; and it was seriously offensive to them to find themselves doing mere police-duty in Georgia when they were sure it was their "right" to be at their own employments in Iowa.

In May the men who had enlisted in the Fourth Iowa in 1862 were sent north, under Captain Whiting, to be mustered out, their three years' service having

ended. About the same time the War Department issued orders for the discharge of all volunteers of the cavalry whose term of service would expire before the 1st of October, all in hospital except veterans, and all who had been prisoners of war and had not yet returned to their regiments.¹ Upon this the veterans reasoned, with soldiers' logic, that they were being punished for re-enlisting as veterans. They really supposed however, as did the people of the North, that it would be necessary to keep a considerable body of troops in the South for an indefinite time. It was expected that, however well the regular Confederate soldiers who had laid down their arms might conduct themselves, the bands of guerrillas, who had been so savage and treacherous during the war, would retire to the mountains and unsettled portions of the country, to keep up a petty and exasperating warfare, requiring the use of many regiments of cavalry on the part of the United States. This proved to be a mistaken judgment, but the government at Washington shared it with the people and the soldiers, and much care was taken by the War Department for some months after the surrender, to prepare troops for such a service. If it should become really necessary to yield to the demand of the volunteers for their release, the regular army would have to be increased; but the government hoped to retain some of the best regiments of volunteers.

About this time boards of examiners were appointed from Washington,² who went to the posts and camps, and called up all the officers of the volunteers, for examination in respect to their relative merits, with a

¹ General Orders No. 77, April 28, 1865, and No. 83, May 8, 1865, War Department, A. G. O.

² General Orders No. 86, War Department, A. G. O., May 9, 1865.

view to the discharge of some and the retention of others. One of the boards appeared at Atlanta in June. The men looked upon its proceedings with suspicion and disapproval, and when a little later, June 28th, an order was received from Upton, then at Nashville, requiring a report of the numbers of the Third and Fourth Iowa, with an intimation that it was intended to fill those regiments to the maximum by disbanding the Fifth Iowa and transferring its enlisted men, the Third and Fourth were sure that they were chosen to remain in the service, and their indignation was much increased.¹ They went on doing all duty assigned, as probably they would have done if they had been retained much longer, though they objected and complained, not only to their officers, but to their friends and to the men of influence in the North. They had plentiful supplies, regular mails, good shelter, and safe employment, but they saw nothing good, because they lacked the two things they wanted above all,—liberty and home.

About the middle of June the Tenth Missouri was ordered to Nashville. There, on the 26th, it was disbanded, the veterans being transferred to "Merrill's Horse," another Missouri cavalry organization, and the others discharged. Upton met the Missourians at Nashville, and very much gratified them by his acknowledgment of their long and arduous service. Referring to the fact that the regiment had begun its fighting career in one of the first battles of the war, at Wilson's Creek,² where the famous Lyon was killed,

¹ The Fourth Iowa, under this order, reported 5 officers and 325 men lacking of the maximum, June 29, 1865, but the regiment was not filled up. The Fifth Iowa was not disbanded, but was mustered out in August.

² It was then known as Bowen's Battalion.

he said that it had since often distinguished itself, and that its deeds under his command, its destruction of the iron-works at Montevallo in the face of Roddey's division sent specially to protect them, its repeated assaults later in the day upon superior numbers, driving the enemy in every instance, and finally its charge at Columbus, through entrenchments manned by infantry and artillery, would ever rank among the most daring feats of cavalry.

Early in July Company G, with all its officers, rejoined the regiment at Atlanta, and remained with it until muster-out. In its escort duty with Upton, the company had served at Augusta and afterward at Nashville, Upton having been relieved from duty with the corps and placed in charge at the latter place of the vast Edgefield cavalry camps. At both places the whole company was kept almost incessantly upon duty. A part of its service was in guarding the specie taken from the famous train with which Davis had tried to escape. This they carried from Augusta to Nashville, where it was finally delivered to Treasury officers, who took it to Washington.

The duty of a general's escort is not merely to ride near him for his protection or show. Even in camp the men are kept much more employed than those of other companies, and in an active campaign they work under constant pressure, often riding by night as well as by day. Only a part of their time is spent with the general. They are sent off on long and perilous marches, and take part in engagements the same as other troops. Under Upton's busy and impetuous orders, Company G found but small chance for rest, and none for idleness. At Montevallo, at Ebenezer

Church, and at Columbus, it shared in the battle with distinguished credit.

With the return of G came the news of the dissolution of the Corps. The greater part of the volunteer armies had been discharged, the remainder were reorganized as to corps and divisions, and Georgia became a separate department,¹ under Major-General Steedman, with headquarters at Augusta. On the last day of June the cavalymen were electrified by an order for the discontinuance of the organization of the Cavalry Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi and the discharge of many of the regiments.

The men had become very proud of their corps and very much attached to it, and it was with genuine regret and sorrow that they thought of its separation. It had done so much within its short life, and had gained such spirit and zeal, that there seemed no limit to its powers. But there were many gratifying rewards, in the commendation of its deeds by those best able to judge and in the promotions and other honors given to the men whose fortune it had been to meet special opportunities for soldierly deeds.

Medals of honor were struck, under orders of the War Department, for the soldiers who had particularly distinguished themselves, and, on a grand parade ordered for the purpose, some men in each regiment were publicly decorated.² At the same time promotions were

¹ General Orders No. 118, War Department, A. G. O., June 27, 1865.

² In the Fourth Iowa these men were: Private Nicholas Fanning, of B, who captured a Confederate flag and two officers at Selma; Private Charles G. Swan, of C, who captured the flag of the rebel Eleventh Mississippi at Selma; Private James P. Miller, of D, who captured the standard of the Twelfth Mississippi Cavalry, with its bearer, at Selma; Corporal Richard H. Morgan, of A, Sergeant Norman F. Bates, of E, Private John H. Hays, of F, Private Eli Sherman, of I, Privates Richard H. Cosgriff and John Kinney, of L, each of whom

made among the officers wherever there were vacancies, and there being many more officers who had seized great opportunities, they were recommended, with high praise, for promotion by brevet. Generals Wilson, Long, Upton, and Alexander were all advanced in the regular army, and many of the volunteer colonels and lieutenant-colonels were brevetted generals. The brigade, division, and corps commanders joined in recommending for brevet promotion many officers in brigade and regimental service.¹

And the generals, division, corps, and army, published their final orders, which filled all hearts with pride. The soldiers will be glad to see them here again in print :

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION,
CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
EDGEFIELD, TENN., June 10, 1865.

General Orders }
No. 21. }

Before severing his connection with the command, the Brevet Major-General Commanding desires to express his high appreciation of the bravery, endurance, and soldierly qualities displayed by the officers and men of his division in the late cavalry campaign.

Leaving Chickasaw, Alabama, on the 22d of March, as a new organization and without status in the Cavalry Corps,

captured a Confederate standard and its bearer at Columbus ; Private Edward J. Bebb, of D, who captured a Confederate flag at Columbus ; Private Robert C. Wood, of A, who, at Columbus, was captured, escaped, and returning with comrades, captured the colonel and the adjutant of the rebel regiment which had held him ; and Sergeant Robert Skiles, of G, who, acting as orderly to General Upton, at Columbus, showed great personal bravery.

¹ In the Fourth Iowa, Majors Pierce and Woods to be lieutenant-colonels ; Captains Abraham and Fitch to be majors ; First-Lieutenant J. Sloan Keck and Second-Lieutenant Peter R. Keck to be captains ; and Second-Lieutenant Loyd H. Dillon to be first-lieutenant.

you in one month traversed six hundred miles, crossed six rivers, met and defeated the enemy at Montevallo, capturing one hundred prisoners; routed Forrest, Buford and Roddey in their chosen position at Ebenezer Church, capturing two guns and three hundred prisoners; carried the works in your front at Selma, capturing thirteen guns, eleven hundred prisoners and five battle flags; and finally crowned your successes by a night assault upon the enemy's entrenchments at Columbus, Georgia, where you captured fifteen hundred prisoners, twenty-four guns, eight battle flags, and vast munitions of war.

On the 21st of April you arrived at Macon, Georgia, having captured on your march three thousand prisoners, thirty-nine pieces of artillery and thirteen battle flags.

Whether mounted with the sabre or dismounted with the carbine, the brave men of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Iowa, the First and Seventh Ohio, and Tenth Missouri Cavalry triumphed over the enemy in every conflict.

With regiments led by brave colonels and brigades commanded with consummate skill and daring, the Division, in thirty days, won a reputation unsurpassed in the service.

Though many of you have not received the reward to which your gallantry has entitled you, you have nevertheless received the commendation of your superior officers and won the admiration and gratitude of your countrymen.

You will return to your homes with the proud consciousness of having defended the flag of your country in the hour of the greatest national peril, while through your instrumentality liberty and civilization will have advanced the greatest stride recorded in history.

The best wishes of your Commanding General will ever attend you.

E. UPTON,
Brevet Major-General Commanding.

Official :

JAMES W. LATTA,
Ass't. Adj't-Gen'l.

**HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., July 2, 1865.**

**General Orders {
No. 39. }**

To the Officers and Men of the Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi :

Your Corps has ceased to exist ! The rebellion has terminated in the re-establishment of your country upon the basis of nationality and perpetual unity. Your deeds have contributed a noble part to the glorious result ; they have passed into history and need no recital from me. In the nine months during which I have commanded you, I have heard no reproach upon your conduct, have had no disaster to chronicle !

The glowing memories of Franklin, Nashville, West Harpeth, Ebenezer Church, Selma, Montgomery, West Point, and Macon may well fill your hearts and mine with pride.

You have learned to believe yourselves invincible, and contemplating your favorable deeds, may justly cherish that belief. You may be proud of your splendid discipline, no less than your courage, zeal, and endurance. The noble impulses which have inspired you in the past will be a source of enduring honor in the future. Peace has her victories no less than war. Do not forget that clear heads, honest hearts, and stout arms, guided by pure patriotism, are the surest defense of your country in every peril. Upon them depend the substantial progress of your race and order of civilization, as well as the liberty of all mankind.

Let your example in civil life be an incitement to industry, good order, and enlightenment, while your deeds in war shall live in the grateful remembrance of your countrymen.

Having discharged every military duty honestly and faithfully, return to your homes with the noble sentiment of your martyr President deeply impressed upon every heart :

With malice against none, and charity for all, strive to do the right as God gives you to see the right.

JAS. H. WILSON,

Official :

Brevet Major-General.

ED. P. IMHOFF,

Capt. & A. A.-Gen'l.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 2, 1865.

General Orders {
No. 108. }

Soldiers of the Armies of the United States :

By your patriotic devotion to your country in the hour of danger and alarm—your magnificent fighting, bravery, and endurance—you have maintained the supremacy of the Union and the Constitution, overthrown all armed opposition to the enforcement of the laws, and of the Proclamation forever abolishing Slavery—the cause and pretext of the Rebellion,—and opened the way to the rightful authorities to restore order and inaugurate peace on a permanent and enduring basis on every foot of American soil.

Your marches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolution, and brilliancy of result, dim the lustre of the world's past military achievements, and will be the Patriot's precedent, in defense of Liberty and Right, in all time to come.

In obedience to your country's call, you left your homes and families and volunteered in its defense. Victory has crowned your valor and secured the purpose of your patriot hearts ; and with the gratitude of your countrymen, and the highest honors a great and free nation can accord, you will soon be permitted to return to your homes and families, conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens.

To achieve these glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the blessings

of free institutions, tens of thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen, and sealed the priceless legacy with their lives. The graves of these a grateful nation bedews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and support their stricken families.

U. S. GRANT,

Official :

Lieutenant-General.

W. A. NICHOLS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

With these great and well-earned praises ringing in their ears, and gladdened by reading in newspapers and letters of the pride and gratitude of their friends at home, the anxious volunteers passed July with more content. If the names of their regiments were not on the happy list for discharge when the Corps was dissolved, they took hope and expected to see them on the next one.

They had not long to wait, though it seemed long enough. General Thomas, who was still in command of the grand military division, in July received authority from the War Department to designate regiments for muster-out in his discretion. Some good friend of the Iowa regiments, probably General Upton, induced him to choose those in Upton's division, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth. On the 2d of August, by telegraph, he directed General Steedman, commanding the Department of Georgia, to muster-out the Third and Fourth then in his department. General Steedman made the necessary orders, and sent them to Atlanta, where they were received on the 5th. What a glad commotion in the camps! The detachments were at once called in, and, amid unceasing fun-making and joyous excitement, the work of preparing the rolls was

hurried through. A mustering-officer arrived from Augusta, and on the 8th the rolls of the companies were completed and signed, the Fourth Iowa was assembled on parade, with full ranks, General Winslow in his place as Colonel, and this order was read :

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
FOURTH DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, M.D.M.,
ATLANTA, GA., August 7, 1865.

General Orders {
No. 3. }

Comrades : The war is ended. The last order you obey directs your return to your homes. Let your future be as commendable as your past has been glorious.

Your career as soldiers is over. You go home as citizens, to reap the reward of your campaigns. Your country will always cherish the memory of her brave defenders.

Eight States have been traversed by your columns. Their soil has been consecrated by the blood of your companions. Your victories will impress their localities on your minds.

Though the battles of this war are over, let us recollect that those of our lives continue to the end, that our orders are from HIM whose plans are always successful, and that justice is no less a divine attribute than mercy.

I shall hear of your behavior in civil life, and believe that you will daily evidence the fact that well disciplined soldiers can become equally good citizens.

During the long period in which I have been associated with you, I have had many occasions to be proud of your conduct, and have often rejoiced that I commanded such brave men.

While I regret to separate from such gallant officers and men, I rejoice with you that our country is intact and united, our government stronger than ever, and that the necessity for our armed service no longer exists.

Confident that when again required, you will be as ready to take the carbine and sabre as you now are to abandon

them, I part from you with many and sincere wishes for your future prosperity and happiness.

E. F. WINSLOW,

Brev. Brig.-Gen.

Official :

A. HODGE,

Captain and A. A. A. G.

For several minutes after the order was read no one thought to move or to give any direction. The 9th was occupied by the muster-out of the Third Cavalry, and the Fourth waited one day. On the 10th the field-and-staff rolls of the Fourth were signed, and, for the last time, the old regiment was drawn up in line ; and when the last formal act was done, the Colonel, with trembling voice and tear-filled eyes, declared the Fourth Iowa Cavalry Veterans no longer in the service of the Union. It was four years and one day since the first company was organized.

But it was the duty as well as the policy of the government to disband the volunteers in their own States, and the Fourth Iowa remained under the orders of the War Department two weeks longer. On the 12th, still under the orders of its officers, it turned its back upon Atlanta and the great field of war in which it had toiled so long and learned so much, and set out by rail for Davenport, Iowa. It was seven days on the way. The narrow means of the railways of those days and the great demand upon them for military transportation made any rapid movement impracticable.

When the regiment arrived it was quartered in Camp McClellan, the same camp occupied by Companies A and B when they came to Davenport, burning to get into the service, four years before. The

Third Cavalry was already there, busy about its discharge. Other regiments were there for the same purpose, and the camp was a busy place. The affairs of the Fourth Cavalry could not be completed until the 24th. On that day the men, with nervous hands, signed their last rolls, received their discharge papers, and went out into the town with strange feelings, hardly able to realize their freedom.

The next morning the Adjutant, detained to turn over to the authorities the completed records, received his final papers, and went down through the principal streets alone. He saw only one man of the regiment. The Fourth Iowa no longer existed: it had already gone back to the people.

APPENDIX.

ENGAGEMENTS AND CASUALTIES.

This list does not include all the fighting in which the Fourth Iowa Cavalry was engaged, but only those contests in which it suffered some loss or which were important in respect to the movements in which they occurred. It would not be possible now, even if it were worth while, to give an account of all its minor conflicts and skirmishes. On some days, especially in certain of the Mississippi campaigns, there was a succession of such engagements, without any loss worth mentioning in the regiment.

Only the casualties which occurred in conflict with the enemy are here given. All casualties will appear in a roll of the regiment which it is intended to print separately.

The regiment, after being ordered, first, in December, 1861, to New Albany (Louisville), where it would have been in the Department and Army of the Ohio, and next, in January, 1862, to Ft. Leavenworth, where, likely, it would have had to take part in the cruel and fruitless warfare of the border, was at last, under a third order, sent to General Halleck, then at St. Louis in command of the Department of the Missouri.

General Halleck at once ordered it into the field, to reinforce General Curtis, who, with the Army of the Southwest, was then confronting a superior force of rebels under Van Dorn and Price in the northwest corner of Arkansas. On its march, at Springfield, Mo., it was stopped by an order from Curtis, his campaign having been just ended by his victory at Pea Ridge.

Then, in April, 1862, its first regular campaign was begun, in Curtis' movement against Little Rock. Its marches in that campaign occupied from April 14 to July 15, 1862, and led

from Springfield, by Ozark, Forsyth, and Vera Cruz, to West Plains, Mo. ; thence by Batesville, to Searcy, Ark. ; thence by Batesville, Jacksonport, Cottonplant, and Clarendon, to Helena on the Mississippi, with many minor expeditions, scouts, and foraging-trips. Some part or all of the regiment met the enemy ten or twelve times in this campaign, but only five are thought important enough to be recorded.

1 (page 37). NITRE CAVE, ON WHITE RIVER, ARK.

April 18, 1862.

Detachments of Co's G and K, under Capt. James T. Drummond.
Force and commander of the enemy unknown.
No loss in Drummond's command.
Enemy's loss unknown.

2 (page 37). TALBOT'S FERRY.

April 19, 1862.

Detachment of Co. F, under Lieut. William A. Heacock. Engagement renewed later by detachments of E, G, and K, all under Capt. James T. Drummond.
Force and commander of the enemy unknown.
Union loss, 1 killed,—Lieut. William A. Heacock.
Enemy's loss unknown.

3 (page 41). LITTLE RED RIVER, OR BROWN'S FORD.

June 3, 1862.

Co's C and H, under Capt. Watson B. Porter.
Enemy, cavalry, number and commander unknown.
Porter's loss : 2 wounded and 3 captured, of Co. C.
Wounded : Corps. Benjamin F. Browning and Charles Butcher.
Captured : the two wounded and Pvt. Andrew J. Murdock.
The captured returned in August, 1862, on parole, and were exchanged.
Enemy's loss unknown.

4 (page 43). WHITE RIVER, OR MT. OLIVE.

June 7, 1862.

Co. F, under Capt. Edward F. Winslow.
Force and commander of the enemy unknown.

Loss of Co. F : Corp. John G. Carson, mortally wounded, died
the same day.

Enemy's loss unknown.

5 (page 43). GIST'S PLANTATION.

July 14, 1862.

Foraging party of Co. F, 12 men, under Sergt. Hira W. Curtiss.

Enemy, 100 cavalry, under Lieut-Col. Chappel.

Loss of Co. F : 1 killed, 5 wounded, and 5 captured.

Killed : Pvt. Richard Harrison.

Wounded : Corp. Joseph Cline, Pvts. Henry R. Sadler, Jabez
Sibley, James W. Butler, and John Dwire.

Captured : The three first-named wounded and Pvts. William
McCabe and William A. McWhorten.

The captured were all paroled within a few days, and were
exchanged and returned to service.

Enemy's loss unknown.

From July 15, 1862, to April 28, 1863, the regiment was near
Helena, Ark., part of a constantly changing force which held the
right bank of the Mississippi there, while Grant and Sherman were
trying to reach Vicksburg by way of Corinth and Grenada. Its
service was incessant scouting, reconnoitring, and foraging, with
more important expeditions against Arkansas Post and Grenada.
There were many petty engagements in this service, but only five
involving loss to the regiment.

6 (page 49). POLK'S PLANTATION.

Sept. 20, 1862.

Detachment of Co. D, a picket-post.

Enemy, cavalry, number and commander unknown.

Loss of Co. D : 1 killed, 1 wounded, and 3 captured.

Killed : Pvt. David Mosher.

Wounded : Pvt. Jehoida Worth.

Captured : Pvts. Jehoida Worth, John W. Hinkson, and Henry Shopbell.

The captured were exchanged and returned, November, 1862.
Enemy's loss unknown.

7 (page 50). JONES' LANE, OR LICK CREEK.

Oct. 11, 1862.

Detachments of Co's A, G, and H, 50 men, under Major Benjamin Rector. Engagement renewed by Co. B, 40 men, under Lieut. George B. Parsons.

Enemy, the Twenty-first Texas Cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. DeWitt C. Giddings.

Loss of the regiment : 4 killed, 6 wounded, 15 captured.

Killed : Co. A, Pvt. John W. Allen.

Co. G, Pvts. Watson Frame, Cornelius W. Jackson, and John W. Williams.

Wounded : Co. A, Pvt. Levi B. Williamson.

Co. B, Lieut. George B. Parsons, Com.-Sergt. Lorenzo D. Wellman, and Pvts. James A. Gray and Milton Platt.

Co. G, Sergt. Thomas W. Hanks (died of his wounds, Nov. 28, 1862).

Captured : Major Rector.

Co. A, Sergt. Asahel Mann, Corp. Isaac M. Irwin, Pvts. John W. Allen (killed after capture), William W. Davis, and Henry Drake.

Co. B, Pvts. Francis McNulty and Alfred Morris.

Co. G, Lieut. Alexander Rodgers, Bugler Thomas E. Arnold, Pvts. John Corbin, Robert P. McAuley, Samuel B. Mann, and Alexander Riddle.

Co. H, Corp. George W. Miller.

The captured were all returned, paroled, in November, and were exchanged, Dec. 1, 1862.

Enemy's loss, in killed and wounded, unknown ; in prisoners, Lieut.-Col. Giddings and 11 of his men.

8 (page 55).

MARIANNA.

Nov. 8, 1862.

Detachments of Co's B, D, H, and L, 100 men, under Capt. John H. Peters.

Enemy, cavalry, mounted, number and commander unknown.

Peters' loss : 22 wounded—

Lieut. Warren Beckwith, Acting Reg'l Quartermaster.

Co. B, Capt. John H. Peters, Pvt. Frederick L. Wells.

Co. D, Lieut. John T. Tucker, First-Sergt. Amon L. Ogg,
Pvts. Benjamin F. Morgan, John M. Wilson,
and four others whose names are not now
learned.

Co. H, Lieuts. Asa B. Fitch and Stephen W. Groesbeck,
Corp. Charles W. Sisson, and six others whose
names are not now learned. Sisson died of
his wound, Dec. 3, 1862.

Co. L, two men whose names are not now learned.

Enemy's loss : killed, 7 (or 17) ; wounded, unknown ; captured,
14, including a major and a captain.

9 (page 62).

BIG CREEK.

March 8, 1863.

Detachment of the regiment, 250 men, under Major Cornelius F. Spearman.

Force and commander of the enemy unknown.

Spearman's loss : 1 killed, Pvt. Benoni F. Kellogg, Co. L.

Enemy's loss unknown.

10 (page 64).

WITTSBURG.

April 8, 1863.

Detachments of several companies, 100 men, part of a detachment of 400 from Clayton's cavalry brigade at Helena, all under Major Edward F. Winslow of the Fourth Iowa.

Force and commander of the enemy unknown.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 killed, 7 wounded, all of Co. L.

Killed : Pvt. Daniel Lorrigan.

Wounded : Corp. Samuel O. Black, Pvts. Henry Fleming,
George W. Sheppard, Richard Major South,
and three others whose names are not found.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG.

May 1 to July 4, 1863.

In this campaign the regiment marched from Milliken's Bend, by Richmond, to Hard Times, La., there crossed the river to Grand Gulf, and then marched to Cayuga, Raymond, Jackson, Brownsville, Bridgeport, Haines' Bluff, and Vicksburg; and, during the investment, incessantly scoured the whole country between the Big Black, the Mississippi, and the Yazoo, below Lexington.

11 (page 81). FOURTEEN-MILE CREEK.

May 12, 1863.

The regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Simeon D. Swan.

Enemy : Wirt Adams' cavalry, dismounted, number unknown.

Loss of the regiment : 1 killed, 3 wounded.

Killed : Co. F, Pvt. Jabez Sibley (also wounded in action,
Gist's Plantation : see page 551).

Wounded : Co. D, Corp. Asa Andrews and Pvt. William L. Ray.
Co. L, Pvt. Charles W. Lash.

Enemy's loss unknown.

12 (page 83). MISSISSIPPI SPRINGS.

May 13, 1863.

The Second and Third Battalions of the regiment, as the advance of Sherman's Corps.

Force and commander of the enemy unknown.

No loss in the regiment.

Enemy's loss, if any, unknown.

13 (page 83). JACKSON (FIRST).

May 14, 1863.

In the first attack upon and capture of Jackson, the Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Simeon D. Swan, was the left flank of Sherman's Corps. Enemy commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.

Loss of Union army, 42 killed, 258 wounded and missing.

No loss in Fourth Iowa.

Enemy's loss, 845 killed, wounded, and captured.

14 (page 93). HAINES' BLUFF.

May 18, 1863.

Company B, under Captain John H. Peters.

The fortress was occupied by Captain Peters without fighting, and 20 of the enemy were taken in it.

15 (page 95). VICKSBURG.

May 19 to July 4, 1863.

Union forces commanded by Maj.-Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the enemy by Lieut.-Gen. John C. Pemberton.

The Fourth Iowa Cavalry was employed on outpost duty in the rear, between the Big Black and Yazoo Rivers, against the advance of Gen. Johnston.

16 (page 98). MECHANICSBURG (FIRST).

May 24, 1863.

A provisional cavalry force, under Lieut.-Col. Simeon D. Swan, including the Fourth Iowa, under Maj. Alonzo B. Parkell.

**The enemy, cavalry, probably the brigade of Col. Wirt Adams.
Loss of Fourth Iowa : Pvt. Francis R. Walker, Co. F, wounded.
Enemy's loss unknown.**

17 (page 99). MECHANICSBURG (SECOND).

May 29, 1863.

The regiment, under Maj. Alonzo B. Parkell.

The enemy, cavalry, under Col. Wirt Adams.

Loss of the regiment, 6 wounded.

Wounded : Maj. Edward F. Winslow.

Co. B, Sergt. John W. Corbin.

Co. E, Pvt. Henry F. Parks.

Co. K, First-Sergt. William A. Bereman, Pvts.

Alonzo Cantwell and Isaac M. Vaughn.

Vaughn died of his wounds, June 10, 1863.

Co. M, Corp. William C. Henderson.

Enemy's loss unknown.

18 (page 103). BEAR CREEK, OR JONES' PLANTATION.

June 22, 1863.

Detachment from Co's A, F, I, and K, 120 men, under Maj. Alonzo B. Parkell. The enemy, two regiments of Wirt Adams' cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Wood, Jr.

Loss of Fourth Iowa, 8 killed, 17 wounded, 36 captured (including 8 of the wounded).

Killed : Co. A, Pvts. James Buttercase, Andrew J. Chapel, Wilson S. Hunt, John McClintock, John Mann, George W. Van Doran.

Co. K, Corp. John M. Frame, Pvt. John W. Yancey.

Wounded : Co. A, Sergt. William T. Biggs (died of his wounds June 25, 1863), Corp. Charles N. Smith, Pvts. James A. Livingston, Levi B. Williamson.

Co. F, Corp. Cornelius Carter, Bugler James G. Henshaw, Pvt. Henry B. Wagers.

Co. I, Lieut. Wm. J. McConnellee, Sergt. Geo. W. Caskey, Pvts. William Johnson, Thomas Miner.

Co. K, Lieut. Joshua Gardner (died of his wounds, June 30, 1863), Sergt. James O. Vanorsdol, Pvts. Silas Bogue, Charles Foster, William Hole, James D. Moore (died of his wounds, June 30, 1863).

Captured : Co. A, Corps. Charles N. Smith and Joseph W. Pierce, Pvts. William Dean, James G. Fletcher, Doran T. Hunt, James A. Livingston, Isaac S. Scott, John S. Shirley, Levi B. Williamson.

Co. B, Pvt. Cyrus Washburn.

Co. F, Sergts. Hira W. Curtiss, Joseph Glasgow, Corps. Jonathan Anthony, Elijah Busby, and Cornelius Carter, Bugler James G. Henshaw, Pvts. James Andrews, Solomon Bremen, Abraham Pelham, Henry R. Sadler, Henry B. Wagers.

Co. I, Lieut. Wm. J. McConnellee, Pvts. John B. Anderson, Thomas M. Bird, Robert

(Captured : Co. I., Campbell, Russell G. Currier, William
continued.) Johnson, Alexis Lull, Thomas Stewart.

Co. K, Corps. Richard W. Bayles, David Cavenee,
William Miller, Pvts. Harlan Jameson,
John A. Kirkpatrick, Francis S. Ramey,
Robert S. Stockton.

All the captured were exchanged and returned to service in October, 1863, except Lieut. McConnellee, who remained in prison a long time and was finally exchanged and discharged from the service without returning to the regiment, and Pvt. Livingston, who was reported to have died in the enemy's hands.

Enemy's loss, uncertain, but at least 15 killed, 16 wounded, and 1 missing : see page 106.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST JOHNSTON.

July 5 to 20, 1863.

19 (page 119). SIEGE OF JACKSON (SECOND CAPTURE).

July 11 to 17, 1863.

Union forces, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Army Corps, commanded by Maj-Gen. Sherman. Cavalry, a provisional brigade under Col. Cyrus Bussey, including the Fourth Iowa under Col. Edward F. Winslow. Enemy, four divisions of infantry and artillery in Jackson under Gen. Johnston, and two brigades of cavalry outside under Brig.-Gen. William H. Jackson.

20 (page 121). BEAR CREEK, NEAR CANTON.

July 12, 1863.

The regiment, under Colonel Winslow.

Enemy, some part of Jackson's cavalry, number unknown.

No loss in the regiment. Enemy's loss unknown.

21 (page 121).

CANTON.

July 17, 1863.

Bussey's Brigade of cavalry and Woods' Brigade of infantry, with four guns, 2,000 in all, under Col. Bussey.

Enemy, Jackson's cavalry estimated at 2,000, with two guns.

Bussey's loss, 15 killed and wounded. No loss in Fourth Iowa,
Enemy's loss, killed and wounded, not learned ; captured, 72.

22 (pages 127 to 138). GRENADA RAID.

(From Vicksburg to Memphis.)

August 10 to 25, 1863.

Part of the Cavalry Forces of the Fifteenth Army Corps, 800 men, under Col. Edward F. Winslow, including 375 of the Fourth Iowa, under Major Alonzo B. Parkell.

Enemy, different bodies of cavalry, encountered from Winona to Hernando, numbers and commanders unknown.

Loss of Fourth Iowa, 6 missing.

Missing : Co. A, First-Sergt. Caleb J. Allen.

Co. C, Corp. James H. Davidson, Pvt. Charles H. Smith.

Co. H, Pvts. James M. Carson, Harvey W. Case.

Co. L, Pvt. George Dashman.

Of the missing, Carson died in prison at Richmond, May 30, 1864 ; Allen died Jan. 2, 1864, immediately after release from prison ; Case, Davidson, and Dashman were in time exchanged and returned to service ; and Smith escaped after a few days' captivity and rejoined the regiment at Memphis.

Loss of enemy, killed and wounded, unknown ; captured 55.

23 (page 136). COLDWATER RIVER.

August 21, 1863.

Third and Fourth Iowa, under Colonel Winslow, the Fourth Iowa under Major Parkell.

Force and commander of the enemy, unknown. No loss in the Fourth Iowa ; 4 wounded in the Third Iowa.

Loss of enemy, if any, unknown.

MINOR OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI

from Sept. 1, 1863, to Feb. 1, 1864, headquarters of the regiment on the Big Black River and on Clear Creek, rear of Vicksburg, including two demonstrations upon Canton in favor of Sherman's movements of troops from Memphis to Chattanooga, and an expedition against Wirt Adams' cavalry near Natchez.

24 (page 163). MOORE'S FORD.

September 30, 1863.

Part of the Cavalry Forces of the Fifteenth Army Corps, 900 men, under Colonel Winslow, including 300 from the Fourth Iowa, under Capt. William Pursel.

Enemy, cavalry, under Brig.-Gen. John W. Whitfield, number unknown.

No loss in Winslow's command.

Loss of enemy in killed and wounded, unknown ; captured, 8.

25 (page 167). BROWNSVILLE.

October 15, 1863.

Cavalry brigade, now the Cavalry Forces of the Seventeenth Army Corps, under Colonel Winslow, including the Fourth Iowa, under Major Spearman.

Enemy, cavalry, under Maj.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee.

No loss in Winslow's command. Loss of enemy, if any, unknown.

26 (page 168). THE BOGUE CHITO.

October 16, 1863.

Forces, same as in last engagement.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 killed, Pvt. John Ireland, Co. B.

Loss of enemy not reported, but several found dead and wounded on the field.

27 (page 169). LIVINGSTON.

October 17, 1863.

Union forces, two divisions of infantry and artillery under Maj.-Gen. James B. McPherson, with the cavalry brigade under Colonel Winslow.

Enemy, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, numbers unknown, under Maj.-Gens. Loring and Lee.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 killed, 1 captured.

Killed : Co. I, Sergt. George W. Caskey (also, wounded at Bear Creek : see page 556).

Captured : Co. M, Pvt. Samuel R. White (died Sept. 25, 1864, in prison at Andersonville, Ga.).

Loss of enemy not reported.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MERIDIAN.

February 3 to 28, 1864.

Union forces, four divisions of infantry and artillery, from Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, under Maj.-Gens. Hurlbut and McPherson, with Col. Winslow's Cavalry Forces, about 1,500 men (including the Fourth Iowa, 400, under Major Spearman), all under Gen. Sherman.

Enemy, two divisions of infantry and artillery, under Maj.-Gens. Loring and French, and four brigades of cavalry under Maj.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee, with Wirt Adams, Starke, Ross, and Ferguson as brigadiers, all under Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk.

Union loss : 21 killed, 68 wounded, 81 missing.

Loss of enemy : killed and wounded not reported ; captured 250, of whom 40 were taken in action by the Fourth Iowa.

28 (page 189). BIG BLACK BRIDGE.

February 3, 1864.

The regiment, under Major Spearman.

Enemy, cavalry of Wirt Adams' Brigade, number unknown.

Loss of the regiment : 1 wounded, Corp. John McCallum, Co. B.

Loss of enemy, if any, unknown.

29 (page 190). RAYMOND ROAD.

February 4, 1864.

Winslow's cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa.

Enemy, cavalry, commanded by Gen. Lee, number unknown.

No loss in the Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy unknown.

30 (page 191). BAKER'S CREEK.

February 4, 1864.

Forces, same as in last engagement.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 captured, Corp. Luther P. Chandler, Co. H.

Loss of enemy unknown.

31 (page 193). JACKSON (THIRD).

February 5, 1864.

Forces, same as in last engagement.

No loss in the Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy not reported.

32 (page 198). CLINTON.

February 5, 1864.

Co. C, Fourth Iowa, under Capt. Warren Beckwith, escort to Maj.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith.

Enemy, cavalry, number and commander unknown.

No loss in Co. C. Loss of enemy, if any, unknown.

33 (page 202). MORTON.

February 9, 1864.

Winslow's cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa.

Enemy, cavalry, Polk's rear-guard, number and commander unknown.

No loss in Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy unknown.

34 (page 202). TUNNEL HILL.

February 10, 1864.

Forces, same as in last engagement.

No loss in Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy, many killed and wounded, but number not learned : see page 202.

35 (page 204). TALLAHATTA.

Night of February 13, 1864.

Winslow's cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa.

Force and number of the enemy unknown.

No loss in Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy not learned.

36 (page 206). MERIDIAN.

February 14, 1864.

Winslow's cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa.

Enemy, a brigade of cavalry under Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Ferguson.

No loss in the Fourth Iowa. Loss of enemy not learned.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF STURGIS AGAINST FORREST.

From Memphis, by Moscow and Bolivar, Tenn., Salem and Ripley, Miss., to Memphis : April 30 to May 12, 1864.

No engagement.

SECOND CAMPAIGN OF STURGIS AGAINST FORREST.

From Memphis, by Lafayette, Tenn., to Ripley and Guntown, Miss., and return.

June 1 to 13, 1864.

Union forces, three brigades of infantry with twelve guns, under Col. William L. McMillen, and two brigades of cavalry with eight guns, under Brig.-Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson, 8,000 in all, led by Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis.

Enemy, four brigades of cavalry with sixteen guns, about 6,000 in all, under Maj.-Gen. Nathan B. Forrest.

37 (page 234).

RIPLEY.

June 7, 1864.

Third Iowa Cavalry, under Col. John W. Noble, and Fourth Iowa, under Maj. Abial R. Pierce.

Enemy, the cavalry brigade of Brig.-Gen. Edward W. Rucker.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 2 wounded, 3 captured.

Wounded : Co. K, Pvts. George W. Holt, Stewart B. Terry.

Captured : Co. D, Pvt. George H. Bachelder.

Co. K, Pvts. George W. Holt, Stewart B. Terry.

The captured were exchanged and returned in January, 1865.

Loss of enemy : 6 killed, wounded unknown.

38 (page 236). BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS, OR GUNTOWN,
called by the Confederates, "Tishomingo Creek."

June 10, 1864.

All of Sturgis' forces engaged, and all of Forrest's.

Sturgis' loss : about 2,000 killed, wounded, and captured, 16 guns, and 250 wagons.

Forrest's loss : reported at 140 killed and nearly 500 wounded.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 2 killed, 18 wounded, 3 captured.

Killed : Co. C, Pvts. Milton W. Stall, Garrett Pilgrim.

Wounded : Co. A, Sergt. William E. Jackson, Pvts. Henry J. Chapman (died of his wounds June 18, 1864), William H. Chapman (died of his wounds June 21, 1864), Andrew J. Lovelady.

Co. C, Lieut. Loyd H. Dillon, Corp. George W. Saint, Pvts. Arsene Gerard, Charles Hilgrin, John Hoakinson, Alfred A. Peterson, Adolph Schloeder, John Straw, John Sutherland.

Co. F, Pvts. Francis M. Noble, James B. Pearson.

Co. I, Pvt. Albert Rice.

Co. K, Sergt. Elisha M. Payne, and Pvt. Zur Rockhold.

Captured : Co. A, Pvts. Ephraim Shaffer, John Adam Warner.

Co. K, Pvt. Charles A. Swan.

Of the captured, Warner was reported died in prison at Andersonville ; Shaffer died Oct. 6, 1864, at Atlanta, on escape from Andersonville ; and Swan escaped and rejoined the regiment after five days.

39 (page 258).

RIPLEY (SECOND).

June 11, 1864.

Third Iowa Cavalry, under Col. John W. Noble, and Fourth Iowa, under Maj. Abial R. Pierce, the brigade under Col. Winslow.

Enemy, Rucker's and Bell's brigades of cavalry, under Forrest.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 3 killed, 10 wounded, 9 captured.

Killed : Co. A, Pvt. Jeremiah Young.

Co. E, Corp. Harvey R. Merriam.

Co. H, Corp. Francis C. Coe.

Wounded : Co. B, Bugler John McNulty, Pvts. Jonathan Morris and Patrick McHugh.

Co. C, Pvt. John C. Hartman (died of his wounds June 24, 1864).

Co. F, Corp. Simon Smith.

Co. G, Pvt. Edwin Huntington.

Co. H, Pvt. Andrew Laird (died of his wounds June 13, 1864).

Co. I, Pvts. Thomas M. Wilkinson, John A. Mercer.

Co. M, Pvt. Robert Hopkirk (died of his wounds,
June 28, 1864).

Captured: Co. B, Bugler John McNulty, Pvts. Leverett J.
Littlejohn, Alfred A. Tracey.

Co. D, Pvts. Daniel Saxton, Job A. Haines.

Co. G, Pvts. Isaac Smith, Edwin Huntington.

Co. I, Pvts. Thomas M. Wilkinson, John A. Mercer.

Of the captured, Saxton, Haines, and Smith were exchanged and returned to service, Wilkinson was released by the close of the war, and all the others died in captivity: McNulty, Nov. 18, 1864, at Millen, Ga.; Littlejohn, Feb. 10, 1864, at Andersonville; Tracey, Dec. 2, 1864; Huntington, Sept. 25, 1864, at Cahawba, Ala.; and Mercer, Oct. 14, 1864, at Andersonville.

Forrest's loss, not reported.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF SMITH AGAINST FORREST.

From Memphis, by Saulsbury and Lagrange, Tenn., and Ripley, Miss., to Tupelo, and return.

June 24 to July 23, 1864.

Union forces, 13,000 infantry, under Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Mower and Cols. David Moore and Edward Bouton, and 3,000 cavalry, under Brig.-Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson, all under Maj.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith.

Enemy, three divisions of cavalry under Forrest, and one of infantry, aggregate 12,000, all under Lieut.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee.

Loss of Smith: 38 killed, 598 wounded, 38 missing.

Loss of enemy (Confederate official reports): 220 killed, 1133 wounded, 84 captured.

40 (page 284).

RIPLEY (THIRD).

July 7, 1864.

Third Iowa Cavalry, under Col. John W. Noble, and Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. John H. Peters.

Enemy, part of Chalmers' Division of Forrest's cavalry, under Lieut-Col. Samuel M. Hyams.

No loss in the Iowa regiments. Enemy's loss unknown.

41 (page 285). CHERRY CREEK.

July 10, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade of Grierson's Division, including the Fourth Iowa under Lieut.-Col. Peters.

Enemy, part of Buford's Division of Forrest's cavalry.

No loss in Winslow's command. Loss of enemy not reported.

42 (page 287). HARRISBURG ROAD.

July 13, 1864.

Third Iowa Cavalry under Col. Noble and Fourth Iowa under Lieut.-Col. Peters.

Enemy, Mabry's Brigade and Forrest's old regiment, led by Forrest in person.

No loss reported on either side.

43 (page 287). TUPELO.

July 13, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade of Grierson's Division, including the Fourth Iowa under Lieut.-Col. Peters.

Enemy, Buford, with two brigades of his division.

No loss in Winslow's command. Loss of enemy not reported, but seven left dead on the field.

**44 (page 287). TUPELO,
called "Harrisburg" by the Confederates.**

July 14, 1864.

This was the general battle of the campaign, all the forces on both sides being engaged.

Losses not separately reported on either side ; but see losses of the campaign, page 564, the most of which were in this battle.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 killed, 4 wounded.

Killed : Co. H, Corp. James Rooney.

Wounded : Co. B, Pvt. Thomas McNulty.

Co. K, Pvt. Church B. Rinard.

Co. L, Pvt. Abner F. Davis.

Co. M, Pvt. Andrew D. Smithburg.

45 (page 290). OLD TOWN CREEK.

July 15, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade of Grierson's Division, including the Fourth

Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Peters, supported later by Mower's Division of infantry, with artillery.

Enemy, Buford's Division, reinforced by Chalmers' Division, with two batteries, all commanded by Forrest.

Losses not definitely reported on either side. Forrest severely wounded.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 11 wounded.

Wounded : Co. A, Pvt. David League.

Co. D, Pvts. Joseph W. Barton, Worthy S. Saunders.

Co. G, Sergt. Polk Tibbetts, Pvts. Theodore S. Jackson, Robert Presley McAuley.

Co. K, Pvts. Francis M. Vanorsdol, Charles M. Jewett, James Ritcheson, Frederick Teeman.

Co. L, Pvt. Emile Myers.

SECOND CAMPAIGN OF SMITH AGAINST FORREST.

From Memphis, by Holly Springs, to Oxford, Miss., and return :
August 3 to 30, 1864.

Union forces, 7,000 infantry, in two divisions, under Gen. Joseph A. Mower and Col. William T. Shaw, and 5,000 cavalry, in two divisions, under Gen. Edward Hatch and Col. Edward F. Winslow. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry in Col. John W. Noble's brigade of Winslow's Division.

Enemy, Buford's and Chalmers' divisions of cavalry, under Forrest.

46 (page 293). TALLAHATCHIE RIVER.

August 9, 1864.

Noble's Brigade of the cavalry, including the Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Peters.

Enemy, Chalmers' Division.

No loss in Noble's command. Loss of enemy not learned.

47 (page 293). HURRICANE CREEK.

August 9, 1864.

Forces, same as in last engagement.

No loss in Noble's command. Loss of enemy not learned.

48 (page 295).

MEMPHIS.

August 21, 1864.

Union forces, various detachments holding the post of Memphis, under Gens. Buckland and Dustan, including Co. C of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry under Capt. Warren Beckwith.

Enemy, 2,000 cavalry, under Forrest.

Loss of Co. C : 2 wounded, Lieut. Losson P. Baker and Pvt. Edwin L. Boham.

Forrest's loss : killed and wounded, about 80 ; prisoners, 30.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRICE.

From Memphis, by Clarendon, Little Rock, Batesville, and Pocahtontas, Ark., to Cape Girardeau, St. Louis, Jefferson City, and Independence, Mo., Trading Post and Fort Scott, Kan., Pea Ridge and Fayetteville, Ark., Tahlequah and Weber's Falls, Ind. Terr., returning by Pea Ridge, Springfield, and Rolla, to St. Louis, Mo. : Sept. 1 to Nov. 30, 1864.

Union forces during the fighting period of the campaign, from October 21st to 28th, a provisional cavalry division, about 6,000, under Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, and several brigades, numbers unknown, of Colorado and Kansas cavalry and mounted militia, under Maj.-Gens. Samuel R. Curtis and James G. Blunt. The first three brigades in Pleasonton's Division were Missouri State troops, and the fourth a part (about 1200) of Winslow's Division, from Memphis, under Colonel Winslow, including 500 of the Fourth Iowa under Major Abial R. Pierce.

Enemy, three divisions of cavalry, under Maj.-Gens. John S. Marmaduke, James F. Fagan, and Joseph O. Shelby, and one brigade of dismounted and unarmed men, under Col. Charles H. Tyler, with 16 guns, numbering in all, Oct. 21, about 18,000, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price.

49 (page 320).

INDEPENDENCE.

October 22, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade, but chiefly the Third Iowa, under Major Benjamin S. Jones : the Fourth Iowa also engaged.

Enemy, Marmaduke's Division.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : Pvt. John Koolbeck of Co. F, wounded.

Loss of enemy not learned.

50 (page 321).

THE BIG BLUE.

October 23, 1864.

Winslow's and Phillips' Brigades, of Pleasonton's Division, under Winslow, including the Fourth Iowa under Major Pierce.

Enemy, the two divisions of Marmaduke and Fagan.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 3 killed and 5 wounded.

Killed : Co. B, Pvts. Thomas J. Cole and John Slavin.

Co. I, Pvt. John M. D. Jacks.

Wounded : Col. Edward F. Winslow.

Co. B, Lieut. Thomas Bowman.

Co. E, Pvts. Michael S. Cunning and John W. Rafferty.

Co. I, Pvt. Abner Root.

Loss of enemy not learned.

51 (page 326).

BIG BLUE PRAIRIE.

October 23, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade, under Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Benteen, including the Fourth Iowa, under Major Pierce.

Enemy, Shelby's old brigade, led by himself.

Benteen's loss : 1 killed and 1 wounded.

No loss in Fourth Iowa.

Loss of enemy : 50 killed and wounded, and 100 captured.

52 (page 328).

THE TRADING-POST.

October 25, 1864.

Union forces, same as in last engagement.

Enemy, Cabell's Brigade of Fagan's Division, holding the crossing of the Marais des Cygnes in Price's rear.

No loss in Benteen's command.

Loss of enemy : in killed and wounded not reported ; captured, about 100, with 2 guns and a part of his train.

53 (page 331).

MARAIS DES CYGNES,

also called "Osage" and "Mine Creek."

October 25, 1864.

Winslow's Brigade, under Lieut.-Col. Benteen, with no guns, including the Fourth Iowa under Major Pierce.

Enemy, the two divisions of Marmaduke and Fagan, with 8 guns.

Loss of Benteen's Brigade : 10 killed, about 50 wounded.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 killed, 6 wounded.

Killed : Co. F, Lieut. Hira W. Curtiss.

Wounded : Co. E, Corp. Charles Totten.

Co. G, Pvt. Michael Hennessy.

Co. I, Pvts. Francis M. Ammon, Charles W. Davis,
Robert Ralston.

Co. L, Pvt. Henry John Croll.

Loss of enemy : killed and wounded not reported ; captured,
1,200.

54 (page 339). CHARLOT PRAIRIE,
also called "Marmiton."

October 25, 1864.

Union force, same as in last engagement.

Enemy, Shelby's Division.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 11 wounded.

Wounded : Major Abial R. Pierce.

Co. A, Sergt. Joseph W. Pierce, Trumpeter Smith R.
Crane.

Co. E, Sergt. Hiram H. Cardell.

Co. M, Pvt. Charles C. Sawyer, and 6 other enlisted
men, whose names are not now known.

Loss of enemy not reported.

MINOR OPERATIONS

of that portion of the regiment remaining at Memphis, during the Price campaign, scouting and reconnoitring in Tennessee and Mississippi, and holding the outposts of Memphis during the operations of Forrest and Hood in Tennessee : Sept. 1 to Dec. 20, 1864.

No engagements of the Fourth Iowa more than skirmishing and picket firing, except that at White's Station.

55 (page 363). WHITE'S STATION.

December 14, 1864.

Detail from Co's A and B, 46 men, under Capt. Eldred Huff
of A.

Enemy, cavalry, under a Major Carpenter, and the guerrillas of Dick Davis and Ford, said to number 400 in all.

Huff's loss : 3 killed, 8 wounded, 20 captured.

Killed : Co. A, Pvt. John L. O'Brien (or Obrian).

Co. B, Sergt. Joseph Gamble and Pvt. John B. Rust.

Wounded : Co. A, Pvt. John H. Flinn.

Co. B, Pvts. Edward Counsel (or Council), Jacob Luddic, Alfred Shaffer, Cornelius Shaffer Samuel J. Shrack, William Smith, and Meli Walker.

Captured : Co. A, Capt. Eldred Huff, Pvts. John Billups, Monroe M. Childs, John Fairchild, Hugh Ferguson, John H. Flinn, Robert A. Hodges, William W. Howell, Doran T. Hunt, George Legrand, and David L. White.

Co. B, Pvts. John W. Akers, Josiah Bowman, George W. Clapp, Patrick McHugh, Theodore Shrack, Robert Speers, James A. Walker, Levi Washburn, and Ralph T. Washburn.

Of the captured, Legrand died, May 27, 1865, at Hilton Head, S. C., after release from prison ; Akers died, April 25, 1865, at Andersonville ; and all the others were released by the close of the war.

GRIERSON'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD,

a raid from Memphis, by Ripley, Tupelo, Egypt Station, Grenada, and Lexington, to Vicksburg : Dec. 21, 1864, to Jan. 5, 1865.

Union force, about 3,500 cavalry, under Gen. Grierson, including 800 of Winslow's Brigade, under Col. Winslow, men who had not marched upon, or had returned from, the Price campaign. The Fourth Iowa, 300 men, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Peters.

The enemy resisted the movement with inferior forces, at Egypt Station and Franklin, and were wholly defeated, with losses of about 100 killed and wounded, 500 prisoners, and great destruction of railways and army supplies.

Grierson's total loss was 27 killed, 93 wounded, and 7 missing.

The Fourth Iowa took no part in the engagements mentioned, and suffered no loss, except that of one man captured, namely,

Captured : Co. H, Pvt. Joseph L. Baker, at Okalona, Dec. 26. Baker was released by the close of the war.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR.

Wilson's cavalry raid against the Confederate last line. From Eastport, Miss., by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, and Columbus, to Macon and Augusta, with the capture of Jefferson Davis and other rebel leaders : March 20 to May 10, 1865.

Union forces, 13,500 cavalry, under Bvt. Maj.-Gen. James H. Wilson, in three divisions, with four guns each, under Brig.-Gen. Edward M. McCook, Brig.-Gen. Eli Long, and Bvt. Maj.-Gen. Emory Upton, in six brigades, under Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton, Col. Oscar H. LaGrange, Col. Abram O. Miller, Col. Robert H. G. Minty, Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Edward F. Winslow, and Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Andrew J. Alexander.

In Alabama, the enemy were commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor, numbering about 15,000, infantry, artillery, and cavalry. The cavalry was commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, in the three divisions of Maj.-Gens. Abraham Buford, James R. Chalmers, and William H. Jackson, the brigades being under Brig.-Gens. Wirt Adams, Daniel Adams, Frank C. Armstrong, James H. Clanton, Edward Crossland, Philip D. Roddey, Peter B. Starke, Alexander W. Campbell, and Tyree H. Bell. In Georgia, Maj.-Gen. Howell Cobb was in chief command, his forces numbering, at Columbus, about 3,000, and at Macon, about 3,500, and his lieutenants being Maj.-Gens. Abraham Buford and Gustavus W. Smith and Brig.-Gens. William W. Mackall, Hugh W. Mercer, Felix H. Robertson, and Robert C. Tyler.

56 (page 435). MONTEVALLO.

March 30, 1865.

Co's F and L of the Fourth Iowa, under Major William W. Woods.

Enemy, cavalry of Buford's Division, number and commander not known.

Woods' loss : 1 wounded, Pvt. Francis M. Boswell, Co. F.

Loss of enemy, if any, unknown.

57 (page 436).

MONTEVALLO.

March 31, 1865.

The Fifth Iowa, of Alexander's Brigade of Upton's Division, assisted by Co. G of the Fourth Iowa, then escort to Gen. Upton.

Enemy, Roddey's Brigade of Buford's Division.

No loss to Co. G.

The enemy lost in killed, wounded, and captured, but the numbers are not reported.

58 (page 438).

SIX-MILE CREEK.

March 31, 1865.

The First and Third Battalions of the Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Peters.

Enemy, cavalry, number unknown, commanded by Forrest.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 5 wounded.

Wounded : Co. E, Trumpeter John Q. Riley.

Co. M, Corp. Jacob S. Gantz, Pvts. Villeroy Abbey,

Oliver F. Chester, and James Lathers.

Loss of Forrest : 5 killed, the wounded and captured not reported.

59 (page 441).

EBENEZER CHURCH.

April 1, 1865.

Union forces engaged, part of Long's Division on the right and Alexander's Brigade of Upton's Division on the left, assisted later by the Third and Fourth Iowa, of Winslow's Brigade.

Enemy, three brigades of cavalry and one regiment of infantry, commanded by Forrest.

No loss in Fourth Iowa. Alexander's loss not reported.

Enemy's loss : about 100 killed and wounded (Forrest among the wounded), 200 prisoners, and 2 guns.

60 (page 444).

SELMA.

April 2, 1865.

Union forces engaged, part of Long's Division on the right and the Second Battalion of the Fourth Iowa, under Major Woods, on the left, all dismounted, one squadron of the Fourth U. S.

Cavalry on the right, and the First and Third Battalions of the Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Peters, on the left, in mounted charge, all commanded by General Wilson.

Enemy, 6,000 or 7,000 dismounted cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in fortifications, commanded by Forrest.

Wilson had 8 guns, Forrest 32.

Wilson's loss : 44 killed, 277 wounded, and 7 missing.

Forrest's loss : killed and wounded not reported, 2,700 prisoners, 32 guns in position and 70 in arsenal and foundry, and great quantities of ammunition and stores of all kinds.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 2 killed and 7 wounded.

Killed : Capt. Eugene R. Jones and Chief-Trumpeter Daniel J. Taber.

Wounded : Co. A, Trumpeter Robert E. Ray.

Co. B, Pvt. Oliver J. Williams.

Co. D, Pvt. John W. Benson.

Co. H, Color-Sergt. James H. Stocks.

Co. I, Pvts. Robert Campbell and Abram Needles.

Co. L, Teamster Hezekiah J. Phelps.

61 (page 469). FIKE'S FERRY.

April 8, 1865.

Detachments from Third Iowa and Fourth Iowa, the latter under Lieut. John T. Reynolds, all under Capt. Samuel J. McKee of Third Iowa.

Enemy, cavalry, number and commander unknown.

Loss of Fourth Iowa : 1 wounded, Pvt. John T. Mendenhall of Co. L, who died of his wound at Selma, April 25, 1865.

62 (page 487). COLUMBUS.

April 16, 1865.

Union forces engaged, Winslow's Brigade of Upton's Division, including the Fourth Iowa, under Lieut.-Col. Peters. In all about 1,000 men of the brigade were employed in the engagement.

Enemy, about 2,700, in fortifications, with 27 guns, under Maj.-Gen. Howell Cobb.

Loss of the brigade : 24 killed and wounded.

Loss of the Fourth Iowa : 2 killed, 9 wounded.

Killed : Co. L, Sergt. Joseph H. Jones.

Co. I, Pvt. Nathan Beezley.

Wounded : Co. A, Corp. Elza A. Reeves, Pvt. John S. Shirley.

Co. D, Sergt. Horton M. Detrick, Corp. Joseph C.

McCoy, Pvts. William Loomis, Elias F.

Ogg, Jehoida Worth (see also pp. 551-2).

Co. I, Pvt. James H. Van Clear (or Van Cleve.)

Co. K, Pvt. David M. Anderson.

Loss of the enemy : 1,500 killed, wounded, and captured, with 63 guns, a navy-yard, a ram for sea-service, and great quantities of military property and supplies.

Some men of the regiment were wounded and captured in casual meetings with the enemy not mentioned above, whose names ought to appear in this list.

Of the Non-Commissioned Staff, Hospital-Steward Joel R. Garretson was captured, June 6, 1863, on a march near Mechanicsburg, Miss. He was exchanged at Annapolis, but did not return to the regiment, being placed on special duty in hospital at St. Louis.

Of Co. C, Pvt. Andon Gates was missing, June 12, 1864, from picket-post near La Grange, Tenn. He appeared at Davenport, Iowa, at the end of the war, and was mustered out as a returned prisoner of war.

Of Co. E, Pvt. Benjamin T. Griffith was captured, Feb. 18, 1864, on duty near Meridian, Miss. He died Feb. 25, 1865, in prison at Florence, S. C.

Pvt. Henry F. Parks was wounded, July 3, 1863, on duty near the Yazoo River, Miss. Also wounded in action at Mechanicsburg : see page 555.

Of Co. F, Corp. Simon Smith was captured, June 18, 1863, on duty near Big Black River, Miss. Also wounded in action at Ripley : see page 563.

Pvt. James M. McNair was wounded, June 28, 1863, on picket duty near Bear Creek, rear of Vicksburg.

Of Co. G, Corp. Thompson Jones was wounded, May —, 1863, on a reconnaissance made by a part of his company near Young's Point, La. He was permanently disabled by the wound, and was transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps.

Of Co. G, Pvt. Wasson Gard was missed, April 10, 1865, near Selma, Ala. He was posted as safe-guard at a house while the column passed, and was never heard of afterward. As he was a faithful, intelligent soldier, it is believed he was killed.

Pvt. Jeremiah Odell was captured, Nov. 22, 1862, having ventured beyond the picket-line. He was exchanged and returned to duty.

Of Co. I, Pvts. Robert Campbell and Samuel Myers were captured, March 27, 1863, near Helena, Ark., under circumstances not now found reported. Both were exchanged and returned to service. Campbell was also wounded in action : see page 573.

Of Co. K, Sergt. Samuel O. Miller was captured, May 25, 1863, at Raymond, Miss., where he was left in charge of wounded. He was exchanged and returned to service.

Of Co. L, Corp. Cory J. Brown was captured, March 8, 1863, and Pvt. Daniel Clancy, Nov. 21, 1862, both near Helena, Ark., and under circumstances not now found reported. Both were soon exchanged and returned to service.

Of Co. M, Corp. Jacob Wright and Pvt. Jacob Uptagraff (or Updegraff) were captured, Sept. 30, 1862, from a picket-post near Helena, Ark. They were exchanged and returned to service in Nov., 1862.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

DUE IMMEDIATELY TO MEETING THE ENEMY.

Killed in action (including the mortally wounded)	.	.	52
Died in captivity or of its effects	.	.	14
Missing (believed killed by the enemy)	.	.	1
Wounded in action (not mortally)	.	.	160
Captured	.	.	118
Total	.	.	345

GENERAL STATISTICS.

The first enlistments of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry were made in July, 1861. The first company was sworn (into the State service) August 9 and 10, 1861. Organization of the regiment authorized, October 12, 1861. Mustered into United States Army, at Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, November 23, 1861. Re-mustered as Veteran Volunteers, at Vicksburg, Miss., December 25, 1863. Mustered out, at Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1865. Discharged, at Davenport, Iowa, August 24, 1865.

Numbers on first official rolls, 48 officers and 1,038 enlisted men ; but as 52 men were rejected at muster in, the original enlistments were	1,138
Number of all recruits	774
Total enlistments, officers and men ¹	1,912
Killed in action (including the mortally wounded)	52
Missing in action (believed to have died of his wounds)	1
Died prisoners of war	14
Died of disease	171
Died by accidents	10
Discharged for disability by wounds or disease	220
Transferred to Invalid and Veteran Reserve Corps	24
Resigned	35
Transferred or promoted to other commands	30
Discharged on reorganization of cavalry in 1862	38
Discharged on expiration of original term of enlistment in 1864	173
Discharged under General Orders of the War Department reducing the army in 1865	113
Discharged by various Special Orders of the War Department	12
Deserted or taken as deserters from other commands	22
Dropped from all other causes	17
Add the rejected, 52, and the recruits not assigned to companies (died or lost between recruiting stations and the field), 28	80
Total losses	1,012
Disbanded after close of the war	900
Highest number on the rolls at one time, May, 1864	1,354
Lowest number on the rolls, November, 1863	791
"Veterans," original members re-enlisted	542
Number of horses used, estimated at	5,000
Marches : by horse or on foot, 6,500 miles ; by steamboats, 5,000 miles ; by rail, 2,500 miles—aggregate, about	14,000
Field of campaigning.—Missouri, Kansas, Indian Territory, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia.	
Engagements fought (as by Appendix, page 549-573, <i>ante</i>)	62
Enemy captured in action	2,890
Artillery captured in action, pieces	29
Flags captured in action	12

¹ Of this number, 124 were officers, holding at different times 173 commissions. Of the officers, 54 were commissioned on enlisting (but this includes 9 surgeons and 1 chaplain), and 70 were raised from the ranks in the field. Of the 47 officers disbanded at the end of the war, 40 had served in the ranks.

INDEX.

A			
	PAGE		PAGE
A Co. , raised in July, 1861, for Second Iowa Cavalry	5	Adams , Brig.-Gen. Daniel, com- mands brigade, enemy's cav- alry, Selma campaign	571
sworn in and encamped	6	his command met in action	435
marches to Camp McClellan at Davenport	2	in action at Ebenezer Church	442
assigned to Fourth Cavalry	3	Additional Assistant-Surgeon au- thorized by Iowa	12
arrives at regimental ren- dezvous	4	Akers , Pvt. John W., captured in action and died in prison	570
has the right of the line	4	Alabama River , bridging and crossing at Selma	468
performs first field-service of the regiment	32	Alexander , Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Andrew J., commands Second Brigade, Upton's Division, Wilson's Corps	421, 571
march from Batesville, Ark., to Salem, Mo.	44	in action near Montevallo, Ala., 436, 572	
in action at Jones' Lane	50	in action at Ebenezer Church, 442, 443, 572	
in action at Bear Creek	100	at the battle of Selma	451
in action at Marais des Cygnes	334	accident in bridging the Alabama his bearing as a soldier	466 487
in action at White's Station	363	makes first attack upon Colum- bus	487, 489
in action at Columbus	497	promoted in the regular army	541
Abbey , Pvt. Villeroy, wounded in action	572	Allen , Sergt. Caleb J., commands company in action	103
Abraham , Lieut. Lot, commands in pursuit of enemy	49	capture and death of	139, 558
Captain , his defense of the rear at Ripley	260	Allen , Pvt. John W., captured in action and killed	51, 552
commands expedition to Flor- ence	428	Allen , Wm. T., Reg'l Com.-Sergt.	13
in action at Six-Mile Creek	438	Ammon , Pvt. Francis M., wounded in action	569
pursuit of enemy at Selma	458	Anderson , Pvt. John B., cap- tured in action	556
in action at Columbus	496	Anderson , Pvt. David M., wounded in action	574
recommended for promotion	541	Andrews , Corp. Asa, wounded in action	554
Adams , Col. Wirt, met in action at Fourteen-Mile Creek	81, 554	Andrews , Pvt. James, captured in action	556
his cavalry in action at Bear Creek	102, 556		
expedition against, from Natchez	176		
Brig.-Gen., commands brigade of enemy's cavalry, Meridian campaign	560		
under Forrest, Selma campaign, 424, 571			
resists movements of Croxton	516		

	PAGE		PAGE
Anecdotes of the Volunteers . . .	391	Baker, Pvt. Joseph L., captured on raid and returned . . .	571
Anthony, Corp. Jonathan, cap- tured in action . . .	556	Baker, Lieut. Losson P., wounded in action . . .	301, 567
Arkansas Post, Hovey's expedition against . . .	56	Baker's Creek, fighting on, Meridi- an campaign . . .	190, 560
taken by McClernand and Sherman . . .	72	charge made by Tenth Missouri .	190
Armorer of the regiment . . .	12	Band, regimental, organized at Camp Harlan . . .	9
Arms, kinds and character of, 25, 63, 127, 183, 282, 369, 370		regimental, mustered out . . .	49
Armstrong, Brig.-Gen. Frank C., commands brigade, enemy's cavalry, Selma campaign . . .	571	a second one privately organ- ized in the regiment . . .	408
in action, defense of Selma . . .	449	Bankston, destroyed by Fourth Iowa under Capt. Beckwith .	361
Army organization, position of the Fourth Iowa in, 60, 80, 115, 159, 227, 292, 360, 420		Barnesville, Ga., destruction of railroad at . . .	508
Army of the Southwest, Fourth Iowa ordered to join . . .	24	Barracks, built by the regiment at Mt. Pleasant . . .	4
proposed campaign in Arkansas, Fourth Iowa joins . . .	30	Barton, Pvt. Joseph W., wounded in action . . .	566
Army of the Tennessee, Fourth Iowa in . . .	60	Bartruff, Carroll H., Chief Bugler .	13
Arnold, Bugler Thomas E., cap- tured in action . . .	552	Bates, Sergt. Norman F., decorated for capture of flag and bearer .	540
Arrowsmith, Elizabeth, care of graves at Mt. Pleasant . . .	20	Batesville, Ark., occupied by Curtis . . .	40
Artillery, first assigned to the cavalry . . .	167	Battalion, organization of in cav- alry . . .	10
used in action, at Bear Creek .	104	staff organization discontinued .	48
at the Bogue Chito . . .	168	Bayles, Corp. Richard, captured in action . . .	557
at Jackson (third) . . .	193	Bayou Maçon, reconnoissance on .	79
at Tallahatchie . . .	293	Bear Creek (rear of Vicksburg), battle of . . .	100, 556
at Hurricane Creek . . .	293	losses in battle of . . .	106
at Marais des Cygnes . . .	337	(near Canton), engagement at, 120, 557	
at Selma . . .	413	Beauregard, Lieut.-Gen. P. G. T., his order to cease hostilities .	510
at Columbus . . .	490	surrender of all his forces . . .	517
in Wilson's campaign against Selma . . .	420	Bebb, Private Edward J., decorated for capture of flag . . .	541
Atkins' plantation, the cavalry bivouacks upon . . .	211	Beck, Capt. Moses M., his 18th In- diana Battery in the Selma campaign . . .	420, 479-481
Austrian rifles supplied the regiment	25	Beckwith, Lieut. Warren, wounded in action . . .	56, 553
B		Captain, famous order of . . .	178
B Co., raised for Second Cavalry .	2, 4	commands in action at Clinton .	190
organization and march to Camp McClellan . . .	6	in action, Forrest's attack upon Memphis . . .	300, 567
assigned to Fourth Cavalry . . .	3	in command on special service at Memphis . . .	300
on the left of regimental line . .	4	destroys property at Bankston .	361
first service in the field . . .	33	commands detachment, "Quinine Campaign" . . .	365
in action at Jones' Lane . . .	52	arrests a funeral procession . .	396
in action at Marianna . . .	55	Beezley, Pvt. Nathan, killed in action . . .	574
in action at White's Station . .	363		
at La Grange, Madison, and Augusta, Ga. . .	535		
Bachelor, Pvt. George H., cap- tured in action . . .	562		

	PAGE		PAGE
Bell, Brig.-Gen. Tyree H., commands brigade, Forrest's cavalry, Selma campaign . . .	563, 571	Bogue Chito, cavalry engagement, . . .	168, 559
Bell, Col. William B., 8th Iowa Inf., in action at Memphis . . .	298	Bogue, Pvt. Silas, wounded in action . . .	556
Benson, Pvt. John W., wounded in action . . .	573	Boham, Pvt. Edwin L., wounded in action . . .	301, 567
Benteen, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W., commands brigade . . .	317	Bonneville, Col. Benj. L. E., orders the regiment under arrest . . .	354
commands brigade in action, Big Blue Prairie . . .	326, 568	Boswell, Pvt. Francis M., wounded in action . . .	572
commands brigade in action, Marais des Cygnes . . .	332, 568	Bouton, Col. Edward, commands Colored troops, Sturgis' campaign . . .	232, 250, 258
commands brigade in action, Charlot Prairie . . .	339	in Smith's campaign against Forrest . . .	281, 286, 564
destroys iron-works, Selma campaign . . .	435	Bowman, Lieut. Thomas, wounded in action . . .	568
in action at Six-Mile Creek . . .	437	Bowman, Pvt. Josiah, captured in action . . .	570
Benton Barracks, St. Louis, occupied by the regiment, 25, 221, 317, 345, 353		Brandon, Miss., skirmishing near . . .	200
Bereman, First-Sergt. William A., wounded in action . . .	555	"Bread Riot" . . .	353
Lieutenant, honorably discharged, 368		Bremen, Pvt. Solomon, captured in action . . .	556
Big Black River crossed, Vicksburg campaign . . .	91	Brice's Cross-Roads, description of the field . . .	236
Big Black River, skirmish on, 189, 560		battle of . . .	239
Big Black River Bridge, battle of . . .	92	operations of the Fourth Iowa, 242, 248, 252, 255	
destroyed by the regiment . . .	122	losses in battle of . . .	268
Big Blue Prairie, battle of . . .	326, 568	Bridge at Columbus, who captured it . . .	498
Big Blue River, the battle of, 320, 568		Bridge on Black River, Ark., built by the brigade . . .	313
charge of Fourth Iowa . . .	324	Bridge over the Cahawba built by the brigade . . .	432
Big Creek, regiment in action at, 62, 553		Brown, Pvt. Cory J., captured and exchanged . . .	575
Biggs, Sergt. William T., mortally wounded in action . . .	107, 556	Brown, Brig.-Gen. Egbert B., commands brigade, Missouri cavalry . . .	317
Big Swamp, Ala., difficult passage, 471		in action supported by Winslow . . .	319
"Bill," Col. Winslow's horse, wounded in action . . .	325	Brown, James, First-Lieut. of G. . .	7
Billups, Pvt. John, captured in action . . .	570	Brown, Joseph, Governor of Georgia, refuses troops for Confederate armies . . .	411
Bird, Dr. Wellington, Assistant Surgeon . . .	13	maintains troops — "Georgia Line" . . .	486
Bird, Pvt. Thomas M., captured in action . . .	556	Browning, Corp. Benjamin F., wounded and captured in action . . .	41, 550
Black, Corp. Samuel O., wounded in action . . .	553	Brown's Ford, engagement at . . .	550
Black Fish Lake, Ark., dangerous passage . . .	311	Brownsville, Miss., regiment engaged at . . .	91
Black River, Ark., novel bridge built upon by the cavalry . . .	313	occupied by Winslow's cavalry . . .	160
Blasier, Lieut. Edward, commands detachment at Augusta, Ga. . .	476	engagement at . . .	167, 559
Blunt, Gen. James G., commands Kansas troops, Price campaign . . .	323, 567	Buck, John, executed by the rebels, 139	
fighting with Shelby, New- tonia, Mo.	342	Buckland, Gen. Ralph P., in action at Memphis . . .	298, 567

	PAGE		PAGE
Cavalry Corps, of the Military Division of the Mississippi, the regiment in	420	Clark, Lieut. S. Kirkwood, wounded in action and dies	72
Cavalry Forces of the 15th Army Corps, the regiment in	80, 158	Clark, Gen. John B., jr., commands brigade under Price	307
of the 17th Army Corps, the regiment in	221	Clayton, Col. Powell, commands cavalry at Helena	50
Cavane, Corp. David, captured in action	557	Clear Creek, rear Vicksburg, regiment encamped on	173
Cayuga, Miss., the regiment joins Grant, Vicksburg campaign	80	Cline, Corp. Joseph, wounded and captured in action	551
Chalmers, Gen. James R., attempt to capture, at Hernando	229	Clinton, Miss., skirmish at	118
commands enemy in action, Tallahatchie River	293, 566	cavalry engaged, demonstration upon Canton	167
commands enemy in action, Hurricane Creek	293, 566	engagement of Co. C. at	198, 561
commands division, enemy's cavalry, Selma campaign	423, 571	Clothing, allowance to the volunteers	385
attacks Wilson's rear at Selma	453	Cobb, Gen. Howell, in chief command in Georgia	571
Chambers, Capt. Alexander, musters in the regiment	13	commands in defense of Columbus	487, 573
Champion's Hill, Miss., battle of	86	commands in defense of Macon	506
losses in battle of	88	protests against capture of Macon,	512
Chandler, Pvt. Luther P., captured in action	191, 560	Coe, Corp. Francis C., killed in action	563
Chaney, Sergt. Albert W., commands Co. F. in action	38	Coffee, value of, to the soldiers	379
Chapel, Pvt. Andrew J., killed in action	108, 556	Coffeeville, Miss., railroad destroyed at	69
Chapman, Pvt. Henry J., mortally wounded in action	563	Coiner, Erasmus, 1st Lieut. of D	7
Chapman, Pvt. Wm. H., mortally wounded in action	563	Coldwater River, engagement at, Grenada raid	136
Charlot Prairie, battle of (see Marmiton Prairie)	339, 569	Cole, Pvt. Thomas J., killed in action	568
Chattahoochee, the gunboat, destroyed at Columbus	502	Coleman, Col. W. O., his regiment under Price	308
Cherry Creek, Miss., the regiment in action at	285, 565	Colored cavalry, engagement with Wirt Adams	361
Chester, Pvt. Oliver F., wounded in action	572	Colt's navy revolvers received	63
Childs, Pvt. Monroe M., captured in action	570	Columbus, Ga., preparations for march against	471
Clancy, Pvt. Daniel, captured and exchanged	575	position and value of	482
Clanton, Brig.-Gen. James H., commands brigade, enemy's cavalry, Selma campaign	571	description of fortifications	484
in action with La Grange	471, 478	battle and fall of	500, 573
Clapp, Pvt. George W., captured in action	570	losses at	501
Clarendon, Ark., occupied in Price campaign	311	Companies, position of, in battalion and regimental line	13
Clark, Alonzo, 2d Lieut. of B	6	Conciliatory policy of Government in 1863	126
Captain, in action at Ebenezer Church	444	"Confederate Hotel" at Jackson destroyed by fire	85
		Conscription in the Confederacy	410
		Cooking utensils	383
		Corbin, Pvt. John, captured in action	552
		Corbin, Sergt. John W., wounded in action	555
		sent to Iowa on recruiting service,	157
		Cosby, Brig.-Gen. George B., commands brigade enemy's cavalry,	162

	PAGE		PAGE
Cosgriff, Pvt. Richard H., decorated for capture of flag and bearer .	540	D Co., on detached service .	35
Cottonplant, Ark., battle of .	45	detail attacked on picket-post .	49
Counsel, Pvt. Edward, wounded in action .	570	in action at Marianna .	55
Crane, Trumpeter Smith R., wound- ed in action .	569	on special service, Meridian cam- paign .	189
Craver, Sergt. Charles F., commands guard of prisoners of state .	531	stubborn defense of rear near Ripley .	260
Crawford, De Witt C., Capt. of Co. H	7	on the "Quinine Campaign" .	365
Croll, Pvt. Henry John, wounded in action .	569	pursuit of enemy at Selma .	458
Cross-Hollows, battle of .	31	in action at Columbus .	497
Crossland, Brig.-Gen. Edward, commands brigade, enemy's cavalry, Selma campaign .	571	posted at Washington, Ga. .	535
in action, Selma campaign .	436, 442	Dana, Capt. Newell B., in action at Selma .	449, 454
Croxton, Brig.-Gen. John T., com- mands brigade, Wilson's Cav- alry Corps .	420, 571	in action at Columbus .	496, 498
detached against Tuscaloosa .	434	Dana, Maj.-Gen. Napoleon J. T., applies for Winslow's Brigade, .	357
unable to rejoin the Corps .	470	Dashman, Pvt. George L., missing, .	558
engagement with Gen. Wirt Adams .	516	Davenport, Iowa, rendezvous and discharge of the regiment, .	2, 548
engagement with Gen. Hill, the last action in the last campaign, .	516	Davidson, Corp. James H., capture and imprisonment of, .	141, 149, 558
appears at Macon after great march .	515	Davis, President, quarrels with Gen. Johnston .	187
Cummings, Dr. Stephen, appointed Assistant-Surgeon .	115	on Confederate desertions .	410
Cunning, Pvt. Michael, wounded in action .	568	his flight .	521, 522, 526-529
Currier, Pvt. Russell G., captured in action .	557	the regiment searches for him .	523
Curtis, Maj.-Gen. Samuel R., suc- ceeds to command in Missouri, .	30	capture of .	529, 530
Fourth Iowa Cav. sent to, .	24, 31, 549	Davis, Pvt. Abner F., wounded in action .	565
victory at Pea Ridge .	31	Davis, Pvt. Charles W., wounded in action .	569
reviews the regiment .	36	Davis, Pvt. William W., captured in action .	552
campaign against Little Rock .	35	Dean, Pvt. William, captured in action .	556
abandons the campaign .	42	Dee, Edward W., 2d Lieut. of E .	7
retreat and march to Helena .	42	Captain, commands battalion at Brice's Cross-Roads .	240
commands Kansas troops, Price campaign .	317, 567	in command of the regiment .	292
repulsed by Price at Little Blue .	319	his passage of the Big Blue in action .	322
battle with Price at Westport .	323	in command of the regiment .	342
takes command in Price campaign .	327	Major, in action at Six-Mile Creek .	438
Curtiss, Sergt. Hira W., commands detachment in action .	43, 551	leads mounted charge at Colum- bus .	499
captured in action .	556	Delhi, Iowa, Co. B organized at .	6
Lieutenant, killed in action, .	338, 569	Desertions among Confederates .	410
Cut-off, The, reached in campaign against Arkansas Post .	57	Detrick, Sergt. Horton M., wound- ed in action .	574
		Dibrell, Maj.-Gen. George G., com- mands escort to Jeff. Davis .	526
		Dillon, Lieut. Loyd H., achieve- ment in action, Clinton, Miss., .	198
		wounded in action .	243, 563
		commands Co. C on expedition .	365
		in action at Columbus .	499
		recommended for promotion .	541

D

D Co., organized as a militia com- pany for border service .	6
joins the regiment with its officers, .	6

	PAGE
Discipline among the volunteers .	14
Dobbin, Gen. Archibald S., commands brigade under Price .	307
Double Bridges, Ga., engagement at .	505
Drake, Pvt. Henry, captured in action .	552
Drummond, James T., Capt. of K, commands detachment on White River .	36, 550
with Cos. E, F, G, K, first engagements of the regiment, 37, leaves the regiment, expiration of term .	550, 368
Drummond, Thomas, Lieut.-Col. of the regiment .	13
character and influence .	14
resigns and returns to regular army .	15
killed in action .	15
Duck Hill, Miss., fighting at, Grenada Raid .	133
Duffield, Lieut.-Col. George, commands the brigade .	310
Durant, Miss., railroad destroyed, Grenada Raid .	130
Dustan, Gen. Charles W., in action at Memphis .	298, 567
Dwire, Pvt. John, wounded in action .	551

E

E Co., organized and enters Camp Harlan .	7
first service in the field .	33
in expedition on White River .	36
Eastport, Miss., camp of Wilson's Cavalry Corps .	408
Ebenezer Church, battle of .	441, 572
numbers and losses of the rebels .	443
Eggleston, Col. Beroth B., makes first attack at Columbus .	489
Egypt, Miss., campaign of .	359
battle of .	361
Eighth Iowa Infantry in Forrest's attack upon Memphis .	298
Election of officers in the companies .	21
Election, Presidential, 1864, vote of the regiment .	344
Eleventh Illinois Cavalry, brigaded with Fourth Iowa .	115, 159
in action at Jackson .	194
Elgin's Mill, novel bridge built by the cavalry .	313
Engagements and casualties, list of .	549
Equipment, delay in providing, character of .	22, 24, 25

	PAGE
Ewing, Gen. Thomas, jr., brilliant defense of Pilot Knob .	315

F

F Co., organized and enters Camp Harlan .	7
marches to relieve Salem, Mo. .	34
expedition on White River .	36
in action at Talbot's Ferry .	37
detached for special service .	42
captures steamboat on White River .	42
occupies Calico Rock, Ark. .	42
in action at Mt. Olive, Ark. .	43
in action at Gist's Plantation, on special duty in Helena .	43, 44
in action at Bear Creek .	100
acts as guard to pontoon train .	189
extraordinary marches, Meridian campaign .	196
takes gun, Marais des Cygnes .	336
attack enemy's flank, Montevallo, in action at Selma .	435, 449, 450, 454
in action at Columbus .	498
takes Alexander H. Stephens, Confederate Vice-President .	530
carries news of capture of Jeff. Davis .	535
Fagan, Maj.-Gen. James B., with Price in Arkansas .	304
commands division, Price's invasion of Missouri .	307, 567
in action at the Big Blue .	322, 568
in action at the Marais des Cygnes .	331, 569
defeated at Marais des Cygnes, Fairchild, Pvt. John, captured in action .	336, 570
Fanning, Pvt. Nicholas, decorated for capturing flag and two officers, Farnan, Maj. James, engagement with Ferguson's cavalry .	540, 206
Farrar, Col. Bernard G., commands mounted men at Natchez .	176
Ferguson, Gen. Samuel W., commands rebel cavalry in action .	206
in Meridian campaign .	209, 560
in action at Meridian .	206, 561
commands escort to Jeff. Davis .	526
Ferguson, Pvt. Hugh, captured in action .	570
Field-and-Staff of the regiment, organization of .	13
Fifteenth Army Corps, the regiment assigned to .	80
Fifth Illinois Cavalry, brigaded with Fourth Iowa .	115

	PAGE		PAGE
Hard Times Landing, crossing the Mississippi at	79	Hodge, Ambrose, promoted Adjutant	113
Harlan, James, U. S. Senator, obtains authority to raise the regiment	3	gallantry in action	324
name given to first camp	4	Hodges, Pvt. Robert A., captured in action	570
father of the regiment	17	Hoge, Col. George B., his brigade in action, Brice's Cross-Roads, 247, 250	
Harris, Maj., a rebel officer killed at Bear Creek	106	Hole, Pvt. Wm., remarkably wounded in action	107, 556
Harris, Wm. E., Captain of L	8	Holly Springs, Miss., occupied, fourth Forrest campaign	292
Harrisburg, battle of, see Tupelo, 287, 565		Holt, Pvt. Geo. W., wounded and captured in action	562
Harrisburg road, engagement on, 287, 565		Hooper, Simon, 2d Lieut. of G	7
Harrison, Pvt. Richard, killed in action	551	Hopkirk, Pvt. Robert, wounded in action and died of his wounds, 564	
Hart, Jacob, 1st Lieut. of K	8	Horse Marines, regiment serves with, at Natchez	175
commands Co. K on expedition	36	Horses, special provision for purchase	3
Hartman, Pvt. John C., mortally wounded in action	563	supply of, and distribution among companies	22
Haskell, Edwin A., 2d Lieut. of H	7	Hovey, Brig.-Gen. Alvin P., campaign against Arkansas Post	56
Hatch, Brig.-Gen., Edward, commands division, Cavalry Corps, District of West Tennessee, 292, 566		demonstration upon Grenada, 58, 59	
Hatchie Swamp, difficult passage of, Sturgis' retreat	253	gallantry in action at Champion's Hill	88
Hays, Pvt. John H., decorated for capture of flag and bearer	540	Hovey, Col. Charles E., commands in action at River Cache	45
Heacock, Wm. A., 2d Lieut. of F	7	Howell, Pvt. Wm. W., captured in action	570
commands F on expedition, 36, 550		Huff, Capt. Eldred, of Co. A., commands detail	267
killed in action	38, 550	disaster at White's Station	363, 570
Hebron's plantation, regiment encamped on	173	captured in action	570
Helena, occupied by Gen. Curtis	46	Huntington, Pvt. Edwin, wounded and captured in action and died in prison	563, 564
the regiment encamped near	46	Hunt, Pvt. Doran T., captured in action	556
encamped in the town	59	captured again in action	570
the regiment leaves for Vicksburg, 79		Hunt, Pvt. Wilson S., killed in action	556
Henderson, Corp. Wm. C., wounded in action	555	Hurlbut, Maj.-Gen., Stephen A., commands corps under Grant	73
Hennessy, Pvt. Michael, wounded in action	569	commands corps, Meridian campaign	185, 560
Henshaw, Bugler James J., wounded and captured in action	556	Hurricane Creek, Miss., engagement at	293
Hernando, Miss., occupied in search for Gen. Chalmers	229	Hyams, Lieut.-Col. Samuel M., commands the enemy in action at Ripley, Miss.	564
Hilgrin, Pvt. Charles, wounded in action	563		
Hill, Gen. (or Col.), Benjamin J., in battle with Croxton, the last engagement of the last campaign of the war	516		
Hill's plantation, scene of action of Bear Creek	101		
Hinkson, Pvt. John W., captured in action	49, 552		
Hoakinson, Pvt. John, wounded in action	563		

I

I Co., formed at Winterset	8
in action at Bear Creek	100
on expedition to Natchez	174

	PAGE
I Co., in action at Selma	449, 450, 454
in action at Columbus	498
Independence, battle of	319, 567
Indian Territory, traversed by the cavalry, Price campaign	342
Iowa Brigade, The, supports the cavalry at Jackson	196
Ireland, Pvt. John, killed in action,	168, 559
Iron-making plants in Alabama, destruction of	431, 436
Irwin, Corp. Isaac M., captured in action	552

J

Jackman , Col. Sidney D., commands brigade under Price	308
Jacks , Pvt. John M. D., killed in action	568
Jackson , the ram, captured and destroyed by the cavalry	501, 502
Jackson , Miss., first capture of, Vicksburg campaign	83, 554
destruction of captured property, siege of, by Sherman	85, 119, 557
second capture of, Sherman's campaign against Johnston	121
assaulted by Winslow's cavalry,	193, 561
third capture of, Meridian campaign	195
Jackson , Pvt. Cornelius W., killed in action	552
Jackson , Sergt. Wm. E., wounded in action	563
Jackson , Brig.-Gen. Wm. H., commands enemy's cavalry, campaign against Johnston	117
covers retreat of Johnston	118
his cavalry in action at Canton,	121, 557
commands division of rebel cavalry, Selma campaign	423, 571
in action with Croxton, Selma campaign	440, 444, 515
Jackson , Pvt. Theodore S., wounded in action	566
Jacksonport , Ark., occupied on march to Helena	45
Jameson , Pvt. Harlan, captured in action	557
Jewett , Joseph E., Major of the regiment	13
Jewett , Pvt. Charles M., wounded in action	566
Johnson , Pvt. William, captured in action and wounded, 107, 556, 557	

	PAGE
Johnston , Lieut-Gen. Joseph E., commands the enemy, Vicksburg campaign	82
cut off from Pemberton by Grant,	84
efforts to relieve Vicksburg	100
resists Sherman's movement upon Jackson	117
evacuates Jackson in the night	121
surrenders all his forces	517
Jones , Maj. Benj. S., commands 3d Iowa Cav., Price campaign,	320, 567
in action at Marais des Cygnes,	335
Jones , Capt. Eugene R., killed in action, Selma	455, 573
Jones' Lane , engagement at	51, 552
Jones , Sergt. Joseph H., killed in action, Columbus	499, 574
Jones , Sergt. Thompson, wounded in action	574
Jones' Plantation , battle of (see Bear Creek)	100, 556
Joyce , Capt. Peter, commands the guns of the cavalry brigade	167
his guns on Meridian campaign	189
at Brice's Cross-Roads	240
at Hurricane Creek	293

K

K Co. , organized and enters Camp Harlan	8
expedition on White River, Ark.	36
destroys nitre-works on White River, Ark.	37
in action at Bear Creek	100
on expedition to Natchez	174
gallant conduct in action, third capture of Jackson	194
in the charge at Marais des Cygnes	335
in action at Columbus	497
saves the bridge from fire at Columbus	499
Kargé , Col. Joseph, commands First Brigade of Grierson's cavalry	227
commands detachment on expedition to Rienzi, Miss.	233
relieves the rear-guard, Sturgis' retreat	264
commands the division	294
commands First Brigade, Winslow's Division	310
Keck , Lieut. J. Sloan, stubborn defense of rear, Sturgis' retreat,	260
gallantry in action at Marais des Cygnes	335
on Gen. Upton's staff	421
recommended for promotion	541

	PAGE		PAGE
Keck, Lieut. Peter R., on Gen. Upton's staff	421	Lamar, Col. C. A. L., rebel, killed in action	487, 501
distinguished in action	436	Lambert, Jesse R., 1st Lieut. of Co. I	8
recommended for promotion, 436, 541	541	Landgraeber, Capt. Clemens, his battery in campaign against Johnston	120
Kellogg, Pvt. Benoni F., killed in action.	62, 553	Lash, Pvt. Charles W., wounded in action	554
Kelly, Samuel P., aided in raising Co. A	6	Lathers, Pvt. James, wounded in action	572
Kerr, Col. Lucien B., charge upon Lee's cavalry at Jackson	193	Lauderdale Springs, reached by Winslow's cavalry, Meridian campaign	209
Ketcham, Edward D., Sergeant-Major of the regiment	13	Lauffer, Simon P., Quarter-Master of the regiment	13
Kinney, Pvt. John, decorated for capture of flag and bearer	540	League, Pvt. David, wounded in action	566
Kirkpatrick, Andrew J., Chaplain of the regiment	13	Lee, Capt. Henry S., battery attached to Winslow's Brigade	223
mustered out on expiration of term	368	Lee, Maj.-Gen. Stephen D., commands the enemy at Canton, Miss.	166
Kirkpatrick, Pvt. John A., captured in action	557	driven back by the cavalry	167
Kirkwood, Gov. Samuel J., visits Cos. A and B at Camp McClellan	3	engagement with, at Livingston	171
Kitchen, Col. S. G., in command under Price	307	commands enemy's cavalry, Meridian campaign	187
Knott, Parson, regiment camped near the house of, Memphis	228	engagements with, at Big Black, Baker's Creek, Clinton, and Jackson	189-193, 560, 561
Koolbeck, Pvt. John, wounded in action	321, 567	Lieut.-Gen., commands the rebel forces, battles about Pontotoc, 285, 564	
L		commands the rebel forces, battle of Tupelo	287
L Co., organized in Camp Harlan	8	Legrand, Pvt. George, captured in action and died	570
raised for Pleyel's Lancers	8	Lexington, Miss., occupied, Grenada raid	129
marches to relieve Salem, Mo.	34	Lick Creek (or Jones' Lane), Ark., engagement at	50, 552
in action at Big Creek, Ark.	62	Lincoln, President, regiment votes unanimously for	344
in action at Wittsburg, Ark.	64	news of the death of	521
on expedition to Natchez	174	effect of his death on the negroes, 522	
on picket, resists attack	287	tributes paid to	536
sent to attack enemy's flank	435	Little, Levi W., Leader of the Band, 408	
in action at Selma	449, 450, 454	Littlejohn, Pvt., Leverett J., captured in action and died in prison	564
in action at Columbus	498	Little Red River, Ark., held by Curtis	41
takes Herschel V. Johnson, rebel leader	530	action on, at Brown's Ford	41, 550
posted at Griffin, Ga.	535	Livingston, Miss., engagement near, 169	
La Grange, Col. Oscar H., commands brigade in Wilson's Cavalry Corps	420, 571	Livingston, Pvt., James A., wounded and captured in action	556
marches to relief of Croxton	444	Llewellyn Church, the regiment in action at	257
fighting with Clanton's cavalry	471		
fighting with Buford's	475		
further fighting with Clanton	478		
takes the flags of his adversaries 478			
assault and capture of Fort Tyler, 479			
Laird, Pvt. Andrew, mortally wounded in action	563		
Lamar, Miss., occupied by the regiment	294		

	PAGE		PAGE
Miller, Pvt. James P., decorated for capture of flag and bearer .	540	Morgan, Pvt. Benjamin F., wound- ed in action .	553
Miller, Lieut. Samuel N., in action at Columbus .	499	Morris, Pvt. Alfred, captured in action .	552
Miller, Sergt. Samuel O., captured on duty .	575	Morris, Pvt. Jonathan, wounded in action .	563
Miller, Corp. William, captured in action .	557	Morton, Miss., skirmish at, Meri- dian campaign .	202, 561
Milliken's Bend, regiment lands at, campaign of Vicksburg .	79	Mosher, Pvt. David, killed in ac- tion .	49, 551
Millington, furnishes plan of works at Selma .	434	Mount Olive, on White River, en- gagement of Co. F .	550
Mimm's Mills, Ga., engagement at, 505		Mount Pleasant, Iowa, place of rendezvous .	3
Mine Creek, battle of (see Marais des Cygnes) .	331, 568	relations between the people and the regiment at .	17
Miner, Pvt. Thomas, wounded in action .	556	Mower, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A., com- mands division, campaign against Forrest .	281, 289, 564
Minty, Col. Robert H. G., com- mands brigade in Wilson's Cavalry Corps .	420, 571	commands division, Smith's sec- ond campaign against Forrest .	566
commands the division .	493, 505	commands forces sent against Price .	309, 317
his action in movement upon Macon .	511	Murdock, Pvt. Andrew J., cap- tured in action .	41, 550
occupies southwest Georgia .	523	Muster in of regiment .	13
Mississippi Central Railroad de- stroyed .	119	Mutiny of Missouri troops quelled by Fourth Iowa .	318
Mississippi Springs, skirmishing near .	83, 554	Myers, Pvt. Emile, wounded in action	566
Missouri, trouble with Secessionists on the border .	9	Myers, Pvt. Samuel, captured and returned .	575
overthrow of Secessionist govern- ment .	30	McAuley, Pvt. Robert P., captured in action .	552
condition of, at time of Price campaign .	304	wounded in action .	566
Mobile, Canby's campaign against,	415	McCabe, Pvt. William, captured in action .	551
Montevallo, Ala., the regiment en- gaged near .	435, 571	McCallum, Corp. John, wounded in action .	189, 560
occupied by the regiment .	435	McClernand, Maj.-Gen. John A., seeks command of campaign against Vicksburg .	68
second engagement near .	436, 572	takes command of forces about Vicksburg .	72
Montgomery, Ala., occupied by the cavalry .	473	captures Arkansas Post .	72
destruction of cotton and other property .	475	expedition up Arkansas River .	72
Montgomery's Point, landing at, campaign of Arkansas Post .	57	assigned to corps command .	73
Moore, Col. David, 21st Mo. Inf., in campaign against Forrest, commanding division .	281, 564	failure at Champion's Hill .	90
Moore, Pvt. James D., mortally wounded .	556	McClintock, Pvt. John, killed in action .	556
Moore's Ford, Big Black River, crossed in demonstration upon Canton .	162	McClure, Andrew W., Surgeon of the regiment .	13
engagement with Whitfield's cav- alry .	163, 559	resignation of .	115
Morgan, Corp. Richard H., dec- orated for capture of flag and bearer .	540	McConnellee, Lieut. Wm. J., wounded and captured in action,	556, 557
		McCook, Brig.-Gen. Edward M., commands division, Wilson's Cavalry Corps .	419, 571

	PAGE
McCoy, Corp. Joseph C., wounded in action	574
McCrackin, David, Leader of the Band	9
McCray, Col. Thomas H., commands brigade of the enemy under Price	307
McCrillis, Col. La Fayette, commands expedition	36
McGlasson, Capt. R. B. M., leads charge upon bridge at Columbus	495
McHugh, Pvt. Patrick, wounded in action	563
captured in action	570
McKee, Capt. Samuel J., commands detachment in action at Fike's Ferry	469, 573
McMillen, Col. Wm. L., commands infantry, Sturgis' campaign,	232, 562
in action at Brice's Cross-Roads,	244, 246, 248, 562
statements of battle of Brice's Cross-Roads	271, 278
commands brigade, campaign of Tupelo	281
McNair, Pvt. James M., wounded on picket-post	574
McNeil, Brig.-Gen. John, commands brigade of Missouri cavalry	317
McNulty, Bugler John, wounded and captured in action and died in prison	563, 564
McNulty, Pvt. Francis, captured in action	552
McNulty, Pvt. Thomas, wounded in action	565
McPherson, Maj.-Gen. James B., commands 17th Corps, Vicksburg campaign	73
in action at Raymond	82
in action at Champion's Hill	87
position in investment of Vicksburg	95
commands army, demonstration upon Canton	166, 559
commands corps on Meridian campaign	185
McWhorten, Pvt. Wm. A., captured in action	551

N

Nashville, Tenn., the regiment ordered to, from Indian Territory	418
--	-----

	PAGE
Natchez threatened by the enemy	174
the regiment marches with force to the relief of	174, 558
Needles, Pvt. Abram, wounded in action	573
New Albany, Indiana, cavalry camp, regiment ordered to	23
Newby, Aaron J., 2d Lieut. of M	8
New Carthage, La., reached in efforts to pass Vicksburg	78
Newhall, Sergt. Henry M., Co. H, Color-Guard	182
Newtonia, Mo., battle between Blunt and Shelby	342
Ninth Illinois Cavalry served with Fourth Iowa	50
Nitre Cave, Ark., first engagement of the regiment	37, 550
Noble, Maj. John W., commanding Third Iowa Cavalry on Grenada raid	127
in command of Grenada	135
Colonel, in action at Brice's Cross-Roads	240
statements about the battle	272
in action at Ripley, Miss.,	234, 562
in second action at Ripley	563
in third action at Ripley	564
commands detachment sent to Kelley's Mill	284
commands the brigade, campaign against Forrest	292, 566
destroys property at Grenada	360
leads assault upon Columbus	493
Provost-Marshal at Columbus	501
destroys the <i>Memphis Appeal</i>	502
Noble, Pvt. Francis M., wounded in action	563
Non-Commissioned Staff, organization and reorganization of, 10, 11, 48 members of	13
battalion, disbanded	48
Numbers of the regiment, 21, 157, 223, 576	

O

O'Brien (or Obrian), Pvt. John L., killed in action	570
Odell, Pvt. Jeremiah, captured and exchanged	575
Officers, chosen by election	21
character and development of	405
general change in Field and Staff,	113
Ogg, First-Sergt. Amon L., wounded in action	553
Lieutenant, commands Co. D on expedition	365
in action at Selma	458

	PAGE		PAGE
Ogg, Pvt. Elias F., wounded in action	574	Pelham, Pvt. Abraham, captured in action	556
Okalona, Miss., fighting near, campaign against Forrest	286	Pemberton, Lieut.-Gen. John C., abandons defenses of the Tallahatchie	70
Okatibbeha Creek, bridged by the cavalry	204	marches against Grant's communications	86
Old Town Creek, battle of	290, 565	defeated at Champion's Hill	88
Organization of cavalry	10	surrenders Vicksburg	109
change in effected	11	Perkins, Orson N., 1st Lieut. of E, commands company on expedition	7
of regiments under the new law,	48	Peters, John H., Captain of B	36
Osage, battle of the (see Marais des Cygnes)	331, 568	commands detachment	6
Osband, Col. Embury D., commands brigade Colored cavalry	359	commands in actions at Marianna	55
in action with Wirt Adams	361	wounded in action	56, 553
Ottumwa, Iowa, Co. F raised at	7	occupies Haines' Bluff and Snyder's Bluff	93, 94, 555
Overmyer, John R., 2d Lieut. of I,	8	in charge of captured trains, Grenada raid	130
Owen, Lieut. F., crosses the bridge at Columbus in action	495	in Iowa on recruiting service	157
Oxford, Miss., occupied by Grant, campaign against Vicksburg	70	promoted Lieutenant-Colonel	113
occupied by the cavalry	294	Lieut.-Col., commands the regiment at Vicksburg	221
P		commands Cavalry Forces at Vicksburg	221
Page County, Iowa, first enlistments for the regiment were in,	6	in command of the regiment	223
Panola, Miss., cavalry destroys the railroad at	69	discipline in the regiment	228
Parkell, Alonzo B., Captain of E	7	commands the regiment in third Forrest campaign	282
Major, tries to have the regiment ordered to Vicksburg	79	in action at Ripley	564
commands the regiment in action, Mechanicsburg, Miss., 98, 99,	555	in action at Pontotoc	565
commands the regiment in action, Bear Creek	100, 556	in action at Tupelo	565
commands the regiment in camp,	123	in action at Old Town Creek	566
commands the regiment, Grenada raid	127	commands the regiment, fourth Forrest campaign	292
in action at Coldwater River, 136,	558	in action at the Tallahatchie River	293, 566
Parks, Pvt. Henry F., wounded in action	555	commands regiment on Grierson's raid	360, 570
wounded again on duty	574	commands the regiment	421
Parsons, George B., 1st Lieut. of B,	6	in action at Six Mile Creek, 438,	572
attacks enemy at Jones' Lane, 52,	552	in action at Selma	456, 573
wounded in action	52, 552	in action at Columbus	573
Patterson, James H., 2d Lieut. of C,	6	commands Post of Atlanta	535
Payne, Sergt. Elisha M., wounded in action	563	Peterson, Pvt. Alfred A., wounded in action	563
Pay of the Volunteers	385	Phelps, Teamster Hezekiah J., wounded in action	573
Pea Ridge, battle of	31	Phillips, Lieut.-Col. Jesse J., junction with his brigade at Grenada,	133
Co. A. reaches	32	Phillips, Col. John F., his brigade in the battle of the Big Blue,	321, 568
Pearl River, Miss., regiment crosses, bridge destroyed by the regiment,	119	in the battle of Marais des Cygnes	332
pontoon at Jackson captured by the brigade	195	Pickel, Lieut. Hugh M., defense of the rear, Sturgis' retreat	260
Pearson, Pvt. James B., wounded in action	563	daring act at Selma	469

	PAGE
Pickens, Pvt. Alpheus, on reconnaissance with Upton . . .	452
Pierce, Abial R., Captain of M . . .	8
early service on Missouri border, . . .	9
sent to Iowa on recruiting service, . . .	157
Major, commands the regiment, Sturgis' campaign . . .	232, 562
in action at Ripley, Miss., . . .	234, 562
in action at Brice's Cross-Roads, . . .	243, 247, 248
statement of the battle . . .	273
second action at Ripley . . .	259, 563
commands the regiment in Price campaign . . .	310, 567
in action at the Big Blue . . .	321, 568
in action at Big Blue Prairie, . . .	326, 568
leads charge of the regiment at Marais des Cygnes . . .	334, 568
leads charge on Charlot Prairie . . .	340
wounded in action, Charlot Prairie . . .	341, 569
recommended for promotion . . .	541
Pierce, Corp. Joseph W., captured in action . . .	556
Sergeant, wounded in action . . .	569
Pilgrim, Pvt. Garrett, killed in action . . .	563
Pilot Knob, Mo., battle of, Price campaign . . .	3 15
Platt, Pvt. Milton, wounded in action . . .	552
Pleasanton, Maj.-Gen. Alfred, commanding with Rosecrans in Mo. . .	307
commands the cavalry, Price campaign . . .	317, 567
at battle of the Big Blue . . .	327
at battle of the Marais des Cygnes . . .	337
at battle of Charlot Prairie . . .	340
congratulatory and farewell orders . . .	347, 348
Pleyel's Lancers, abandoned for the Fourth Iowa Cavalry . . .	8
Polk, Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas, commands the enemy, Meridian campaign . . .	187, 560
retreat from Meridian . . .	206
Polk's plantation, attack upon picket-post at . . .	49, 551
Pontotoc, Miss., engagements near, . . .	286
Porter, Asbury B., Colonel of the regiment . . .	13
personal care in purchase of the horses . . .	22
resigns . . .	113
Porter, Admiral David D., fleet in action, Arkansas Post . . .	72
fleet in flank movement by Steele's Bayou . . .	77

	PAGE
Porter, Captain Watson B., commands Co. C in action . . .	41, 550
Port Gibson, Miss., battle of . . .	80
raid against intended . . .	160
Pray, Capt. Samuel M., in action at Selma . . .	449, 455
takes Herschel V. Johnson . . .	530
at Griffin, paroling Confederates, . . .	535
Prentiss, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin M., commands at Helena, including Fourth Iowa . . .	60
Price campaign, begun from Memphis . . .	310, 567
ended in the Indian Territory . . .	343
numbers and losses in . . .	351, 567
congratulatory orders upon . . .	347
Price, Maj.-Gen. Sterling, plans campaign to recover Missouri, . . .	304, 307
his orders for the campaign . . .	306
character and influence of . . .	306
his forces in the campaign, . . .	308, 317, 344, 567
crosses the Arkansas and enters Missouri . . .	312
repulsed by Ewing at Pilot Knob . . .	315
fighting with Curtis and Blunt . . .	319
retreats upon defeat at Big Blue and Westport . . .	325
pursued by the cavalry . . .	328
final defeat of . . .	342
driven beyond the Arkansas . . .	343
his report of the campaign . . .	351
Prices of necessities in the South . . .	413
Pursel, William, Captain of I . . .	8
commands the regiment on expedition . . .	160, 559

R

Rafferty, Pvt. John W., wounded in action . . .	568
Ralston, Pvt. Robert, wounded in action . . .	569
Ramey, Pvt. Francis S., captured in action . . .	557
Rations allowed the Volunteers . . .	382
Ray, Trumpeter Robert E., wounded in action . . .	573
Ray, Pvt. William L., wounded in action . . .	554
Raymond, Edward W., Quartermaster-Sergeant . . .	13
Lieutenant and Quartermaster, mustered out . . .	368
Raymond, Miss., battle of, Vicksburg campaign . . .	83

	PAGE
Saulsbury, Tenn., rendezvous for campaign against Forrest	282
Saunders, Pvt. Worthy S., wounded in action	566
Sawyer, Pvt. Charles C., wounded in action	569
Saxton, Pvt. Daniel, captured in action	564
Schloeder, Pvt. Adolph, wounded in action	563
School for officers	15
Scott, Pvt. Isaac S., captured in action	556
Scott, Pvt. William, unhorses the enemy's commander	499
Searcy, Ark., end of Curtis' march against Little Rock	41
Second Iowa Cavalry, Cos. A and B raised for	2
serves with the Fourth Iowa	282
Sells, Wm. H., 1st Lieut. of L	8
Selma campaign, conditions at opening of	410
plan of	416, 429
forces of the enemy	423
supplies for	428
march begins	428
Selma, plan of fortifications obtained	434
fortifications of	447
battle of	450, 573
position of Fourth Iowa in battle	451
charge of the Fourth Iowa	456
fall of	457
losses, captures, and destruction in battle of	459, 467
Shaffer, Pvt. Alfred, wounded in action	570
Shaffer, Pvt. Cornelius, wounded in action	570
Shaffer, Pvt. Ephraim, captured in action and died	563
Shanks, Col. David, commands brigade under Price	308
Sharp's carbines supplied	127, 183
Shaw, Col. Wm. T., commands division under Smith, campaign against Forrest	566
Sheafor, Lieut. M. V. B., commands detachment at Augusta, Ga.	476
Shelby, Gen. Joseph O., under Price in Arkansas	304
commands division in Price's army	307, 567
in battle at Westport, Price campaign	325

	PAGE
Shelby, Gen. J. O., commands the enemy, battle of Charlot Prairie	339, 569
battle with Blunt at Newtonia	342
Sheppard, Pvt. George W., wounded in action	64, 553
Sherman, Pvt. Eli, decorated for capture of flag and bearer	540
Sherman, Maj.-Gen. Wm. T., fails in attack at Chickasaw Bluffs	72
early operations against Vicksburg	59
aids McClernand in capture of Arkansas Post	72
assigned to command of 15th Army Corps	73
attempt to flank Vicksburg by Steele's Bayou	77
Fourth Iowa assigned to corps of, campaign against Jackson	80, 116
orders the Grenada raid	124
orders demonstration upon Canton, letter to Winslow	158, 165
requests the regiment to forego Veteran furlough	182
preparations for the Meridian campaign	184
marches against Meridian	189, 560
orders the cavalry to attack Jackson	191
gives orders for destruction of property at Meridian	207
returns to Vicksburg escorted by the Fourth Iowa	217
orders Fourth Iowa to Memphis, his desire to destroy Forrest	222, 226
orders second campaign against Forrest	230
orders third campaign against Forrest	281
congratulations upon the fall of Richmond	474
Shirley, Pvt. John S., captured in action	556
wounded in action	574
Shogola Creek, skirmishing at, Meridian campaign	202
Shoppell, Pvt. Henry, captured in action	49, 552
Shrack, Pvt. Samuel J., wounded in action	570
Shrack, Pvt. Theodore, captured in action	570
Sibley, Pvt. Jabez, wounded and captured in action	44, 551
killed in action	82, 554
Sickness in the regiment	39
Sidney, Iowa, Co. A organized and encamped at	5

	PAGE		PAGE
Sisson, Corp. Charles W., mortally wounded in action . . .	56, 553	Spearman, Maj. C. F., expedition to Arkansas Post . . .	56
Six-Mile Creek, Ala., engagement of regiment at . . .	438, 572	demonstration upon Canton . . .	167
Sixteenth Army Corps, the regiment in cavalry division of . . .	223	expedition to Natchez . . .	174
Skiles, Sergt. Robert, decorated for gallantry . . .	541	campaign of Meridian . . .	188, 560
Slavin, Pvt. John, killed in action, 568		in camp in Veterans' absence . . .	221
Slemmons, Col. Wm. F., commands brigade, Price's cavalry . . .	307	leaves the regiment, term of service expired . . .	368
captured in battle of the Marais des Cygnes . . .	336	Speers, Pvt. Robert, captured in action . . .	570
Smith, Maj.-Gen. Andrew J., commands division, Meridian campaign . . .	189	Spencer carbine supplied regiment, 282	
commands army, third campaign against Forrest . . .	281, 564	Spicer, Wm. J., courier, capture and execution of . . .	213
commands army, fourth campaign against Forrest . . .	291	Springfield, Mo., regiment encamped at . . .	35
commands forces, campaign against Price . . .	309, 317	Stall, Pvt. Milton W., killed in action . . .	563
Smith, Pvt. Charles H., capture and escape . . .	141, 558	Stamm, Lieut. Andrew N., honorably discharged . . .	368
Smith, Corp. Charles N., wounded and captured in action . . .	556	Stanton, Edwin M., Sec'y of War, issues special order to raise the regiment . . .	3
Smith, Pvt. Isaac, captured in action and exchanged . . .	564	famous order to continue the war, 516	
Smith, Corp. Simon, captured on duty . . .	574	Starke, Col. Peter B., rebel regiment of engaged, Bear Creek, 102	
wounded in action . . .	563	his brigade routed at Jackson . . .	194
Smith, Pvt. William, wounded in action . . .	570	commands brigade, Forrest's cavalry, Selma campaign . . .	571
Smith, Maj.-Gen. Wm. Sooy, commands provisional cavalry corps for campaign of Meridian . . .	186	St. Louis, Mo., regiment arrives at, 25	
his orders for the campaign . . .	188	gives reception to the Veterans . . .	219
his fighting and failure, 188, 208, 213		Statistics, with casualties . . .	576
Sherman's efforts to reach him, 208 to 213		Starr, Col. Matthew H., mortally wounded in action . . .	301
Smithburg, Pvt. Andrew D., wounded in action . . .	565	Steedman, Maj.-Gen. James B., commands the department . . .	540
Smizer's farm, foraging party on . . .	61	orders muster out of Fourth Iowa, 545	
Snyder's Bluff, Miss., occupied by the regiment . . .	94	Stewart, Pvt. Thomas, captured in action . . .	557
camp of the regiment moved to . . .	100	Stocks, Sergt. James H., Color-Guard . . .	182
Society Hill, Ala., shows Union sentiment . . .	482	wounded in action . . .	573
Soldiers, their life and development . . .	372	Stockton, Pvt. Roberts, captured in action . . .	557
South, Pvt. Richard Major, wounded in action . . .	553	Stone, George A., Major of the regiment . . .	13
Spearman, Cornelius F., Capt. of D, 6		Straw, Pvt. John, wounded in action, 563	
early service on Missouri border, 9		Sturgis, Brig.-Gen. Samuel D., commands expedition against Forrest . . .	227, 562
commands Cos. D and G on detached service . . .	35	commands second expedition against Forrest . . .	230, 562
Major, commands the regiment in action . . .	62, 553	character of . . .	231
		in action at Brice's Cross-Roads, 238 to 263, 562	
		report of Brice's Cross-Roads . . .	270
		procures exonerating statements from subordinates . . .	280
		relieved of command . . .	280

	PAGE		PAGE
Supernumerary second-lieutenants	11	Tenth Missouri Cavalry, in action	
Sutherland, Pvt. John, wounded in		at the Trading Post	330
action	563	in action at Marais des Cygnes	333
Swan, Simeon D., Major of the		in action at Charlot Prairie	339
regiment	13	in Wilson's Cavalry Corps, Selma	
Lieut.-Col., ordered to join Grant,	79	campaign	420
commands in action, Fourteen-		audacity in destroying Bibb Iron-	
mile Creek	81, 554	works	436
in action before Jackson	83, 554	daring attack upon enemy's line	437
commands the cavalry in action,		detachment against Clapp's fac-	
	99, 555	tory	490
resigns	113	charge upon bridge, Columbus	494
Swan, Pvt. Charles A., captured in		mustered out	538
action	563	Terry, Pvt. Stewart B., wounded	
Swan, Pvt. Charles G., decorated		and captured in action	562
for capture of flag	540	Texas cavalry, 21st regiment, en-	
Swan's spring used at Camp Har-		gagement with	50
lan	5	under Whitfield in Miss.	140
T		Third Iowa Cavalry, first serves	
Taber, Chief-Trumpeter Daniel J.,		with the Fourth	61
killed in action at Selma	457, 573	the Fourth Iowa brigaded with	115
Tactics, Scott's cavalry, first book		on the Grenada raid	127, 129, 135
supplied	15	in action at the Coldwater	136
replaced by Cooke's	15	on first campaign of Sturgis	
use of Scott's restored in part	427	against Forrest	227
Talbot's Ferry, Ark., second en-		on expedition to capture Chalmers	230
gagement of the regiment	38, 550	on second campaign, Sturgis	
Talladega, Ala., engagement near,		against Forrest	232
(see Blue Mountain)	516	in action at Ripley	234
Tallahatchie River, the regiment in		in action at Brice's Cross-Roads,	
action at	293		243, 272
Pemberton driven from, by dem-		in action at Ripley	258
onstration upon Grenada	70	on Smith's first campaign against	
engagement of cavalry at	293	Forrest	282
Tallahatta, engagement at	203, 561	sent against enemy at Kelly's	
Taylor, Capt., James D., 17th		Mills	284
Indiana Mounted Inf., killed		brilliant movement in action	286
in action by Forrest	441	in action with Fourth Iowa at	
Taylor, Lieut.-Gen. Richard, com-		Tupelo	287
mands Confederate forces,		aiding infantry in action at Ellis-	
Selma campaign	423, 448, 571	town	290
flight from Selma	458, 462	on Smith's second campaign	
report of fall of Selma	461	against Forrest	292
Teeman, Pvt. Frederick, wounded		on the campaign against Price	310
in action	566	fine fighting at Independence	320
Tenth Missouri Cavalry, brigaded		in action at Trading Post	330
with Fourth Iowa	159	in action at Marais des Cygnes	335
in action at Baker's Creek	190	captures rebel generals Marmad-	
in action at Jackson	194	uke and Cabell	338
in Sturgis' campaign against For-		in Wilson's Cavalry Corps, Selma	
rest	232	campaign	420
in action at Brice's Cross-Roads,		on expedition to Florence, Ala.	423
	240, 243, 246, 254, 275	spirited charge near Montevallo	437
in campaign against Price	310	in action at Ebenezer Church	443, 572
in action at Independence	320	at the battle of Selma	450
in action at Big Blue	326	first in the assault upon Columbus	493
		ordered to be mustered out	545
		mustered out	547

	PAGE
Thirteenth Army Corps, regiment assigned to	60, 73
Tibbetts, Sergt. Polk, wounded in action	566
Tishomingo Creek, the enemy met, battle of, see Brice's Cross-Roads,	236, 237
Tobesofkee Creek, Ga., engagement at	505
Toombs, Robert, at Columbus, Ga., the day of its capture	487
suffered to escape	530
Totten, Corp. Charles, wounded in action	569
Tracey, Pvt. Alfred A., captured in action and died	564
Trading-Post, Kan., fighting at,	328, 568
Troy, Samuel S., 1st Lieut. of H,	7
Tucker, John T., 2d Lieut. of D	7
wounded in action	56, 553
Tullis, Thomas C., Captain of G	7
on expedition to White River	36
dies at Helena, of disease	60
Tunnel Hill, Miss., engagement at	202, 561
Tupelo, occupied by Winslow's Brigade	286
fighting on picket-line	286, 565
battle of	288, 565
engagement on the Pontotoc road,	287, 565
second engagement on the Pontotoc road	287, 565
Tyler, Col. Charles A., commands brigade of unarmed and dismounted men in Price's army,	308, 351, 567
Tyler, Brig-Gen. Robert C., aids in the defense of Georgia,	479, 571
killed in action at Fort Tyler	481

U

Ullery, Benjamin, first death in the regiment	19
Union carbines issued	127, 183
Uptagraft (or Updegraff), Pvt. Jacob, captured on picket-post,	575
Upton, Emory, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., contends with Gen. Dana for Winslow's Brigade	359
cavalry camp named for, Louisville, Ky.	357
commands division in Wilson's Cavalry Corps	357, 419, 571
military career	422
division occupies Montevallo	435
in action at Ebenezer Church,	443, 572
to lead forlorn hope at Selma	451

	PAGE
Upton, Emory, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., directed to make the attack upon Columbus	477
in action at Columbus	496, 573
his high opinion of his division,	518
his speech to the Tenth Missouri,	538
promoted in the regular army	541
his final order to the troops	547

V

Van Clear (or Van Cleve), Pvt. James H., wounded in action,	574
Vandever's Brigade, the regiment joined to	47
the regiment withdrawn from	50
Van Doran, Pvt. George W., killed in action	556
Vanorsdol, Pvt. Francis M., wounded in action	566
Vanorsdol, Sergt. James O., wounded in action	556
Lieutenant, in action at Jackson,	194
Vaughn, Pvt. Isaac M., mortally wounded in action	555
Vernon, Miss., raid against intended	160
skirmishing near	161
Veteran reenlistment of the regiment	178
Veteran furlough	182, 217, 219, 221
Vicksburg, situation at opening of campaign	65
operations of Farragut and Williams against	66
Halleck retains control of operations	67
attempts to reach by canal	73
Grant's boats run the batteries	78
the regiment ordered into the campaign	79
invested	94
the first assault upon	95
the second assault upon	95
service of regiment during siege,	95, 97
surrender of	109
expedition to, from Memphis	358
Volunteers, education and development of	372
anecdotes of	388
Von Zinken, Col. Leon, commands Post of Columbus	487

W

Wagon-masters	12
Wagers, Pvt. Henry B., wounded and captured in action	556

	PAGE		PAGE
Waldron, Geo. W., Adjutant of the regiment	13	White River, Ark., first engagement of the regiment	36
Walker, Pvt. Francis R., wounded in action	555	engagement on, of Co. F	43
Walker, Pvt. James A., captured in action	570	White's Station, Tenn., engagement of Cos. A and B	363
Walker, Pvt. Meli, wounded in action	570	Whitfield, Brig.-Gen. John W., commands rebel cavalry, Jackson campaign	118
Wallace, Lieut.-Col. M. R. M., commands cavalry sent to Natchez	174	hangs John Buck	140
Ward-master	12	met in action, demonstration upon Canton	160
Waring, Col., George E., Jr., commands cavalry division	227	battle offered him	163, 559
commands First Brigade, Grierson's Division	232	Whiting, Frederick S., 1st Lieut. of M	8
in action at Brice's Cross-Roads, 238, 243, 244	238, 243, 244	Captain, commands detachment on expedition	475-477
movements in the retreat, 250, 253, 258, 264	250, 253, 258, 264	superintends construction of bridges	534
Warner, Pvt. John Adam, captured in action and died in prison	563	Wilkin, Col. Alexander, 9th Minnesota Inf., in action at Brice's Cross-Roads	247, 250
Washburn, Brig.-Gen. Cadwallader C., commands cavalry at Helena	60	commands brigade, campaign against Forrest	281
Maj-Gen., in command at Memphis	225	killed in action at Tupelo	282
his credulity	229	Wilkinson, Pvt. Thomas M., wounded and captured in action	564
escapes Forrest	297	Williams, Pvt. Oliver J. (or Josiah), wounded in action	573
Washburn, Pvt. Cyrus, in charge of Woodruff guns	62	Williams, Maj. Martin H., his statement of battle of Brice's Cross-Roads	272
captured with gun	105, 556	Williams, Pvt. John W., killed in action	552
Washburn, Pvt. Levi, captured in action	570	Williamson, Pvt. Levi B., wounded and captured in action	552, 556
Washburn, Pvt. Ralph T., captured in action	570	Wilson's Cavalry Corps, composition of	419
Washington, Mo., scene of a mutiny quelled by Fourth Iowa	318	Wilson, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. James H., commands the cavalry of the grand military division	416
Weber's Falls, Ind. Terr., end of march in Price campaign	343	Fourth Iowa assigned to his corps	357
Wellman, Com.-Sergt. Lorenzo D., wounded in action	552	his military career	421
Wells, Pvt. Frederick L., wounded in action	553	his care and zeal in organization and discipline	427
West Plains, Mo., occupied by Army of the Southwest	39	ordered against Tuscaloosa and Selma	416
Westport, battle of	322	authorized to conduct independent campaign	416
Wheeler, Maj-Gen. Joseph, commands escort to Davis in his flight	526	opens the campaign	429, 571
White, Lieut.-Col. Frank, his charge at Ebenezer Church	441	comments on the first conflicts of the campaign	436
receives the surrender at Macon, 512	512	plan of attack upon Selma	450
White, Pvt. David L., captured in action	570	in action at Selma	455, 573
White, Pvt. John L., sentenced to be shot	178	leads charge upon the works	456
White, Pvt. Samuel R., captured in action and died in prison, 172, 559	172, 559	his adversary's opinion of him	463
		confers with Forrest and decides to join Sherman	465

	PAGE		PAGE
Wilson, Bvt. Maj-Gen. James H.,		offers battle at Benton . . .	163
occupies Montgomery . . .	473	letter from Sherman on Grenada	
in action at Columbus . . .	492, 497	and Canton movements . . .	165
leaves Columbus for the Carolinas,	504	commands the cavalry, McPherson's	
receives news of cessation of hos-		demonstration upon Can-	
tilities	510	ton	167
ordered to resume hostilities . . .	517	in action at Brownsville . . .	167
his opinion of the cavalry . . .	518	captures Pearl River pontoon at	
his movements to capture Davis		Jackson	195
and others	522	interest in Veteran re-enlistment,	180
promoted in the regular army . . .	541	commands the cavalry, Meridian	
his final order to the corps . . .	543	campaign	189
Wilson, Pvt. John M., wounded in		attacks Lee on flank at Jackson,	191
action	553	in action, capture of Jackson . . .	195
Winona, Miss., occupied, Grenada		reconnoissance toward Canton . . .	200
raid	131	builds floating bridge over the	
occupied again, Grierson's raid,	360	Okatibbeha	205
Winslow, Edward F., Capt. of F,	7	captures Meridian	206
sent to relief of Salem, Mo. . .	34	march to Lauderdale Springs,	
commands F on special service . . .	42	search for Gen. Sooy Smith . . .	209
recaptures men and wagons taken		prepares to receive attack . . .	209
at Gist's plantation	43, 551	cavalry movements returning from	
in action on White River	43, 550	Meridian	210
commands detail on foraging		in command of regiment as escort	
expedition	61	to Sherman	217
commands cavalry in expedition		takes the regiment to Iowa on	
against Wittsburg	64, 553	Veteran furlough	219
Major, influence in getting the		procures remount for regiment . . .	222
regiment ordered to Vicksburg,	79	commands Second Brigade,	
reconnoissance, Fourteen-Mile		Grierson's Division	223
Creek	81	discipline in the brigade under . . .	228
distinguished in action, Fourteen-		commands expedition to capture	
Mile Creek	82	Chalmers at Hernando	230
wounded in action at Mechanics-		commands brigade, second Sturgis	
burg	99, 555	campaign against Forrest	232
promoted Colonel and takes com-		operations at Brice's Cross-Roads,	238-251
mand	113	covers Sturgis' retreat	249
Colonel, commands the regiment,		urges Sturgis to fight Forrest . . .	252
campaign against Johnston . . .	117	thanked by Sturgis for good con-	
attacks the enemy, Bear Creek		duct of brigade	269
near Canton	120	in action at Ripley, Sturgis' retreat	257
commands cavalry sent against		his conduct at Brice's Cross-	
Madisonville	121	Roads	270
commands independent brigade		in action at Ripley, Miss.	258, 563
of cavalry	123	commands brigade, third cam-	
his orders for march from Vicks-		campaign against Forrest	282
burg to Memphis	124	service of, campaign of Tupelo,	286
in command of two brigades at		in action at Cherry Creek	285, 565
Grenada, Miss.	124	in action, Harrisburg Road, . . .	287, 565
on Grenada raid	127-138, 558	in action at Tupelo	287, 565
in action at Coldwater River . . .	136	in action at Old Town Creek, . . .	290, 565
successful completion of Grenada		commands division, fourth cam-	
raid	137	campaign against Forrest	292, 566
Chief of Cavalry, Fifteenth Army		in action at the Tallahatchie	
Corps	158	River	293, 566
his orders for demonstration upon		in action on Hurricane Creek,	
Canton	158		293, 569
occupies Brownsville	160		

	PAGE		PAGE
Winslow, Colonel Edward F., dis-		in action at Brice's Cross-Roads,	
abled by wound	294		242-249
commands division, Price cam-		in action, Sturgis' retreat,	
paign	310		249, 256, 257, 260-265
novel bridge-building, Price cam-		in action at Ripley	258, 263
paign	313	in action at Cherry Creek	285, 565
commands brigade, Pleasonton's		in action near Pontotoc	286
provisional division	317, 567	in action at Tupelo	287, 565
in action at Independence,	320, 567	in action at Harrisburg	285, 565
placed in charge of the field,		in action at Old Town Creek,	290, 565
battle of the Big Blue River,		in action at Tallahatchie River,	
	321, 568		293, 566
wounded in action at the Big Blue,		in action at Hurricane Creek,	
	324, 568		293, 566
commands brigade, Grierson's		in action at Independence	320, 567
raid to Vicksburg	359	in action at the Big Blue	321, 568
his activity in preparation for		in action at Big Blue Prairie,	326, 568
last campaign	369	in action at the Trading Post,	
promoted, Bvt. Brig.-Gen.	407		328, 568
Bvt. Brig.-Gen., commands First		in action at Marais des Cygnes,	
Brigade, Upton's Division,			333, 569
Wilson's Corps,	420, 571	in action at Charlot Prairie,	339, 569
bridges the Cahawba and takes		ordered to Nashville to join Gen.	
Montevallo, Ala.	432	Thomas	344
directs charge at Selma	456	in action near Six Mile Creek,	437
in command of post at Selma	466	in action at Ebenezer Church,	443, 572
destroys property and supplies		in action at Selma	450
at Selma	466	sent north from Selma to reach	
in action at Columbus	496	Croton	466
in command of post at Columbus,	501	assigned to the assault upon Col-	
destroys property and supplies at		umbus	490
Columbus	501	in action, assault upon Columbus,	
congratulatory order on Selma			493, 573
campaign	519	in occupation of Macon, Ga.	513
congratulatory order, close of		Winslow, Henry E., 1st Lieut.	
campaign	519	of C	6
commands the division in pursuit		Wirz, Henry, conviction of	156
of Davis	523	Witherspoon's plantation, near	
service in reconstruction of rail-		Helena, regiment encamped on,	46
road to Nashville	533	Wittsburg, Ark., the regiment in	
his order to the brigade upon		action at	64, 553
mustering out	546	Wixon's plantation, near Vicksburg,	
farewell order to the regiment	546	camp removed to	99
Winslow's Brigade, composition and		Woman's Loyal League of Iowa	
campaigns of, 127, 160, 186, 227,		presents flag to the "Veterans,"	181
232, 282, 292, 310, 360, 420		Wood, Lieut.-Col. Robert C., Jr.,	
in action, Coldwater River,	136, 558	commands enemy at Bear	
in action at Moore's Ford	163, 559	Creek	102, 556
in action at Brownsville	167, 559	Wood, Pvt. Robert C., captured at	
in action at the Bogue Chito,	168, 559	Columbus	491
in action at Livingston,	169, 559	decorated for gallantry in action,	541
in action, Raymond Road	190, 560	Woodruff, Elias B., Lieut. of F,	
in action at Baker's Creek	191, 560	commands company, Meridian	
in action at Jackson	193, 561	campaign	196
in action at Morton	202, 561	Woodruff guns received by the	
in action at Tunnel Hill	202, 561	regiment	62
in action at Tallahatta	204, 561	Woods, Col. Charles R., his brigade	
in action at Meridian	206, 561	in action	120, 557

	PAGE		PAGE
Woods, Wm. W., 2d Lieut. of E .	8	bridges destroyed on Grenada	
Captain, commands part of regi-		raid	133
ment cut off in action	260	Yancey, Pvt. John W., killed in	
Major, second in command,		action	556
Grierson's raid to Vicksburg,	360	Yazoo City occupied by the cavalry,	
in action near Montevallo, 435,	572	Grenada raid	128
commands battalion, assault upon		Yeoman, Lieut. Joseph A. O., bril-	
Selma	449, 450, 454	liant attempt to capture Davis,	
recommended for promotion .	541		526, 527
Worth, Pvt. Jehoida, wounded and		Yorke, Lieut. - Col. P. Jones,	
captured in action	49, 551, 552	commands "Quinine Cam-	
wounded in action	574	paign"	365
Wright's Battalion, Missouri Cav-		Young, Pvt. Jeremiah, killed in	
alry, service with	32, 97	action	563
Wright, Corp. Jacob, captured on			
picket-post, and exchanged .	575		
		Z	
Y		Zollars, Thomas J., 1st Lieut.	
Yallobusha, line of, defended by		of F	7
Pemberton	70		

